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II

THE DIARY OF
SIR JOHN MOORE
VOL. II

THE DIARY OF SIR JOHN MOORE

EDITED BY

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR J. F. MAURICE, K.C.B.

WITH PORTRAIT AND MAPS

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. II

LONDON
EDWARD ARNOLD

Publisher to H.M. India Office

1904

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CONTENTS OF VOLUME II

CHAPTER XVII

THE INVASION OF EGYPT UP TO THE DEATH OF SIR RALPH ABERCROMBY, 1801

	PAGES
Bad weather delays landing—Moore with Lintendahl reconnoitres shore—Naval reports on weather had dealt only with it from naval point of view not applicable to landing—Ships safe; anchorage good; landing impossible; rain heavy—On 7th March wind abates—At 2 A.M. troops embark by brigades in flat-bottomed boats and launches—Two small vessels anchored in-shore to mark points for direction of landing—On these boats rendezvous by companies, regiments, brigades—Supporting troops follow in ships drawing less water than big troopships—Moore with Cochrane—Moore's reserve directed on high sand-hill—Hope is sent by Sir Ralph to ask if proposed point is not too steep for attack—Moore answers steepness not too great for ascent, therefore (because giving ground protected from enemy's fire) favourable—Gunboats engage enemy—Fifteen guns open on boats as they row in—Some boats sunk—Severe fire of both grape-shot and musketry—Grenadiers, Light Infantry of 40th, 23rd, and 28th in line under Moore move on the sand-hill without firing—They charge the French and capture four guns—Oakes with left of reserve (43rd and 58th) repulse cavalry and infantry attack—Enemy retreats—Want of cavalry prevents pursuit—Moore with Anstruther reconnoitres—Reserve brought to selected point—Corsicans are trapped by French—12th March: Army moves forward, "reserve" leading—French fall back—On the 13th, at 6 A.M., Army advances against French posted immediately in front—French counter-attack is driven back and retires behind their guns—Moore halts front line, but Army coming up, continues advance—In result, Army is obliged to fall back to the point chosen by Moore at first—Army takes up this position about four to five miles from Alexandria—Field-works are erected—Guns and stores landed—On the 18th a rash cavalry reconnaissance comes to grief—The Army very inferior in numbers to the entrenched French—Sir Ralph thinks nobody would envy him his position—21st March: Menou, having brought his whole army from Cairo to join French before Alexandria, attacks, and is badly beaten—Sir Ralph Abercromby is mortally wounded—Moore and Oakes both wounded—The "Army of Italy" say they had "never been fought before"—Defects in artillery—Sir Ralph's death, Moore's eulogium—Moore laid up for three months by wound	1-20

CHAPTER XVIII

THE MARCH ON CAIRO AND CAPITULATION OF THE
FRENCH ARMY

PAGES

Hutchinson succeeds Sir Ralph in command of the Army—He arms works against Alexandria, and sends Spencer against Rosetta and the forts commanding the entrance of the Nile, which are all taken —Hutchinson leaves Coote with 6500 men before Alexandria, and having strengthened Spencer's force at Rosetta, decides to move with these against French at Rhamanie—He is expecting Baird's Indian contingent at Suez—The Grand Vizier is with Turkish troops at Salahih, and has detached cavalry to gates of Cairo— Aboukir and Mariout canal cut—Hutchinson, on driving the French from Rhamanie, finds that they retreat on Cairo, not, as he expected, on Alexandria—Hutchinson at first decides unwillingly against following them, the Army not being equipped for such a march—French corps moving out of Cairo to attack Turks, oblige Hutchinson to move on Belbeis to support Vizier and effect junction with Baird—Burlos taken; garrison captured—French, attacked by Vizier's army, retreat on Cairo—Fifteen hundred French cap- tured in successive small detachments—News that monsoon detains Baird—Vizier insists on moving on Cairo—Hutchinson therefore conforms—Moore approves—Twelve hundred Mamelukes join— Baird crosses desert from Kosseir to Keneh—French fleet attempt- ing to reinforce Cairo are captured, except one corvette, which gets in—Bunbury's account of the cabal against Hutchinson stopped by Moore—Moore joins the Army before Cairo—Cairo had just been surrendered—The garrison to evacuate Egypt— Hutchinson's despatch on Sir Ralph's death—Moore conducts French army to the coast—The march: 1. As described by him; 2. As described by Bunbury—Moore's severe comments on Belliard —Belliard's action explained by the nostalgia of French army— Letters collected by Count Yorck von Wartenburgh illustrating this	21-39
---	-------

CHAPTER XIX

THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF ALEXANDRIA

Moore moves up with reserve to east of Alexandria, while Coote, with Guards, Ludlow's, Craven's, and Finch's brigades, move by water to west side of the town—Forces on east make two lodgments, and demonstrate to attract enemy's attention—Inefficiency of Engineers—Ignorance of war causes picquets to fail when attacked by enemy—Moore notices it in orders—It is found that the French have neglected the west front, the east being that against which the British advance had been made—On Coote arriving, French

turn attention to west—Coote reinforced—The Army by brigades—Fort Marabon surrenders to Coote—This enables our ships to enter the harbour—Coote, with their support, advances—Moore makes false attack—The west attack pressed, because it gives immediate approach to body of place—Menou begins to negotiate—Asks three days—Tries to gain more time, but on 2nd September he surrenders—Cradock embarks under orders from England—Orders from home—Fox commands in Mediterranean—Exaggerated estimate of numbers of Army at home—Moore appointed to Alexandria, arranges to go home—Cradock an old schoolfellow of Hobart—Moore discusses French scheme with a French engineer, and sees their fortifications—Also discusses the proper defence of Alexandria for us—Moore suggests an occupation of Egypt by us very much such as exists in 1903—Moore's voyage home—False news that peace with France has been actually signed—Finds general rejoicing—Moore discusses the Egyptian campaign in a paper provoked by General Regnier's criticisms—"The soldier and his sword" the only provision which Ministers at home had thought necessary before ordering the conquest of Egypt—Sir Ralph therefore obliged to wait at Marmaras to equip his Army—He has 14,000 men—The French, a year and a half before, had 40,000—The expedition, therefore, "rash and ill-judged" in Abercromby's belief—Abercromby with his Army resolve to do their utmost to turn it into success—The Army, by the mistakes of Ministers, had been disgraced undeservedly before Ferrol and Cadiz—Without cavalry or artillery themselves they now fronted the "Army of Italy" in superior numbers under a General whose capacity was unknown to them—The confidence of the Army in Sir Ralph and his in them carries them through—From 2nd January to 18th February occupied in collecting necessaries at Marmaras—The time spent in training the troops for the coming embarkation and disembarkation, and in manœuvres suitable to the expedition—The mistake about horses [of which Wellington had subsequently to complain]—The failures of British expeditions due to the fact that they were planned by "Ministers ignorant of military affairs, and too arrogant and self-sufficient to consult military men"—French expeditions always planned by soldiers, often by the men who commanded them—The sword of honour presented to Moore, and the accompanying letters	40-60
---	-------

CHAPTER XX

FRONTING NAPOLEON. THE NEW DISCIPLINE

Death of Moore's father—The Peace of Amiens—Moore in June 1802 succeeds to the command of the Kent district—Correspondence with Horse Guards—(Sir Hudson) Lowe's Corsican Corps as Light Infantry—Moore moves to Chatham—Moore uses peace reductions

to improve quality of officers and men—Moore's purge—Stages of the previous development of Light Infantry—Moore takes it in hand—His regiment, the 52nd, is ordered to be made Light Infantry—Selects Lieutenant-Colonel M'Kenzie as commanding officer—Selections of officers and men—War begins again—Moore's brigade appointed to hold coast fronting Napoleon's preparations at Boulogne—His double duty to prepare the coast-line and county for defence, and to train his brigade as Light Infantry for immediate duty—Scheme proposed for "driving the country"—Moore's objections to such a proposal for England—Letter to David Dundas explaining proposals for defence ultimately adopted—Faulty construction of defences not admitting of immediate rectification—Dungeness to be post of observation, protection of ships, and to oppose disembarkation, but not for defence—Inundation the defence at Dungeness—Discusses "driving"—No time for it—England too rich—Enemy will be able to live as long as he is here—Therefore he must be driven out at once—Horses and waggons only removed—Every man of coast counties enrolled and organisation adopted—Local defence by inhabitants—Signals established and known—Depôts—Englishmen unadapted to a system of retreat—No foot of ground should be ceded—Moore's own troops can drive into the sea any landing force if Kent be organised behind him—Finds county gentlemen agree with him—"Driving" is officially given up and Volunteer Act introduced, but from mere <i>vis inertiae</i> the old orders continue to be issued—No one is informed of new scheme, no organisation is provided—Confusion between two different systems—Fierce wrath against Napoleon for his preparations for invasion—Volunteers enrolled—Moore attends many county meetings to arouse enthusiasm—The brigade under Moore—Hard work involved—The proposed sending of a riding horse for an officer under him and Moore's reply—Slow progress except in 52nd because of incompetent commanding officers—Moore urges displacement of some, and selected officers being put in their place—Three letters of Moore's in behalf of good officers—Moore proposes improvement in artillery organisation—The point of Moore's reform of Light Infantry training lies in the new principles of discipline creating an organism to replace a machine—Gawler's work on Light Infantry the best summary of Moore's methods—Colonel Clark's account of the discipline [see, however, also chapter xxiii, p. 155, for Moore's own description of the discipline of the 52nd]—The man who created the discipline—Successive studies by Sir W. Napier, by Hopkins, by Colborne, by Sir Charles Napier—Moore's sarcasm—Moore's confidence in victory over the French—Wellington's discipline and Moore's—Exceptional promotion granted to 52nd—Moore's K.B.—Moore begins his long period of refusing the great object of his ambition and long training, independent command—He refuses because patriotism and duty bind him instead to point out the absurdity of the proposals made	61-96
--	-------

CHAPTER XXI

MOORE REPORTS ON FERROL AND ON BOULOGNE

	PAGES
Moore offered by Cabinet command of a proposed expedition to attack Ferrol—He exposes the utter inadequacy of the information on which the scheme is based—It is agreed that he shall go incognito to the fleet under Cochrane, then off Ferrol, and sails thither in his brother Graham's ship the <i>Indefatigable</i> —Cochrane and he land to inspect Ferrol, and being seen have to run for it, and narrowly escape capture—A sudden squall obliges the first lieutenant to cut the cable of the <i>Indefatigable</i> whilst Graham Moore is away from the ship—For five days they are unable to return, but on 23rd December they recover Graham Moore and sail for England—Moore's report stops the expedition—Moore is employed to report on a plan of Sir Sidney Smith's for an attack on Boulogne after the Grand Army has marched for Ulm and Austerlitz—His report convinces Pitt of the absurdity of the proposal—Moore's relations with Pitt and Fox—His friendship with Lady Hester Stanhope and attachment to Miss Fox—Reasons for not proposing to her .	97-114

CHAPTER XXII

MOORE IN SICILY AS ADVISER TO GENERAL FOX UP TO THE DESPATCH HOME OF MR. A'COURT

Change of Ministry after Pitt's death—Fox sends his brother, General Fox, to the Mediterranean as Minister Plenipotentiary and Commander-in-chief, and selects Moore, as the man recognised as the ablest soldier of the time, to go with him as adviser—Record of Sir James Craig's previous expedition and its fiasco—Moore on the voyage out meets Admiral Collingwood—Finds Gibraltar much neglected—Moore's description of Maida—First experiences of Sir Sidney Smith—Moore is despatched to interview him in order to stop the mischief he is doing—Rumours of war and peace: France, Russia, Austria—Moore's advice to General Fox as to the general policy to be pursued—Reinforcements announced—Sir Sidney Smith's schemes—Circello, under dictation of Queen and Sir Sidney, proposes a wild scheme for the expulsion of the French from Naples, and asks Fox's co-operation—Moore urges Fox to await the development of events and orders from home—[At this time an attempt at a renewed coalition of Prussia, Austria, and Russia was being made by England. It was the period between Austerlitz and Jena.]—If peace were made with the German Emperor by France, English action in Italy would be absurd; if the coalition were made and Austrian troops advanced into Italy, the moment for action would come—Fox should advise Sicilian Government not to act at a wrong moment, but in any case not allow himself to be drawn into a false move—Proposes stiff letter to Sir Sidney exposing his

intrigues—News of the death of Fox (the statesman)—No instructions from Ministers—Lord Lauderdale still negotiating in Paris—Reinforcements known to be *en route*, presumably for some important offensive action—Vague news of Jena and the fall of Prussia—Moore in a private letter to Brownrigg discloses the whole situation—General Fox sees the truth clearly, but will not act decisively—Sir Sidney's intrigues and power—Our entering into the plans of the Sicilian Court gives us no military force, but on the contrary is a weakness, because the whole people are against the Court—The people will probably side with the French in case of invasion—If the island were English or under English direction we should have a friend in Sicily—We cannot hold it with all the people against us because against their vile Government—Drummond succeeds Fox as Plenipotentiary—Fox wishes to resign his military command also from ill-health, but will not decide—Drummond reports Sicilian proposals—Moore sent to him to explain—Drummond agrees—Characters of King and Queen—Acton and Circello—Prince of Hesse, the Commander-in-chief, believes the French *émigré* officers under him to be traitors—The Queen's "lover," M. de St. Clair, is the arch-traitor—Picture of the Court—Moore urges Drummond to take a firm line—Drummond's instructions are to keep well with the Court—Drummond writes strongly as to Sir Sidney Smith, and sends Mr. A'Court home to explain the whole situation . . . 115-146

CHAPTER XXIII

SICILY UP TO THE DEPARTURE OF GENERAL FOX

Admiral Duckworth's expedition to Constantinople—A corps of 5000 men to be detached from Sicily in the event of war with Turkey to seize Alexandria—Drummond sends to warn Duckworth that whatever he tells Sir Sidney will go to the Queen, and through St. Clair be betrayed to the enemy—Queen intrigues for a Russian corps to be sent to Sicily, then opens secret negotiations with Napoleon, actually betraying us—Sir Sidney goes with Duckworth—Moore persuades Duckworth that it will be better not to send the troops at once to Alexandria, but to wait till Duckworth sends news of war from Constantinople—Moore's objections in advance to the Alexandria expedition—We ought not to shut up our forces in distant garrisons—Advantage of naval superiority is to act offensively—Seven thousand or more men should have been sent to assist the fleet at Constantinople—Fears lest fleet may fail for want of them—Difference between effect of short, sharp offensive action of this kind and a garrison such as proposed for Alexandria—Letters of Duckworth and Blackwood in Castlereagh Correspondence of March 1807 after the failure of the expedition, showing correctness of Moore's anticipation in early February before

Duckworth left Malta—Moore, dissatisfied with having no power to get the decisive action taken which he judges necessary, and wishing to have the whole responsibility or none, asks to be recalled, in hopes of a chief command elsewhere—Moore to Brownrigg and Gordon points out the mistakes and dangers of the present expedition, and shows what should have been done—Drummond visits Fox—He has been completely trapped by the Queen now—She has nominally retired from control, but rules all through the Ministers, who dare not act without her—Drummond, who had stopped the subsidy, now pays it, and believes himself supreme—Moore puts this plainly to Drummond—News arrives from Duckworth of war—Troops under General Fraser are at once sent to Alexandria—St. Clair, the Queen's lover, is appointed "Assistant" to the hereditary Prince, who becomes Inspector-General—Moore inspects Paget and 52nd at Milazzo—He describes the system of discipline—He goes with Fox to Francavilla, and then on a tour through the island—Description of country—Drummond now presses for a conjoint expedition with the Sicilians—Fox refers proposal to Moore—Moore urges that if absurd before, it is worse now because of the Alexandria detachment—Two letters from Circello are subsequently sent by Drummond pressing Fox again—He, fearing censure for acting against his judgment, refers the question to Moore—Moore stands firm—Moore writes to Brownrigg, 15th April 1807, describing the situation fully and exposing Drummond's conduct—Duckworth's failure—Fraser at Alexandria—Letter to Mr. Leckie—Moore repudiates views as to any constitutional changes in Sicily—The necessity, from the point of view of our getting effective support, of wise and just administration is what he feels—We must also have men we can trust, not French traitors who get power by pandering to the Queen—Diary continues: News of Portland Administration having succeeded Grenville's—Leckie convinces Drummond of Queen's influence, but does not affect his action, which now becomes as irregular as it had been weak—Sicilians feebly invade Italy—Fiasco at Alexandria—Moore's comments—Fox reports home—Reinforcements sent to Fraser—Utter failure of Sicilian attempt on Italy—Panic succeeds rashness—The Commander-in-chief drunk—Moore writes to Brownrigg, 3rd July 1807, mentioning a despatch from Castlereagh—War with Turks to be stopped—Castlereagh reckons on 20,000 available troops—He desires Fox to improve Sicilian army—None of those things exist or are possible, as Fox's letters and mine have shown—Drummond and Queen are fatal obstacles to invasion of Italy—Everything betrayed to enemy—We have 8000 men only—Conditions under which we could have acted—Further orders from Castlereagh, received 4th July, direct evacuation of Alexandria—Moore contrasts Castlereagh's activity in correspondence with silence of Grenville Administration; attributes latter fact to disunion after Fox's death—General Fox is recalled, Moore appointed to command—Sir A. Paget, on

way to negotiate peace with Turks, tells Moore how the Queen and Drummond speak of Fox and him—Moore arranges to go to Palermo—Moore writes fully and confidentially to Castlereagh on the whole case	PAGES 147-183
---	------------------

CHAPTER XXIV

MOORE IN COMMAND IN SICILY

Moore dines with Drummond at Palermo, and with him visits Circello and the Queen—The chief of the Sicilian staff is directed to give him information—Fox having, on receipt of Castlereagh's despatch, asked for the command of the Sicilian army in order to secure its efficiency, Moore replies to Circello that the fact of information being supplied to him gives him no command—The reply is that if he will act against Naples the command will be given him—Sir John Acton arranges for Moore a private audience of the Queen—He has a most friendly talk with her—Drummond is much offended by the private audience—They have a fierce quarrel—Moore, knowing the dominance of the French and anti-English faction, believes that the chief object of the proposed attack on Italy is to get rid of the English army, and perhaps to have it destroyed—Moore gets some information of the Sicilian Army—Moore speaks out plainly to the King and Queen, who are both friendly and declare their impressions changed—General Bourcard is appointed Commander-in-chief—Moore gives advice for Army reform—Moore is seized with fever—News comes of Tilsit—Moore has a remarkable conversation with the Queen, and is somewhat fascinated by her in her extreme distress, when she is so thoroughly cowed by misfortune as to be for once genuine—Peculiar conditions of the contest with France illustrated by the Russians handing over Ionian islands to French before our commanders have any instructions for the new situation—Rapid communication throughout French Empire—Our slow methods—On 3rd October Moore receives orders to embark with a force of 7000 men as soon as the garrison from Alexandria arrives—He is to go to Gibraltar for orders—Ambiguous Russian fleet appears, and Moore orders that they shall not be admitted to Sicilian harbours—At Gibraltar Moore finds that an order had been sent to him to remain in Sicily with the whole force, but that in case he had actually sailed he was to proceed to England—At the same time he hears that if he has not left the Straits he may be available for several of the purposes for which he was sent to Gibraltar: 1. Portugal; 2. Madeira; 3. Royal Family of Portugal—He is to communicate with Sir Sidney Smith and Lord Strangford—Goes in a frigate off Lisbon to see Sir Sidney—Various rumours and reports, mostly false, reach him—At last he hears of flight of Royal Family,—Sir Sidney Smith has gone with them—Lord

Strangford also gone—Returns to Gibraltar in order to get news from Sir Sidney or Lord Strangford—Hearing nothing he returns to England—He finds Drummond has influenced “some members of the Cabinet” against him—Castlereagh has “rather defended” him, the Duke of York been his steady friend—Castlereagh is civil and sympathetic—[During period at home Moore presided over court-martial on General Whitelock] 184-202

CHAPTER XXV

IN COMMAND OF THE SWEDISH EXPEDITION

On 17th April 1808 Moore is sent for to command 10,000 men to aid the King of Sweden—He will be “received with every attention” at Gothenburgh—He is not to put himself under the King’s command, or go from the coast so as to make re-embarkation, return, or recall difficult—He is to work with Admiral Saumarez—On 17th May he, at Gothenburgh, receives from Colonel Murray, who had been sent on, a report of Swedish weakness and proposed plans: (1) The attack on Zealand; (2) On Norway—Murray looks on first as impossible—Moore shows that whole Swedish army is broken into fractions, each opposed to very superior numbers—Sweden is in no condition for schemes of conquest—It must look to safety—Swedenburgh, the only fort in Finland, had capitulated to Russians—A letter from the Swedish King objects at once to the conditions imposed by Government for the employment of the force—The King declines the aid unless these are changed—Moore replies that he would be happy to serve under his Majesty, but is bound by his instructions—Moore sends home the King’s letter by Murray—He tells Castlereagh that had the King’s schemes been less wild he might have tried to arrange for immediate service, leaving final decision for Government, but as it was he thought best to adhere strictly to his instructions—Murray has already seen that the King is at times either deranged or of weak intellect—He is not merely a despot, but will allow no one else to do anything but register his orders—No one dares tell him the truth—We can do him no service—His people in despair or indifferent—Nobles ready to submit to any Power and hating the war, wish him forced to compromise—“We left the Baltic when we could have done everything, and return to it when we can do nothing”—Letters from Gordon and Brownrigg, and two despatches from Castlereagh—Neither attack on Zealand or Norway are to be made, but this is only communicated in such a way as to leave most of the responsibility of dealing with the King to Moore—He may, if the King insists, land at Christiansand by way of co-operation, “or in such other manner as his Majesty shall direct”—Further, Moore is told that “it was with much surprise and dissatisfaction that the King (George III.) had heard that there had been any hesitation on the part of the Swedish Govern-

ment to permit the troops to land"—Mr. Thornton is told that unless this is done Moore is ordered to return with the troops—He is to communicate this officially—Moore with Colonel Murray reaches Stockholm, 14th June—Sees Thornton, who has only received a copy of Moore's instructions—On 16th June Moore has a private audience—King criticises Moore's instructions—Next day the King sends his Quartermaster-General, Tibell, with a proposal for invasion of Finland—Tibell agrees to Moore's objections, but Moore must explain to King—Moore's second interview—King repudiates his own Ambassador—King now proposed attack on Norway, and sends Tibell with a scheme so futile that Tibell himself laughs at it, and they agree "to talk of something else"—Moore through Thornton informs King of his orders to return home—On 23rd June Moore's third audience follows—King treats Moore as personally responsible for his instructions—Moore, much pressed by the King, says that he will not return to England till he has heard in answer to despatches *now to be sent*—Immediately afterwards he sees that he has exceeded his instructions, which, under the conditions, require his immediate return—Thornton agrees to tell the King that Moore, in his wish to conform to the King's views, had given a promise *ultra vires* and could not carry it out—He must be guided by such instructions as he may receive as to time—The King's Adjutant-General brings Moore when in bed an order not to leave Stockholm without permission from the King—King sends for Murray—From the King's language it is clear that he has placed Moore under arrest—Thornton plainly tells the King that if Moore is not instantly released the consequence must be war—Murray is invited to dine with the King—Murray points out through Thornton the impossibility—King orders Murray to attend at Haye and threatens him—Murray goes—The King being more reasonable, Moore defers his proposed departure—When Murray returns next day the King is mad as ever—King demands an apology before releasing Moore—Moore and Thornton agree that it is Moore's duty to return to the post his sovereign had assigned him, evading the abuse of force by Sweden—By a ruse he rejoins the Army, and on 3rd July sails for England 203-231

CHAPTER XXVI

MOORE'S QUARREL WITH MINISTERS

The Government have made up their minds not to have Moore in command, and on the day of his arrival, before he lands, they appoint Sir Hew Dalrymple to command the whole force to be sent to Spain, and Sir Harry Burrard, as second in command, to take over the command of Moore's Swedish force—Motives leading to this decision cannot be judged by our present knowledge of the men's after career, but only by the situation in July 1808—Their reasons

for objecting to Moore, and their preference for Sir A. Wellesley, were not due to a prophetic vision of the coming Peninsular War—They had much stronger personal motives—Details of these—Moore's Diary continues: Whilst at sea the ships are ordered to the Downs—On 15th July Moore reports arrival—Senior naval officer is told to send Moore to town—Moore reaching town on Sunday 17th June, sees Gordon and hears the whole story—Monday, 18th, Moore sees Castlereagh, who speaks only of Sweden—The Cabinet has approved his conduct there—Moore then sees Duke of York, who is embarrassed on ascertaining that Castlereagh had said nothing to Moore about the Spanish arrangements—When Moore is in bed he receives a note from Charles Stewart, the Under-Secretary, saying that Lord Castlereagh wished to see him at 3 P.M. next day, and that he should arrange to leave town at once after the interview—Lord Castlereagh, manifestly ashamed of the intrigue, will not face the facts, but drops them out casually—Moore expresses his sense of the treatment he has received—He is said to have opened the door again and predicted the failure of the campaign then to be carried on under Sir Hew Dalrymple—Extraordinary error into which Mr. Stapleton has been led on this subject, and into which he has led those who have trusted him without examining dates and facts, notably Sir Bartle Frere and Sir Herbert Maxwell—Castlereagh writes Moore a letter, here given with Moore's reply—Moore having resigned command to Sir Harry Burrard, they sail together in the *Audacious* and become great friends—About 16th August Sir Harry removes into a frigate and goes to Mondego—Moore is ordered by Sir Harry to land at Mondego—He hears of Roliça—He is ordered to come round to Sir Harry—At Ericiera he hears of Vimeiro, and at once writes to congratulate Sir Arthur—The letter of latter in reply—Wellesley points out that *in less than a fortnight no fleet will be able to remain on the coast*, and that supplies for large numbers will become most difficult—Moore joins Army and finds confusion—No one but Sir Arthur does anything—Sir Arthur "extremely right" in his views—Moore tells both Sir Hew and Sir Arthur that he looks upon this as the latter's campaign and, waiving any claims of his own, wishes "whatever is brilliant" in the finishing to be done by him—Moore looks upon all campaigning under Sir Hew as so hopeless that any termination to the affair is better than fighting under him—The Convention—Moore notices the strength of the Torres Vedras country and thinks French should have held it [Napoleon's own comment at a later date]—Sir Hew's utter helplessness and the general confusion—Sir Hew shows Moore a despatch of Castlereagh's, "plausible verbose nonsense"—Sir Arthur writes to Moore proposing an interview—They meet—Moore's account of the conversation—Both agree as to Sir Hew's incompetence—Moore declines intrigue against him—Sir Arthur urges Moore to let him make his peace with Ministers—Moore has no feeling against them, but will not apologise for having told

	PAGES
them they had wronged him—News of the outburst of wrath in England at the "Convention of Cintra" arrives—Moore having become more closely acquainted with facts, rather modifies his former opinions and is inclined to defend Sir Harry Burrard now that he is down—Sir Arthur's despatches have misled people at home	232-271

CHAPTER XXVII

MOORE'S DIARY THROUGHOUT HIS SPANISH CAMPAIGN
UP TO SAHAGUN

The despatches appointing Moore to command an expedition into Spain arrive on 6th October, and next day Moore takes over the command, Burrard remaining in command in Portugal—Moore preferring to equip Army in Portugal and around Salamanca, and dreading a sea voyage when "no fleet could remain on the coast," decides to move by land to meet Sir David Baird's corps sent by the Government to Corunna—Private correspondence with Castlereagh—Moore's effort is to get out "before the rains"—Moore's notes on the route—At Castello Branco he hears from Hope, who expects to be at Valladolid on 30th November—Alpedrinhao, 5th November, Moore hears that Castanos is making movements that may bring on a premature action—From Madrid reports now received he fears Spanish defeat—Becoming, therefore, anxious for his junction with Hope, he writes to him that from what he has seen of the road said to be impassable for guns he thinks Hope may find a shorter road passable—"I have not necessity to picad" for your move—Junta refers him to Castanos for concerting movements—He sees the brigade (modern "battery") of artillery at Cogilha—The rains begin—Anstruther's mistake—Salamanca, 13th November, bad news of Junta; of French reinforcements: the 6th Regiment—French have entered Burgos—15th November, the French have entered Valladolid—The force from Portugal cannot all reach Salamanca sooner than 25th November—*If French advance*, retreat inevitable—Moore holds troops ready to march with three days' provisions, but continues concentration—Gives Baird and Hope free hands—No sign of Spanish resistance: peasants enthusiastic; Government imbecile—News of Blake's defeat—Despatches from Castlereagh show how little is known in England—Spanish on eve of serious defeats—25th November, writes Castlereagh facts—"A fine people"—It will only be from want of leaders if they fail—Baird has been led by false information, and want of cavalry to correct it, to begin retreat—Moore orders him back—Castanos on eve of defeat—Junta flying from Madrid—Moore sees all, but is determined to unite Army and try fate—30th November, Castanos routed—Moore orders Baird to come round to unite with him in Portugal, and Hope from Villa Castin to force his march by Pene-

	PAGES
anda and Alba de Tormes to Ciudad-Rodrigo—Moore will then fall back and with united Army move to Cadiz by sea—On 5th December the news of Madrid enthusiasm gives hope of Spanish resistance—He orders Baird to the front again—Hope is at Alba on the 4th—Moore sends Graham for information to Madrid—11th December, hears from Graham of fall of Madrid—The troops are moving on Valladolid without waiting for Baird—Threatens French communications in order to give chance to Spaniards, but fears they will leave him in the lurch, in which case his retreat must be on Astorga and Galicia—On the 13th at Alacjos sees Berthier's letter: moves on Toro instead of Valladolid—Stuart's mission from Frere (the only mention of Frere's name in the Journal, except the note of one letter being sent him)—Halts at Sahagun because provisions have not been able to get through the snow—Sahagun, 26th December, troops being on parade for march on Carrion, hears French are marching from Madrid: that march on Badajoz has been stopped: Carrion reinforced—Retirement ordered . . .	272-287

CHAPTER XXVIII

MOORE'S LAST CAMPAIGN: ITS WORLD-WIDE EFFECT

Deficiency of data available for most historians—Moore's stroke at Sahagun and triumphant escape the boldest, the most successful, the most brilliant stroke of war of all time—The force against him—Napoleon in his zenith, his army in its perfection—No resistance in Spain—Everything concentrated on one purpose—Napoleon's utter failure and his own consciousness of it—Sir Bartle Frere's happy application of a Napoleonic phrase—Napoleon's own evidence—Lanfrey shows that Napoleon has disguised the true facts—He himself brought on the Austrian war because of his failure against Moore—The famous scene on the road to Astorga a theatrical performance for a specific purpose—Not only to have drawn off Napoleon, but, having done so, to have escaped triumphantly from the net, was the essence of Moore's achievement—Capture of Lefebvre under Napoleon's eyes—If Napoleon had made an example of the British Army all the rest would have been nothing—"Phantoms hatched in the imaginations" of historians unconsciously biased by the personal prejudices of the past due to Moore's firm adherence to candour and truth—Influence of Moore's campaign on Wellington's success—Wellington's one criticism of Moore ignored by those who have assailed him—Pains taken by them to emphasise the fact that Moore did consider the advance on Sahagun "a movement of retreat"—Southey *v.* Wellington as war critic—Relative insignificance of the point whether Carrion or Corunna had ever been fought 288-304

CHAPTER XXIX

THE MARCH INTO SPAIN

PAGES

Moore's one purpose in moving as quickly as possible out of Portugal was to try to avoid being caught by the rains in the mountains—Sir Arthur's own action as evidence of his view of this—The old story of inefficient commanding officers to be got rid of—Moore's instructions and the impressions of Government as determining his action—Explicit orders that he is to act as an auxiliary force to the Spanish Armies (about to drive the French over the Ebro being understood), and that he is to act on a plan concerted with them—Castlereagh describes the situation to Sir John Stuart—The possibility of Austrian war from the first before Moore—Equipment and mobilisation of the Army to be completed at Valladolid after concentration there under protection of Spanish Armies on the Ebro—The ideas represented by the march of an army into Hyde Park have no bearing on war—To divide for facility of movement and supply, to unite for fighting the universal rule—Ludicrous criticism of Mr. Oman on this subject—Hope, who is to command artillery and cavalry, presses on Moore the necessity of his marching by Madrid road—Under his orders, and with the data on which the campaign was based, the movement of the artillery by the best road was the natural and right one—A General cannot utilise information obtained one hundred years after his death—Habitual disregard of this point by critics—Detailed examination of criticism of Napoleon and of Moore—Napoleon's "Faites moi savoir"—Its failure in Spain—Moore's letter to Sir William Bentinck	305-327
--	---------

CHAPTER XXX

MOORE AT SALAMANCA

Moore at Salamanca finds that his instructions are not applicable to the facts—No attempt is made here to deal with the campaign in detail—Its part in Moore's biography is alone brought out—The *dramatis personæ*—Moore's relation to Castlereagh and the Cabinet—The want of silver coin, not immediately the fault of the Cabinet—The Cabinet through Castlereagh argumentatively and separately approve each step taken by Moore—Lord Londonderry—His habit of intrigue, his relations with his brother, his incapacity for understanding war—Mr. Frere, his relations with Canning and brilliancy as a writer—Vast exaggeration of Mr. Frere's influence on Moore's action—Moore's slight notice of him in the Diary—Lord William Bentinck—Charles Stuart—Hope, Baird, Fraser—Spencer, the two Pagets—Crauford—Condition of the Army—"Wellesley's Army" and "Moore's Army"—"The British"—Moore's own

situation—Solitariness of the responsibility of a General commanding in the field—A fiduciary through the Cabinet of the nation—Baird's weak action—The unfounded charge against Moore that he allowed himself to be influenced by the chatter of his army—The point Moore had to decide—He, alone responsible to the Cabinet, has to judge what course they would direct could they know the facts which their despatches show they do not know—An exact analogy of our own time in the case of Lord Wolseley at Corté on hearing of the fall of Khartoum—The electric telegraph supplies fresh orders, changed because of distant events—Moore's data for forming his own judgment—Points in previous instructions remaining applicable—Baird's views—Mode in which Moore overrules them—On one only point Moore is in duty bound to consult Frere, and does so—On one point, as directed to do, he asks information from Frere—Scandalous misrepresentation by Lord Londonderry—Moore's own summing up of the case to Frere—The Charmilli incident—The only point on which Moore takes any notice of it—Moore has been influenced by all the evidence from Madrid so far as to think there is a chance of Madrid holding out long enough to occupy Napoleon whilst he strikes at French communications—For that secrecy is essential—Moore is shocked by Frere's expecting him to confide in Charmilli—That this was the essential point and the cause also of his reserved manner to Escalante and Bueno is evidenced by his indorsement on Frere's letter here given—Moore's despatch to Castlereagh explaining his reasons for deciding not to retreat but await events at Salamanca and prepare for advance—What Moore had done (7th October to 5th December)—Baird's equipment backward, Hope's well forward—The assertion that the Ministry would have wished Moore to risk the destruction of his army by not being ready to retreat if the French advanced before his concentration—The reply—Caning's despatch to Frere here given	328-361
--	---------

CHAPTER XXXI

THE GREAT STROKE

Moore prepares to start feeling his way and watching his opportunity, making ready for retreat, knowing well the peculiar difficulties of retreat with a British army—Rawsness of the actual army, and certainty that Moore's skilful move would not be understood—Moore on starting obtains, by the capture of Avignac on 12th October, nearly exact information of Napoleon's strength and the distribution of his army—Therefore, though he hears of the fall of Madrid, it does not affect him—Letter to Castlereagh records capture of Berthier's letter, and Moore's change of movement thereon—In this letter Moore asks for transport, available in case of his retreat to the coast—Warning to Cradock to be ready to evacuate Portugal in case Napoleon continues march against it—

Necessity of warning: not in conflict with Wellington's action at a later stage under quite different conditions—The question of reinforcements submitted to Castlereagh—Misquotation of Moore on this subject—General policy of Moore's retreat avoiding battle the sound one had he had food—Imperative, as he had not—Napier's the true military narrative of the retreat—Contrast between a subaltern's view of movements he does not understand, and that of the man who moves the pawns—Moore at Sahagun on the watch—Letter to Frere—Captain Sterling's account of the reception of the order to retreat—The latter half of Wellington's criticism of Moore—A question of practice, in which modern soldiers follow Moore, not Wellington, and with advantage—Excellence of Moore's immediate staff—General deficiency of staff work—Sterling's evidence—Disastrous effect on the soldiers of the very natural flight of the inhabitants—The disorders of the march—Special causes aggravating them—Not due to excessive rapidity—Moore's letters from Benevente to Romana, General Brodrick, and Lord Castlereagh—The choice between Vigo and Corunna—Moore, always for Corunna, had accepted Baird's local information so far as to send officers to report—On receipt of their report at Las Herrerias, 4th January, he decided on Corunna—Moore's despatch from Astorga—Moore throughout the retreat—His steps to repress disorder—Lord Londonderry's view of them as too severe—The view of the men who did the fighting—Moore's stimulus for the men—His tactical skill—Napier's expression as to Moore's "regretting" at Corunna Crauford's division committed to the Vigo route before the change—Reasons for not agreeing with Napier—The brevity of the whole campaign—What had been done in the time—Moore at Corunna, battle-picture by Sir Charles Napier—The moment of triumph and vindication—The cannon-ball—The end—A crushing victory turned into a successful rear-guard action—Canning's eulogium on the Sahagun stroke—The revulsion—The wind shifts, and the weathercocks with it—Canning's proposal to Castlereagh the true cause of the duel—Canning's revenge—Frere's last communication with Moore—The change Moore had wrought in the situation—Moore's words misread become a stumbling-block to Wellington—How Moore had prepared the way for Wellington—Moore before future generations . . . 362-398

APPENDIX 399-401

INDEX 403-437

MAPS

LOWER EGYPT	<i>At end</i>
ENVIRONS OF ALEXANDRIA	"
THE STRAITS OF MESSINA	"
SPAIN AND PORTUGAL (Moore's Campaign)	"

THE DIARY OF SIR JOHN MOORE

CHAPTER XVII

THE INVASION OF EGYPT UP TO THE DEATH OF SIR RALPH ABERCROMBY, 1801

“DIADEM,” ABOUKIR BAY, *6th March*.—It has blown a gale of wind from the N.W. since the 3rd, and the sea has run so high that a landing has been quite out of the question. Yesterday my signal was made from the *Kent*, and I went on board to Sir Ralph. As there was a prospect of the weather moderating, he wished me to go inshore with Colonel Lintendahl to see what works the French had erected, the nature of the ground, &c. We reached a bomb-vessel, which was anchored in seventeen feet of water about a mile and a half from the shore. I could observe no works whatever; the ground to the left is very woody and unequal, that upon the right a high sandhill. The distance between the two is about a mile, and in this space the landing must be made. The lake of Aboukir bounds the left, and the right of the sandhill is searched by the guns of the fort of Aboukir; the ground is favourable to the enemy, as he can be concealed close to the shore. The enemy have the means of concealing their force. They show none, but they have had time to collect one, and it is but reasonable to suppose they have availed themselves of it. I could see their picquets extended along the line above-mentioned, and there seemed a constant movement

of individuals and small parties along it. The captain of the bomb concludes that fresh troops have joined, from a greater bustle appearing this day than before. Sir Ralph is determined to land as soon as the weather will admit of it. The wind is now from the South-West, off shore, and the sea has considerably abated, yet the weather appears still unsettled. The bad weather we have met with is contrary to all the information given by our naval officers who for two years past have frequented this coast. Their error probably has arisen from not having considered the weather with a view to a land operation, but merely what would affect a fleet. The anchorage here is good, and the weather, though such as to render a communication with the shore impracticable, has never been such as to endanger the ships. Contrary also to every previous information of the climate upon this coast, there has been constant and very hard rain. Information has been received of six sail of the line having escaped from Brest and entered the Mediterranean.

Upon the 7th March the wind abated, and the weather promising well, orders were given in the afternoon for the troops of the reserve, Brigade of Guards and two regiments of Major-General Coote's Brigade, to get into the flat boats and launches at two in the morning. As the ships which contained them were all troopships, and were anchored six or seven miles from the shore, two small vessels were anchored in the evening near the shore; the one to mark the right of the landing, the other an intermediate point on the same line; the boats, as they received the troops, were directed to rendezvous alongside these two vessels, where the captains of men-of-war who, under Captain Cochrane, had the direction of the landing, arranged the boats of their respective divisions in accordance with an order previously settled, which was that of Brigades, of Regiments, and of Companies, agreeable to the order of battle of the army. The troops of the second landing were removed in the evening from the large ships outside to others drawing a less draught of water. These

anchored further in for the purpose of supporting the first disembarkation more expeditiously.

Soon after daylight the majority of the boats were at the rendezvous, but it took a considerable time to arrange them. I was in the boat with Captain Cochrane, and the reserve upon the right was directed upon the centre of the high sandhill. The rest of the boats were to dress by them. The high sandhill commanded the ground on each side; it was the left flank of the enemy's position or it was his centre. In either case it was desirable to possess it, and I was determined to gain it with the regiments of the right of the reserve as soon as possible. Just as the signal was about to be made for the boats to advance, General Hope came to me from Sir Ralph, who was with Lord Keith on one of the bomb-vessels, to say that if the fire from the enemy was so great that the men could not bear it he would make the signal to retire, and therefore desired Captain Cochrane and me to look occasionally to the ship he was in. General Hope then said that Sir Ralph wished to know if I was still of the same opinion with respect to the point of landing on the right, or if I did not think it would be better to extend a little more that way towards the bottom of the hill, as the latter appeared to be very steep in front. I said that I did not think a change necessary; that the steepness was not such as to prevent our ascending and was therefore rather favourable.

It was now eight o'clock; the enemy had for two hours been spectators of our movements, and we could see them drawn up with their cannon to oppose us. Some gunboats proceeded to engage their attention; the signal from Captain Cochrane's boat was made to advance; we were fired upon from fifteen pieces of artillery as soon as we were within reach, first with round shot, afterwards with grape, and at last by the infantry. The boats continued to row in steadily, and the sailors and soldiers occasionally huzzaed. Numbers were killed and wounded, and some boats were sunk. The fire of grape-shot and musketry was really most severe. As soon as the boats touched the land the officers and men

sprang out, formed on the beach, and landed. I then ascended the sandhill with the Grenadiers and Light Infantry of the 40th, 23rd, and 28th Regiments in line. They never offered to fire until they had gained the summit, where they charged the French, drove them, and took four pieces of cannon, with part of their horses. We followed them, they firing as they retired to the border of a plain, where I halted in favourable ground until I could perceive what was being done upon the left, where a heavy fire of musketry was still kept up. Brigadier-General Oakes with the 43rd, 58th Regiments, and the Corsican Rangers, which composed the left of the reserve, landed to the left of the sandhill. They found the enemy ready to receive them. They formed expeditiously, were attacked by both infantry and cavalry, both of which they repulsed, and they also followed them into the plain, taking three pieces of artillery. The Guards, who should have been upon the left of the reserve, as well as some of the regiments of General Coote's Brigade, got into some confusion on landing and were at first in the rear of the 42nd and 58th; but, as those regiments advanced, the others fell into their place on the left. The want of cavalry or of artillery (for it was some time before that which landed could be dragged through the sand) prevented us from pursuing further and destroying the enemy. They made good their retreat, though with considerable loss. Ours amounted to 600 killed and wounded, of which the reserve lost 400. The enemy had had eight days to assemble and to prepare; the ground was extremely favourable for defence. Our attempt was daring, and executed by the troops with the greatest intrepidity and coolness. In the course of the afternoon the rest of the army landed, and the whole moved forward a couple of miles. The Castle of Aboukir was blocked. An attempt was made to summon it; but they fired upon Lieutenant-Colonel Murray and declined every communication. Sir Ralph directed that some heavy artillery should be landed to fire upon it.

On the morning of the 9th March I went forward with Lieutenant-Colonel Anstruther, the Quartermaster-General,

who was going to look for a new position. We took with us some cavalry, the Corsicans, and the 92nd Regiment. We posted the latter about two miles in front, and proceeded a couple of miles further with the Dragoons. We then met a strong patrol of the enemy, which induced us to retire. The country which we had seen was uneven; sandy and thickly interspersed with palm and date trees. At the place where the 92nd had been posted, whilst we went forward with the cavalry, there was a small redoubt and flagstaff; and the sea and Lake of Madie, running in on each side, narrowed the ground at this spot more than at any other, either in front or in rear of it. Upon its being represented to Sir Ralph as a favourable point to possess, he directed me to take post upon it with the reserve. I reached it about twelve o'clock, and, after posting my outposts, I went with a patrol in front until I saw the enemy's cavalry.

On the 10th at daylight I advanced in front of the picquets with the Dragoons and Corsican Rangers to feel what was in my front. We very soon met the advanced guard of a considerable body of cavalry, who endeavoured to push us back; but, as we were but a little way from our picquets, and as the ground was favourable to infantry, the Corsicans were directed to disperse and post themselves. By this means they forced the advanced guard of the cavalry back; but, instead of being satisfied with this and keeping their stations, they followed the enemy, who led them close to their main body, and then turned upon them, wounded several, and took an officer, a surgeon, and ten men prisoners. It appeared afterwards that it was only a strong escort of cavalry for the purpose of reconnoitring. Many officers who by their dress and attendants appeared to be officers of rank were observed. The skirmishing which took place at first still continued, but, as it answered no purpose, I ordered our people to remain fixed and not to fire unless fired upon. By this means the firing was stopped. The main body of this detachment of the enemy remained in our neighbourhood until the afternoon, when they disappeared, leaving in our front common

picquets and videttes only. All the afternoon I observed officers reconnoitring my front and flanks, so much so that I suspected they had some design. I however considered my position so strong that I did not apprehend a direct attack on my post. I thought they might endeavour to carry off a picquet. I reinforced the picquets, particularly those on the flanks at night. Nothing happened during the night. On the 11th Sir Ralph came up to us. The difficulty of landing and forwarding provisions is what has prevented the army from moving forward. Yesterday it blew hard. The Lake of Madie is being reconnoitred, and it is hoped that the supplies may be forwarded by it. The Brigade of Guards moved forward and took post in my rear, about half-way between me and the army. Three days' provisions were delivered to the troops, and in the evening orders were issued for the march of the army next morning.

12th March.—The army marched from its right in two columns, each composed of a wing. The reserve in two columns formed the advanced guard to each. I led the right, General Oakes the left. I had for object a square tower and flagstaff. General Oakes was to keep his proper distance from me for forming. The enemy's cavalry retired before us, skirmishing as we advanced. The country was sand interspersed with palm trees, and the ground not so uneven as to prevent the columns generally from seeing each other. The tower was evacuated, and the heads of the columns were there halted. From the top of it a body of infantry was seen advancing upon us, and some ground, a quarter of a mile in front, being considered as more favourable, we were ordered to form line and advance to it. The formation was made quickly and with correctness, and, though the ground over which the reserve marched was broken and intersected by brushwood and old ruins which obliged the companies frequently to file round, yet the general line was preserved, and the movement made with such steadiness that when we were halted upon the new ground there was hardly any correction necessary. I gave

the object of march to the colours of the 23rd Regiment upon the right by which the whole was directed. The enemy halted and afterwards retired upon seeing our movement. The first line was composed of the Reserve, Brigades of Guards, Cradock, and Coote. The regularity and coolness with which they moved was the more creditable as it was in the face of the enemy, whose main body was posted upon heights which terminated at the distance of about a mile and a half. Their advanced posts were immediately in our front. We lay upon our arms where we halted, and I was ordered to take the advanced posts and cover the front of the army with the 90th and 92nd Regiments.

The reserve had been fagged for several days before. As it was therefore desirable to give them rest, the 90th and 92nd, though belonging to other brigades, were put under my command for the night. I divided these two regiments each into three bodies, separated at such distances as to cover the front of the army, and I ordered each body to throw forward one-third of their numbers, with the officers belonging to it, as sentries in front. This formed a strong chain, which was relieved every hour by one of the thirds in reserve. The enemy was so close to us that it was evident that neither army could move without bringing on an action. The necessary orders were issued in the evening, and at six o'clock in the morning of the 13th the army moved in two columns from the left, each composed of a line. The reserve in one column from the left marched upon the right of the other two to cover that flank, and with orders for the head to keep dressed with the second brigade of the right column of the army. Our intention was to attack the enemy's right, and if possible to turn it. The advanced guards to the two columns of the army were formed by the 90th and 92nd Regiments. These having upon the march passed too much ahead of the columns, were attacked by the main body of the French, and suffered severely before the columns could deploy and come to their support. They, however, held their ground, and defeated a body of cavalry which attempted to charge them.

The action now became general along the whole front. The French, when forced back, retreated under the protection of a numerous artillery. They halted and fired whenever the ground favoured them. I kept the reserve in column, covering the right flank of the two lines. We advanced rapidly, exposed to a most heavy cannonade from the front, and of musketry from hussars and light infantry on the flank. The men, though mowed down by the cannon, never lost their order, and there was no period during the action or pursuit that I could not have halted the reserve and instantly wheeled to a flank without an interval. The two lines advanced in equal order. We at last reached a rising ground which overlooked a plain, through which the enemy were retreating in confusion. As I observed that the right was in advance of the rest of the army, and that if we followed into the plain we should be under the guns of fortified heights in front of Alexandria, I begged of Major-General Cradock, whose brigade was next mine, to halt in this position, which was favourable, until the rest of the army came up. We should then perceive whether it was Sir Ralph's intention to pursue farther. The army came up and continued advancing; we who had halted then did the same. When, however, the strong ground in front, upon which the enemy had halted and formed, was realised, we were directed to halt about the middle of the plain.

I then met Sir Ralph; a consultation was held, when it was determined that General Hutchinson, with some brigades of the second line, which had been least engaged, should attack the enemy's right, and that the reserve, supported by the Guards, should attack their left near the sea. As General Hutchinson had a considerable circuit to make, my attack was to be regulated by his. When this column got round to the left, opposite to the ground it was intended to attack, it appeared to General Hutchinson so strongly defended by a numerous artillery, commanded by the guns of the fortified hills near Alexandria, that he halted and sent to Sir Ralph that the heights could not be carried without

considerable loss, and if carried, as they were exposed to the fire of the fortified hills, it would be impossible to hold them without instantly entrenching themselves, of which they had not the means. He therefore demanded further orders. Sir Ralph sent General Hope to see the ground—he afterwards went himself; many hours were in the meantime lost, and the day was getting late. The enemy had had time to recover his spirits and amend his disposition. Upon observing the reserve formed in column opposite to his left, he sent a body of men and some artillery to that point; it was now evident that what might have been attempted at first was no longer advisable. The attack was given up, and a position was marked out upon the heights in the rear where the right had halted in the morning. To this we were directed to retire. Whilst in the plain we had been exposed to the cannonade of the enemy, by which many officers and men were killed and wounded. Our loss this day amounted to 1300 killed and disabled; that of the enemy could not be near so great. His superiority in cavalry prevented our deriving that benefit from the defeat of his army which we might otherwise have done. His artillery was powerful, ours as nothing; for, as it had to be dragged by men through a sandy country, it could not keep pace with the infantry. We were therefore destroyed by his artillery without the power of retaliation. But the undaunted spirit of the troops made them constantly advance in spite of every loss, so that we gained ground, which is the great object in action. We drove the enemy back, though with loss superior to his. Every attempt the enemy made, either with their infantry or cavalry, was defeated, and at last the whole retired under cover of their artillery.

The fault, if any, which we committed was the advancing beyond the position we afterwards took up before we had come to a determination to attack the heights. Halting to deliberate in the plain exposed us to the guns of the heights, and, when the attack was deemed imprudent, obliged us to a retrograde movement, which was mortifying to troops who had displayed such spirit, and who had

been successful. It was made, however, with great order, and without any attempt of the enemy to impede it. I do believe that had we pursued the French over the plain without altering the disposition of the army, we might have driven them beyond the heights, even though their position had been prepared and fortified; but, without cannon, ammunition, provisions, or the means of entrenching ourselves, I doubt if we could have held it. I therefore think we should have been satisfied with our first success, and remained upon the ground in which we first halted. At the time the attack was intended, it is probable it would have failed. The enemy had had time to recover himself, the position was strong and had been prepared. Our distance from Alexandria does not exceed four or five miles. It is found that the boats can come up the Lake of Madie to within half a mile of our camp, and here it is determined to land the stores, ammunition, and provisions; the enemy are about a mile and a half in our front, the picquets and sentries of the two armies close to one another. The two first days they attempted to drive in our videttes, which brought on a skirmishing, in which the French had two or three men killed. Since this they have desisted: and Sir Ralph, having occasion to write to the General commanding, expressed a wish not to aggravate the calamities of war by any acts which, without benefit to the general cause, tended only to distress individuals. He received a polite answer from General Friant, entering fully into Sir Ralph's sentiments.

Our position, with our right to the sea, our left to the Lake of Madie and the Canal of Alexandria, is weak upon the left, where both in front and rear is an extensive plain. Some field works are being erected along the whole front: a redoubt upon the canal; heavy cannon are being landed, which, when placed along our front and in the works which are being made, will make our position tolerably secure. The camp equipage is ordered to be landed, and the officers, who landed with nothing but the clothes which they had on their backs, are now permitted to get on shore some

light baggage. No deserters have come in; the Arabs, who have brought us some provisions, give no information that can be depended upon. We are ignorant of General Menou's motions, whether he is still at Cairo, or if he is assembling a force at Demenhur. All we know is that the enemy fought us upon the 13th with six or seven thousand men; that the position they have taken opposite to us is extremely strong and studded with artillery; that if we carry it we have still the siege of Alexandria to carry on, defended not by a simple garrison but by an army, with another army on our flank and rear. The operation is beyond our force. It is mortifying that so much good spirit and so many valuable lives should be expended without obtaining our object. On the 14th I was General of the day; Lieutenant-Colonel Brice of the Guards, who had the picquet of that brigade, lost his way in the night, strayed past his sentries, was wounded and taken up by one of the French videttes, and died next day in Alexandria. The dead of both armies, who were lying on the ground between the outposts, were by agreement of the two commanders buried this day. We find water in tolerable abundance by digging in the neighbourhood of the camp, and have not been obliged to depend, as was expected, on the ships. Our principal distress is the want of fuel. Everywhere round us are the marks of ancient buildings; in digging for water aqueducts have been discovered, one of which is full of fine water. The ruin near the redoubt upon the right has been a very considerable building; the French call it "Caesar's Camp."

On the 17th I rode along the canal two or three miles. It runs between the Lakes Madic and Mærotis; the latter is in most places dry, nowhere deep, and the bottom a firm sand, which cavalry and guns may traverse. I fell in with a French patrol, and returned. Upon the 18th a detachment of the 12th and 26th Dragoons, patrolling in the line where I was yesterday, were driven back by a detachment of French cavalry. A stronger detachment was called for, and marched without any order from headquarters; they

attacked the French in their turn and beat them, but, pursuing without prudence, they blew their horses and fell in with a body of infantry, which killed and wounded a great many, took three officers and sixteen men prisoners. The rest returned in a woeful state. Colonel Archdale, of the 12th, who commanded, lost his arm. Upon the 19th some severe animadversions appeared in orders upon the imprudent conduct of the cavalry. Upon the 20th Sir Ralph called upon me. It is said that Menon is collecting his force at Demenhur, but the information is not certain. Sir Ralph is well aware of the critical situation of our army; that from erroneous information, and misled by the intercepted letters, Government has sent him with a force very inadequate to the service. The French, independent of armed Greeks and Copts, are superior to us in numbers; the greatest gallantry must fail when opposed to superior numbers, protected by position and by fortifications. There is no information of the distance of the fortified hills (Cretia and Caffarelli) from the present position of the French, or of what use we may derive from their present position should we carry it in besieging their works. Sir Ralph, however, said that as soon as the heavy cannon was brought up and entrenching tools forwarded, he thought it incumbent on us to make an effort. His plan was to endeavour in the night to push forward the artillery, and form the troops under such cover as he could find, and at daylight advance to the attack of both their flanks. If we failed we could still return to our present position, and maintain it until another was prepared in our rear to favour a retreat, and finally our re-embarkation. He regretted the throwing away of so fine an army, and added that he believed nobody would envy him his situation.

"DIADEM," 23rd March.—I was Major-General of the day on the 20th. After visiting the picquets I remained with the left picquet of the reserve until four in the morning of the 21st. The enemy had been perfectly quiet during the night. Nothing had been observed from them but some rockets,

which it was not uncommon for them to throw. Imagining everything to be quiet I left orders with the field officer to retire his posts at daylight, and I rode towards the left to give similar orders to the other picquets as I went along. When I reached the left picquet of the Guards I heard a fire of musketry on the left; but everything continuing so quiet on the right, I, from the style of the firing, suspected it was a false alarm. I had observed a want of intelligence and confusion the evening before in the officer who commanded the picquets in that quarter. This confirmed my suspicion. I was, however, trotting towards the left when a firing commenced from the picquets of the reserve. I immediately turned to my aide-de-camp, Captain Sewell, and said, "This is the real attack, let us gallop to the redoubt." I met as I returned all the picquets falling back, and by the time I reached the redoubt in which the 28th were posted, I found it warmly attacked. The day had not yet broken, and the darkness was made greater by the smoke of the guns and small arms.

My arrangements, in case of our being attacked, had been settled beforehand. I had agreed with Brigadier-General Oakes that the redoubts and old ruins in front of the right of the army, in which I had posted the 28th and 58th Regiments, must be supported, and was the ground for the reserve to fight upon. In fact, if carried by the enemy, it would have been impossible for our army to remain in their position. The general orders were for the troops to stand to their arms an hour before daylight, and fortunately they had fallen in before the attack commenced. Colonel Paget, with the 28th, manned the redoubt, and had in reserve two companies which he formed on the left of it, as the redoubt was open in the rear. The 58th Regiment lined the old ruins, which were retired twenty or thirty yards behind the right flank of the redoubt, and swept the ground between it and the sea. In accordance with what had been concerted, General Oakes, upon the attack commencing, brought down the left wing of the 42nd to the left, and I sent Captain Anderson to the right wing, with orders to the

23rd Regiment, and four flank companies of the 40th, to support the ruins. We could feel the effect of the enemy's fire, but it was impossible as yet to see what he was about. His drums were beating the charge, and they were with their voices encouraging one another to advance. My horse was shot in the face, and became so unmanageable that I was obliged to dismount. Colonel Paget, whilst I was speaking to him on the platform of the redoubt, received a shot in the neck which knocked him down; he said he was killed, and I thought so; he, however, recovered a little, and he was put upon his horse.

About this time the left wing of the 42nd arrived on the left. Some person told me at that moment that a column of French had turned our left. I thought that in the dark they had mistaken the 42nd for the French, and said so. I could distinguish them forming exactly where I had ordered them; but Colonel Paget, who had not yet retired, rode up to me and said, "I assure you that the French have turned us, and are moving towards the ruins." I looked to where he pointed, and accordingly saw a battalion of French in column completely in our rear. The right wing of the 42nd arrived at this instant. I ran to them, ordered them to face to the right about, and showed them the French completely in their power. They drove them into the ruins, and not a man of these French escaped being killed, wounded, or taken. The instant this was done, I led the regiment back to the flank of the redoubt. We met another column of the French which had also penetrated; we attacked them, and I received a shot in my leg. At this time I met Sir Ralph and told him what had passed at the ruins. The 42nd and part of the 28th drove the other column, but pursuing too far, got into disorder, and were attacked suddenly by cavalry. Major Honeyman, as I had difficulty from the wound in my leg in walking, had lent me his horse. The cavalry were completely amongst us; but our men, though in disorder, rallied, and brought down with their fire so many men and horses that the rest were glad to get off. The great object

of the French was to gain the redoubt, ours to defend it we could now see pretty well about us.

They made another effort with a line of infantry to attack the redoubt in front and on both flanks. The 58th Regiment in the ruins allowed them to approach within sixty yards, and then gave their fire so effectually as to knock down a great number of them; the rest went off. Upon the left the 42nd and 28th repulsed what was in their front, but were again charged by a large body of cavalry, who penetrated, got into the redoubt and behind us. Sir Ralph was actually taken by a French dragoon, but a soldier of the 42nd shot the man. I was obliged to put spurs to my horse to get clear, and I galloped to the ruins to bring up from thence some of the troops which I knew were formed and in good order. The 28th Regiment, who were lining the parapet of the redoubt, without quitting their post turned round and killed the dragoons who had penetrated there. The 42nd, though broken, were individually fighting, and I ordered the flank companies of the 40th from the ruins to pour in a couple of volleys, though at the risk of hurting some of our own people. The field was instantly covered with men and horses, horses galloping without riders—in short, the cavalry were destroyed. Every attack the French had made had been repulsed with slaughter. In the dark some confusion was unavoidable, but our men, wherever the French appeared, had gone boldly up to them. Even the cavalry breaking in had not dismayed them. As the day broke the Foreign Brigade under Brigadier-General Stuart¹ from the second line came to our support, shared in the latter part of the action, and behaved with spirit. Our cartridges were expended, and our guns for want of ammunition had not fired for some time. Daylight enabled us to get our men into order, and, as the enemy's artillery was galling us, I placed as many men under cover of the redoubt as I could. We were for an hour without

[¹ This "Brigadier-General Stuart" is John Stuart, subsequently Sir John Stuart, Count of Maida. We shall meet with him again.]

a cartridge; the enemy during this time were pounding us with shot and shell, and distant musketry. Our artillery could not return a shot, and had their infantry again advanced we must have repelled them with the bayonet. Our fellows would have done it; I never saw men more determined to do their duty; but the French had suffered so severely that they could not get their men to make another attempt. They continued in our front until the ammunition for our guns was brought up. They then very soon retreated. The great effort of the French was against our right opposite to the reserve. Another column had also attacked the Guards, who were upon the left of the reserve; it was repulsed with loss. The rest of the army was not engaged.

Letters were found from Menou to a General Officer, by which it appears that the whole French force in Egypt had been concentrated for this attack. Menou as well as all his army were confident of success. The prisoners say they were from 12,000 to 14,000. They add that they have never been fought till now; that the actions in Italy were nothing to those they have fought since we have landed. Our loss is not yet ascertained; I hope it will not be found to exceed 700 or 800. That of the French must, I think, be from 2000 to 3000; I never saw a field so strewed with dead. Our effective was not more than 10,000. Sir Ralph received a shot in the thigh, but remained in the field until the action was over, and was then conveyed to the *Hôpital*. Amongst the last shots which were fired one killed the horse Major Honeyman had lent me. The wound in my leg, which I received in the beginning of the action, was become painful and stiff towards nine, when the affair ended. General Oakes was also wounded about the same time, and nearly in the same part of the leg that I was, but we had both been able to continue to do our duty.

The affair being ended, as soon as I could get a horse I desired Colonel Spencer to take the command of the reserve, and I returned with Oakes to our tents, where

the surgeon dressed our wounds. The bone is not touched in either, there is no danger; but, as for some time we shall be incapable of action, we have returned to the ship, where from being more quiet we have a better chance of speedy recovery. Captain Anderson, my aide-de-camp, is also with us, wounded in the arm. He was for some time in the hands of some French hussars, who were, he believes, exposed to the same fire by which he was wounded. He fell, and they made off. This action lasted from about half-past four in the morning till near nine, during which the French made three different attacks. There has seldom been more hard fighting; their numbers were superior to ours, they had the advantage of cavalry, and a numerous well-served artillery; but our troops seem to have no idea of giving way, and there cannot be a more convincing proof of the superiority of our infantry. Some cannon and many standards have been taken. I have not learnt correctly the loss of the French, but it is, I understand, upwards of 4000. Ours is they say 1100,¹ 500 of which belong to the Reserve. Our artillery failed us as it did in Holland for want of arrangement; with the Reserve there were none but subalterns at the guns. There were no captains or superior officers to superintend, and, when the ammunition contained in the boxes and the limbers was expended, there was no supply. The musketry ammunition was also too far to the rear, and it took hours to bring it up. There is certainly something wrong about our artillery; it was formerly our best corps; it is now far from it. Among the officers there is a want of military spirit; they seem to me throughout to prefer situations of comfort to those which lead to distinction.

“DIADEM,” 24th March.—Sir Ralph is, I hear, much better this day; the ball is not extracted, but he is tolerably free from fever. Sir Sydney Smith went in yesterday

[¹ Note in MS. : “The loss was 1300.”]

with a summons to the French; they are to send their answer this day.

29th March.—Sir Ralph was seldom free from fever, got no sleep but from opium, and had occasional delirium; for some days past the surgeons have had little hope of his recovery. I received a note this morning from his son, which informed me that he had expired last night at 11 o'clock without pain. His death at this period is most unfortunate for his country; but he could have fallen at no moment and under no circumstances more fortunate for his fame. He has conducted the only part of the expedition which is likely to be brilliant; and, after beating the French in three successive actions, which is more than has been done by any General this war, he has died of the wounds he received in battle. Sir Ralph was a truly upright, honourable, judicious man; his great sagacity, which had been pointed all his life to military matters, made him an excellent officer. The disadvantage he laboured under was being so extremely short-sighted. He stood in need, therefore, of good executive Generals under him. It was impossible, knowing him as I did, not to have the greatest respect and friendship for him; he had ever treated me with marked kindness. The only consolation I feel is, that his death has been nearly that which he himself wished, that his country, grateful to his memory, will hand down his name to posterity with the admiration it deserves. Sir Ralph has always been accused of exposing his person too much, but I never knew him carry this so far as in the action of the 21st. When it was so dark that I could scarcely distinguish, I saw him close in the rear of the 42nd without any of his family. He was afterwards joined by General Hope. When the French cavalry charged us a second time and our men were disordered, I called to him and waved with my hand to him to retire; but he was instantly surrounded by the hussars. He received a blow with a sabre on the breast which cut through his clothes and only grazed the flesh. He must have been taken or killed if a soldier had not shot the hussar.

In writing home, Moore said of his late chief:—

“Sir Ralph has fallen at a moment most unfortunate for his country. We stand in need of his experience, his sagacity, and judgment to extricate us; but he could have fallen at no period more fortunately for his own fame. It has happened to no other General during this war to beat the French in three successive actions. He will be honoured and lamented by his country, and his name handed down to posterity with the most distinguished of his countrymen. This is the consolation I derive from the loss of the best man, and best soldier, who has appeared amongst us this war.”

THE “DIADEM,” 1st May.—My wound, which was at first thought slight, has proved extremely troublesome and painful; the ball, it seems, passed between the two bones of the leg, and though fortunately it hit neither, it did sufficient injury; my leg continued inflamed for a long time and matter collected between the wounds; the inflammation was at last reduced by means of poultices and fomentations. The matter, which seemed at first to be collected between the wounds, fell down towards the ankle, and was at last let out by the surgeon. During all this time, nearly five weeks, I was confined to my seat, was troubled with fever, &c. &c.; and the surgeon, though he assured me that my leg was in no danger, was extremely doubtful as to the time of my recovery, or what operations I might be obliged to undergo. A great deal of matter issued from the opening he made, and much has since discharged itself; but from that moment I have recovered rapidly. The leg has put on quite a different appearance; the different sinuses which the matter had formed have adhered, and I have every hope of being quite well in three weeks or a month. My leg and thigh are much wasted, and my body from long confinement is very weak; but I can now move with crutches. It is my intention to move to Rosetta.

It may be as well, whilst the records of these

operations are fresh in the minds of those who have read them, to note that, if we may judge from the historians of the beginning of the twentieth century, Moore was mistaken in supposing that Sir Ralph's name would be "handed down to posterity with the most distinguished of his countrymen." When none else had done so, he three times defeated the "Army of Italy." The British army which inflicted those defeats was created by himself, and dependent for its effective organisation as an army on himself, Moore, and his generals alone. He is remembered only to awake about "Egypt" a passing sneer, such as leaves the impression that our modern biographers and historians do not know the difference between the history of the first conquest of Egypt in 1801 and the Egyptian failure of 1807, and do not know who deserves the credit of either.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE MARCH ON CAIRO AND CAPITULATION OF THE FRENCH ARMY

UPON the death of Sir Ralph Abercromby, the command of the army fell to Major-General Hutchinson. His attention was at first directed to strengthen his front with works, in which he has placed a considerable quantity of artillery. Colonel Spencer was then detached to Rosetta with about 1200 British and between 4000 and 5000 Turks, who arrived with the Captain Pacha, and were landed about the time of Sir Ralph's death. The town was evacuated upon Colonel Spencer's approach, and he took up above the town a position which I understand was strong. He detached part of his force to erect batteries against St. Julien and Stone Fort, which command the entrance of the Nile. This fort held out several days, until a breach was made; it then surrendered. Two hundred and seventy men composed the garrison. They lost seventeen men by our fire; our loss was one or two only. The 6th April, the *Pearl* frigate arrived, with information that the French squadron of six or seven sail of the line had sailed from Toulon on the 19th March full of troops, steering for Alexandria. They were afterwards seen and followed by Sir John Warren and his squadron off Sardinia, but they escaped from him in the night, and have since been seen in a crippled state steering for Toulon. Sir John has joined Lord Keith, and the whole fleet is now off Alexandria. The French have concentrated their force at Alexandria and Rhamanie; they have strengthened and curtailed their line in front of Alexandria to enable them with greater safety to detach to Rhamanie, which is the key of their communication with the country, and where they have collected their treasure

from Cairo. General Hutchinson has reinforced considerably the troops at Rosetta. Major-General Cradock with Brigadier-General Doyle have joined them. The former commands until such time as General Hutchinson goes himself.

General Hutchinson dined with me some days ago. He told me that the British force independent of the Turks on the Rosetta side amounted to 4500; that he had left under Major-General Coote, before Alexandria, about 6500; that with the force from Rosetta, he meant to move up the Nile towards Rhamanie and dislodge the French from thence if he found it could be done without much risk; but that there was certain information of the arrival at Suez of Admiral Blanket, who was followed by a force of 5000 or 6000 troops, hourly expected there. The Grand Vizier was at Salahih, from whence he had detached a corps of cavalry to the gates of Cairo. Upon the junction of these two corps, and their moving down the Nile, whilst he moved up, the French must easily be dislodged from Rhamanie. He would therefore be cautious of risking what, with a little patience, would be rendered certain; as a check of any kind to us in our present situation might have most serious consequences. The General, at the cry of the Navy and Army, contrary to his own opinion, was induced to direct the canal to be cut, and to let in the water from the Lake of Aboukir into that of Mariout. By this means, the canal which conveyed water to Alexandria has been completely destroyed. As the Lake Mariout is lower than that of Aboukir, the latter empties itself faster than it is supplied from the sea. The consequence is, that the navigation of the Lake of Aboukir, upon which our supplies from the fleet depend, is in danger of being interrupted; in short, by opening the dyke, much mischief has been done, whereas it is not yet apparent what benefit we are to derive from it.

ROSETTA, 13th May.—I was advised to come here for the change of air, and I left the *Diadem* on the morning of the 10th in one of the country boats, and arrived the same

day before dinner. I have a house upon the banks of the Nile, agreeably situated and cool. General Hutchinson's force, amounting to 5000 British and equal numbers of Turks, was encamped at Hamil, on the Nile, about four miles in front of this place. He moved forward upon the 5th instant, and on the 7th came in sight of the French, who were posted some miles upon this side of Rhamanie, at Lalf. The French abandoned this position upon our approach, and we encamped a little beyond it. Our army marched again upon the 8th, and on the 9th came once more in sight of the French near Rhamanie. They were posted behind a dyke with their right on the Nile, their left protected by a fort. Our army halted and formed. The day was spent in cannonading and skirmishing. The enemy were observed to send off their camels, and to take measures for retreating.

A strong body of their cavalry were advanced to protect this movement. They retreated in the night, leaving in the fort, for the protection of their wounded, about eighty or ninety men, who surrendered next morning. In the course of the 10th, an escort of forty dragoons with some officers from Alexandria, not knowing of the retreat of the French, came in to our advanced posts and were taken. From them the General first learnt that the French had retired upon Cairo, not upon Alexandria; this was unexpected. A patrol was immediately sent to Demenhur, by which this information was confirmed; it was found that the French had not passed that point. The force of the enemy, including 800 cavalry, amounted to 4000. The General determined to follow them to Cairo, and he marched accordingly upon the 11th. I had written to the General upon my arrival here. On the 12th I received a letter from him, in which he informs me that he at first had thoughts of going to Cairo, but he found it impossible. The troops from the heat were getting sickly, and from not being prepared for so distant a march, the army was unprovided with many essential articles. The General states that it is necessary to make a show of following the enemy in order to drive them into Cairo, and

prevent their crossing into the Delta and attacking the Grand Vizier. He would therefore continue his march for a couple of days more, and would then return to this neighbourhood; he adds that he had sent to the Grand Vizier to retire to his entrenched camp at Salahih.

ROSETTA, 21st May.—Letters from the army state that a corps of French having marched from Cairo to attack the Vizier, General Hutchinson meant to move across the Delta upon Belbeis, with the double view of supporting the Vizier and of facilitating the junction of a body of 5000 men arrived at Suez from India under Major-General Baird. A convoy with money and clothing going from Cairo to Alexandria down the Nile has fallen into our hands, as well as an escort of 600 men with 500 camels from Alexandria. The General in consequence of the circumstances above mentioned has of course changed his plan, and will not march back to this neighbourhood. The safety of the Vizier and a junction with the force in the Red Sea must be his objects. The French on Fort Illisbe, near Damietta, evacuated that fort upon the approach of a detachment of the Vizier's army and retired upon Burlos. They have since to the amount of 500 men embarked in some small vessel and left Burlos, after spiking the guns. We have sent a detachment to take possession of the fort at Burlos, and we understand that the French who evacuated it have been taken by our cruisers. The Turks occupy Illisbe, so that now the whole coast is in our possession.

ROSETTA, 23rd May.—Yesterday General Hutchinson wrote to me from his camp at Elkam that 7000 French, Greeks, and Copts from Cairo had attacked the advanced corps of the Vizier's army at El Hanha, consisting of 5000 cavalry and 3000 infantry, and had been entirely defeated by them. General Hutchinson had before written to the Vizier not to risk an action till he was near enough to support him. This was also the Vizier's intention, but his army thought differently; they fought and were victorious. The particulars of the action had not reached the General,

but the success was undoubted. In consequence of their unexpected victory the General has determined to remain in his present camp on this side of the Nile until an officer he has sent to Suez to Admiral Blanket returns. The post of Belbeis is absolutely necessary to enable the Vizier to send the camels, &c., to General Baird for his passing the desert, and had the French driven the Turks from that post General Hutchinson must have dispossessed them of it. This had determined him to cross the Delta, though by such movement he left the depôt at this place, as well as his convoys upon the Nile, in a great measure unprotected. The 600 prisoners last taken are some of the best French troops. It is odd that they thus risk their troops in detail. Within this fortnight we have taken above 1500; 100 at the Rhamanie, 100 with a convoy on the Nile, 600 escort from Alexandria, and 600 the garrison of Illisbe and Burlos.

26th May.—Subsequent accounts from the army state the success of the Turks at El Hanha not to have been so great as was at first reported. The French force was about 4000. The Turks attacked them and forced them to retire; but they did not avail themselves of the advantage they had gained, and allowed the French to retreat in good order to Cairo.

ROSETTA, 1st June.—General Hutchinson went over to the Vizier's army to pay him a visit and to concert future operations; he returned upon the 29th. I have not heard from him since that, but orders are come to forward heavy cannon from this, by which it appears that he means to attack Cairo. The troops under General Baird in the Red Sea are prevented from reaching Suez by the North-West winds which have now set in in that quarter.

3rd June.—A letter this morning from General Hope mentions that the conferences between General Hutchinson and the Vizier have led to the determination of attacking Cairo. The army moved upon the 1st a few miles merely

to shift their ground; but as soon as provisions are forwarded they will proceed as far as the point of the Delta, if not to the investment of the place. Two regiments, the 89th and the 30th, under Colonel Stewart, are posted at the junction of the Canal of Menuf with the Eastern Nile. The Vizier is lower down upon that branch. The Mamelukes under Osman Bey are upon their march to join our army and within a few hours' march of it. They are said to consist of 2500 men. General Hope states the strength of our army upon the Nile to be 4800 infantry and about 500 cavalry; the Turks upon that side between 6000 and 7000; the force under the Vizier cannot be estimated. General Coote has in the camp before Alexandria 6000 fit for duty. General Hutchinson has ordered him to detach Brigadier-General Oakes with the 28th and 42nd Regiments to join the army on the Nile. This secures to me the joining that army as soon as I am well, as now the whole of the Reserve, the 23rd Regiment excepted, are with it. There is no chance of our being joined by the troops from India; they are stopped from getting up the Red Sea for this season.

There has, I understand, been much difference of opinion whether Cairo or Alexandria should be attacked first. The Vizier refused, they say, to co-operate in any operation but that of Cairo. This left General Hutchinson no option; but independent of that consideration I think it is to be preferred; indeed, unless we could have invested Cairo at the same time I doubt if we should have been able to besiege Alexandria, which I take to be by far the most difficult operation of the two.

8th June.—The army marched upon the 4th; the baggage and sick go by the Canal of Menuf, as the Nile is at present too low for the "Germs." The whole will unite at the junction of the two branches. The Vizier's army will probably form a junction at the same place; it moves upon the Damietta branch. The Mamelukes (1200) have joined; are a fine race of men, and well mounted. Letter—

have been received from Colonel Murray of the 84th Regiment, from Kosseir, where General Baird, with the rest of the force from India, was daily expected.

The army upon the Nile is healthy, but the troops that are stationary before Alexandria are sickly; they are much affected with the disease in the eyes so common in this country. At the hospital at Aboukir the plague has made some havoc. Our medical people treat it as a virulent fever, and say that hitherto it has not appeared to be by any means so fatal as the fever in the West Indies. All the bad cases have been attended with buboes and swellings. The plague, though in a less violent degree, also exists here.

ROSETTA, 14th June.—Our army arrived on the 8th at the junction of the two branches of the Nile. A letter from General Hutchinson, of the 6th, mentions that the Mamelukes had informed him that 5000 men had crossed the desert from Kosseir, and had arrived on the Nile. He therefore expects to be joined by this force under General Baird about the end of this month. A French squadron was reported some days ago, 100 leagues to the westward. They were seen afterwards at anchor about 45 leagues from Alexandria.¹ Their men had been in the boats, but were prevented from landing by the high surf. Alarmed at the appearance of a convoy bound to Malta, they cut their cables. Lord Keith has detached Sir Richard Bickerton with half his ships in search of them. He himself, with the rest, continues to watch Alexandria. The French consisted of four ships of the line, two frigates, and some small transports; four of the latter, carrying troops and stores, have been taken; on board of them is a company of comedians. A corvette, however, escaped our fleet and got into Alexandria on the 9th.

16th June.—Sir Richard is returned without having seen the French. The vessels taken had only merchandise on board; no troops or stores; and the report that the troops were in the boats ready to land when the French

[1 "Not true."]

ships were at anchor is not true. Captain Anderson left me this morning. The wound in his arm, which he received on the 21st, is well, but he has not the use of his arm or hand. The surgeons have recommended him to return to England as the best chance of recovering it, and he has complied, as there was no probability of his being able to serve more this campaign. I walked out this afternoon for the first time since I was wounded upon the 21st March. I hope to be able to join the army in a few days.

Moore's Diary, frank and often severely critical of mistakes as it is, is also often peculiarly generous towards others, more especially when his reporting certain facts might add to his own credit. Sir Charles Bunbury records that during the part of the Egyptian expedition with which this chapter has dealt, Moore succeeded in putting a stop to a cabal which wellnigh wrecked the whole success of it. There is no doubt that on the death of Sir Ralph Abercromby the whole army looked up to Moore as the one General on whom they could rely, though both Hutchinson and Cradock were senior to him. Hutchinson's march on Cairo was a very bold one. When he was at Rhamanie the tumultuous insubordination of the Grand Vizier's army, which had expected to sack Cairo, and could not be restrained from rolling on, obliged Hutchinson either to sacrifice this allied army or to advance. He decided to move on. "But," says Bunbury, "when he announced his intention to his principal officers a storm of opposition, swelling almost into a mutinous cabal, arose in the camp. . . . It seems probable that the opponents of the Commander-in-chief did not openly avow what was in all likelihood the secret motive of their opposition, their personal dislike, and their want of confidence in him. At this time the

General had no man of rank near him with whom he had been on terms of intimacy, or in whom he had been accustomed to confide. Moore was the officer on whose judgment he usually relied; but Moore had been confined since the battle of March 21st by the effects of his wound, and he had not yet rejoined the army." "In truth," he adds in a note, "this cabal had become little less than a mutiny on the part of officers holding the highest rank under General Hutchinson. They had written to both Coote and Moore inviting their concurrence in a plan which tended virtually, if not absolutely, to deprive Hutchinson of the command of the army; and their mad project was defeated mainly by the stern and uncompromising answer which they received from Moore."¹

The suppression of this in the Diary is exceedingly characteristic of Moore.

CAMP BEFORE CAIRO, 30th June.—My wound, though not quite closed, was so nearly so, that I could no longer refrain from joining the army before Cairo, and taking part in the operations of the siege. I sent my horses by land, embarked in a "Germ" on the Nile on the 26th, and arrived within a few miles of this camp on the 28th in the evening.

Yesterday morning I joined the army. Upon the troops taking up this ground on the 21st the French General demanded a conference. Brigadier-General Hope was sent by the Commander-in-chief with power to negotiate, and after a week's negotiation a treaty has been signed and hostages exchanged for the surrender of Cairo and evacuation of Egypt by the garrison in twelve days from the 28th. The officers and men preserve their property, and return to France with their arms. Public stores are delivered up. The French in the meantime have given

¹ Bunbury, "Campaign in Egypt," pp. 127, 128, and note.

us possession of the Gate of Gizeh and of a small outwork on the other side of the Nile; neither are posts of consequence.

CAMP NEAR GIZEH, *4th July*.—The British, the Mamelukes, and the Turks under the Captain Pacha are encamped together on this side of the Nile (the west), the army of the Vizier are on the other side; a bridge of boats connects the two. Two regiments, the 30th and 89th, under Colonel Stewart, are with the Vizier. Two days ago I rode to the Pyramids of Gizeh, about five or six miles from camp. There are three of different sizes; they were formerly faced with marble and granite; this has fallen off, but in other respects the three are entire. They form immense piles of building without beauty. The Sphynx, the head and bust of which is uncovered, is colossal, and is close to the Pyramids. The Pyramids are upon the border of the desert. Yesterday I rode with General Hope to the Vizier's camp. We went to the post which was given up by the French, and is occupied by the 30th Regiment, and from thence we rode close to the walls of Cairo. The French did not take notice of us, and we had thus a tolerable view of their position. It is so extensive as to require an army to defend it. We should have been able soon to make ourselves masters of their first position and of the town, but there are works to which the French might have retired which must have been regularly besieged. These it would have required time and labour to capture. I am therefore the more confirmed in the opinion of the propriety of the treaty. I visited on my return the Vizier and Reis Effendi, whom I had known when in Syria. His army is considerably increased since our late successes; their lure is the pillage of Cairo, and they are waiting impatiently for the moment the French move out to plunder and murder. This we deplore but cannot help; the Vizier himself dare not attempt to prevent it.

EMBABA CAMP, *8th July*.—Yesterday the army moved to this place, a couple of miles down the Nile, merely for

the purpose of camping upon fresh ground. The left of the army is on the Nile opposite to Bulack, the right in a village. We are in two lines; the Turks in our front are also in two lines. The day before we left our old ground the Vizier visited us, the line turned out and he rode along it. That same day two of the French generals, Morand and Donzelot, dined with General Hutchinson.

CAMP, 11th July. — Yesterday morning the French evacuated Cairo and moved to Gizeh, the Island, and Ibrahim Bey's garden. The evening before Colonel Stewart, with the 30th and 89th Regiments, took possession of the citadel. The Turks entered Cairo upon the French leaving, and have already committed some murders.

CAMP, 14th July. — I went the day before yesterday with General Hutchinson into Cairo: we first rode round all the works, visited the citadel, and then dined with Mr. Rosetti, a principal merchant, Imperial Consul. The line of defence round Cairo is about twelve miles, too extensive to be defended by any works. Those erected are in general trifling; they could not, however, have been assaulted. Had it been possible for us to have known them, at the time the convention was concluded, as well as we do now, we might have forced the French to accept of less favourable terms; but as it is, we have to congratulate ourselves that they are not defended. We should have been delayed, and should have lost men both by that and sickness. The town of Cairo is very bad: the streets unpaved and narrow, the houses sad, and the heat intolerable. A great part of it is in ruin, the consequence of frequent revolutions and plague. The latter carried off this year 30,000 people. When in Cairo despatches were brought to the General which had just arrived from England in the *Zeda* frigate. General Hutchinson has received the red ribbon, the local rank of Lieutenant-General, and is confirmed in the command of the army. By the public and private letters we find that ample justice has been done to us at home for our exertions in this country.

The honours paid to the memory of Sir Ralph have afforded the army much satisfaction. General Hutchinson's public letter upon Sir Ralph's death, describing the action of the 21st, is the best performance of the kind I have seen. That part relating to Sir Ralph is peculiarly excellent. It is as follows:—

“We have sustained an irreparable loss in the person of our never sufficiently to be lamented Commander-in-chief, Sir Ralph Abercromby, who was mortally wounded in the action, and died on the 28th March. I believe he was wounded early, but he concealed his situation from those about him and continued in the field, giving his orders with that coolness and perspicuity which had ever marked his character, till long after the action was over, when he fainted through weakness and loss of blood. Were it permitted for a soldier to regret any one who has fallen in the service of his country, I might be excused for lamenting him more than any other person; but it is some consolation to those who tenderly loved him that, as his life was honourable, so was his death glorious. His memory will be recorded in the annals of his country, will be sacred to every British soldier, and embalmed in the recollection of a grateful posterity.”

CAMP, 10 MILES BELOW CAIRO (UPON THE NILE), 15th *July*.—General Hutchinson and General Cradock being both indisposed, the former ordered me to take the direction of the march of the army to the coast. Every arrangement being made with the French General for the movement, we marched at daylight this morning in the following order: From our left, the Turks; baggage of British; the rear line of British; the first line; cavalry; rearguard. The French. The ground for the French encampment is given to them by our Quartermaster-General. It is about two miles from us. Our front is towards them, and our advanced posts placed to prevent any communication. The Mameluke cavalry is to join us to-morrow, and will march in the rear of the French,

and I shall order them to keep patrols between them and the desert.

CAMP AT VERDAM, 17th *July*.—General Morand came with a message to me from General Belliard on the 15th, and he dined with me. He is a man about thirty, the son of a lawyer, and leaving college about the beginning of the Revolution, has served the whole war. He is an agreeable man, with gentlemanlike manners. He talked much about Egypt, Buonaparte, and Kleber. Among other anecdotes relating to the Egyptian expedition, he told me that 12,000 men, independent of the troops, had accompanied them from France, and at that time they could have brought with equal ease 100,000 if they had had the means of transporting them. We continued marching yesterday and this day, our rearguard always in sight of the advanced guard of the French. Our men fell ill in numbers daily of ophthalmia. Three hundred were obliged to be conveyed in boats after two days' march, though 600 had been left in Gizeh previous to our march. We have no other complaints.

CAMP ESCHLIMÉ, 23rd *July*.—We have marched thus far without any occurrence worth noticing. All intercourse between the armies is prevented, or at least confined to the chiefs. The moment we come to our ground the picquets are posted, with orders to allow no one to pass without special leave. I had one day some business with General Belliard. I allowed our army to pass me, and waited for him. I found him at the head of his troops, whom he immediately halted. After I had done my business, I asked if he had any objection to my seeing his column pass. He gave an evasive answer, which showed he did not wish it.

CAMP BEYOND RHAMANIE, 26th *July*.—Yesterday I had an opportunity of seeing the position the French held at Rhamanie. It was not a good one, and being sensible of this, it had never been their intention to stay in it.

General Hutchinson has been blamed by many for not attacking them in it, and it has been said that he might have destroyed them or forced them to surrender. This is not the opinion I have formed from viewing the position. The French had taken their measures too early for a retreat to be prevented from making it, especially as they were superior both in cavalry and artillery. The most that General Hutchinson could have done, and that only because the French seem to have waited too long in their position, was to have pushed their rearguard, by which means he might have killed some, and taken perhaps a few guns; but it was understood that Rhamanie was a very strong position, and that the French would dispute it. Our army should have encamped nearer, the evening before they advanced to it, the position should have been reconnoitred, and the order of march formed with a view to an attack. This was not done. On the contrary our army, ten miles from Rhamanie, marched in two columns, as usual, one British, one of Turks. When it arrived within a few miles of the French, the latter threw out their cavalry in front of their right. They thus forced us to form the line. This took time. More time was taken to reconnoitre and to form a plan. In the meantime the enemy brought on a skirmishing fire with their sharpshooters. Having thus occupied us, they made good their retreat. The French position, though found bad after examination, does not appear so at first sight; and is not so bad but that, if we had attacked it improperly, we might have been worsted. The General in prudence could not have done more than attack their rear when he was assured they were retreating. The French continue to give us little or no trouble. I am in hopes that by the time we arrive in Hamad on the 28th the preparations for embarkation will be such as to enable the first division of the French to file to the coast. A considerable reinforcement of troops has arrived from England—the 24th, 25th, 26th Regiments, 22nd Dragoons; from Minorca, the two battalions of the 20th and the Ancient Irish Fencibles;

from Trieste, the Lowenstein Jagers. All these have been landed at Alexandria.

CAMP NEAR HAMAD, 30th *July*.—We arrived here yesterday, a day later than was intended. Owing to the bad arrangements of the Quartermaster-General, I was forced to pitch my tents on the 28th on the same ground on which we had lain the 27th. I only changed the front of the army in order still to front the French, who passed us on the 28th. I saw their whole army pass that morning, and counted them. They were near 8000 men, of which 800 were cavalry, and fifty pieces of cannon, well horsed and equipped, besides which 2000 men fit for duty are in the Germans, attending, &c. The army which has surrendered may fairly be estimated at 10,000 fighting men. They are very fine, stout fellows, and in good spirits. Belliard's conduct in surrendering seems to me one of the basest acts I have heard of. He might certainly, with so respectable a force, have defended himself, have crippled us, and delayed the surrender for a fortnight or three weeks. The French are encamped between us and Rosetta: the latter place is strongly garrisoned under General Oakes, and beyond him, towards Fort St. Julien, are the Turks under the Captain Pacha. The arrangements for the embarkation are in tolerable forwardness. The first division of the French march to the caravanserai to-morrow, and the next morning, 1st August, at daylight they are to embark. The second division will move next day, and so on till the whole are on board. The Quartermaster-General is gone to Rosetta to expedite matters, and I hope in ten days that the whole will be finished, and that we may be able to proceed to the attack of Alexandria. General Hutchinson arrived at Rosetta last night from Cairo. To-morrow I shall ride in to see him.

From Moore's description of his movement from Cairo in command of the army when it was conducting the French to the coast, it might be supposed

to have been a very simple operation. That was the very reverse of the case. As Sir Charles Bunbury puts it: "At this time both Hutchinson and Cradock were so seriously ill that the command of the troops devolved upon Moore. With him rested the arrangements for the march to Rosetta, and the personal direction of a very delicate and doubtful service. Here also were 8000 French soldiers in complete military array, carrying their arms and ammunition, their cavalry well mounted, their field-pieces fully horsed, to be escorted 200 miles by about 3500 British, the Capitan¹ Pacha's division of Turks, and 200 or 300 Mamelukes. But the plan and its details, as framed by Moore, were admirable, and they were carried into effect with perfect success. On the 15th July the march began. First went the wild horsemen of Syria, followed by the more orderly foot-soldiers of the Capitan Pacha; next, but with a long interval, marched the French infantry, with their guns, their cavalry moving abreast, but on the left flank and farther from the river. After another interval came the British column, led by Moore, and our dragoons and the detachment of Mamelukes formed a rear-guard. A great fleet of *djermes* carrying the sick, the baggage, &c., and escorted by our gun vessels, dropped slowly down the Nile, so as to keep up a constant communication with the French and English columns.

"During a march of several days, there arose not a difficulty or disagreement of any sort. Our late enemies were in high good-humour and in the gayest spirits. At the halting places, the English and French would mingle in companionship, and laugh, and discuss as well as they could their battles and their for-

¹ It will be noticed that Moore writes this "Captain."

tunes. After a short rest at Rosetta, to give time for the preparation of transports in the Bay of Aboukir, General Belliard's army, with all its followers, and even most of their horses, were embarked between the 31st of July and the 7th of August, and they were escorted by British men-of-war to the ports of France."

The conduct both of Belliard and of the French in joyfully surrendering would be unintelligible if we did not possess the following extracts from the letters of various officers and men of the French army, which Count Yorck von Wartenburgh has collected. The "Army of Italy" left behind in Egypt by its great chief had become infected with nostalgia as with a mortal disease, and, hankering as they were both for home and for service under Napoleon, it was a pleasure to them to surrender themselves when they found that they could not defeat the hitherto despised English. The blows inflicted by Sir Ralph Abercromby on the pride of an army that looked back to the first great campaign of Napoleon as their heritage of glory, had shattered the only bond that held them together.

Most of the following letters seem to have been written whilst Napoleon was still in Egypt. As long as he was there, his presence and the prestige of victory prevented this humour seriously affecting the efficiency of the army as a corporate body. It was utterly impossible for Belliard to have fought to the bitter end with troops of this temper.

"This is a land of misery. The inhabitants are savages, who have in every way incurred the curse of nature; they have not one thing in their favour. In every village of Lower Egypt one is, so to speak, in the midst of a band of murderers." No sooner did the troops enter the first town than they came to the

following conclusion : " There is nothing on earth so wretched, so miserable, so unhealthy as Alexandria ; the houses are mud hovels, with holes instead of windows . . . in a word, imagine the ugliest and worst-built pigeon-cotes, and you will have a correct idea of Alexandria." Nor did Cairo please them any better. " This town is horrible ; the streets breathe the plague on account of the filth, the people are disgusting and brutalised." " This abominable hole of a Cairo is inhabited by lazy vagabonds squatting all day long before their disreputable hovels." Every march, every movement of the army, entailed the greatest sufferings. " Since we have been in Egypt the army has not ceased to suffer. The tremendous exertions we have had to make in the desert ; the great heat, which seemed to make the soil red-hot ; the necessity of being always on the march, though entirely without provisions : all this has led to many volunteers dying, falling suddenly down from sheer exhaustion." On all sides an intense longing showed itself to get away from the country. " I assure you that if I ever have the happiness to set foot on my native soil once more, it will be never to leave it again. There are not four Frenchmen among the forty thousand here but think the same." " It is almost impossible for me to convey any idea to you of what we have suffered ; sufferings upon sufferings, privations, misery, fatigues, we have gone through them all to the utmost." " We are living in a country of which every one is sick to death. If the army had known it before leaving France, not one of us would have embarked ; we should all have preferred death a million times to exposing ourselves to the wretchedness in which we are here." Not a few indeed confirmed the truth of

these last words by their suicide. "Several soldiers have blown out their brains, others have cast themselves into the Nile; some dreadful things have happened." "We have had men here who committed suicide in the very presence of the Commander-in-chief, saying to him, 'This is your work!'" Thus the army was not far from mutinying. "Some soldiers have been overheard to remark on seeing their generals pass, 'There are the butchers of the French,' and a thousand other expressions of the same kind."¹

CAMP NEAR HAMAD, 3rd August 1801. — General Hutchinson was looking very unwell; he left few directions, made no arrangements, and set out next morning for the *Poudroyant*; from thence he purposes to go to Alexandria. The embarkation of the French troops continues, and there is reason to hope that it may be completed in six or eight days.

CAMP NEAR ROSETTA, 8th August. — The French having nearly all marched to the place of embarkation, we moved the day before yesterday to this ground, which is very dry, and within a couple of miles of Rosetta. The Nile, in consequence of the rise, had begun to encroach upon the ground we left. General Belliard, with the rest of his troops, marched yesterday and embarked this morning. There remain of this whole army only some sick and convalescents at Rosetta, who wait until the bar is passable. General Doyle's Brigade marched for Alexandria yesterday. Brigadier-General Hope's Brigade moves to-morrow, and I shall follow with the Reserve next day. The field artillery and the cavalry are to remain at Rosetta during the siege of Alexandria. Horses have been received from the French sufficient, with those we had before, to mount the 12th, 22nd, 26th Regiments, besides horsing our field artillery.

¹ "Napoleon as a General," by the late Count Yorck von Wartenburg, edited by Major Walter H. James, pp. 136, 137.

CHAPTER XIX

THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF ALEXANDRIA

CAMP BEFORE ALEXANDRIA, 14th August.—I arrived with the Reserve at this camp yesterday, and encamped in three lines upon the right of General Hope's and Doyle's brigades. General Hutchinson is still on board the *Poudrant*, but is expected here this day. I saw him the day before yesterday. I went on board whilst the Reserve were passing the Blockhouse Ferry. He is still very weak and ill. Our position here was strengthened immediately after the action of 21st March, and is now certainly a very formidable one.

CAMP BEFORE ALEXANDRIA, 17th August.—Yesterday morning the Guards, General Ludlow's, Lord Craven and Finch's Brigades, under the command of General Coote, embarked in boats on the new lake, to land to the westward of Alexandria, and complete the investment. This corps consists of nearly 5000 men. In order to favour this movement two lodgments were directed to be made on the flank of the enemy's position. The one on the left was made under the orders of General Cradock; that on the right under mine. The troops for this attack—Stewart's Regiment and the Lowenstein Rangers—assembled under Brigadier-General Stewart after dark in front of our works, and moved forward half-an-hour before daybreak. They drove in the enemy's outposts, and pushed forward a part as far as a commanding hillock within 900 yards of the enemy's works. From this we had a perfect view of their position; but the fire was too great to retain it, and the hillock too

distant for support. Upon the French coming out in force we retired to a position which had been previously selected, where 400 men were at work making an entrenchment. Our taking possession of the hillock mentioned was done with no view but to reconnoitre. We had no hopes of retaining it. The enemy were driven in in the same manner from the Green Hill upon our left. They afterwards came out in some force and attacked us, but were driven back by the 30th Regiment, who charged them. These lodgments are 700 or 800 yards in front of our position. We had five men killed, one officer and thirteen men wounded. On the left there were about thirty killed and wounded. The French upon the left behaved very ill, and fled the moment they were charged, though it was by inferior numbers.

19th August.—On the 17th the entrenchment was, without any interruption from the enemy, made, sufficient to cover Stewart's Regiment. In the evening this regiment was relieved by the 23rd and 28th, the 40th (Hank companies), and Corsican Rangers under Colonel Paget. During the night a working party of 250 men was employed in erecting a two-gun battery to the front and right of the entrenchment, to which a communication was also made. About 2 A.M. the French drove in the Corsican picquets and wounded two men, but did not advance. The picquets resumed their station. This occasioned an alarm, and the picquets and sentries across the plain, which communicate with those from the green hill on the left, ran in. On the 18th De Rolls' Regiment, and that of Watteville, both of Stewart's Brigade, relieved the trenches under Colonel Durler. Three hundred men were employed to reconstruct the two-gun battery on the right of our entrenchment. It was so faulty as to be useless. They also widened and deepened the entrenchments; but these I was this morning disappointed to find still extremely slovenly and defective. In the night some of the enemy again crept near our sentries in the plain and wounded one of them; they also

took prisoner a sergeant of De Rolls'. Our picquets again ran in, and I have found it necessary to take notice in the Division Orders of this repeated misconduct. In truth, it is not want of spirit which makes our men act thus; they are certainly very brave; but our officers and men are extremely ignorant of war, and never have their duties explained to them. General Coote landed the morning after he left this to the westward of Marabon without opposition. He has found abundance of water. I meant to commence a fire against the fort of Marabon this morning. Some heavy guns have been sent to him, and firing has been heard all the morning in that quarter. Brigadier-General Oakes arrived this morning from Rosetta with the Royal and 58th Regiments.

20th August.—The report yesterday from General Coote was rather favourable, and agrees with reports from deserters and others, that the French have paid the whole of their attention to this front, and have neglected that to the westward. Should this prove true, the force to the westward will be augmented, and attack pushed there whilst a demonstration only is made on this side. This front is certainly formidable, and I much doubt if our engineers have talent enough to attack it. We have gained no ground since the 17th, and the works we have erected are ill-executed and paltry. Two hundred Turks were sent to me last night, and at daylight this morning I put them into the broken ground in front of the entrenchment, and withdrew from it the Lowenstein Jagers. Last night the French were perfectly quiet, and this morning, when I went forward at daylight, instead of the usual number of the enemy, which hitherto have been seen at that hour lining their works, I am sure there were not 500 men in them. I suspect that they have been employed the whole of the night working to the westward.

On the 9th of August the army was brigaded as follows —

REGIMENTS AND CORPS.

Major-General Lord Cavan . . .	{ Coldstream Guards 3rd Ditto
Major-General Ludlow, 1st Brigade of the Line	{ 25th 44th 27th, 1st Battalion 27th, 2nd Ditto
Major-General Finch's Brigade of Ditto	{ 24th 54th, 1st Battalion 54th, 2nd Battalion 26th
Brigadier-General Stewart, 3rd Brigade of Ditto	{ Stewart's De Rolls' Dillon's Watteville
Brigadier-General Hope, 4th Ditto .	{ 8th 18th 79th 90th
Brigadier-General Doyle, 5th Ditto .	{ 30th 50th 89th 92nd
Brigadier-General Blako, 6th Brigade	{ Royal 20th, 1st Battalion 20th, 2nd Ditto Ancient Irish
Major-General Moore, Reserve, with Brigadier-General Onkes . . .	{ Queen's 28th 42nd 58th 40th 23d Welsh Fusiliers Grenadiers and 4 compa- nies of Light Infantry. Rifle Corps of Lowenstein Chasseurs Britanniques Corsican Rangers

21st August.—The same appearance of want of men this morning in the French lines. The Turks I placed yesterday in front were very quiet during the night, and have

entrenched themselves upon the green hill on the left; two redoubts have been erected for the security of that position. We did not work last night. Six hundred men were ordered to drag 24-pounders to the left, but were counter-manded in consequence of the want of platforms.

22nd August.—Half of the Lowenstein Jagers went yesterday evening from the Reserve to join General Coote. The other half go this night or to-morrow. The fort of Marabon surrendered last night to General Coote; the garrison consisted of 200 men.

23rd August.—General Coote advanced yesterday in three columns, and took post within three-quarters of a mile of the "Redoute des Bains." He was opposed by scattered infantry only, and by cannon in different batteries which the enemy abandoned on his approach. Five pieces were taken. Some of our ships and gunboats entered the harbour, which the capture of Marabon renders safe. These protected the left flank of General Coote's corps. Our loss is supposed to be about fifty men killed and wounded. We now halve with the enemy the possession of the western harbour, and command completely the entrance of it. Brigadier-General Blake's Brigade, under the command of Colonel Spencer, embarked on the lake yesterday evening to join General Coote; it consists of about 1300 rank and file. In consequence of orders sent to me late last night to give a false alarm to the French, I drove in their picquets at four o'clock this morning, and made the Turks take possession of the small hill we were on on the 17th. This had the full effect. The enemy opened all their batteries upon us, and continued firing until after daylight. One Turk was wounded and two horses killed. It was suspected that the French meant to have attacked General Coote this morning; this alarm was intended to prevent them.

24th August.—General Hutchinson went yesterday to the westward; he returned late last night. The ground there appeared so much more favourable than that on this side

that he has strong hopes of penetrating. General Coote is to open batteries as soon as possible against the Fort des Bains. On this side our works to secure the green hill are not finished. The engineer had proposed advancing on the right, and a strong working party was ordered for the purpose; but, as in General Hutchinson's absence I commanded, I prevented his beginning, and proved to him that he was far from being prepared for such an operation.

26th August.—I went yesterday to General Coote's side. I found a battery of four 24-pounders and four mortars erected against the "Redoute des Bains." The French were not at the pains to return a shot, as the battery was at 1100 or 1200 yards from their works; they contented themselves with throwing shells into our camp. The French picquets were infinitely too much advanced; last night they were driven back; some officers and sixty or seventy men were taken prisoners. The French, in the course of the night, sent out a strong body to regain the ground they had lost, but the 20th and 54th Regiments moved to the support of our picquets and drove them back. We have lost some men and have had some officers wounded, but we must extend our front to the right towards the lake, before we can do anything effectual. The advantage of the western attack is that you get at once at the body of the place; whereas, on this side, if we do gain the fortified heights in our front we have still the other works to besiege, which are quite detached from those of the body of the place. This morning we began a very foolish fire from our batteries on our left. Though I was General of the day I had no orders on the subject; I however went to the battery at daylight. The French did not return a shot for two hours; they then fired some shells and round shot from a few 18-pounders and field-guns. Seeing that our fire was ineffectual we ceased firing, as did the French. No person was hurt.

27th August.—Yesterday evening between six and seven o'clock an aide-de-camp of General Menou came to our

advanced posts, stating he had papers which he wished to deliver in person to General Hutchinson. An order was accordingly sent to admit him. An order was passed between ten and eleven at night to notify that a cessation of hostilities had been agreed to between the two commanders. I have just been with General H., who says they have asked three days to draw up terms of capitulation.

30th August.—Yesterday afternoon General Menou's aide-de-camp returned with a letter, not containing articles of capitulation as he had promised, but a proposal to appoint three commissioners on each side to meet on the 31st between the advanced posts to discuss articles of capitulation. The General sent Menou for answer that he was surprised at such a proposal after he had consented to three days' armistice in order to receive his terms. The General added he would name no commissioners, but hostilities should recommence that night at twelve. Whenever Menou was again inclined to treat, he might send his proposals, when the General would let him know such as could and such as could not be accepted. It was announced to the army that hostilities should recommence at midnight, and a working party of 300 men was ordered for that hour to the green hill. But a second letter from Menou was almost immediately received to beg that hostilities might be deferred until two o'clock this day, when he would transmit the articles of capitulation. This was agreed to. This *début* of Menou's is shuffling, and when put with the rest of his conduct shows that little liberality is to be expected from him.

2nd September.—The articles were sent according to promise. General Hutchinson refused a great many which were very unreasonable, but left very honourable terms. They return to France with their arms and ten pieces of artillery, preserve their private property, and are to embark in two days. The shipping and all public property is to be surrendered.

The capitulation was signed yesterday, and this day at

eleven o'clock our Grenadiers take possession of the front position and of some of the principal works.

11th September.—Orders from England directed Sir John Hutchinson to detach from 3000 to 4000 men under Major-General Cradock to garrison Corfu. The first division of this corps embarked in the ships of war yesterday and are expected to sail this day. The rest of it, I believe, will follow as soon as ships are ready. By the capitulation the French were to have embarked this day, but the want of shipping has prevented it. Several of our officers have been in Alexandria since the signing of the capitulation, but in general there has been but little communication between us and the French. I have visited their works, which are very extensive. The fortified position in our front is strong; the lines are drawn with judgment, and executed with much art. In every part the superiority of their engineers is apparent. Had we attempted to assault them our loss must have been great, and in all probability we should have been repulsed; but we might easily have lodged ourselves near their lines, and erected a fire to silence theirs and to level their works, and from thence the assault would have been certain of success. The approach from the west is more easy, but an obstinate enemy might have held us at bay even there for a fortnight or three weeks longer. They have asked shipping for 11,000 and odd persons, of whom I suppose 5000 will be found to be soldiers carrying arms. They have a considerable number of such, and all the wounded of the three first actions, besides a proportion of civilians.

18th September.—The first division of the French, consisting of about 1500, marched to Aboukir three days ago and embarked. It will be a considerable time before any more can be embarked. Lord Keith sailed with the troops for Corfu before he had made any arrangement for the embarkation of either the French or of us, and left Sir Richard Bickerton to superintend it without necessary instructions, and everything in confusion. On the after-

noon of the 15th, Lord William Bentinck arrived from England with despatches dated the 24th July. He sailed from Portsmouth the 27th. The next morning Sir John Hutchinson sent for me and communicated to me their contents. General Fox is appointed to the command of the troops in the Mediterranean, and upon the supposition that Alexandria, and consequently the whole of Egypt, is by this time in our possession, the following disposition of the troops is directed from home. In the disposition sent out the different regiments are named for each service. The numbers are as follows:—To remain in Egypt, 6000 men, besides the Indian army. For Malta, 7000 men. To go to Gibraltar, and from thence to be employed on a particular service, 4000. The rest, supposed to be about 4500, are to return to England. Upwards of 20,000 men are thus disposed of, whereas the effective force does not exceed 15,000 or 16,000. The allotment of the Generals is, General Moore to Alexandria, General Cradock with the 7000 for Malta, General Coote has the 4000 for particular service, General Ludlow those to go home.

The instructions which accompany this arrangement direct General Fox to send the 7000 men under Cradock to Sicily upon the demand of the British Minister at Naples. They state that as I may be already upon my way home, or incapable from my wound of remaining in the country, in that case Lord Cavan is to be left at Alexandria. It has never been my object to remain in garrison anywhere, and as the Duke of York did me the honour to write to me in June a very polite letter pressing me to return home for the recovery of my wound, which had been reported very bad, and the arrangement was made upon the supposition that I had done so; upon these grounds I founded my plea to General Hutchinson for being permitted to return to England. I added that from letters I had received from home I found my father had been very ill, that I had been very little with him since the commencement of the war; that I knew it would be a great comfort to him as well as to my mother that

I should be with him, which I also said was of importance to my family affairs.

The General very handsomely agreed to my demand, and I expect to sail for Malta in the *Termagant* in a few days. Having an opportunity by way of Constantinople, I wrote to Colonel Brownrigg to acquaint him of my intention to return home, that my father's state of health made it necessary, and that I had had the less scruple in asking leave as my return seemed to have been expected, and an arrangement made accordingly. My leaving this country did not therefore derange any of H.R.H.'s plans, and I hoped that H.R.H. would so far enter into the motives upon which I had acted as not to be displeased at what I had done. H.R.H. knew how much I had already served abroad, and how willing I am to do so still if required. I confessed in my letter to B. that these were not my only motives for returning to England. I owned to him that I felt hurt, after the manner I had served during the whole war, to see that active commands were given to others and that I was proposed to be left in a garrison. I could consider Alexandria as nothing else, and since I was not to be actively employed, I think they might have called me home.

In the arrangement sent out, it is plain that the meaning of Lord Hobart is to favour General Cradock, who happens to be his old schoolfellow, for even General Fox, though appointed Commander-in-chief, seems fixed to Malta in order to leave the immediate command of the troops employed to Cradock. This is a mode of acting which cannot fail to disgust officers who, though they have not been schoolfellows of Lord Hobart, have been serving in every climate since the commencement of the war.

I went into Alexandria two days ago; a Colonel of French Engineers rode round the works with me. The French might certainly have kept us out a fortnight longer, but their works are in a very unfinished state. The Colonel told me that most of them had been begun

since we landed; that, though a plan for the fortifying of Alexandria had been determined, yet the execution had been postponed from the want of funds, and also from the opinion of the Generals who had remained in Egypt that Egypt was to be defended in the field. They had therefore much neglected the fortifying of any particular spot, but trusted to the quick assembling of their army on any emergency. With this view Kleber had always kept a body of 7000 men at Rhamanie as a central spot from whence they could instantly march upon Alexandria, Aboukir, or Damietta. General Menou had neglected this mode of defence. The work they have done since we landed is prodigious; it is what no other troops would have done. The works in general are well executed. The garrison of Alexandria never were quartered in the town but were huddled by demi-brigades, with considerable intervals between each, in what is called the "Enceinte des Arabes," which is the space between the old walls of ancient Alexandria and the wall which enclosed the present modern Alexandria. The huts are made of stone from the ruins, of which the whole Enceinte is composed. Amongst these ruins nothing remains to be looked at but the obelisk called Cleopatra's Needle. This is erect; another upon which the hieroglyphics seem more perfect is lying near it. The ancient walls, which are supposed to have been built by the Saracens, have been repaired by the French so as to form a complete enclosure. On the outside of these and on the side of the inundation is Pompey's Pillar, which is a most beautiful object. It is difficult to conceive how a single pillar can convey so much majesty and beauty.

The inundation formed by the cutting of the Canal of Alexandria has totally altered the defences of Alexandria, and renders most of the works erected by the French superfluous. The real defences of Alexandria consist in the first place in preventing a landing upon the peninsula; for which purpose Aboukir should be fortified; works should be raised to defend the approach to the westward

across the isthmus formed by the lake Mariout and the sea, and the French position to the eastward should be repaired and made more solid. The bed of a canal, which formerly joined the ancient Mærotis to the sea, still exists about three miles to the westward of Alexandria. I walked to it. It might again be opened, and would serve as a barrier to the place on that side. Since the landing of the French in Egypt the trade of Alexandria has been intercepted by our cruisers. Many of the commercial inhabitants have therefore left it since that period, and the population is said to be diminished one half, from 10,000 to 5000. The two days I rode through the town, most of the houses seemed to be uninhabited; the streets were crowded with French soldiers, but very few people of any other description. Should it remain any time in our possession it will again become a place of considerable trade. Under our protection more commercial persons may establish themselves than ever did under the former government, and the town of Alexandria may flourish. It will be the only part of Egypt which will benefit by our conquest; the rest of the country in the hands of the Turks is already pillaged by them, and will continue to be so. This might have been managed otherwise; it was possible for us to give to the Porte a settled revenue. Under the Mamelukes the revenue was only nominal. We might then have fixed some barriers in favour of the people, whom we might have supported and screened from oppression, at least as long as we kept an armed force in the country.

The inhabitants from the beginning have been favourable to us; this has been confirmed by the good treatment they have all along received. Our soldiers have paid for whatever they have had. Never was there in an army so little plunder. Perhaps therefore it was in the power of the English to do more in Egypt than it will ever be in that of any other nation. They hate the French with great reason; their conduct has been infamous and cruel.

AT SEA, 26th September.—I took leave of my friends on the 21st, and embarked in the evening on board the *Termagant* for Malta. The wind not proving fair for getting out of the harbour on the 22nd, we were prevented from sailing until daylight on the morning of the 23rd.

Captain Sewell embarked with me, as he means to join General Villettes. Major Gifford remained with his regiment, as he understood it was going on service.

H.M. SHIP "FOUDROYANT," AT SEA, 30th September.—Yesterday at daylight nine men-of-war were seen; these turned out to be Lord Keith's fleet, which sailed from Aboukir on the 13th with part of the troops under Major-General Cradock, destined originally for Corfu. I waited on Lord Keith, and he invited me to come on board the *Foudroyant*, as he was also bound for Malta. Contrary winds and calms prevented his making greater progress.

MALTA, 8th October.—We arrived here this forenoon, and were immediately admitted to pratique. General Fox, upon whom I waited, arrived from Minorca a fortnight ago. No despatches have come from England since those received by General Hutchinson before I left Egypt. General Fox has consented to my proceeding to England, and I expect to sail in the *Morgiana* brig to-morrow or next day.

"MORGIANA," AT SEA, 13th October.—We sailed from Malta on the afternoon of the 10th; the winds have been favourable; we are now abreast of the small island of Galita. The second division of troops intended for Corfu arrived at Malta the day we left it.

"MORGIANA," OFF THE ROCK OF LISBON.—We passed Gibraltar on the morning of the 27th. We only lay-to in the bay for an hour to deliver some letters for the garrison. We were informed that a peace with France had been signed. This was confirmed to us yesterday by the *Petrel* sloop-of-war, and this morning by the *Superbe*, Captain Keates, who sent us a newspaper of the 10th instant. The rejoicings in both France and England

seemed equally great. I landed at Portsmouth on the 10th November.

The following paper, which appears in the same MS. volumes as the Diary, seems to have been written a year or two after the Egyptian campaign was over; but as it directly concerns the events recorded in the previous chapters, and is a warm defence of Sir Ralph, I think it better to place it here. The heading is his own.

NOTES OCCASIONED BY READING GENERAL REGNIER'S
ACCOUNT OF THE EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGN

The orders to proceed to Egypt were received at Gibraltar the 24th October 1800. The fleet, in which 20,000 were embarked, had been driven to and fro in the Gut of Gibraltar since its return from before Cadiz, the 7th October. The scurvy had begun to show itself, many of the ships wanted repairs, and all of them wanted supplies of water and provisions.

Three days were employed in making arrangements and in separating that part of the force which was directed to serve in Portugal under Sir James Pulteney; on the 27th it sailed for the Tagus. On the same day the first division of the Egyptian army sailed for Minorca. For the sake of expedition and in order to procure the repairs and supplies for the fleet, it was determined to sail in small divisions. Whilst a part of the fleet was repaired and victualled at Gibraltar, another watered in Tetuan Bay, and the rest sailed to Minorca and Malta. The whole had orders to rendezvous at Malta. Whilst the ships were being repaired and victualled in those different ports, the sick were landed, fresh meat and provisions were procured for the troops and sailors, quantities of lemons were laid in against scurvy, and such attention was paid, that when the armament collected at Malta towards the end of

November the fleet and army were remarkably healthy. The fleet was ready to sail from Malta on the 13th December, but it was detained by contrary winds until the 20th; it arrived in Marmaras Bay on the 1st and 2nd of January 1801. The Gulf of Makri, of which Marmaras is one of the harbours, had been pitched upon to form a junction with the Turkish fleet, under the Captain Pacha, and as a convenient station for the armament to get wood and water, and then to take its final departure for the coast of Egypt. At this place also, and at Rhodes, the Quartermaster-General and Commissaries were directed to assemble the variety of stores and provisions they had been ordered to collect for the army. These gentlemen had been despatched from Gibraltar in a fast-sailing brig-of-war, with orders to precede the expedition and to provide, in the different ports, shipping, guides, and the numberless articles required by the army to enable it to make a descent and afterwards act in Egypt.

From whatever cause it proceeded, whether from the ignorance of Ministers, after seven years of war, of what was necessary for an army beyond men and arms, or their conviction that the French army in Egypt was, from its number and composition, so despicable that the appearance of a British force was alone sufficient to induce it to surrender, so it was that when Sir Ralph received his orders at Gibraltar he had about 14,000 infantry and artillery, including 2500 dismounted dragoons; the soldier and his sword, but not a horse for either cavalry or artillery; not a waggon nor the means of conveying a single article a yard from the beach. Whatever representations he made to Ministers upon this subject, he lost not a moment in proceeding with the execution of his orders. The Commissariat had orders to prepare in the best manner whatever they could. Sir Ralph considered the expedition from the beginning as rash and ill-judged. He could not persuade himself, merely upon such information as the intercepted letters contained, that an army of 40,000 of the best soldiers of France, which had left their country

but a year and a half before, and which had suffered but little from the sword, could already be so much reduced, either in number or quality, as to give him hopes that with a force such as was given to him he should be able to force a descent, undertake a siege, and finally dispossess them of Egypt. He, however, at once made up his mind to the undertaking; he felt the disgrace which had undeservedly fallen upon the army because of the ridiculous exhibitions at Ferrol and before Cadiz. He was determined, whatever might be the result of this expedition, that no disgrace should attach to him or the troops he commanded; that they should faithfully perform their duty to their country, and, if they failed of success, it would be because success was not to be obtained against such superior advantages of number and situation.

This sentiment was ever uppermost in his mind. He often expressed it, and it would appear that he had infused it into his army. For they, as well as the Commander-in-chief, knew how arduous was the undertaking upon which they were sent. They knew nothing of the character of the French General. They respected the French troops, and knew the victories they had achieved. They expected to be opposed to superior numbers in an open country, without cavalry or artillery to oppose those of the enemy. They were warned of the difficulties under which they must labour from want of water and of every comfort. But they loved their Commander, had complete confidence in his talents and experience, and were determined to submit cheerfully to every deprivation in the execution of his orders. He confided in their valour, and trusted, whatever might be the issue, to convince the world that no enterprise, however arduous, could deter British troops from attempting it in the service of their country. Upon the arrival of the fleet at Marmaras few or none of the preparations made by the Quartermaster-General were yet in any forwardness. Both he and the officers of the Commissariat had been sufficiently diligent, and had agents employed in every part of the Levant; but that country affords but few means, and the

nature of the government and the disposition of the inhabitants make it difficult to command those few. It was the 18th of February before everything was collected. The time which had been spent at Malta and Marmaras was, however, usefully employed. The Commander inspected the regiments and brigades separately. He gave praise where it was due, and was severe in his animadversions wherever he observed carelessness or inattention. He became thus acquainted with the state of every corps and the character of its commander. Discipline was improved and emulation excited. Corps were landed daily for exercise. The men were warned of the importance of preserving invariably their order in an open country exposed to the attacks of cavalry; and the attention of the general officers was called to adopt the simplest and most speedy modes of forming from the column of march columns to resist the shocks of cavalry. The troops, particularly those intended for the disembarkation, were placed in the boats in which they were intended to disembark, and arranged with the guns in their proper order, and the landing was practised several times in the order in which it was afterwards executed.

Whilst at Marmaras, the 12th and 26th Regiments of Dragoons joined from Portugal, but, unfortunately, they had been ordered to leave their horses behind them. It was not taken into consideration that this expedition could only last a few months, and that if cavalry could be at all of use it must be in the beginning, and, therefore, if the expense was what prevented the horses from being sent, it would have been better to have saved the whole and not even sent the men. Lord Elgin had been asked to purchase horses for the cavalry and staff officers, and he accordingly did send 300 or 400, but his Lordship must have been miserably deceived by those he employed, for the horses he sent were the worst possible. The least weak were selected for the artillery, and practised in drafts. The rest, with such as were purchased in the neighbourhood, amounting to about 400, were distributed among the cavalry, but cavalry so badly mounted, and upon horses not trained, could not cope

with the French, and they could therefore be employed only as patrols and videttes. The preparations were all finished on the 18th January, and with the first fair wind the armament sailed on the 2nd February. The causes I have stated, not those imputed with so much illiberality by General Regnier, are those which retarded the expedition. Indeed, when everything is considered, it is rather a matter of surprise that it was ready so soon. Sir Ralph's measures were taken with judgment and foresight, and his purpose pursued with a degree of temper and perseverance which seldom has been equalled. The moment the preparation was completed the armament left Marmaras. Sir Ralph depended solely upon the British force he took with him. He could place no reliance in any co-operation with the Vizier. The officers he had sent to that army had reported its advance as problematical, and at any rate its composition as so despicable as to render any assistance it could offer as very trifling. The Captain Pacha, with his reinforcement, was still at Constantinople, and at that time no information had reached us of an intended co-operation from the Red Sea.

A French general may be excused for ignorance of what retards maritime expeditions, and still more of the causes of delay to which British expeditions are exposed.

From this point the notes are only continued in fragments, but I give them as they stand, because of their general application to many parts of Moore's career; evidently he had intended to make the notes much more complete.

There are other causes of delay and difficulty to which British generals are subject of which the French have no experience, and for which it is not surprising if they make no allowance. The military expeditions of France have, during this war, been planned by military men, frequently by the very generals who were to execute them, who knew and took care to provide whatever was necessary. The

military operations of Great Britain have been directed by Ministers ignorant of military affairs, and too arrogant and self-sufficient to consult military men. Sir Ralph Abercromby, when he received his orders at Gibraltar to attack Egypt, had from 14,000 to 15,000 infantry and artillery, 250 dismounted cavalry, not a horse for either cavalry or artillery, not a waggon or the means of conveying an article a yard from the beach. In short, there was the soldier and his sword, and thus provided he was ordered to take the field and undertake sieges. He was without any information with respect either to the force or the disposition of the French army, except what was contained in the intercepted letters. The surprise is that he was able to act so soon, and that, in four months from his departure from Gibraltar, he was enabled to equip his army and to land in Egypt; and this would not have been accomplished but for the judgment and foresight with which he made his arrangements. His coolness, assiduity, and perseverance in following his purpose, in spite of numberless vexations and disappointments, were truly admirable. Every precaution was taken to preserve the health of the men. The sick were landed at the different ports, and officers left in charge of them with orders to forward them as soon as they were sufficiently recovered. By this means infection was prevented, and, though the numbers were diminished, yet what remained were healthy and fit to act, and the sick when recovered and forwarded had the effect of a reinforcement.

Shortly after his return to England Moore received from the officers who had served under him a sword, accompanied by the following letter:—

*Letter from Colonel the Hon. EDWARD PAGET to
Major-General MOORE.*

“April 1802.

“SIR,—The Commanding Officers of those corps, who had originally the good fortune to be placed under your command in the reserve of the Army in Egypt,

have commissioned me to present a sword to you in their name, and to request that you will accept and consider it as a token of their unbounded esteem.

“It would be presumptuous, Sir, in me to attempt to point out in you what are those rare talents which you possess, the application of which has rendered you the object of so much veneration to the corps which had the honour to serve under your immediate command. I must therefore content myself, Sir, with alone entreating you to believe that, whatever these are, they have not been less successfully exerted in promoting the interest of His Majesty’s service and in confirming the glory of our native country throughout an arduous and memorable campaign than they have been in fixing on a basis never to be shaken the affections and admiration of those in whose name I have the honour to subscribe myself, with every sense of respect, Sir,—Yours, &c. &c.,

“EDWARD PAGET.”

The Answer—To Colonel the Hon. EDWARD PAGET, &c. &c.

“April 1802.

“SIR,—I had the honour to receive your letter to me, in the name of the Officers commanding the corps which composed the reserve of the Army in Egypt, together with the sword which they have done me the honour to present to me. Such a present, from men themselves so respectable and whose conduct has merited so much praise, cannot fail to be equally flattering and pleasing to me, in whatever light I consider it—as a mark of their approbation or a token of their friendship and regard.

“I beg that you and those gentlemen will accept of

my warmest thanks. Be assured that I shall be proud of wearing their sword upon every occasion ; and when it becomes necessary to draw it, I hope it may be at the head of men like them and those they commanded, who leave little else to their General than to emulate their example and second their ardour in the road to fame and honourable distinction.—I have, &c. &c.,

“JOHN MOORE.”

CHAPTER XX

FRONTING NAPOLEON. THE NEW DISCIPLINE

MOORE on his return was for a short time occupied with family business consequent upon his father's death, which took place soon after he arrived. The Peace of Amiens was not actually signed till the 27th March 1802, Addington being then Premier. It led at once to a large reduction of the army, and Moore, who was at first stationed at Brighton in command of a force of all arms, was busily employed on the details involved in the discharge of officers and men. His Diary ceases during this period, but from 8th February 1802 there is a voluminous correspondence showing the nature of his work. At Brighton, where he was under the orders of Lieutenant-General Hulse, then at Canterbury, there is nothing of sufficient interest to record. About the middle of June 1802 he succeeded Lieutenant-General Hulse in command of the district, and moved to Canterbury. His old Corsican commander, General David Dundas, was at this time Quartermaster-General, and most of the correspondence with London is carried on with him, with Major-General Brownrigg, the Military Secretary, and with Colonel Calvert, the Adjutant-General. Though each particular detail is a matter of mere routine, the correspondence as a whole shows the gradual evolution of order out of a chaos which startles any soldier acquainted with the methods of our own time. Grave

as may be our defects in organisation, we have made progress since then.

A letter of 14th July 1802 is of much interest, because it records Moore's high appreciation of the value of the services of the corps of Corsicans which was formed out of those officers and men who had wished to attach themselves to the English army when we vacated the island. They were made into a very effective body by Captain Lowe, afterwards the Sir Hudson Lowe of St. Helena fame, and were extremely useful under Moore in the Egyptian campaign. In pressing their claims on General Brownrigg, Moore says of them that should war break out again they would, if now well treated, furnish us with a body of men "better adapted to the service of light troops than any, I shall venture to say, that we shall have. The Corsicans are naturally attached to the English. They are brave, intelligent, and faithful." It is a letter significant in more ways than one. First, it shows what might have been made of the Corsican corps during our possession of the island had they been organised under an effective administration. Secondly, the letter suggests the almost entire lack in our army of light troops. The provision made by Moore for these will be the chief subject of this chapter.

In October 1802 he was moved to Chatham. In the reductions due to the peace Moore made great efforts to ensure that good and effective officers should be retained, and that those who took no interest in their profession should go, so that even the reductions might tend to improve the quality of the regiments as they would remain. The following letter, a specimen of many, will show how the reduction was carried out

in detail. He writes to General Brownrigg from Chatham on 8th December 1802 :—

Lieutenants M^cP. and J. request to be permitted to retire on half-pay, which request I hope H.R.H. will be good enough to grant. Ensign B. will prefer being placed on half-pay to remaining elder ensign. Lieutenants Court—— and Van—— prefer being reduced on half-pay to serving upon ensign's pay.

And then in a postscript :—

It may appear to H.R.H. that should Lieutenants M^cP. and J—— be placed on half-pay, Lieutenants Court—— and Van—— may in that case be considered as permanent lieutenants, and not of the number to serve on ensign's pay. But I can assure H.R.H. that the service will not suffer if they are put on half-pay, agreeable to their wish, and Lieutenants Cook and Luchel advanced in lieu of M^cP. and J.

As in the same letter two other lieutenants who have come to grief are cleared out, it will be seen how vigorous was the purging which Moore's own regiment, the 52nd, was undergoing at this time.

The next letter I shall notice will need some introduction. Mr. Fortescue has traced the earlier steps taken in the formation of bodies of light infantry in our army. He has shown that during the wars with the French in America, and during the war of American Independence, the conditions forced all our more active and far-seeing soldiers to adopt some system for meeting on their own terms, but with the advantages of discipline, the Indians and the backwoodsmen. Howe in 1758 was beginning the training of light infantry. "We must learn the art of war from the Indians," said Brigadier Forbes. Washington, then fighting as a British officer in charge of irregulars, wished to put

men and officers into Indian dress, and set the example himself. Howe formed a regiment known as "Gage's Light Infantry." It was at the time numbered the 80th.¹ Wolfe, taking the best marksmen of each regiment, organised them into a separate corps (vol. ii. p. 361). Amherst and Wolfe used bodies of marksmen often armed with rifles. "Morgan's Light Infantry" was for a short time formed and numbered the 90th Regiment (p. 591). Tarleton Simcoe and Ferguson had met the Americans with their own weapons.²

"Almost every important action of the war was fought on heavily-wooded ground"—that and "the deadly marksmanship of the American riflemen" had for the time forced officers on the spot to adopt a mode of training and a kind of equipment very different from any that had been known in England.

Nevertheless, till the date of Jena, 1806, the tactics of Frederick the Great were the model for the Continent. David Dundas, who had more perfectly than any one else studied the methods of Prussia, had become the great authority in England. After the peace in 1763 all the light companies had been reduced, though they were re-established seven years later, after all war experience had been lost. In 1774 light companies of seven regiments were assembled at Salisbury, and exercised as a battalion by General Howe. In 1798 a brigade was formed under Howe, consisting of a detachment of royal horse artillery, two troops of light horse, and two light companies, and were exercised on the Essex coast. A system of light infantry drill was there carried out. In the same year a German book on light infantry drill was trans-

¹ Fortescue, vol. ii. pp. 323, 324.

² *Ibid.*, vol. iii. p. 529.

lated, and recommended to the attention of all officers by the Commander-in-chief.¹ All these had been evanescent attempts to prepare such troops for a special emergency. Moore's letter naming the Corsicans under Lowe's training as the best he expected to see, shows how little of past experience gathered from the American wars had been available when it was wanted.

When Moore was commanding a brigade at Chelmsford after his return from the Helder (chap. xv.), a circular (17th January 1800) had been issued to the commanding officers of fourteen regiments desiring them to select two sergeants, a corporal, and thirty privates each. One captain, one lieutenant, and an ensign, who volunteered for the work, were to be selected and detached as for a temporary duty for light infantry work. They were assembled at Horsham in March 1800, and a camp was formed at Swanley for training. It was broken up at the end of July 1800. During most of the time that this camp was in existence, Moore was on his way to the Mediterranean with Sir Ralph, and I can trace no allusion to it in any of his papers. This miscellaneous collection of light infantrymen was reorganised at Blatchington under Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart in August 1800. Charles Napier joined the camp there on 25th December 1800. For this camp Colonel Manningham drew up a series of "Regulations for Riflemen." The two officers who had had this experience, Colonel Coote Manningham and Lieutenant-Colonel the Honourable William Stewart, in 1802 drew up a memorandum to Government proposing a

¹ See vol. v. of the *Oxfordshire Light Infantry Chronicle*, "History of Light Infantry," by Colonel Mockler Ferryman.

corps furnished with arms of precision, and pointing out the advantage of training such a corps in the duties of riflemen. I cannot in Moore's correspondence trace any evidence of the fact, but it is said that this memorandum was in 1802 referred to him, and it is intrinsically probable that it would be so, because it was to Moore that at this time all the authorities around the Duke of York were in the habit of referring any question of practical soldiering. I do not know what his answer may have been, but on 2nd October 1802 Moore sends to Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart a route for the "march of the 'rifle corps' under your command" to Shorncliffe, and at the end of the letter says: "I hope you will find the station at Shorncliffe adapted both to your target practice and field movements."

Shorncliffe was in the district of which Chatham was the headquarters, and a little later Moore urged that if Shorncliffe was to be made a permanent station, additional ground should be assigned to the rifle corps. Large portions of the land in possession of the Government had been let by the Ordnance Department to farmers. During the spring of 1803 a series of lectures, afterwards published in an octavo volume, were delivered to the 95th on the duties of riflemen by Colonel Coote Manningham.

In the same year "Regulations for the Exercise of Riflemen and Light Infantry in the Field, with diagrams and two pages of bugle sounds," were issued, with a preface which states that it is founded on a work written by a German officer of distinction. The preface is signed by the Adjutant-General.

These were the circumstances which had preceded the formation, under Moore, of the camp at Shorn-

cliffe, which not only created the light infantry division of the Peninsular War, but was the introduction of a new form of discipline different altogether from that of the time, and destined, like many products of Moore's mind, to be vindicated by the course of history, the very stars in their courses fighting in its behalf.

It is clear indeed that Moore must have been for some time in consultation with the officers at headquarters on the necessity for the formation of a body of light infantry. I think that he had had several conversations with them in London, very probably caused by his rather startling statement that the most efficient body of the kind we were likely, after all our war experiences, to possess was Lowe's battalion of Corsicans. The first actual document that I know of which introduces the subject is an order of Moore's at Chatham, in which he publishes a Horse-Guards order of the 10th January 1803. This order announces that the 2nd battalion of the 52nd Regiment is to become the 96th Regiment, and that transfers of officers between the two on certain assigned conditions are to take place. This was followed by a second order of 18th January, announcing that the 52nd was to become a corps of light infantry, and that men were to be selected accordingly from the two battalions, so that, the 96th being constituted as a line regiment, and soon afterwards sent off to Ireland, the 52nd should be supplied with men suitable for light infantry work.¹

From this time Moore's correspondence is full of the subject. His constant anxiety is, in the first

¹ Given in Captain Moorsom's "Historical Record of the 52nd Regiment" (Oxfordshire Light Infantry), 1860, p. 61. †

instance, as to the selection of officers, and primarily of the commanding officer. The delicacy of this operation will perhaps best be suggested by the following extract from a letter to General Brownrigg, of the 17th January 1803 :—

“When I am authorised to announce the intention of forming the 52nd as a light corps, perhaps some of those officers least adapted to that service may, of themselves, apply to be removed to the 96th, in which case others might be chosen without regard to seniority. But such as will not make this option may be removed gradually hereafter, when opportunities offer of doing it without injury to them. A most essential point is the choice of an officer to place at the head of such a corps, and fortunately the situation of the present lieutenant-colonels of the 52nd Regiment, who hold staff employment, enables H.R.H. to remove one, or both of them, without injuring either their interest or their feelings, and of bringing forward officers who, with the necessary talents, have the inclination to dedicate their whole time to their duty. Of this description, Lieutenant-Colonel M'Kenzie of the 44th is one; and if H.R.H. chooses I can write to him on the subject—and perhaps it will be best to remove one lieutenant-colonel only at first, reserving the other in case a fit person presents himself hereafter.”

M'Kenzie had served under Moore during the Egyptian campaign. The regimental tradition is that when he first saw M'Kenzie's mode of working his battalion he did not like it, but that when he had more carefully studied it he came entirely to approve of it. At all events, the proof of his belief in M'Kenzie's capacity lies in the fact that in his first letter on the subject of the selection of officers he asked to have him brought from another regiment to command his

picked corps. The selection of men for light infantry duties was a much more obvious and simple matter.

"The service of light infantry," he writes in this letter to Brownrigg, "does not so much require men of stature as it requires them to be intelligent, handy, and active, and they should in the first instance be young, or they will neither take to the service nor be easily instructed in it."

The selections were made accordingly; the grenadiers going to the 96th, and men who, without being tall, were young and active, replacing them in the 52nd. Last came the question of arms and equipment, the details of which are not now of interest for my purpose, though they occupied very much of Moore's care and attention at the time.

Though on the 8th March 1803 a message had been sent from the King to Parliament, announcing that it had become necessary to prepare for war, Moore seems to have shared a very general belief that Napoleon was only bluffing, and "calculated," as he puts it, "on Buonaparte's retreating whenever it came to the last." On the 15th May, whilst still at Chatham, he received a private letter from Brownrigg, which warned him of the necessity for immediate steps for the defence of the kingdom. He naturally asks how he is to be employed, what troops are to be under him, &c. Of the district of which he is in immediate command he writes:—

"From Deal to Dungeness is a long line. Dover and the castles of Sandown, Deal, and Walmer may be susceptible of defence. The forts from Hythe to Dungeness are capable of none, but must be abandoned the moment a landing is effected. No infantry should be stationed in them, unless a few are necessary to assist the artillery in working the guns——"

with more as to the actual situation at the time now of only antiquarian interest.

By the 2nd June he has already moved to Sandgate, having been appointed to the command of the brigade which from this time immediately fronted Napoleon's preparations at Boulogne for the invasion of England. Sir David Dundas had been given the command of the whole southern district. Moore's attention is now mainly directed to two objects—the formation and working up of his brigade for war efficiency, and the mode of meeting invasion if it takes place. It will be convenient to deal with the second of these two subjects first, because, while some of Moore's views thereon are of permanent interest and very suggestive for all time, yet the circumstances have so completely changed that comparatively little remains strictly applicable to the future. Of the more permanent interest of the new discipline which Moore introduced at Shorncliffe there will be much to say.

The scheme of home defence, at the time when war began again, was based on the notion of our attempting in England what Wellington afterwards carried out in Portugal. The idea was to “drive the country,” as it was called, that is to say, to endeavour to leave the enemy without means of subsistence. Moore's reasons for disapproving of this attempt in England are given in the following letter. It must be remembered before it is read that at this time the vast army of volunteers had not been enrolled. With reference to Dungeness and the Militia it is necessary to observe that though the forts did not admit of defence, Moore attached the greatest importance to the effect of the fire of the guns and of the Militia upon an enemy whilst still in the boats. It is obvious that the

Militia could not be left in an indefensible fort whilst the water was being let out over the country in their rear. Hence the order for their retirement to a point in rear of this inundation as soon as the enemy had landed. For many years past (at least once in six months) some one has forwarded me certain sarcastic remarks by the late Colonel Duncan, M.P., the writer of the "History of the Royal Artillery," upon the orders of Moore to the East Kent Militia, founded upon Sir David Dundas's approval of the proposals in the letter I am about to give. Colonel Duncan's paper, in which these criticisms are contained, is an interesting illustration of the danger of commenting upon orders the motives for which one does not know.

To Lieutenant-General Sir DAVID DUNDAS.

SANDGATE, 1st July 1803.

DEAR GENERAL,— . . . Since I wrote last I have been with Colonel Twiss round Dungeness. The works at that place are so faulty, that it is hardly possible immediately to adopt measures to make them defensible. A tower in each of the five works would be requisite—and these would not be sufficient for the extent to be defended. It would be unwise to abandon this post. Colonel Twiss intends, therefore, to repair the stockading, and whatever is deficient in the four forts and centre redoubt, to mount four guns in the latter, to remove the other four guns from it, with whatever stores and ammunition is in excess of what is immediately required for the service of the artillery actually mounted.

Thus Dungeness must be considered as a post of observation, and to give protection to ships anchoring within reach of its forts: to oppose by its fire the disembarkation of troops; the moment the enemy are landed the garrison to retire, spiking the guns, and blowing up the

ammunition, and to this purport, if you approve, shall the instructions be drawn for the Militia intended to be stationed there. The real defence of Dungeness will rest in the difficulty of crossing so great a track of shingle, and in the power we shall have, whilst we command the sluices at Dyme Church and Scot's Float, of filling the ditches, and, by cutting the dyke, inundating the marsh, and thus confining the advance of an enemy to a very few roads. With this view Colonel Twiss proposes to erect a tower at each sluice. In the meantime an arrangement should be made to ensure the sluices being opened should the descent of an enemy in that quarter render such a measure advisable.

Major-General Cartwright proposes that two sheds should be erected, the one half-way between Rye Harbour and the nearest fort of Dungeness, the other between the Sandwich River and the nearest fort towards Deal, for the purposes of patrol, as otherwise those intervals cannot be watched. Some directions, he thinks, must likewise be given to the cavalry in Sussex to communicate with the 14th Regiment in Kent. The detachment of the 2nd Dragoons at Rye and Winchelsea is very small, and commanded by a non-commissioned officer.

I am sorry to find, from your letter, that the former measures of driving the country are to be adopted. It was, I understand, a favourite one of Sir C. Grey, and much ingenuity was shown by Colonel Taylor in the details he drew out for its execution. If ten days' or a fortnight's notice were to be given, it might be practicable. A few hours' notice, in all probability, is all we shall have. It will then be impossible; at any rate, in my opinion, it will be unadvisable. England is a country so well stocked, that no effort will remove to any distance the means of subsistence. It may be laid down as an axiom, that as long as an enemy is permitted to stand on English ground so long will he subsist on English property. Every effort should be made that his stay should be as short as possible, and assurance given by Parliament that the loss of

individuals will be made good by the community at large. Horses and waggons alone should be removed, and in the coast counties every man capable of work or of bearing arms must be enrolled, and belong to some association, company, battalion, or whatever name is preferred.

Every man will thus know his leaders, who of course will be the neighbouring gentlemen and better sort of farmers, and his place of rendezvous. The county, thus organised, is never to assemble but when the enemy is in sight, to fight for their own county, not to be marched into any other. Signals of alarm established, and universally known, upon which every man runs to his post. Depôts of arms and ammunition lodged in various parts in aid of those already in the possession of individuals, the number of which should be ascertained. Every man to go to his alarm post with two or three days' provision. This force, when assembled, to be under the direction of the general officer commanding. Previous exercise I deem unnecessary. Most men, I take for granted, can fire and load a musket. Some few simple, general directions only might be printed and distributed for the instruction and guidance of those persons who would act, in such a mass, as officers and leaders.

The measures hitherto adopted have been with a view to drive and retreat, which leads to confusion and despondency, and is consistent with a warfare in which the French excel and to which the English are the least adapted. The language and the system should be to head and to oppose, and no foot of ground ceded that was not marked with the blood of the enemy. Nothing would damp his spirit more than to see the country turned out against him. He knows the strength of our army—regular, militia, and reserve—and will come prepared to meet, and may hope to beat it. But how penetrate or subdue a country where the population are armed and opposed to him? If the inhabitants of this neighbourhood occupied the heights, I should not doubt but that the force I have, thus aided, would drive into the sea any

force France could send against us; or, if we did not, we should leave them without power to follow, or inclination to engage in such another encounter.

Moore continued to press this question of the right mode of defence, and he writes on 21st July 1803 to Colonel Gordon :—

“I am sorry to have confirmed by you, what I already suspected, that little benefit has arisen from the county meetings. There is, however, much good spirit in the county. It wants to be directed, and this Sir D. could do if he went to those meetings prepared and determined to take a lead. You may depend upon it he would be listened to, and his directions followed. The want of previous arrangement will throw us into confusion at the moment of action, and we shall lose the advantage, which will never recur, of opposing the enemy at landing.

“The gentlemen here are sensible of the folly of attempting to drive the county. Those with whom I have spoken see all the mischief with which the system is pregnant. They submit to it as to authority, but would infinitely prefer to be desired to enrol men to fight. They only wish to see an Act passed to indemnify from the public stock all losses sustained from the enemy when they are opposing him. I shall speak to the magistrates, and endeavour to ensure the arrival of sufficient waggons for the camp.”

After a time, other influences no doubt contributing, Moore's views prevailed. “Driving the country” was given up, and the Volunteer Act was introduced into Parliament; but, as so often happens with us, the nation at large was not fully informed of the change of view, and Moore writes to Sir David Dundas to point out the evil consequences of this :—

“It is impossible to witness the good disposition of the people generally in this part of the district and not regret

that so little advantage is taken to animate them to stand forth in defence of their coast. They have been coldly called upon, since the meeting at Sittingbourne, to give in lists of their stock, and put down their names for particular services, but no encouragement has been given to arms over guides, drivers, &c., and the consequence has been that the number to carry arms is much the smallest. If the idea of driving is given up as inexpedient or impracticable the people should surely be told so, and their attention turned another way. At present, for want of explicit instructions, they are kept in a state of suspense which tends to lessen their confidence in themselves and others. At this instant, if they were attacked, the military excepted, not a man would know what is expected of him. I am daily more convinced, that in the present disposition of the country, if proper means were adopted, the enemy, in whatever numbers he appeared, might be baffled in his first attempt, and never get beyond the beach; but if he gets over the landing without loss, and once penetrates, the spirit this will give him, the despondency it will cause in us, will render his expulsion very difficult. The measures pursued in the counties, and the Bill pending in Parliament, are in complete contradiction. The measures pursued, similar to those followed at the end of the last war, inculcate the impossibility of resistance in the first instance, and instruct to drive and to retreat. The Bill for arming the people, if carried into effect, will ensure success in the first instance. It will, at all events, enable us to wait at the points attacked, with the certainty of powerful and immediate support. But, between the two, people are puzzled, and the present movement is rendered weak beyond what there is any necessity for.

Bunbury has well described the preparations that were being made on the opposite side of the Channel for the embarkation of the invading army:—

“In the meantime Bonaparte had loudly proclaimed his determination to conquer peace in London—in other

words, to subjugate Great Britain. To this task he applied himself with characteristic energy. Through the summer and autumn of 1803 every river and port from Ushant to the Texel was ringing with the clink of hammers and the din of multitudes employed in building the greatest flotilla that ever darkened the sea. Napoleon hoped at first that he should be able to make his attack at some time in the winter of 1803-4, and such were the exertions used that nearly one thousand of his vessels were collected at Boulogne before the end of December. . . .

"Various establishments on a gigantic scale were found to be indispensable at and near Boulogne. Great basins, too, were to be excavated there, and at Etaples, Ambletuse, and Wimereux for the reception of the vessels. Forts also were to be constructed, and with great difficulty, *in the sea*, for the protection of the outer roadsteads."

These preparations, and the gathering of the hostile army in the great camp, aroused a passionate flame not only of national patriotism, but of detestation of the man Napoleon.

"There had suddenly blazed up in the breasts of millions a fierce, uninquiring, unappeasable detestation of the individual."

Before the end of the autumn Moore's wish had been more than fulfilled, 342,000 men had enrolled themselves, were provided with arms, and were devoting their leisure hours to military exercises. "Still," as Bunbury puts it,

"our preparations were only in their infancy; and if Napoleon could have crossed the Channel in the winter of 1803-4, as he first designed, our means to meet his veteran troops would have been found utterly unfit for battle, though the determination of the British people not to be conquered, and the unyielding temper of our stout old King, would have prevailed, though after long suffering and incalculable losses."

Whether it be true or not that those losses must, in that event, have been incurred, depends on the question whether Moore's confident conviction was or was not just, that the force he had, with this support behind it, "would drive into the sea *any* force France could send against us; or, if we did not, we should leave them without power to follow, or inclination to engage in such another encounter." For of all that unordered national enthusiasm, Moore's brigade at Shorncliffe was on land the shield and buckler, and it was in that confident spirit that with it he faced the hosts of Napoleon. No one, to that generation of Englishmen, would have dared to propound the shameless invention that—

"The constitution of Moore's mind led him to look at the dark rather than the hopeful aspect of things; and it was his further misfortune to have imbibed that exaggerated opinion of the French as a military people, the ability of their Generals, and the consummate wisdom of their Emperor, which the enemies of Government in England were always labouring to produce for the purpose of humbling the spirit of their country."

The initial misconception which led on Southey to his reckless misrepresentations is more conveniently nailed to the table at this point than at any other, because during the particular period of which I am now writing Moore was continually engaged at county meetings in rousing the spirit of the people, with great effect, and, as I have shown in the specimens I have quoted, with the fullest confidence of assured victory.

Necessarily, the brigade itself that was to stand in the forefront against an invasion which the whole nation was expecting was the prime subject of Moore's

care. Now at last he had the opportunity of putting into practice those principles which he had years before expounded in St. Lucia to Sir Ralph Abercromby. The circumstances all favoured him. The fact that under the keenly strained eyes of the whole nation this brigade was fronting the hosts across the narrow straits gave a moral power to the man who commanded it that enabled him to call upon those under him for exertions that could scarcely have been exacted, in England at least, during the piping times of peace. He used that power to the full. It would probably nowadays startle and offend a father who proposed to send his son a horse to be told, as one under such circumstances was told by Moore, "that he should be very pleased that the horse should be sent, but that it would be necessary for the father to send with it some one to ride it, for his son would have no time to do so." The saying represented pretty nearly the fact for all those who then served under Moore. The training which was to be now taught was new, and in some sort experimental, and required every man's devotion to ensure its perfection.

Moore was, as his letters to Gordon and others show, gradually working it out with his lieutenant-colonels; yet receiving for that purpose little help from any one save M'Kenzie. The question of the selection of officers was still, as always, the most important one, and he writes on 4th September 1803 to Colonel Calvert:—

"I had hopes, from the pains I have taken, and the mode I directed to be followed in the instruction of the regiments of my brigade, to have made much progress, and if honoured with another visit from H.R.H. to have shown him something tolerably perfect, but except in the 52nd the progress has been trifling. The other

commanding officers, though many of them good enough men, have not military heads, and seem incapable of acting from general instruction. I am satisfied that to have a tolerable army it will be necessary for H.R.H. to take some strong measures. Some commanding officers, the state of whose regiments justify it, must be told to retire from the service, the duties of which they are unequal to. The command must not be allowed to devolve upon their majors, who may be equally incapable, but be given to officers of approved talents. One or two measures of this sort generally known would excite an exertion which at present is much wanted."

Hitherto, in this matter of his choice of officers, I have shown chiefly Moore's care to eliminate the inefficient and to replace them by men whom he had proved and found worthy. The next three letters will show the generosity with which he espoused the cause of those who had no other friend, and the kind of qualities that enlisted his sympathy. As will be seen, these three letters were all sent in June, but I give them as specimens, and they are more appropriate at this point.

To Colonel CLINTON.

SANDGATE, 6th June.

DEAR SIR,—I take the liberty to enclose a memorial from a young lad upon the half-pay of the 42nd Regiment. He has sent it to me, begging that I would forward it to His Royal Highness. He is a young lad of spirit, which he had occasion to display on more than one occasion when under my command. The circumstance to which he alludes in his memorial I remember at the time. He was then an ensign, and when the 42nd was ordered for the expedition he received the notification of his appointment to a lieutenancy in the 93rd at home, but he refused it, and accompanied the 42nd, in which he afterwards

got a lieutenancy, and was reduced. Had he accepted that in the 93rd he would now be the second oldest in the regiment.

Though born a gentleman he has little money, and I believe few friends to assist him. What perhaps may interest you in his favour, I own it has me, is that he is nephew to a Major McLean, famous for his gallant conduct in the Seven Years' War—you must have heard Sir Henry Clinton speak of him. They were aides-de-camp at the same time to the Hereditary Prince. He had but one arm; he had lost the other in the West Indies, and was killed, the last action of the war, at Burgers Mill.

You will perhaps think me importunate in my recommendations, but officers who have no interest naturally look to the General under whom they have served, and when I know their conduct has been good, I feel it a duty to forward their pretensions to His Royal Highness.

To Messrs. COX, GREENWOOD AND COX.

SANDGATE, 12th June.

GENTLEMEN,—It seems to me but a shabby proceeding in Government to oblige the first lieutenants of regiments to raise men for rank, as they are in general a class of officer without money, and have already had the mortification to see several of their juniors purchase over them. Lieutenant Charles Rowan, the eldest lieutenant of the 52nd Regiment, is exactly in this predicament, but as he is a good young man, and an attentive officer, the want of a few hundred pounds shall not make him lose his rank upon this occasion. I shall advance whatever is necessary to enable him to raise the thirty men required. I beg, therefore, that you will have the goodness to place to his credit three hundred pounds. I shall write by this post to Messrs. Drummonds to sell some money I have in the Stocks and to lodge an equal share with you, but in the meantime I shall thank you much to give credit, to the amount stated, to Lieutenant Rowan, that he may com-

mence recruiting without delay. If this sum is not found sufficient, I shall order more to be lodged with you. Lieutenant Rowan goes to town, and is advised to fix himself in London for the purpose of raising his men; but all the recruiting parties of the regiment are also instructed to enlist for him; therefore Lieutenant-Colonel M'Kenzie, who commands the 52nd, and to whom the parties will report their success, must, as well as Lieutenant Rowan, have the power of giving credit upon this £300; but upon this part of the subject I am not conversant, and shall take it as a favour if you will see Lieutenant Rowan when he calls, and direct him in what manner it should be arranged. I take the liberty to enclose a letter for him, which I beg may be delivered when he calls at the office.

To Colonel CLINTON.

SANDGATE, 15th June.

The enclosed memorial was sent to me by Lieutenant Gandy of the 50th Regiment. From his knowledge of Italian and French, as well as from other qualities he possessed, he was chosen to be adjutant of the Corsican corps, which was attached to the reserve on the Egyptian expedition. If corps, such as the memorial states, are to be raised, there are few officers in our service who might be more usefully employed there than Lieutenant Gandy, who, independent of the talents I have stated, possesses private virtues which render him respectable and worthy of whatever good fortune befalls him.—I am, &c.,

J. MOORE, Major-General.

Mem.—Lieutenant Gandy recommended strongly to me by Major Lowe. The private virtues, supporting a sister and brother out of his pay. The corps referred to a Maltese one said to be proposed.

Nor was it only of the infantry that Moore was the first great reformer. At that time the guns were given

separately to battalions. In a letter to Sir David Dundas of 25th June he writes as follows:—

“The guns as notified to me by Colonel Campbell have been received by the different regiments, and I have given directions in brigade orders with respect to the care and management of them; but I believe more advantage would be derived if the guns were attached to brigades in proportion to their strength instead of to battalions, and were under an artillery officer, to whom a proportion of officers and men from the brigades might be attached to be instructed, and to assist in working, as well as in the care and management of the guns, horses, &c., and I own I wish that something of the kind were adopted.”

It was, relatively to after developments, a small reform; but it is the beginning of improvement that is always the difficulty. When once the guns had been collected together under an artillery officer, the further steps in the creation of an effective field artillery followed in due course. The horse artillery had been for some time in existence. This was the first step forward for the field artillery.

There is nothing in the records of the Shorncliffe time which so well as the St. Lucia letters sets forth from Moore's own pen the kind of training at which he is aiming. As I have shown, so far as the drilling and equipment of a body of light infantry was concerned, many previous efforts had been made. The one thing that was wanting was the man of genius who should see that when the close formations of Frederick the Great and of the earlier days were given up, and when each man had to work separately but in combination, the essential thing required was not a new drill but a new discipline, a new spirit that should make of the whole a living organism to replace a

mechanical instrument. What gives to this work of Moore's its chief interest is that it was he who at Shorncliffe worked out the very discipline to which breechloader and quick-firing gun are now goading us, all unwilling, by the experience of war after war, not for an exceptional selected corps, but for whole armies. I know nothing that so admirably sets forth the true resultant of the experiences of the American Civil War, of the Franco-German War, and of the South African War, as Colonel Gawler's "The Essentials of Good Skirmishing." That little book represents the working out during the unbroken experience of five years' campaigning of the Shorncliffe training. There is in vol. iii., 1894, of the *Oxfordshire Light Infantry Chronicle* a summary by Lieutenant-Colonel Clark of the broad principles of the discipline, which will sufficiently indicate the difference between it and the savage rule of terror under the lash, and with constant application of the gallows, which represented the idea of the time.

Clark says that the principles insisted on were: First, that it was necessary to have the officers efficient before the men, and to require of the officers real knowledge, good temper, and kind treatment of the men. Second, that power should be delegated to officers commanding companies, the men to be taught to look up to them in matters alike of drill, food, clothing, rewards, and most punishments. Third, that all officers and non-commissioned officers were to understand that it was their business to prevent rather than to punish crime. The whole system was one of developing, not of repressing intelligence, of making the development of the man contribute to the effective unity of the whole, of enlisting the zeal of the private as much as of

the officer in perfecting the whole. Nevertheless, no summary and no formulæ or expressions would furnish the true explanation of the success, which by universal testimony attended the work, without a knowledge of the head who inspired it. None of the detractors from Moore's fame have ever been able to challenge this, which is for the most part quietly ignored by them in the explanations which they offer of actions which they interpret according to a fancy picture of the man, the creation of their own imaginations.

¹ His was the fire that warmed the coldest nature, and urged all who came in contact with him onward in the path of glory along which he strode so mightily himself. No man with a spark of enthusiasm could resist the influence of Moore's great aspirations, his fine presence, his ardent, penetrating genius.

Or this, which for the most part consists of unchallengeable facts :—

² To awaken the faculties of those under him, inspiring and teaching, was one of Sir John Moore's qualifications for command. At Shorncliffe camp he devised such improvements in drill, discipline, dress, arms, formation, and movements, as would have placed him for military reforms beside the Athenian Iphicrates, if he had not the greater glory of dying like the Spartan Brasidas. His materials were the 43rd, 52nd, and Rifle Regiments, and he so fashioned them, that afterwards, as the Light Division under Wellington, they were found to be soldiers unsurpassable, perhaps never equalled. The separate successful careers of the officers strikingly attest the merits of the school. So long a list of notable men could not be presented by three regiments of any service in the world. In it will be found above ninety who attained the rank of field officer or higher grades, and

¹ "Life of Sir Charles Napier," by Sir W. Napier, 1857, vol. i. p. 58.

² *Ibid.*, vol. i. p. 58.

amongst them four who commanded armies, three being celebrated as conquerors; two Adjutant-Generals of the British army, three military secretaries, sixteen governors of colonies, and the two organisers of the metropolitan and Irish constabulary; many generals who have commanded districts, one who commanded a foreign army, and several persons noted in science and literature, or by peculiar missions and organisations, belong to the roll; and nearly all were of some fame in battle, though unequal in merit and reputation.¹

From three infantry regiments, obscure until Moore took them in hand, went forth this crowd of men, skilled to gain authority and public notice without political or family interest, save in a very few cases. Certainly it was a great school, and Moore's teaching is thus well described by one of his scholars, and one not amongst the least capable of great actions, if fortune had not been adverse. "It pleases me that you design to notice that real camp of instruction—Shorn Cliff. There officers were formed for command, and soldiers acquired such discipline as to become an example to the army and proud of their profession. The details of Moore's system, from the setting up of a recruit to the movement of a brigade, you are well acquainted with;² but though drill was an important part of the instruction, it was not, as you also know, by that alone the soldier was there formed. It was the internal and moral system, the constant superintendence of the officers, the real government and responsibility of the captains, which carried the discipline to such perfection.

"My opinion of discipline is so strong, that I must speak of it. I rank it higher for the well-being of an army than

¹ The complete list is given in the *Oxfordshire Light Infantry Chronicle*, 1898, pp. 152-161.

² If Napier was thus acquainted with them it is a thousand pities that he never told us what they were. All record of the daily detail of the training at Shorncliffe, other than as it may be gathered from that of the brigade which he trained, and of the distinguished pupils who survived him, is lost. It is that which is too commonplace to-day to be noted for which fifty years hence biographer and historian search with vain regret.

any other consideration; very far above that of being present at many battles, for battles with respect to the soldiers can only be the test of discipline. When the Light Division joined the army at Talavera it had not been engaged with the enemy, while the army it joined had been engaged on the Douro and the Tagus, yet was inferior in discipline for war. seeing that its picquets were often in scrapes, and at Talavera a brigade had been surprised. But the men of the Light Division, though new to war, were looked up to from the day of junction as the *veterans of the army*! and by their discipline they sustained that character throughout the war, committing no blunders, and showing themselves the same orderly soldiers on the breach as in the line.

J. P. HOPKINS."

To this may be added that the Light Division, though always on the outposts, in most difficult situations, never lost any baggage, except on the retreat from Salamanca, when some French horsemen, pressing the British cavalry in a wood, got into the rear of the division and cut off *two mules*!

Nor can this by a soldier not trained at the camp at Shorncliffe, but one who had better right than any to speak of the effect of that training, be ignored. It is the testimony of the man who, from 1811 onwards, commanded the 52nd throughout the Peninsular campaign, under Wellington, and with it gave the decisive stroke at Waterloo (Colborne—Lord Seaton). Though it was written in 1809, before these events, time only added to Seaton's enthusiasm for Moore, and no word would have been modified later.

Sir John Moore's official despatches alone, in the absence of other proofs, would convince discerning readers that he possessed powers of no ordinary cast. Whether he narrates, argues, or details, there reigns throughout his letters an ease, a clearness, a matchless facility of expression which could only result from a corresponding distinctness and facility of

conception. They are evidently the production of one who, while a variety of complicated affairs press upon his attention, without an effort comprehends, disentangles, arranges, and retains the whole; who perceives instantaneously the exact tendency and bearing of nascent circumstance, and to whose penetrating glance *what is intricate seems straight*. More remarkable still than the masterly freedom of his style is the careless security with which he exposes the facts within his knowledge, and his opinions founded on these facts, regardless of any possible effect of his communications as to his own private interests or reputation; forgetful of the ascertained sentiments of the individuals whom he addresses; forgetful that he is himself a party to the transactions which he describes; one object, and one alone, occupies his attention—that of unfolding fully what he sees distinctly and feels strongly. Such absolute rectitude of design could belong only to a great and upright mind.

But it was not in his correspondence alone, public or private, that he discovered his superiority to personal and selfish considerations; his manners, his discourse, the whole tenor of his life, were of the same manly and unaffected strain. Neither in the society of his friends, at the council, on the parade, nor in the field did he ever either aim at exhibition or stoop to disguise; he allowed himself to be seen as he was.

It is not easy to appreciate the positive benefits which the British army derived from the talents and exertions of Sir John Moore. Repeatedly in the face of danger he animated his countrymen by his example, and led them on to victory; yet conspicuous as were his services in the act of combat, they were surpassed in utility by the effect of his instructions and superintendence in the hour of preparation for active warfare.

His life, as it has been stated from authority, was spent among the troops. The whole force of his abilities was unremittingly employed in devising and executing measures for promoting the comforts and advancing the efficiency of the soldiery. The camp at Sandgate, where he had the

opportunity of carrying through and exemplifying fully the effect of his plans, will long be recollected as exhibiting the perfection of military economy and discipline. It was a school of unrivalled repute for officers as well as men. To have served there is a recommendation of a candidate for employment. Instructions of such a nature are not confined to the individuals who receive them; one imparts to another what he has been taught; the precept and example are diffused through an increasing circle; and it is impossible to tell when the benefit stops. Sir Arthur Wellesley is now pursuing the French with troops essentially improved at least, if not formed, by Sir John Moore.

Some may doubt whether merits of the above description are alone sufficient to characterise the great General. Perhaps they are not, and yet it would be difficult to point out in history an instance wherein striking advances in discipline have been effected by others than military men of the highest order. The opportunity for proving and displaying the full extent of his talents by one of those brilliant achievements called victories on a large scale was not afforded to Sir John Moore. Those, however, who knew the strength of his natural abilities; who were aware of his familiar acquaintance with every branch of the art of war, acquired by extensive reading, profound reflection, and constant practice; those who witnessed the finished perfection wherewith the important military operations at various times entrusted to his execution were performed, who marked his presence of mind and commanding glance in the field, who saw that he uniformly rose with the occasion, that danger only excited and gave scope to his powers; that every enterprise which he undertook was beneath his force; that every difficulty which he did encounter shrunk from before him; *they* distinguished him from the officer of mere industry; fondly anticipated a period that should rank him with the *Turennes* and *Marlbroughs* of history, or the equally illustrious military names of the present day; and still think that *life alone was wanting to his fame*. I forbear to dwell on the many virtues that adorned the private

character of Sir John Moore; on his filial and paternal piety; his habits of temperance and activity; his sincerity; his humanity; his kindness to friends and dependents; his liberality. One excellence, from its near connection with his public merits, ought to be more particularly adverted to—the unsullied purity of his views and conduct in whatever regarded his own interests. He abhorred the most distant semblance to what was mean or selfish. At any moment he would have sacrificed without hesitation his fairest prospects rather than seek command or emolument by solicitation and intrigue. The decent correctness of behaviour which some content themselves with aiming at is not otherwise than laudable; but the principles and motives of such persons can no more stand comparison with the nice and delicate feelings of honour which ruled the practice of Sir John Moore, than the sickly white of the painter with the lustre of falling snow.

Nature, which bestowed such care in the forming of his intellect and heart, had not withheld from him the more trifling advantage of a graceful form. His person was in a high degree manly, elegant, and commanding; his features were fine and strongly indicative of that calm intrepidity which marked his character. I never looked in a face which told so intelligibly that the mind was so inaccessible to fear or weakness. A stranger contemplating his countenance would have said, "*That man it is impossible to alarm.*" I hardly know whether I am writing with the view of conveying a notion of his worth to those who were personally unacquainted with it, or of awaking pleasing recollections of his talents and virtues in the minds of his friends. For either purpose, in fact, this sketch is too imperfect. I am rather indulging my own feelings by recalling to my thoughts the varied excellencies of this accomplished soldier, whom I shall ever class with the distinguished few, the *magnanimi heroes* whose exertions and endowments redeem the failings of their species, and successfully assert the dignity of human nature.—From the *Pilot* newspaper. July 9, 1809.

But I think that perhaps the happiest and liveliest sketch of Moore at Shorncliffe, though it includes some later incidents, is this from the pen of Sir Charles Napier :—

Sir John Moore was equally destitute of affected dignity. He entered into the society of those under his command as their equal, confident that his vast superiority as a man would, at all times, raise him above them more than even his great rank could do; he required no external aid. There was among his officers an awe of him; but it was not inspired by any reserve or haughtiness of manner on his part, though I have seen him put down pert and self-sufficient men by a degree of sarcasm which few could withstand; those who could were not likely to provoke it. His manners were extremely polished and agreeable, and at times even playful. I recollect once standing in the street at Lisbon looking at a very pretty woman who was at a window, when some one gently laid hold of both my ears, saying in a joking tone, "Ah, caitiff! have I caught you? what right have you to look at such an ugly woman as that? I will put you under arrest." Turning round I saw it was the Commander-in-chief. "I will thank you for the punishment, sir," said I, "if you will place the ugly old woman over me as sentry." Another time, when going from his quarters in the village of Sandgate to the evening parade on the heights of Shorncliffe, the ascent being steep, Moore said to six or eight officers who were with him, "Now for a race to the top of the hill," and away we all started. Neil Campbell (afterwards with Napoleon at Elba) beat us all, and Moore was second. These are trifling matters, but they mark the unaffected and social feelings of a great man, and as such the reader will perhaps pardon them. Regard, admiration, and in very many instances gratitude for the deep interest he took in their welfare, were the feelings which were entertained for Moore by those who served under his command. There were some characters whom no man liked, and they disliked Moore;

but such men had another feeling, which kept them in their proper places—fear. Moore's nature was unaffected, kind, gentle, benevolent; nor was he roused to severity until provoked by great want of zeal for the public service or by great criminality.—“*Lights and Shades of Military Life*,” ed. by Sir C. Napier, pp. 55, 56.

Of Moore's capacity for occasional sarcasm the late Colonel Henderson sent me the following story. He does not say whence he obtained it, so I give it only on his authority. Moore was one day inspecting a worthy old colonel with a soul not above buttons. “Your men are clean—very clean,” said Moore, and then after a pause—“so are the Gosport Volunteers.”

During the winter a landing from boats was considered impossible, and the camp for the time being was broken up, the troops going into barracks, but still vigorously exercised and ready for any attempt. The following year, 1804, the work was resumed, and the regimental training of the 52nd at least being now fairly complete, the brigade was worked together as a whole, and the entire body accustomed to move off with all equipment and stores packed as for war within an hour of the first signal.

The General, the tendency of whose mind, according to Southey, was “despondency,” writes about this time to his mother:

“The collection at Boulogne can only mean this part of the coast, and I am pleased with the prospect of seeing the first of it. If we beat the French handsomely in the first instance, the house at Marshgate will not hold you.”

All through his life the same confidence in our beating the French, provided only the army itself was put into such order as he was now creating for his own brigade at Shorncliffe, and that the right time and

circumstances were chosen for action, was his permanent thought. From the time when as a boy his ambition was that his brother and he should beat the French by sea and land, he had never varied from the conviction which he had expressed in a letter from St. Lucia :

"If we had a little of the old spirit we should thrash them as we have done heretofore."

Throughout all the long years that had intervened since then, "his," by the testimony of all who came under his influence, "was the fire that warmed the coldest nature and urged all who came into contact with him onward in the path of glory," but none knew better or had experienced more bitterly than he that two things were needed to make our armies triumphant : one, such drastic reform and vigorous training of the army itself as he was carrying out at Shorncliffe ; the other, the choice of the right circumstances and mode of action applied with knowledge of the needs of warfare, and with patient biding of the time till the opportunity came.

In his second volume (pp. 302-311), Mr. Oman has given a substantially true and just account of the nature of Wellington's discipline and of his relations with his army. But he abnegates one of his most valuable functions as an historian when he ignores the truth of what Wellington said as to the actual condition of that army as a whole, more especially in his letter to Castlereagh of 17th June 1809 from Abrantes, which may be read in Gurwood.¹ If he would read the description which Mr. Fortescue has given of the mode in which the army was dealt with at the time with which he is in his latest volume concerned, or the passages which I have quoted (vol. i. p. 13)

¹ Vol. iii. p. 302.

from Bunbury, than whom no one had had better means of knowing the truth, Mr. Oman would see that these words of his, thus unqualified, are dangerous and mischievous. No one who has not read the "Private Journal of Judge-Advocate Larpent," who from 1812 was on Wellington's staff till the end of the war, has a right to dispute the truth of Wellington's words, nor if he has read it will he do so. Wellington dealt with the facts as he saw them. He did not, as Fortescue and Bunbury have done, point out the causes of them, and he took no trouble to do away with them. It is a fatal and a dangerous thing to disguise from a nation, or from the statesmen and writers who lead and guide it, that an army is not made effective by sweeping in men from the gutters and prisons, clothing them and calling them soldiers, and then putting in command of them officers chosen for no merit and selected on no principle, offering them no inducement to exertion, giving them no training, and finally treating it as an insult to the British cloth to affirm that between such a regiment as the 52nd was, when Moore had moulded it at Shorncliffe, and such regiments as Wellington describes in his Abrantes letter to Lord Castlereagh there is a vital difference.

The plain fact is that the training of Shorncliffe was wholly exceptional. I have shown how much it involved, that few except Moore either did or could attempt. If such a process could have been applied to the whole army, Wellington's complaints need never have been made. Wellington had the actual facts before him, and had to take the instrument as he found it. His remedy and Crauford's was to flog and hang it into order. Between the two systems, his and Moore's, there is a great difference. How markedly unique was

then the condition of the 52nd was strikingly recognised in the course of this year (1804).

On the 23rd August 1804 the Commander-in-chief reviewed the brigade at Shorncliffe, and on the following day the 52nd manœuvred by itself before the Duke of York. On the 29th August, because of "the superior state of the 52nd Regiment," the King granted to the regiment exceptional promotion which the addition of a 2nd battalion made possible. Moore directed the letter from the Military Secretary, which conveyed this information, to be inserted in the regimental order book, and added, "The officers owe it to their own good conduct and to the attention they have paid to their duty, but above all to the zeal with which they have followed the instructions of Lieutenant-Colonel M'Kenzie, to whose talents and to whose example the regiment is indebted for its discipline and the character it has so justly acquired."

On 28th September 1804 Moore received letters informing him that he was to receive the K.B., as it was then called. On the 7th April 1805 the 52nd presented him with a diamond star of the knighthood. The letters which passed between him and the officers are given in full in the records of the regiment. They are characteristic, but it will be sufficient for me to refer to these.¹ Between these dates Moore was employed on very different duties from those at Shorncliffe. If our arms were to be triumphant it was essential that such miserable expeditions as the latter part of that of the Helder, after Abercromby's triumphant success, should be avoided. That failure, the Cadiz and the Ferrol fiascos, already mentioned, and the Constantinople and Alexandria disasters of

¹ Moorsom, p. 70.

1807, to be recorded hereafter, were typical of the kind of expeditions which were yearly bringing the British army more and more into contempt by no fault of its own. Abercromby's great success had been due to the careful preparation which circumstances had enabled him to give to his army. Everything that could be neglected had been neglected at home.

And now the time was come when in case after case Moore was to be offered the heaviest bribe that could possibly be tendered him, if only he would advise the carrying out of expeditions that were not opportune, and as to which no adequate precautions to insure success had been taken. All his life he had been carefully training himself to be fit to command armies in the field. Now he was the one man to whom Pitt turned as fit to command. He had sprung forward, as has been seen, to take part in Stuart's splendid conception of the attack on the French in Italy at the right moment in 1798, and to use his own expression, nothing could to him "be more delightful" than personally to have been in command of an expedition similarly planned and thought out. But the heavier sacrifice was required of him to tell the Government in case after case that their schemes were as malapropos and as unwise as those which I have selected impartially from the action of Governments on both sides of the House. Happily at this moment we had in office "the Pilot that weathered the storm," and he was much too wise not to accept the warning of dangerous rocks from the man whom he trusted. Of one of the projects on which Moore had thus to report we have a complete account from his own pen. It admirably illustrates the manner in which the Government were liable to be deceived as to the

completeness of the information they possessed, and it suggests the nature of the warnings which, had they always taken as sound advice, would have been given them against the follies that brought the English name into discredit. I devote the next chapter to Moore's condemnation of this project as recorded in the Journal, and to another similar case of which I only know from other sources.

With regard to Ferrol, the antecedent circumstances were that we had known for some time that the "Prince of the Peace," who was the paramour of the Queen of Spain, and the virtual ruler of the country, was completely in the hands of Napoleon, and that in accordance with Napoleon's demands he was only waiting to declare war upon us until the treasure-ships had arrived in Spanish ports from South America. We had accordingly anticipated events by sending out a squadron under Graham Moore to intercept them, and he had captured or sunk them all. Naturally war was only a question of days, and we were expecting the declaration of war, which soon followed, but had not yet been sent. Mr. Frere, our Minister at the Spanish Court, had, as Moore notes, not yet quitted Madrid. Graham Moore is the brother commanding the *Indefatigable* with whom Sir John travels.

CHAPTER XXI

MOORE REPORTS ON FERROL AND ON BOULOGNE

November 1804.—From the commencement of the war in May 1803 I had been stationed in command at Sandgate. On Sunday morning, the 25th November 1804, a King's messenger brought me a letter from Mr. Pitt requesting that if possible I should meet Lords Camden and Melville at his house in London at two o'clock, as they wished to converse with me on a subject thought to be of some importance; and if I reached town before two, I should receive some papers which they wished me to peruse previous to the meeting. The same day's post brought me a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon, by order of the Commander-in-chief, desiring me to be in town on Monday forenoon, as H.R.H. wished to see me. I immediately wrote to Sir David Dundas, under whose command I was, to acquaint him with the order I had received. I left Sandgate about mid-day, slept at Farningham that night, and arrived in town early on Monday. When I called in Downing Street I received from Mr. Pitt's private secretary a packet sealed and addressed to me by himself; on returning with this to my lodgings I met Mr. Huskisson, one of the Secretaries of the Treasury, but who, in Mr. Pitt's former administration, had been Under-Secretary of State in the War Department under Lord Melville. He told me he had directions from Lord Melville to give me some papers as soon as I came to town, and if I would walk down to the Treasury he would give them to me. I said I would follow him, which I accordingly did in about half-an-hour. He gave me a bundle of papers, open. He said that these contained Sir James Pulteney's correspondence at the time of the Ferrol expedition. He did not believe I should find

anything in them which would be of any use to me now, but he would give them to me as he had been directed, and I might look them over.

After a short conversation with Mr. Huskisson about Ferrol, which showed me that he was trusted by Ministers with their most secret plans, I left him to read my papers previous to the meeting in Downing Street. The papers given to me by Mr. Huskisson contained the correspondence of Sir James Pulteney with Mr. Dundas at the time and after the Ferrol expedition, but which, as he said, contained nothing which could now be of use.

Those given to me by Mr. Pitt's order consisted of two very long reports from Sir Edward Pellew to Lord Hobart when commanding the squadron off Ferrol. The one is dated October 1803, the other in January 1804. Sir Edward had been desired by Lord Hobart (then War Minister) to send him information respecting Ferrol and the possibility of attacking it.

The reports contain very little real information with respect to the defences of Ferrol, very little even of that sort of information which might have been expected from an intelligent naval officer on points of which, professionally, he must have been a competent judge. The reports assert, strongly but generally, the facility of destroying the fleet and arsenal of Ferrol by a combined attack from a squadron and army of ten thousand men. But the information and the reasoning by no means support this strong assertion. It is to be regretted that when Lord Hobart's thoughts were directed to Ferrol he had not employed, together with Sir Edward, some intelligent land officer. At that time, and until the late capture by my brother of the frigates with the money, there was every facility of landing on any part of the coast, and of even going into Ferrol. In this manner the most perfect and minute knowledge of the place might have been acquired, and even a plan of attack formed, ready to execute the moment hostilities should break out.

The present Ministers seem, from the conversation I had with them afterwards, to think that Sir Edward's

reports contained every necessary information. They had already determined on an expedition, and, having fixed upon me to command it, they had sent for me to communicate their design and to determine the mode in which it was to be executed.

At two o'clock I went to the meeting; it consisted of Mr. Pitt, Lord Melville, and Lord Camden. They were strongly impressed with the opinion that either by a sudden attack the town of Ferrol might be carried, or the fleet and arsenal be destroyed by bombardment from the isthmus of Mugardes on the south side of the harbour, and they were willing, for the short time such expedition would last, to spare 15,000 or even, Mr. Pitt said, 20,000 troops, if that number would ensure the accomplishment of so desirable an object. I told them I knew nothing of Ferrol, that however desirable it was to destroy or capture the ships in the harbour, the practicability of it would depend upon the situation of the place, its defences, and the garrison it contained. The reports I had read had given me little knowledge on these subjects. They contained no description of the batteries which defended the harbour and its entrance, whether they were open and such as could be assaulted, or such as must be taken by heavy artillery. The reports contained as little respecting the immediate defences of the town and arsenal. With respect to a bombardment from the south by landing in the bay of Arres, the reports were satisfactory so far as they asserted the safe anchorage to the fleet in the bay of Betanzos, and the possibility of disembarking in every weather in the small bay of Arres, which was defended by two small batteries of six guns each, three of which only were mounted in each; that the isthmus was only three miles across, and from the north side of it to Ferrol across the harbour was not more than 2000 yards; but the reports did not state (of this indeed Sir Edward was probably no judge) whether the isthmus presented any other advantage besides its narrowness to an army posted to cover a bombardment. A bombardment was an operation which must take up many days, during which whatever hostile

force was in the neighbourhood would be assembled. It was, therefore, most important to know how far the isthmus afforded the means of taking up such a position as would enable an inferior force to cover the bombardment until it had fully accomplished its purpose, and the means of then re-embarking the troops and artillery. If they had no other information than that which they had given me, I could have no difficulty in giving it as my opinion that there were not grounds upon which in prudence it was possible to determine on the propriety of an attack on Ferrol.

Lord Melville then said that not only Sir Edward Pellew, but Admiral Cochrane and the officers of the squadron now off Ferrol, were also impressed with the facility of the destruction of Ferrol; that even Admiral Gambier, who was not a man apt to assert lightly, had, without knowing that such a measure was in contemplation, recommended him by all means to strike a blow at Ferrol; that, in short, there was a general conviction of the weakness of the place. I said it might be so, and I knew nothing to the contrary; and, as it appeared that it was intended I should have a principal command, it was my wish on every account that the attempt, if practicable, should be made. But I had yet to learn upon what grounds these gentlemen had formed their opinions. No doubt many of them had had opportunities of gaining a knowledge of the place; but in the correspondence I had seen they had done no more than to assert their opinion generally, without stating the information upon which it was founded. I then offered, before anything further was determined, to go myself privately to Admiral Cochrane's squadron off Ferrol, and in conversation with the Admiral and his captains learn exactly the extent of their information. I should also take an opportunity of running into the Betanzos, see Arres Bay and its batteries, and though what was seen from a ship could not be much trusted, still I should endeavour to form some opinion of the ground on the isthmus. This was approved, and my brother's frigate, the *Indefatigable*, which had been repairing, but was supposed to be ready at Plymouth, was pitched

upon to take me, under the pretence of carrying despatches to Admiral Cochrane. These orders given publicly could cause no suspicion, and I could manage the rest by writing privately to my brother.

I dined that day at Mr. Pitt's with Lords Camden, Melville, and Harrowby. Next day (Tuesday) and also Wednesday, until four o'clock, I was detained by the Duke of York. With him I talked over the particular troops, officers, and ordnance I should require. I recommended to H.R.H., as I had also done to Mr. Pitt, to consult General Congreve of the artillery upon the subject of the ordnance necessary for the bombardment, and mentioned him as perhaps the most fit man to command the artillery upon the expedition. In that case he might be trusted, if not entirely, yet in some degree with the object of the expedition; that it was safer to trust an officer of character like him, than such people as Hadden and Macleod, whom I suspected of carrying on a kind of underplot at the Ordnance to serve their friends and to be courted by them. H.R.H. took notes of what I said, and promised to prepare everything in my absence; that Malta and Gibraltar would afford a good blind. I mentioned Sir David Baird as the officer I should wish to have for second in command. I left town without a servant in a hack chaise on Wednesday afternoon about four o'clock. I travelled all night. The first night I slept at Exeter, and reached Plymouth Dock on Friday evening at dusk, when, according to agreement, I met my brother at the Fountain Inn. I was in hopes of immediately embarking, and sailing before there was a possibility of its being discovered who I was; but my brother told me the ship was on Hamoaze, that the wind blew right in, and so strong, as to render it impossible to warp her out, but he hoped the weather would moderate or change before next morning.

PLYMOUTH, 5th December 1804.—This is the sixth day since my arrival, and the wind has continued such as to prevent the possibility of sailing. The *Indefatigable* was,

however, warped yesterday part of the way to the Sound. I have continued at the inn, where I am not known, and as I never venture out until dark, I hope to remain concealed until the weather admits of sailing. This confinement is very tiresome, but what is to be regretted is the loss of time should the expedition on my return be determined on. There is yet no certain intelligence of Mr. Frere having left Madrid; therefore hostilities are not yet commenced.

ON BOARD THE "INDEFATIGABLE," 7th December.—On Wednesday, the 5th, my brother sent to me about three o'clock in the afternoon that the wind admitted of his going out, and that he was getting under weigh. I therefore immediately went on board, and we got to sea that evening. Nobody on board seemed to know me, and I pass for Mr. Williams. The weather is fine and the wind fair, so I hope to be off Ferrol to-morrow or next day.

"INDEFATIGABLE," BETANZOS BAY, FERROL, 17th December.—We met with contrary winds and blowing weather; it was not until Friday, 14th, that we reached Cape Prior, when we spoke the *Montague* and *Minotaur* cruising. They informed us that Admiral Cochrane with the rest of the squadron were at anchor in this bay. The wind failed, and we could not get in that day. The next the wind was from the east, and the squadron came out. We then communicated with the Admiral by signal, and in obedience to his orders a boat was sent to him with the despatches brought by my brother from England. I took this opportunity to write a note to him, to acquaint him with my being on board, and that I would go to him as soon as the wind admitted of our getting near him. The Admiral came himself on the return of the *Indefatigable's* boat, and arrived as we had finished dinner. He did this on purpose to prevent my going to the *Northumberland* (the flagship), where he said several of the officers and men who were with him in the Mediterranean knew me. The information he gave me was that the Spaniards had taken an alarm

about Ferrol, and were marching troops to it in considerable numbers. He said he still continued to have intercourse with both Ferrol and Corunna, but that of late the boats were not allowed to land in Arres Bay or on that peninsula. He proposed that the *Indefatigable* should anchor a good way up in Betanzos Bay, from whence I should have the best view of the bay of Arres, the batteries which defended it, and of the ground near it. In the meantime he said he would keep the rest of the squadron cruising off, that there might be less chance of my being known. It was, however, next Sunday, the 16th, before we got in. The wind, though blowing fresh on the outside, failed us when we got in with the land, and it was three o'clock in the afternoon before we let go the anchor. The Admiral came on board after breakfast, and stayed the whole day.

18th December.—Yesterday morning the Admiral came on board the *Indefatigable* early to breakfast, and at eight o'clock he and my brother and I started for the shore. The Admiral and my brother were dressed in blue jackets, and he brought out a couple of fowling-pieces and some dogs with him under the pretence of shooting. He said we could land on the east side of Betanzos Bay and walk up a hill on which there was a church immediately over the bridge of Hiume, from whence we should have a view of Ferrol and all the country about it. The Admiral said he had often shot there. There were no troops on that side, and as for the people of the country, they were very well accustomed to the English. We landed accordingly, ordered the two boats round to wait for us opposite to Reddes, and we ascended the hill. The distance was a couple of miles to the top. We passed many country people at work in the fields, who were all very civil and directed us to the best road. From the top of the hill we had a bird's-eye view of Ferrol town and harbour, saw the shipping, arsenal, &c., as well as the peninsula of Arres. The distance in direct line from Ferrol was about five miles. We also saw distinctly the bay of Arres and the batteries which pro-

tected it. We had not been at the top half-an-hour when I observed a party of soldiers passing from Reddes in a boat.

We immediately concluded that we were discovered. We sent a sailor down to the boats to desire them to go round to a sandy bay on the other side a good way above where we had landed, but desired him, if he was questioned by any Spaniard, to say we were gone to the village of Hiume. We set off in a direct line to the sandy bay, which was about three miles off. When we reached it the boats had not arrived. We endeavoured through the interest of a priest, at whose house we stopped, with whom the Admiral was acquainted, to get a fishing boat to take us off, lest any party of soldiers should arrive; but, though we offered them a good price, the fellows would not take us. Whether they had any suspicion that we were followed, we knew not. At last our own boats made their appearance, and we were not a moment in getting into them. The sailors were equally glad to receive us. They told us that the party of soldiers which had crossed over from Reddes had only desired them to go away, but before they had collected all the men a party of twenty-five or thirty soldiers made their appearance from the side of Hiume. At this moment arrived the sailor we had sent from the hill. The boats therefore immediately pushed off from the shore. A midshipman, a young boy, and two of the men belonging to the Admiral's boat were still on shore. They made signs to them from the boats to make haste, but before they reached the beach the soldiers intercepted them and took them prisoners. They were sent back under a small escort. The rest of the detachment watched the boats and followed them along the shore in the direction in which they steered; but, fortunately, though the men of the detachment ran and seemed very eager to keep pace with them, the boats rowed faster than they could march, and we got off.

As soon as we were out of the sandy bay we saw the detachment, which had not above a quarter of an hour's walk to the place where we had been waiting. Upon seeing the boats standing out they turned about also and went to

their quarters. We thus escaped narrowly from a most disagreeable scrape; for though I dare say that upon the Admiral's representation the midshipman and the two sailors will be returned, this would not have been the case had they got hold of the Admiral. My situation would have been most unpleasant, as I must have concealed my real name, and, had it been discovered, they might have thought themselves authorised to treat me as a spy. It was my confidence in the Admiral which led me into the scrape; he should have known better how matters stood. The view I had had was of little other use than to gratify curiosity. From a bird's-eye view I could neither judge the ground of the peninsula, how far it was favourable to take positions for covering a bombardment and re-embarkation, nor could I judge the distance from the peninsula to the arsenal and shipping, and thereby form a just opinion of the probable effect of a bombardment. The amount of what I have learned from the Admiral is that the Spaniards have taken the alarm and have marched to this quarter a considerable number of troops, that Fort St. Felipe is a work of considerable strength, and that the other batteries which defend the entrance of Ferrol are such as can only be taken from the shore by cannon. No number of ships could force a passage, but, if they could, they must be destroyed as soon as they get into the harbour by the formidable batteries of the town and arsenal. The land defences of the town are perhaps not such as could resist for any time a regular attack, yet, when tolerably garrisoned, are quite out of the reach of assault; but indeed from the Admiral's description of the land defences (he himself never saw them) I can form no just estimate of the resistance they could make. He describes the bastions to be solid, with several heavy guns in each, but the curtains to be only a wall of three feet in thickness and loopholed breast-high from the ground; they are from 15 to 25 feet in height.

"INDEFATIGABLE," 22nd December, AT SEA.—In the forenoon of the 18th my brother went to pay some visits to

some captains of the squadron, and was to return to dinner, for which he expected the Admiral. In the afternoon it blew so fresh as to prevent the Admiral from coming to dinner or my brother from returning. We knew by a boat from the *Endymion* that he was on board that ship with Captain Paget. About four o'clock it blew a gale of wind, and in the night our anchor dragged. There was only another anchor and cable in the ship. We might have let go that one, but then we must have entirely trusted to it; had it failed we must have gone upon the rocks, for we should by that time have been too near them to get under way. Lieutenant Gore, who in my brother's absence commands the ship, determined not to run that risk, but to put to sea when he could. He accordingly ordered the cable to be cut; the ship, fortunately, hove her head the right way, and we got to sea in the middle of the night. It continued to blow tremendously all that night, all Wednesday, and until Thursday forenoon, when it abated considerably. By this time we were blown a great way to the northward and westward. All Thursday it continued to blow fresh and directly against us. Yesterday the wind was light but contrary, with a high sea; last night and this morning there has been a great deal of rain, but the wind though light is favourable; if it continues so we may expect to get within sight of the squadron off Ferrol this evening. We are not without apprehension that some misfortune may have befallen some of the ships we left at anchor. They were placed less favourably than we were for getting out; and one of them was observed to drag her anchor before we cut. This has delayed my return to England. The Admiral was to have brought his despatches on board on Tuesday, and next day we should have sailed for England. The absence of my brother and the bad weather together have made the time pass but uncomfortably.

"INDEFATIGABLE," OFF FERROL, 23rd December.—We are at last arrived off Ferrol after a most disagreeable five days'

cruise. Yesterday evening we made the land, but it was so hazy that it could not be ascertained what land it was, and we put about for the night. This morning we again stood in; it was still very hazy, but we at first discovered Cape Prior, then the tower of Corunna, and on standing still nearer we perceived the squadron part under way and part at anchor at the entrance of Betanzos Bay. My brother came out to us in a lugger; most glad to get once more to his own ship. He has brought the Admiral's despatches for England, and a line to me excusing himself for not coming on board lest he should be blown off. His note states that the Spaniards have forbidden further communication with the shore. They are mounting guns on their different batteries, and troops are daily marching to Ferrol. They expect hourly the declaration of war. My brother told the Admiral he was certain, as the wind was fair for England, I should prefer taking advantage of it to being longer detained, as I could get no information by staying in addition to that which I already had; he has accordingly brought with him his orders to return to Plymouth. We are now lying-to to deliver some provisions to the *Naiad* frigate; as soon as this is done we shall make sail for England.

AT SEA, 24th December.—We made sail for England at six o'clock yesterday evening; the wind continued fair, with the only pleasant weather we have had this week past.

OFF PLYMOUTH, 3rd January 1805.—We made Ushant on Wednesday, the 26th December, and expected to have reached Plymouth next morning; but the wind changed in the night to the eastward and blew fresh. In the course of Thursday it blew a gale of wind, which lasted with great violence until the Monday, when, towards the evening, the gale abated, but continued to blow from the eastward. On Tuesday night it fell calm, and on Wednesday we had a westerly wind, which enabled us to make the Lizard light in the evening, and this morning we were off Plymouth,

when a signal was made from one of our ships in Lawsand Bay for us not to anchor, and orders were sent on board to my brother to go off Brest. This was accompanied with a private letter stating that as it was much wished to keep secret my having been with him at Ferrol, he was directed to join Admiral Cornwallis that there might be no communication between the ship and the shore. This was the less necessary as I am not known on board the *Indefatigable*; we are, however, standing in, and I shall be landed from a shore boat. We have had shocking weather, and I should have been most uncomfortable had I been with anybody but my brother.

In consequence of the report, written and verbal, which I made to Mr. Pitt, the expedition against Ferrol was given up. As the Spaniards had evidently taken the alarm, were assembling troops and putting their batteries in order, a surprise was out of the question; and the difficulties against an enemy on his guard were very great, and as many of them were naval difficulties, the season of the year rendered them doubly insurmountable. The bay of Betanzos, from the trifling winds which we found there, is of difficult access. Men-of-war, but still more ships of transport, must be exposed to the batteries in working in. Experience has proved that the sea-wind seldom blows here so as to take ships off the entrance of the bay. The sea-wind always fails, perhaps owing to the high lands. The bay, though spacious, yet is not so much so as to enable a considerable fleet to lie at anchor out of reach from the shore, and Arres Bay is the only spot where it would be possible to make a landing. Upon the whole, the difficulties of landing were very great, and there was no information with respect to the force in Ferrol or its neighbourhood, or to its local strength or defences, to justify an attempt being made upon it.

It was only a few months later that Moore was again employed upon a very similar mission. In August 1805, immediately after Napoleon had marched

for Ulm and Austerlitz, the idea very naturally occurred to many that the obvious thing to do was to attack the flotilla in Boulogne, which had been made ready to transport the army, now moved away. The one thing which does not seem to have occurred to them was, that the idea was so very obvious that Napoleon was certain to have taken it into account, and to be only hoping that the English Government would involve themselves in another fiasco by an attack at the very time when he was expecting it. Sir Sidney Smith had acquired a great reputation by his all-important success against Napoleon at Acre, but he was a feather-headed man, eaten up with personal vanity, and liable to be caught by the wildest suggestions that promised to give him prominence. Lord Castlereagh's correspondence from 9th August 1805 to January 1806 is filled with proposals submitted to him for an attack by means of submarine boats and Congreve rockets upon the Boulogne flotilla. The scheme was entrusted for execution to Sir Sidney Smith, but he very soon found that without the co-operation of a land force he could do nothing. So far as Sidney Smith's self-revelation in the business is concerned, it is very fairly summed up by Lord Barham, who was then at the Admiralty, in the words, "There seems to me such a want of judgment in our friend Sir Sidney, that it is much safer to employ him under command than in command." That did not, however, prevent Castlereagh from obtaining Moore's report as to the possibility of a landing on the French coast near Boulogne, and on 29th September 1805 Moore was on board the *Antelope* off Boulogne with Sir Sidney. Moore's judgment in the matter is thus recorded in a letter from Pitt to Castlereagh:—

WALMER CASTLE, *6th October 1805.*

You will have learned from General Moore the substance of what passed between him and me, which left me convinced that any attempt at landing is attended with too much risk to justify the experiment.¹

I have no papers of Moore's own upon the subject. He probably thought it all-important that his communication with the Government should not be even recorded on paper, because at some future date an opportunity might present itself when such an attempt might be safely made. The case was evidently different with Ferrol, since the Spaniards had already taken alarm. As in the next and subsequent chapters the Diary will be completely absorbed by military and political events, it will be convenient that I should record here Moore's personal relations with the two great chiefs, Pitt and Fox, of whom the former died at the beginning of the period with which the next chapter deals, and the other within a year of his great rival. With Pitt, Moore was not only on intimate terms as a great soldier with a great statesman, but he had become also an intimate friend of his family. This was so notorious, that it was falsely reported that he was engaged to Lady Hester Stanhope, to whom one of his messages was sent when he was dying. The exact facts are set forth in the following statement by Sir William Napier, which records the truth as known to Moore's own family. It is only necessary to add to Sir William Napier's statement that I believe Fox never spoke to Moore in his life, though he took a

¹ See for all this "Castlereagh's Correspondence," 2nd series, vol. i. from p. 86 to p. 110, including letter of 23rd September from Castlereagh to Moore, giving him directions, p. 95, and Pitt's letter, p. 117.

particular interest in the soldier's career, and made a point of hearing any stories that he could about him. The Miss Caroline Fox, the statesman's niece, to whom Sir William alludes in such enthusiastic terms, became Lady William Napier. She must certainly have been an exceptionally able woman, for her husband records the fact that she deciphered for him the whole of the French ciphered despatches captured during the Peninsular War before the ciphers could be obtained, and that when they were obtained the deciphering was found to have been perfect. All the skill of England could not provide the Duke of Wellington with any one who could during the war perform for him what would then have been this almost incalculably valuable service.

¹ Sir John Moore was not, as generally believed, affianced to Lady Hester; his attachment to her was strong, his admiration great; but the first was only a sentiment of friendship, enhanced by her relationship to Mr. Pitt, whose personal esteem he enjoyed in a singular degree. Admiration was a necessary concomitant of acquaintance; it was for such a man impossible not to admire the lofty genius of a woman created to command as well as to attract, but love in the passionate sense was not there. General Anderson, his bosom friend, assured the writer of this biography that the only person Sir John Moore thought of marrying was Mr. Fox's niece, Miss Caroline Fox, a lady who has since displayed a power of mind and enduring fortitude in terrible trials that surpass even the creations of fiction. To her, when in Sicily with her father, Sir John Moore did at one time design to offer marriage, but she was then not eighteen, and after a hard struggle he suppressed his passion with a nobility of sentiment few men can attain to. "She is," he said to General Anderson,

¹ "Life of Sir Charles Napier," by Sir W. Napier, 1857, vol. i. p. 39.

"so young, that her judgment may be overpowered: the disparity of age is not at present very apparent, and my high position here, my reputation as a soldier of service, and my intimacy with her father"—he might have added his great comeliness and winning manners—"may influence her to an irretrievable error for her own future contentment; my present feelings must, therefore, be suppressed, that she may not have to suppress hers hereafter with loss of happiness."

There is yet another subject on which it will be better for me a little to anticipate the coming chapters. It will be found that Moore gives an account of the battle of Maida which leaves an impression exceedingly favourable to Sir John Stuart. That may tend to confirm a mistake which appears to be exceedingly common in our day.¹ If ever there was a battle won by the brigadiers, the regimental officers, and the men, to the success of which the commander contributed the least possible influence, and marred hopelessly by his incapacity for taking advantage of it, that battle was Maida. The true heroes of Maida were Kempt, Acland, Ross of the 20th Regiment, Haviland Smith, O'Callaghan, and Lowry Cole.

Sir John Stuart "seemed to be rather a spectator than a person much or *the* person *most* interested in the result of the conflict. He formed no plan, declared no intention, and scarcely did he trouble himself to give an order. . . . As I found that I could get no orders from him, I made it my business to go round to the leaders of our several brigades, to give them what information I could, and try to supply their wants."²

¹ The biographical sketch in the "Dictionary of National Biography" is far too favourable. Mr. Oman and Sir Herbert Maxwell appear by their allusions to it to have been equally misled.

² Bunbury, p. 248.

After the battle, Sir John Stuart abandoned all further concern about his army; and, retiring to Sir Sidney Smith's ship, devoted himself for forty-eight hours to writing his despatch. Bunbury's whole story is one of the most telling and convincing descriptions I ever read. What from a biographical point of view immediately concerns me is to offer an explanation of the reason why no hint of all this, well as it was known to Sir John Moore, appears in his Diary.

During the Egyptian campaign, in the last great fight in which Abercromby was killed—

"A very large share of the honour of that day's victory was justly awarded to General Moore; but Stuart always fancied himself aggrieved, and he cherished the belief that he and his foreigners won the battle of Alexandria. Moore, therefore, was the man of whom he was particularly jealous, and with whom he could not bear to serve."¹ "Every quality in Moore was real, solid, and unbending; in Stuart all was flighty and superficial, though there was a good deal of original cleverness. The former was penetrating, reflecting, and though his manner was singularly agreeable to those whom he liked, to those whom he did not hold in esteem his bearing was severe; while Stuart was vain, frivolous, and sarcastic."

Moore felt very keenly that the disappointment of Stuart at finding himself superseded was most natural, and did his best to soothe him. It is because of this personal relationship between the two men that Moore's Diary is written without a hint of the feebleness of Stuart's own part at Maida. His only mention of Stuart in his letters home is one in which he says that had the Ministry known of Stuart's victory, which he warmly praises, he himself would never have been sent

¹ Bunbury, p. 271.

to Sicily, and that Stuart's action in asking to go home was most natural, and just what he should have done himself under the circumstances. When, after Moore's departure from Sicily, Sir John Stuart returned with all his borrowed honours thick upon him to the command of the troops there, his failure as a commander was so utter and scandalous, that he well-nigh destroyed his army, almost reducing it to a condition of general mutiny.

CHAPTER XXII

MOORE IN SICILY AS ADVISER TO GENERAL FOX UP TO THE DESPATCH HOME OF MR. A'COURT

FROM this time forward Moore's life becomes so closely connected both with the successive Ministries in England and with the events of the great European War, that in order to understand the Diary a few short notes on both these subjects are necessary. On the 21st January 1806 Pitt died. To recapitulate, Moore had been the soldier on whom Pitt and his Government relied for counsel from the time when the war began again after the Peace of Amiens. By his advice, as has been seen in the last chapter, they were saved from the mad attempt at Ferrol. By his advice they had rejected Sir Sidney Smith's wild schemes for a landing in the teeth of Napoleon's army and in France. He had been the chosen leader of the forces which in Kent immediately fronted Napoleon's great host on the shores of Boulogne. There Pitt and Mr. Secretary Dundas, afterwards Lord Melville, continually visited him and consulted him. Both Pitt and Mr. Secretary Dundas also frequently called him into private conference in London to consult him about schemes over which they were dreaming. Frequently these conferences took place after a private dinner, and as Mr. Dundas shared Pitt's notorious weakness for the bottle, it is recorded that on more than one occasion Moore, a specially abstemious though a very hospitable man, left the discussion

holding up his hands in despair that the fate of the country should depend on the decisions of two men in the condition in which he had left them. At times they acted without consulting him, as, for instance, in the case of Lord Camden's orders to Sir James Craig, to be presently recited. It is probably in consequence of the exceedingly confidential nature of these communications, and of the kind of comments that he would necessarily have made on them, that the Diary was stopped during a period of Moore's life, as to which it would have been for many reasons peculiarly interesting to have it. He was all the time the soldier in service with troops on whom the Duke of York relied for every new experiment, such as I have described in the creation of the Light Division at Shorncliffe. As he was under the immediate orders of Sir David Dundas, his old Corsican friend, who was now the recognised authority on drill and manœuvre, his innovations were much facilitated by his being on personal friendly terms with that dry old chip, in whom "there was much worth and valour."

When Pitt died, killed virtually by Napoleon's crushing victory over the Austrians and Russians at Austerlitz, which shattered the latest of Pitt's many Continental combinations, the King, after a vain attempt to reform the Pittite Cabinet without Pitt under Lord Hawkesbury, sent for Lord Grenville. Grenville, who had been formerly Pitt's Foreign Minister, had entered into alliance with Fox, and though Grenville became Premier, Fox, with the King's consent, became Leader of the House of Commons and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Fruitless attempts to make peace convinced Fox of the inevitable necessity of continuing the war, against which he had always

protested. As one means of carrying it on Fox proposed (May, 1806) to send his brother, General Fox (then Governor of Gibraltar), as Minister-Plenipotentiary and Generalissimo to the Mediterranean, in order to form a large force in Sicily, virtually to watch for an opportunity for carrying out under far less favourable conditions a scheme analogous to that which Sir Charles Stuart had proposed in 1798. It was essential that General Fox should have the most trustworthy and experienced military adviser who could be found, and, though throughout the war Moore had been politically a supporter of Pitt and opposed to Fox, the latter, both for his brother's sake and on national grounds, selected Moore to fill the difficult position, both because of his general military reputation, and because Moore had already become the established military adviser of the former Government and was known to the General. The idea that some such force in the Mediterranean was required had been entertained by Mr. Pitt's Government, and early in 1805 Sir James Craig had been despatched with a flotilla to the Mediterranean to co-operate with a Russian force in endeavouring to save the kingdom of Naples from Napoleon, who was threatening it in order to make his position in Italy more secure, prior to his transferring his great army from the Boulogne camp for that campaign against Austria and Russia, which was subsequently signalised by the surrender of the chief Austrian army at Ulm, and by the crushing defeat of the Russian and Austrian armies at Austerlitz. When Sir James Craig was despatched to the Mediterranean, Pitt's hopes were high as to the coming success against Napoleon of the Russian and Austrian alliance, which he had fomented. Unfortu-

nately Craig, though he was sent from England whilst everything looked promising, found on his arrival before Naples that the Court had been terrified into a nominal and treacherous peace with Napoleon. That base Court had immediately notified to the Russian Minister that they intended entirely to disregard the treaty with Napoleon, and still wished for the presence of the Russian and English armies. Sir James Craig, much puzzled by this conduct, had nevertheless landed his army in Naples, but the rapid and victorious campaign of Napoleon, after he had at the end of August, as he expresses it, countermarched his army from the shores of Boulogne, soon forced the Archduke Charles to retreat from Italy, and the wretched Neapolitan Court found that after all its intrigues Italy was flooded with the French army of Massena, and not with the Russo-Austrian army, on which its hopes of successful treachery had been founded. To make a long story short, Sir James Craig, finding that his position was untenable, decided to carry out, instead of the defence of Naples, one of the many other projects for the employment of his army which had been detailed to him by Lord Camden. Though he had only brought to the Mediterranean some young battalions, who were designed to release in Malta a number of older soldiers sufficient to place at his disposal about 7000 men for active service, he was to be ready to undertake the capture of Alexandria and the protection of Sardinia; he was also to see whether it might not be possible to capture Minorca. The chief object, however, among those for which this wonderful army was to be employed, was the security of Sicily. Sir James Craig, therefore, when he had discovered the utter hopeless-

ness of defending the kingdom of Naples, had fallen back upon Messina, and had made good the one possession which he could actually secure, the island of Sicily. Reference to these events, which had taken place prior to the arrival of Fox and Moore in Sicily, is so frequent in the next three chapters of the Diary, that it has been necessary briefly to describe them. For a sufficiently full and most graphic description of this earlier period I may refer to Sir Charles Bunbury's "Military Transactions in the Mediterranean." To distinguish between the work of the two Cabinets, it should be noted that it was Lord Camden who issued the orders to Sir James Craig. He was Secretary for the Colonies in Pitt's Administration of May 15, 1804, and was succeeded by Lord Castlereagh. It was Mr. Windham who issued the orders for Duckworth's expedition to the Dardanelles, and for the unfortunate attack on Alexandria which destroyed during the period of Fox and Moore's commands all prospect of effectually acting in Italy. He was Secretary of State in what was commonly known as "the Cabinet of all the talents," that of Lord Grenville and Fox. Before the Sicilian part of the Diary is read, I ought perhaps to explain that the "Capi" and the "Massi," frequently mentioned, were respectively the leaders and the gangs of banditti who had been developed in Calabria by the misery produced both by the intolerable government and by the French invasion.

PORTSMOUTH, 13th June 1806.—About the middle of May Sir James Craig returned from the Mediterranean in bad health. He had upon retiring from Naples rendezvoused with the troops at Messina, where they disembarked and took possession of the citadel. Upon leaving Sicily he had given up the command to Major-General Sir John Stuart. Upon

Sir James's arrival in England General Fox was appointed to the chief command in the Mediterranean, and I was appointed to serve under him as Lieutenant-General and second in command. A frigate was despatched to notify to General Fox his appointment, and to direct him to proceed from Gibraltar to Sicily. I left the command at Canterbury¹ and went to town to prepare for my departure. Major-Generals Mackenzie, Fraser, Sherbroke, and Edward Paget were also named for the service in Sicily. The force there has been increased from 7000 to 12,000. The *Chiffone* was named to take us, and Generals Fraser, Sherbroke, and I met here on Monday, the 9th instant, in order to embark. The order for sailing is hourly expected.

"CHIFFONE," AT SEA.—We embarked on Saturday, the 14th June, and fell down to St. Helen's, where we anchored, and in the evening, the wind proving fair, we sailed. Before we left Portsmouth accounts arrived that Lord Melville had been acquitted of all the charges. How the House of Peers reconcile this to their honour I know not, but I doubt if this acquittal will place Lord Melville in the estimation he was held by the public before he was accused. We met with favourable winds, and came in sight of Lord Collingwood's fleet off Cadiz on Friday, the 20th. I accompanied Admiral Purvis, who had his flag on board the *Chiffone*, to the *Ocean*, and was introduced to Lord Collingwood. I dined and remained with him till the evening. He is a respectable-looking sea officer of the old school, simple and unaffected in his manners. He was cheerful and affable to his officers; several of the captains of the fleet were at dinner, and after dinner I had a good deal of conversation with him, in which he gave me the impression of a man of sense. He told me there were eleven sail of the line in Cadiz fit for sea, and there would shortly be fifteen. There were seven or eight in Carthage, and four or five in Toulon. He was convinced that they would attempt a junction, and he thought it would be in the Mediterranean. Admiral Purvis left the *Chiffone* and hoisted his flag on board the *Minotaur*. We made sail

¹ Where latterly Moore had succeeded Sir David Dundas.

about eight in the evening for the Gut, and about three o'clock on Saturday afternoon, the 28th, we anchored in Gibraltar Bay. I found that General Fox had sailed in the *Orion*, 74, with his family, about three hours before our arrival. This was provoking, as I have letters for him which it would have been of consequence to him to have received upon his arrival in Sicily. They contain his appointment as Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Court of Naples, which he is to hold as well as the command of the troops. I have also the letters of recall of Mr. Elliot, the present Minister.

We were detained by easterly winds at Gibraltar eight days, until Saturday afternoon, the 5th of July; when we sailed in company with the *Active* frigate, the *Race-horse* brig, and a convoy of nineteen transports, victuallers and traders. It was late before the whole fleet were out, since which we have had strong west winds. During the eight days we were detained at Gibraltar we only stayed three days on shore. The inns are bad, and the places hot and dirty. I was sorry to see the very bad state of the garrison. It looked more like a place where the inhabitants did occasional military duty than a military station. It is singular that since the Duke of Kent's time there has been no medium between great severity and complete relaxation. Gibraltar, when I was quartered in it formerly, was a cheerful place; everything about it was military; in every quarter were met either bands of Spanish or military parties smart and well dressed; everything about it was alive, and the parade in the morning was a fine military display. Now there is no general parade; the detachments are marched from the regimental parades to their posts. The soldiers off duty are all dirty, and the regiments in the worst state of discipline. The duty is of course done in a slovenly way, and everything seems neglected and going to decay.

MESSINA, 7th August.—After a tedious passage of thirty days from Gibraltar we arrived here on the 5th instant. It was considered dangerous to go through the Straits of

Messina with a convoy. We therefore passed Malta and went round to the south and east sides of Sicily. General Fox is here; he arrived on the 22nd of July. He found the troops just returned from an expedition into Calabria under Major-General Sir John Stuart. The Major-General had been pressed by the Court of Palermo to land a body of troops in Calabria, where the French force, under General Regnier, they said, did not exceed 300 or 400 men, and where the Calabrians only wanted the countenance of a British force to rise and exterminate them. Sir John Stuart found that our retreat from Naples under Sir James Craig in the winter and our subsequent inactivity had impressed the Sicilians with an opinion that we durst not oppose the French, and that therefore some effort was necessary to give lustre to our arms, and gain the confidence of the people of this island, without which it would be in vain to attempt to maintain ourselves in it. As he was positively assured that Regnier's force did not exceed 4000, and had no support nearer than Naples, he thought it a favourable opportunity to endeavour to cut it off. He embarked not quite 5000 men, leaving Brigadier-General Broderick with the remainder of his force in command of the citadel of Messina, and landed without opposition in the bay of Eufemia on the 1st July.

General Regnier, who, as it has since appeared, had accurate information of the force destined to attack him, immediately collected his troops, and on the 4th took a position on a height to the south-west of the plain of St. Eufemia, with the rivulet of Lamato in his front. Sir John Stuart had been occupied in landing artillery and stores, an operation which had been retarded by the surf. He immediately marched to attack the enemy. Had Regnier remained in his position, as it was a very strong one, we might have failed to carry it, and at all events our loss must have been great; but confident of his own talents, the superiority in numbers and quality of his troops, he left his position, and marched down into the plain, determined to get between us and our ships. His force consisted

of 7500 infantry, besides 300 cavalry. He had invited all the neighbourhood to a fête he intended to give in the field after taking the English prisoners. The two lines were formed oblique to each other, so that, as each advanced, the left of the French and the right of the British, where the Light Infantry of both corps were posted, were the first engaged. The French, fully impressed with the idea that if they advanced the British would give way, came on with great confidence, and when within fifty yards, beat the charge and ported arms; but when they saw the British, instead of running as they expected, advancing on them with their arms also ported, their courage failed them. They turned when within a few yards, and by the fire and bayonets of the English Light Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Kempt, were almost entirely destroyed. The rest of their line on the left was attacked nearly at the same moment by Brigadier-General Acland's brigade, and beaten. Their right, where there was a corps which had never deployed, and with which they had intended to turn our left, which they outflanked, made some resistance. But on the 20th Regiment, which had that moment landed, coming up and attacking them, they also retired across the plain, protected by their cavalry and artillery. Our loss in killed and wounded does not exceed 250. The French left 500 dead on the field, and in wounded and prisoners their loss is estimated, in, and subsequent to the action, from 4000 to 5000 men.

No action, for the numbers engaged, was ever more brilliant, and, when coupled to the Egyptian campaign, is a proof that if our armies were equally large, our superiority over the French would be as apparent on shore as it is at sea. General Regnier, who held us so cheap on this occasion, and who in his account of the campaign in Egypt had said that the English had neither displayed talents nor courage, retired with about 2000 men to Catanzaro. His second in command, General Compere, was wounded and taken. The Calabrians, who had not stirred before, after the action rose in great numbers, and, having been supplied

by us with arms and ammunition, are attacking the French in every direction. It is doubtful whether Regnier will succeed in getting back. Two regiments, under Colonel Macleod of the 78th, were embarked and sent round to Crotona, where they took and destroyed the French magazines, and brought off a considerable quantity of brass ordnance. They destroyed or sunk all the iron guns. The French, under Regnier, retired from Catanzaro, and it is said have reached Capano, where they have met with reinforcements from Naples. The "Massi" were too despicable to make any impression upon him, though had they possessed a very small share of spirit and enterprise, not a man of this corps could have escaped through a country so rugged and without provisions but such as they could collect on their passage.

The French, by this expedition of Sir John Stuart's, have lost the magazines and stores, and all the coast artillery, which they had with much trouble and expense brought into that difficult country, and have been forced to evacuate lower Calabria. No doubt it is in their power to return into it, and to re-establish themselves. The inhabitants are not of a character to be able to prevent them. The better sort are all favourable to them, as they protect them from the depredations of the "Massi," or armed peasantry, who are a banditti. But hereafter the French will be obliged, if they return to Calabria, to occupy it in much greater force, and to have that force better supported. In the meantime, whatever operations they intended against Sicily are retarded. Gaeta surrendered by capitulation on the 18th of July. The Prince of Hesse was unfortunately wounded, and obliged to be carried on board an English ship. The command devolved on some inferior officer, who immediately capitulated. Sir Sidney Smith might have prevented this had he sailed immediately to Gaeta after the action of the 4th at Maida, and it was so concerted between him and Sir John Stuart, but he chose rather to gasconade along the coast and give himself the airs of taking, in the rear of the army, towns which had already been abandoned, or which must, at any rate, necessarily have fallen into the hands of our troops on their march back to Reggio.

He also lost much time at Scilla, against which, though Brigadier-General Oswald with a detachment of troops had been sent to besiege it, he landed two 12-pounders and began firing at a distance of 1200 yards. He flattered himself that he would have obliged it to surrender, and he summoned the officer commanding it several times. When he at last discovered that his attempt was vain, he sailed off; and when the castle was nearly breached by batteries brought within 200 yards of it, it surrendered to Brigadier-General Oswald, who gave the garrison better terms, that he might not be forced to destroy altogether a post which it was thought might be useful to ourselves. It is the only post which the British have retained in Calabria, and our engineers are employed in repairing it and putting it into a state of defence. I have seen it. It is very strong, but it is commanded. The difficulty is to get cannon to the spots from whence it can be breached, but on every side but that towards the land it is inaccessible.

MESSINA, 29th August.—General Fox was perplexed with demands for men, money, arms, and ammunition made upon him daily by Sir Sidney Smith from the coast of Calabria. He could form no distinct opinion from Sir Sidney's correspondence of the transactions in Calabria, or of the necessity of those demands. He therefore requested me to go to Sir Sidney, see what he was about, and if possible communicate with the "Capi" or chiefs in the interior, and bring him a report of the real state of matters. He gave me powers to decide for him, and to give whatever directions I thought necessary. I embarked in the *Apollo* frigate on the 16th August, and after going as far as the island of Capri, I returned to Messina yesterday. I found Sir Sidney off Cape Sicora in the bay of Salerno. He had with him, besides his own ship, the *Pompée*, 80, the *Thunderer*, 74, *Hydra* and *Aurora* frigates, four transports, and several gunboats, avisos, &c. They seemed floating on the face of the waters without object. When I went on board I found that, two days before, he had, at Cape Licora, gone under a French battery,

which in a very few minutes had struck the *Pompée* thirty-two times, and had killed and wounded forty-three men. Among the former was a lieutenant and a midshipman; he had then ordered the marines to land and get in the rear of the battery, which they did without loss, and took forty of the enemy prisoners. Had he done this at first he would have saved his own men and not have risked disabling his ship. I had a long conversation with him.

He spoke like a man who was directing a formidable force under distinguished leaders, and that nothing but the want of money and arms, which were denied him, had prevented his driving the French from lower Italy and placing Ferdinand upon the throne of Naples. When he had finished, I told him that General Fox, foreseeing from the tenor of his letters that he should have no opportunity of visiting him in person, had sent me to communicate with him; that the action of Maida had added lustre to our arms, and had deprived the French in those parts of that ideal superiority which they were so fond of assuming. It had cleared the two Calabrias of the French, and had enabled us to destroy the magazines they had collected, as well as their whole coast batteries from Licora to Cotrone. If they returned into lower Calabria it must be in much greater force than heretofore, and this, with the difficulty of transporting guns and warlike stores, would probably prevent their attempting it until next year. We had given the Calabrese and the Court of Palermo a fair opportunity to guard their country had they been, as they pretended to be, at all equal to it. We had supplied them with arms and ammunition; but, as they had failed, it had never been the intention, and certainly was not General Fox's, to land the British force and tie it up in the mere defence of Calabria. The Calabrese were a people divided amongst themselves; the persons of property were unfortunately favourable to the French. Those with us, or rather with the Court, were, as they properly called themselves, the *briganti* or *banditti*, who were averse to all order or civil government, and intent on plunder and murder rather than

united by a love of liberty or any praiseworthy sentiment. Their chiefs were not the men of most energy amongst themselves, but adventurers from other countries, most of them low vagabonds, who had deserved, or escaped, the gallows. The French, after being beaten and dispersed at Maida, had been permitted to collect and to retire to Cassano; they had since then been reinforced and united, and permitted to advance, passing through the difficult part of the country to Cosenza. General Fox, seeing so little dependence was to be placed in the Calabrese "Massis," did not think it safe to risk a small corps of British in their defence, and did not conceive it to be the policy of England to tie up a large one.

The defence of Sicily was at present the main object. Frigates and gunboats could be usefully employed in preventing warlike stores from being carried coastways in the Calabrias. Some Neapolitan troops under General Acton were going into lower Calabria, and would be stationed at Monteleone. General Fox was endeavouring to gain every information with respect to the country and its inhabitants, and would with this view send British officers to General Acton, if he found that the Calabrese could be organised and directed to any useful resistance. They should be supplied with means; but, as he took the whole of this upon himself, he must beg that Sir Sidney would desist from interfering with the affairs of the Calabrias, and not give promises or direct measures which, when done without his (General Fox's) knowledge and sanction, tended to counteract and militate against the plans he might adopt. Sir Sidney said that I should probably find him somewhere in the Gulf of Salerno when I returned from Capri. I proceeded there in the *Apollo*, and landed in that island the next morning. Lieutenant-Colonel Lowe, who commands the Corsicans, is stationed there with his corps. It affords no anchorage to vessels in the winter, but is at all times an excellent post from whence to observe the bay of Naples. The landing-places on it are few, and of difficult access; upon the whole it is a safe post.

It facilitates whatever communication we wish or are able to carry on with Naples and the mainland. The situation and the island itself are delightful. After staying a few hours on shore, visiting with Colonel Lowe his posts and walking to view the ruins of Tiberius' palace, we re-embarked and sailed. I found here two regiments in transports under Brigadier-General Acland, who had been sent after the action at Maida to make demonstrations on the coast. I saw no use in his continuing longer, and I ordered him to return with the troops to Messina. We found Sir Sidney nearly in the spot in which I had left him, floating in search of adventures for no earthly use. I delivered to him in writing the substance of what I had before said to him in conversation. He entered into a long discussion, and seemed anxious to explain what had at first led him to take a lead in the affairs of Calabria. There was much falsehood and misrepresentation in what he said; but he did not know how much I already knew of all that had passed previous to my arrival in Sicily. I told him General Fox was satisfied that everything had hitherto been done for the best, but the time was come when it was necessary to introduce more order and regularity than in the first moments of success had been possible, and, as much inconvenience would result if every one acted independently, he wished, as it was his duty, to conduct the affairs of Calabria, as far as the British were concerned, himself. On my return I communicated with different places on the coast—Policastro, Maratea, Amante, &c. In the country in which Sir Sidney was amusing himself with the idea that he was directing a campaign I found the inhabitants frightened and disheartened, hoisting the white or republican colours as danger threatened, and massacring and pillaging each other as one or other party was uppermost. The magistrates and persons in authority, from Sir Sidney or the Court, are a set of weak, pusillanimous men. They said the "Massi" were beaten and dispersed, their leaders had fled, and the country must be lost unless supported by troops

of the line. It was evident that the Calabrians were incapable of taking advantage of the strength of their country to protect themselves; that those who had proposed it had no other view but to be relieved from the immediate oppression of the French, and to gratify their vengeance on their countrymen who had joined them.

It seems therefore to me to be cruel and very unbecoming the British nation to encourage this kind of insurrection, which tends to the ruin of both parties, and, if we do not mean really to defend the Calabrese, we should leave them to make the best peace they can, and not, by encouraging the revolt, subject them to more severe punishment. Whilst absent I received a despatch from General Fox, enclosing a letter from Sir John Stuart pressing him to make demonstrations with troops upon the coast as a diversion in favour of the Calabrians. General Fox in his letter expressed himself averse to fritter away his force in this manner until my return, or until he heard from me. Upon my return, however, I found that the General had yielded to Sir John's importunity; that he had detached Brigadier-General Cole with his brigade to Pizzo. Brigadier-General Acton, with some Neapolitan cavalry and infantry, were gone to Monteleone, and Stuart had passed over into Calabria at Scilla with some light companies and a troop of cavalry. In the meantime the Duke de la Foresta had embarked and come off from Catrona in a frigate, though not a Frenchman was near him, and the "Capi" had in like manner abandoned the "Massi" and had fled to Messina. Brigadier-General Cole is ordered to return immediately, and I hope that in like manner Sir John Stuart will be ordered back.

There seems to me to be no medium. We should either march our whole force into Calabria, if its defence is a British object, or leave them to themselves. We should not risk small corps which, without giving real protection to the country, only serve as baits to the enemy, who will not fail to cut them up. We have beaten the French and destroyed their magazines in Calabria, and

have taught them not to risk small corps in our neighbourhood. The troops at Messina and a proportion of transports stationed at Milazzo will make the French cautious of committing another corps in lower Calabria. We should do no more; if the Calabrians cannot defend themselves, they must submit; our attention should be turned to the immediate defence of Sicily and to getting our troops and departments into some order, that we may be ready either to defend Sicily if attacked, or go upon any other service should we be so ordered. General Fox has written strongly to Sir Sidney to desist from interfering with the inhabitants.

Information has been received from Vienna that peace between France and Russia was signed on the 20th July. The terms are that the French troops are to be withdrawn from Germany. Swedish Pomerania is not to be attacked, the Turkish dominions are guaranteed, and the Russians guarantee the island of Sicily, which is to be given in exchange for the Balearic Islands. As it is known that we were treating in concert with Russia, it is presumed from this separate peace which Russia has concluded that the Emperor Alexander has, like all the other princes of the present day, played us false and disgraced himself. The Court of Palermo is in great consternation, and by letters from Mr. Elliot it appears that the Queen has an intention of coming here. Sir John Acton has resigned.

MESSINA, 1st *September*.—General Fox embarked this afternoon for Palermo; this will prevent the Queen from coming to Messina. The Marquis of Circello succeeds Sir John Acton as Minister. The July packet arrived from England two days ago, but she had a bad passage, and has brought nothing later than the 8th July. One letter from Mr. Windham to General Fox mentions the intention to send a reinforcement of above 6000 troops.

MESSINA, 12th *September*.—The August packet arrived a few days after General Fox left this. I forwarded the official letters to him unopened to Palermo, and I had no private ones which gave me any information. It appears

that we were still negotiating, that 6000 are embarked in England as a reinforcement to this army, but had not sailed. Two days ago a courier passed through this place from Vienna with despatches for Palermo. He reported that negotiations were broken off both with England and Russia. There was no truth in the pretended peace said to have been signed by Russia with France, that, on the contrary, all was war. General Acton, with the Neapolitan troops in Calabria, has for some days been retreating, and yesterday the last of them embarked at Scilla. General Acton waited on me this day. He says the French, said to be commanded by Marshal Massena, were at Mileto, but advancing; he estimates them at 6000, but with other corps following in echelon. I received letters yesterday from General Fox. He says the Queen and the Court are full of landing at Naples, and, by means of the Calabrian "Massi" and the British troops, recovering their dominions. In all this nonsense they are encouraged by Sir Sidney Smith, who sees the Queen in private twice every day. Fox adds that if he resists the landing at Naples he understands he is to be pressed to take up a position at Maida, and, should he not receive special instructions to the contrary from home before the arrival of the expected reinforcements, he does not see how far he will be able to resist the solicitation.

I have written to him that without doubt he will be instructed from England, but should this not be the case, I should certainly neither land at Naples nor take up the proposed position; that the first could be of no permanent advantage even to their Sicilian Majesties without the co-operation of other Powers. Maida was no position, but if it was, I would not occupy it; that if a position was wanted, this of Sicily was the only one from which he could not be driven. I would land in Calabria with no view but to fight and to go forward; that though the recovery of the Neapolitan throne was a favourite object with the Court of Palermo, it was possible to conceive that England might have views beyond it in establishing themselves militarily in Sicily, and I should wait the develop-

ment of those views without troubling myself with the wishes and opinions of the Neapolitan Court, who, the General says, were hinting that if we had no intention of doing more than to preserve Sicily, they would be better without us. I should keep the army in the best order I could, ready to execute whatever was directed, but not entangle myself in operations in Calabria which could tend to no possible good, but from which it might be difficult to withdraw the troops if wanted for other services.

MESSINA, 20th September.—The General returned from Palermo the evening before last. He tells me he has received no orders or instructions from home, but trusts that he will do so before the reinforcement arrives. He is much disgusted with the Court of Palermo, where he says he witnessed more childishness, wickedness, and folly than is to be met with in any other part of the world. Sir Sidney Smith is there intriguing and encouraging all their extravagances. Sometimes he is to be Viceroy of Calabria; at others to have the island of Lampedosa to hold as a fief from the King of Naples with the title of duke, and to go to Jerusalem and make instant war on Buonaparte in the King of Naples' name!!! The information about the French in Calabria, which I had from a merchant who marched with their army from Salerno to Melito, and then came on to Scilla, is, that their main body, then of 10,000 men, is at Cozenza, that Massena with about 3000 had advanced to Monteleone, and sent Regnier forward from thence with 1000. Since this gentleman passed it is understood that reinforcements had arrived at Naples, which I take for granted they have sent forward to Salerno and Lagonegro. Their army, according to this disposition, is nowhere committed, and is ready to act against us whether we land at Naples or in Calabria. I have not learned what force they have, or whether they have any on the side of Cassano and Crotone.

MESSINA, 2nd September.—On the 21st I went to Milazzo, and returned yesterday afternoon. The country about Milazzo is quite different from any I had yet seen in Sicily.

From below the village of Gisso it extends gradually into a plain, between the mountains and the sea, of different breadths to several miles beyond the peninsula of Milazzo. The bay of Milazzo affords good anchorage for ships of any size. It is exposed to certain winds, and is therefore not frequented by our fleet during the winter; but I understand that those winds are found not to blow home, and that ships may ride in safety at all seasons. The plain of Milazzo seems to me the situation for the disposable force, and that, leaving a garrison at Messina, the rest of our troops should be encamped or hutted in the plain, with our transports in the bay. This is the most threatening position we can take. The troops would, I am convinced, be more healthy and much better prepared for service than they would be if dispersed in the villages round Messina.

MESSINA, 28th September.—I set out on the 26th on a tour to Augusta and Syracuse, meaning on my way to visit Etna and to proceed, if I had time, to Castro-Giovanna, Girgenti, and Trapani. I reached Taormina the first day, but was recalled by an express from General Fox yesterday. He wished to consult me on despatches he had received from the Marquis of Circello, the first Minister to their Sicilian Majesties. The despatches contained a letter (No. 6) from that Minister, with a plan for an attack on the kingdom of Naples. The letter stated that the daily solicitation H. S. Majesty received from Naples, and the disposition of that people, joined to other reasons, had determined H. S. Majesty to employ all his means in the execution of the plan transmitted; that H. S. Majesty could not promise himself complete success without the aid and concurrence of General Fox with a part of the forces under his orders, but that the aid of the maritime force was indispensable to escort and protect the expedition; and that he had already received orders to apply for them to Admiral Sir Sidney Smith. The plan was founded on the present discontent of the people of Naples, who were ready to rise upon the French, and on that of the Calabrians, who had already testified their attachment to the Royal cause. It states the

whole French force in Lower Italy not to exceed 20,000 men, 10,000 of which only were French; that Massena had with him in Calabria 12,000 of the *élite* of their army; the other 8000 were dispersed in various parts—Apulia, Abruzzo, &c. &c.; and that the garrison of Naples did not exceed 2000. The disposable British force in Sicily is called 12,000, the Sicilian 15,000, out of which a corps of 8000 could be picked. It was proposed to land these, under the Prince of Hesse, in the neighbourhood of Naples, which, in the absence of Massena at the distance of fifteen days' forced marches, could offer no resistance. The British were to land in Calabria as soon as the success at Naples was known, and follow and harass Massena in his retreat to succour Naples.

Nothing can be more absurd than the whole plan, or more false and erroneous than the data upon which it is formed. It is intersected with much impertinence, and even though from other circumstances it was not known, yet the language and general character of it would sufficiently discover it to be the joint production of Sir Sidney Smith and the Queen. General Fox begged me to return, as he wished to consult me before he returned any answer to the despatches. He said in his note to me that he was aware of the torrent of abuse which would be written home if he did not concur in the plan, and, as the subject was purely military, he wished to have my opinion. I told the General that I knew no event that had happened to induce him to change the resolution he had already formed; that I considered the position Massena had taken up was one in which he could not be hurt. It was intermediate, and he could at pleasure move from it to the defence of Naples or that of Calabria. A very short time must now either bring him (General Fox) instructions from home, or ascertain the event of the negotiations which have been carried on. If Germany remained as before subservient to France, and we continued with Russia as our only ally, it was impossible to hope for any permanent good from anything we could do in Italy; but if, on the contrary, the coalition which was

talked of in the North of Europe was formed, we might then act in Italy with great effect. At present prudence dictated our being quiet, and, at any rate, that we should not be led by the folly and wickedness of the Court of Palermo and its advisers into measures which we disapproved.

I recommended to the General to answer the Marquis of Circello by positively refusing to concur in the measures he had proposed; to assure him that it was not less the wish of the British Court than his to see their Sicilian Majesties restored to their throne and former dominions; and that he should be happy to employ the force under his command in the manner that would best tend to so desirable an end; but that with respect to the time and manner when it should be undertaken, he held himself to be the sole judge. In his opinion this was not the moment, and as to the plan submitted, it was so faulty, that he could not believe it had been formed in concert with any man of military experience. He declined to have any share in its execution, and should regret if H. S. Majesty was so ill advised as to attempt it himself. With respect to the naval aid, Sir Sidney Smith knew best the orders he had received from his Commander-in-chief; but as he believed those were to protect Sicily and to act in concert with the British land forces, he could not believe he would employ the fleet and transports under his command in any operations in which the British commander did not concur and in which the British army took no share.

I recommended the General to write to Sir Sidney, and in very plain terms tell him that he must not flatter himself that his conduct was any secret; that his intrigues with the Queen and the Court of Palermo were obvious to every one; that he was sent to command the squadron for the purpose of acting in concert with him, not to intrigue with the Sicilian Court. If he had any measures to propose, it became him to discuss them with him, not through the channel of Circello. He understood that application was to be made to Sir Sidney for the aid of the British squadron

and transports to escort the Neapolitan forces to Italy; that it was a measure he (General Fox) disapproved, and had refused to co-operate in, but that he was looking daily for the occasion to act offensively with the British army, and he trusted Sir Sidney would consider well before he engaged in any enterprise which might render it impossible for him to co-operate with the British troops. The General has not written so forcibly as I wished and advised him to do, either to Sir Sidney or to the Marquis Circello. He has, however, perhaps written sufficiently so. I believe that both the one and the other require to be spoken to in very plain language. I would not hesitate with Sir Sidney to show him that I was perfectly acquainted with his intrigues and his meanness, and that, however much he might flatter himself with deceiving others, he did not deceive me; and as to the Court of Palermo, as we have a force that can command Sicily, and as we pay them a subsidy, we have a full right to let them feel, though respectfully, that we are to dictate, and not to be dictated to.

1st November.—Brigadier-General Campbell, the Adjutant-General of the army, arrived two days ago; he sailed from Falmouth with the packet on the 1st October. He came from Gibraltar in the *Athenian*, and was wrecked in her on the rocks of Skerki, but was one of the fortunate who escaped. He brings confirmation of Mr. Fox's death. The packet has brought no public despatches to the General. If there were any in the *Athenian* they have been lost. Yet General Campbell says the reinforcements for this place had sailed from Plymouth a week before he did, and may be daily expected. Lord Lauderdale was still at Paris, yet Buonaparte had left Paris and was gone to the army, assembling opposite to the Prussians in Westphalia. I cannot help thinking that a peace is still a probable event, or surely Ministers would have sent General Fox instructions. There can be no reason for reinforcing this army unless it is intended to act offensively with it. The General will, however, not venture to employ it on any service until he

receives instructions, or has some general information of the plans of Government, and this in the present stage of the negotiation Ministers are perhaps not able to give.

About this time the first vague rumours of Jena and the fall of Prussia under the arms of Napoleon reached Sicily, and Moore writes in a private letter to General Brownrigg:—

MESSINA, 27th November 1806.—“Our reinforcements, we hear, have entered the straits, and we look for their arrival daily. From what was brewing in the north of Germany, we were in hopes with the reinforcement to have acted offensively, but after these successes of Buonaparte, if true, and we have bulletins which state him to be at Berlin, there is little chance of our operations extending beyond the defence of this island. Sicily is an important object to France, and when he has settled the affairs of Germany, Buonaparte will no doubt turn much of his attention and a considerable part of his force to gain possession of it. If the island was our own, and we could command its resources and its energies, and had only the enemy to contend with, I do not doubt even with a less British force than we shall soon have, that we should be able to maintain ourselves, and to baffle all the efforts France can make; but if things are allowed to continue as at present, so that we have the British force alone to depend on, with this weak and wicked Court and all the hatred which attends it to baffle and counteract us, it is impossible to say how soon a misfortune may befall us. Paying and supporting this Court as we do, certainly the British Ministers and Commander-in-chief have a right to interfere in their councils, and I am convinced that General Fox might in a great measure control and direct them. I have often urged him to assume a high tone, but it seems contrary to his nature. He disapproves as much as any one of all they do, sees the ruinous tendency of all their measures, and though he does not conceal from them his disapprobation, yet he takes no other means to prevent their perseverance in them.

“ Acton has lately been dismissed from the administration. I cannot think from what I have heard of him that he is an able man, but he is said to be an honest man and a friend to the English. Circello has replaced him. He is considered in this country as a very contemptible, foolish fellow, a mere tool in the hands of the Queen and Sir Sidney Smith. The latter is supposed to have had a considerable influence in his appointment, and is said, and I believe there is no doubt of it, to be at present the chief director of the Queen, and consequently of the Sicilian Government. They could not well have fallen into worse hands. Under his auspices the whole of the Sicilian military force has been taken from General Fox and placed under the command of the Prince of Hesse. The measure was not even communicated to him until it was known to every fisherman in Messina, and until the order for the march and embarkation of the different corps had been sent to them. All their troops are withdrawn from their garrisons cantoned in the villages, from Trapani to the neighbourhood of Palermo. This measure, whether in itself right or wrong, is done without concert with General Fox, and in case of an attack on Sicily he has not the control over a single Sicilian soldier. The British or Sicilian troops might in that event still act to the same end, but each would be directed according to the views of their respective commanders, who at present are independent of each other.

“ You may say, ‘ What can be Sir Sidney Smith’s object in this state of things, so contrary to the interest and to the dignity of his own country ? ’ When under the command of the Prince of Hesse or of any Sicilian general, their troops are in reality under Sir Sidney, and can at once be employed upon any expedition which his folly plans or his vanity dictates. At all events, the fact is sufficient. I am not obliged to account for the motives of such a man. From experience, I know that nothing is too absurd for his folly, nothing too mean or too wicked where his vanity or his interest is concerned. The General might perhaps also in some degree control Sir Sidney by speaking openly

to him, and telling him that his intrigues at Palermo were no secret to him, that his duty was to attend to his squadron, that he deviated from it when he interfered with the Sicilian Court, with which he himself alone, as the King's Minister, Commander-in-chief, and the person in the confidence of the British Government, could with propriety communicate. Sir Sidney might in this manner have been restrained, but not completely checked, for it is his nature to be false and intriguing. It is not in his power to despise momentary applause, or to adhere for any time to a sensible and manly line of conduct.

"General Fox has written home representing strongly the facts with respect to Sir Sidney, stating the impossibility of acting in concert with him. He is now at Palermo, with his ships in all directions, but not two of them in a state to meet the enemy. It is ungracious to be obliged to speak so ill of a Court which we are sent to support, but General Fox is too honest a man to speak of them otherwise than as he finds them. It is his business to represent the truth and leave H.M. Ministers to make what decision they think proper. The government of this country is, and has been, so vexatious and oppressive, that it is impossible for the inhabitants to do otherwise than hate it. They make no secret of the fact that they are determined no longer to submit to it, and, if we do not, as they wish, rescue them from it, they will throw themselves into the arms of France. By what means we are to do this I shall not say, but the possession of Sicily is a most important object, whether as a military post or as a valuable colony. If the Court of Palermo and the present government continue, and we are seriously threatened, I doubt if we shall hold it. Were they removed and the island declared English, we should, with the hearts of the people and the energy which I think they could still be brought to display in a cause they approved, be able to maintain it against the world. But, if Buonaparte has been as successful as it is said he has been in Germany, it is time for our Ministers to make their decision. No half measures will do. At all events we

must be directed to dictate to and control the Court, who, if allowed to act for themselves, will by their weakness and folly ruin us very quickly; but nothing short of declaring the island English, and giving to it the advantages of British legislation, will ensure to us a friend in Sicily, or make our tenure in it of any duration."

H.M. SHIP "KINGFISHER," AT SEA, *the 27th December 1806*.—A few days ago General Fox received a letter from Mr. Drummond, dated from Palermo the 18th instant, announcing to him his arrival as Minister Plenipotentiary to that Court, accompanied with an extract from his instructions. The same conveyance brought the General from Lord Howick his letters of recall as Minister.¹ Mr. Drummond mentions the solicitude of the Court of Palermo for an enterprise against the kingdom of Naples. As this is a military operation, Mr. Drummond says that it would be unbecoming in him to offer an opinion on the expediency of it. He has therefore refused to give Circello any opinion that shall differ from that of General Fox. As, however, he must report home the different statements that are made to him, he wishes to be furnished with the General's statements upon the expediency of a measure so earnestly desired by the Sicilian Government, as with every wish to be impartial it was very difficult to hear arguments on one side only, and yet to remain unbiassed. The General thought that it would be more satisfactory than writing if I went to Palermo. As I had been in his secrets and had thought with him on every measure that had been taken, I could explain everything to Mr. Drummond more to the satisfaction of all parties. I embarked accordingly in this ship from Messina on the 24th, but have met with such contrary winds that I do not expect to reach Palermo before to-morrow. Mr. Secretary Fox was of opinion that whatever person was sent to relieve the General from the diplomatic part of his functions should still be subordinate

¹ On the death of Fox, Lord Howick had succeeded him as Secretary of State in Lord Grenville's Administration

to him or to whoever was the military commander. General Fox had stated a wish to be relieved from this part of his duty, as a preparatory step to giving up also that of the military. He, however, still thought that his brother's principle of making the Minister subordinate to the military commander would have been adhered to; this, however, does not seem to be the case. Mr. Drummond has no such instructions. The General has received permission to leave the command in Sicily whenever he pleases, and to return either to Gibraltar or England as he thinks proper. He has, however, come to no determination on the point.

PALERMO, *7th January 1807*.—I arrived in this bay on the night of the 28th and landed next morning. I immediately went to the house of Mr. Drummond, where I found an apartment prepared for me, and there I have remained ever since. In my first conversation with Mr. Drummond I explained the motives upon which General Fox had hitherto acted, and his reasons for objecting to undertake at present any expedition into Calabria or the kingdom of Naples. With the force he had he could only act in Italy with any effect at a time when the French were occupied elsewhere and were not able to detach largely for the defence of Italy; and therefore the time for the undertaking depended much more upon events that might take place in the north of Europe, than on those that were passing in our immediate neighbourhood. At the present moment, when the French had been so successful in Germany, it would be madness to think of it. I found Mr. Drummond perfectly prepared to agree with me in everything I said. We had much discussion upon the state of the Court of Palermo, the conduct of Sir Sidney Smith, &c., upon which points we also agreed. Mr. Drummond is a sensible, well-informed man, and as he was Minister at the Court of Naples some years ago, he is perfectly acquainted with the character of the Court and of the individuals who compose it.

For many years Sir John Acton was Minister and had

the management of affairs. During his administration the Queen had little to say. Some months ago the Queen contrived to get him turned out, and brought in the Marquis of Circello, a tool of her own, and since that time she has had the sole direction of the government. What degree of intellect the King has I cannot say. He is an indolent man, hating business, and is satisfied, provided the government goes on, and he is allowed to follow his favourite amusements of hunting and fishing. His natural disposition is not bad. He is good-natured, easy, and familiar with those with whom he converses. The populace of Naples liked him. It is the same here, and some of the noblemen of the best character are attached to him.

The Queen is generally called clever; she is active, meddling, and intriguing. She has assumed so much of the character of a man as to make her unamiable as a woman. The late Empress Catherine of Russia is perhaps her model; she has, like her, a lover, but with this difference—that Catherine rewarded the lover with titles and riches, but was not governed by him. The Queen of Naples has placed hers in an employment for which he has no capacity, is influenced by him, and, as he is a Frenchman, it is more than suspected that she is betrayed by him. The truth is that she is not clever, except in conversation and intrigue. She is violent, wicked, with a most perverted understanding, led by her passions, and seldom influenced by reason. She is attached to nobody but as far as they can be of use to her. She gives her confidence, however, to all who flatter her and enter into her views, and by those she is led. She is quite incapable of discretion in affairs, though never happy but when dabbling in them. Her passion at present is to return to Naples, and, as she desires it, she will not listen to the obstacles which oppose it, but would sacrifice every man in Sicily in the attempt, though if the force now here were once annihilated, she can have no hope of ever seeing another formed for her protection.

Two or three days after my arrival I was introduced to

the Queen in private by Mr. Drummond. She made us sit down, was extremely polite, and conversed on general subjects with us for about twenty minutes. Her manners are good, she expressed herself well, and has the appearance of having been handsome. She must be now nearly fifty. After I had explained myself to Mr. Drummond and seen the Queen, my mission terminated, and I was about to return to Messina; but Mr. Drummond and others expressed a wish that I should continue here until the King's return from a hunting party, that I might be introduced to him. It was hoped that my speaking to him might prevent the expedition to Naples with the Sicilian troops which the Queen was meditating. This has given me time to see and converse with every person of any note at the Court, and to represent to them the extreme folly of the Queen's measures. The Prince of Hesse Phillipstal, who is Captain-General of the Sicilian forces, is quite of my opinion. He is an honest man, but unfortunately not a very wise one. I have endeavoured to be well with him, looking forward to our being called upon to act together. At present he commands the Sicilian troops, but his staff is composed of French emigrants, who, he thinks, are traitors. Monsieur de St. Clair, the Queen's lover, is the head traitor. Their troops are not all clothed nor armed, and few of the corps have any discipline. Their officers are very bad. There is, however, among them material for an army, but I doubt if the Prince of Phillipstal possesses the talent necessary to form them. His conduct at Gaeta has, however, gained him the confidence of the soldiers.

The King returned two days ago, and yesterday evening Mr. Drummond and I waited upon him. He received us alone in his private chamber. After the first compliments he spoke with much feeling. He said he was of the same opinion now as he had always been; he wished to be well with England, and was satisfied that the English meant to act fairly by him. He knew that some persons had endeavoured to leave a different impression, but it had been without his knowledge or consent, that for his part he

liked and confided in the English, and should always act faithfully and honestly by them, and in future he should take care that nothing was transacted that did not pass through his hands and had his approbation. He added: "I may become poor and unfortunate, but I trust I shall always preserve the character of an honest, honourable man. Mr. Drummond, you have known me formerly, and, I hope, never knew me depart from my word. Believe me, I am now the same, and that nothing will ever make me act otherwise." He spoke in Italian, in which he said he could express himself with more ease. We answered him in French. He certainly spoke his feelings, and was evidently agitated. His manners are those of a good-natured country gentleman.

He invited us to dine with him this day, the 11th January. The dinner consisted of twelve persons. Mr. Drummond, Sir Sidney Smith, the Russian Minister, and I were the only strangers, the rest were the Ministers and Officers of the Court. It was impossible for a dinner of the sort to be more devoid of ceremony. The King was in good spirits; the conversation ran entirely upon hunting. He spoke a great deal, and told some ridiculous anecdotes, with the humour and gestures of a lazzarone. After dinner we went to drink coffee in an adjoining room, where we found the Queen with the princes and princesses. The Queen introduced the latter to me, and was as usual very polite, paying me and the British troops many compliments. She, however, likes neither me nor the troops, and has already abused both very grossly. The King is a good-natured, selfish man. If he had £3000 a year and a pack of hounds he would be in his place; but, as a King, and circumstanced as he is, to see him occupied with his amusements only is a little disgusting. As the Queen is active and is willing to relieve him from the trouble of business, it is not probable that she will lose her ascendancy. The Queen disregards Sicily as unworthy her attention, though it is the only territory she possesses. She never thinks of ameliorating the condition of its in-

habitants or adopting regulations for its future improvement. Her thoughts run entirely upon the reconquest of Naples, and no person who does not flatter her in this matter can be in favour with her. The English have been sent here for the preservation of Sicily, and to aid in the reconquest of Naples when it is practicable; their Generals do not think the moment for attempting it has yet arrived, and have an interest in common with her in not undertaking it too soon; yet as they oppose her wishes, however much they support their opposition with argument, she detests them and their whole nation, and gives her confidence to Frenchmen and men sold to France, who, from personal views, encourage her in her absurdity, by which they alone can profit.

It is difficult to describe a Court more debauched, more mean or more weak. Their only talent is intrigue; it is the Queen's also; but they counteract each other, and everything is known; all intrigue and are intrigued against. The Queen has spies in every family, but they all have spies equally on her and on each other. It is a scene quite painful to witness; and I never was more pleased than when I was able to come away from it. I do think that the English Minister might by a bold and firm language overawe them, supported as he is by a military and naval force, and representing a nation which pays them subsidies. I have mentioned this to Mr. Drummond, but he says that his instructions direct him to keep well with the Court. I believe that by following the line I advise he would be more certain of keeping well with it; for I believe he could very soon have the sole direction of it; and it is very necessary he should, for under the guidance of the Queen it is impossible that either her views or ours can prosper. After our dinner with the King Mr. Drummond closed his despatches for England and sent them by the packet which he had detained for that purpose. He also sent in the packet Mr. A'Court, the Secretary of Legation, to explain more fully the state of affairs to Ministers. Mr. A'Court has been many years at

this court. He is a sensible man, and perfectly capable of giving Government the information they stand in need of. Mr. Drummond has written strongly respecting the conduct of Sir Sidney Smith, representing the impossibility of acting with a man who, from a strange perversity of head, seems to have forgotten the honourable station of a British Admiral and is dwindled into that of a Neapolitan courtier. His despatches, in other respects, corroborate the statements which have already been made by General Fox, and press for permission to hold such language and adopt such measures as will control the Sicilian Government.

CHAPTER XXIII

SICILY UP TO THE DEPARTURE OF GENERAL FOX

MESSINA, 30th January 1807.—A few days ago the *Ajax*, eighty guns, arrived at Palermo. She had been detached by Sir John Duckworth to announce his arrival with the *Royal George*, the *Repulse*, and *Windsor Castle*. Despatches from Sir John Duckworth, from Lord Collingwood, and from the Secretary of State, which were brought by the *Ajax*, were forwarded to General Fox. The Secretary of State¹ mentions that, in consequence of the hostile disposition manifested by the Turks against Russia and Great Britain, it had been thought advisable to send a squadron under Admiral Duckworth to the Dardanelles, where, after communicating with the British Minister, Mr. Arbuthnot, at Constantinople, he was, if it was judged expedient, instantly to act hostilely against the Porte. It was also the determination of Ministers that in the event of war with the Turks a corps of 5000 men should be detached from Sicily to take possession of Alexandria; that this corps should be immediately made ready, so as to be able to sail the moment information was received from Sir John Duckworth of his determination to commence hostilities. The letters from Lord Collingwood and Duckworth were in conformity to those received from the Secretary of State. This morning General Fox received a letter from Mr. Drummond at Palermo, dated 27th January, stating that Sir John Duckworth had arrived off that port with his squadron two days before, and had been joined by the *Ajax* and *Pompée*, but did not land. He had sailed for Malta, and would probably see General Fox at Messina as he passed. Mr. Drummond adds that, not having been

¹ i.e., Mr. Windham.

sufficiently well to go himself on board of Admiral Duckworth's flagship, he had written to him and had sent Lord Burghersch to explain still more fully his sentiments, and to put him on his guard against Sir Sidney Smith, who, if he was trusted, would certainly communicate all he knew to the Queen of Sicily. Mr. Drummond tells several anecdotes of Sir Sidney, whose secret intrigues with the Queen continued to the last. He was closeted with Monsieur St. Clair until the moment of his departure. Mr. Drummond adds that there is too much reason to believe that the Queen at one time was negotiating for a large corps of Russians to be sent to Sicily, but, since the late successes of the French, she has opened through Spain a negotiation with Buonaparte, and is now actually betraying us. I do not know that Sir Sidney Smith is privy to this, but I believe him to be so unprincipled that he is capable, for any advantage to himself, or gratification to his vanity, first to betray us and then the Queen. His head is a most perverted one, and his nature false without bounds. He is a good riddance from Palermo, and it is to be hoped that Sir John Duckworth will trust him no further than he sees him.

H.M.S. "APOLLO," AT SEA, 3rd February 1807.—When it was discovered that Sir John Duckworth had passed with his fleet by the south of the island, General Fox expressed a wish that I should go to Malta and see him before he proceeded to the Dardanelles, as by such communication I should be able to explain matters more fully than could be done by letter. I embarked in the *Apollo* on Saturday, 31st January, but we have met with such perverse winds that we are only now in sight of Malta, but without the power of entering it. I have employed myself in writing my letters for the packet, which arrived at Messina a few days before I left it, and which is to call at Malta on her return to England.

H.M.S. "APOLLO," 5th February.—On the evening of the 3rd we got sight of the *Royal George*, as she and the squadron

were leaving Malta, in time to make the signal to speak the Admiral, upon which they bore up for us, and I went on board of Sir John Duckworth's flagship about eight o'clock. He told me that he had detached a vessel some days ago to inform General Fox that Italinski, the Russian Minister at Constantinople, had made his escape in the *Active* frigate and was now at Malta, and that the Porte had declared war with Russia; and, as Sir John considered war with Russia equivalent to hostilities with England, he had suggested to the General the propriety of sending at once the 5000 troops to Alexandria without waiting for his arrival in the Dardanelles. Sir John states that the despatches from Mr. Arbuthnot, announcing the war with Russia, mention that what had determined the Turks to take this step was the march of the Russians into Moldavia, for which no explanation had been given; but that they continued the same attention towards him and to express the same friendship and goodwill towards the British nation. I told Sir John Duckworth that I could not say what determination General Fox would make, but my own opinion was to await the result of his appearance in the Dardanelles, which might still induce the Turks to retract and render the expedition to Alexandria unnecessary. At all events, the delay could be attended with no bad consequences. There was nothing to prevent our taking possession of Alexandria whenever we pleased; it was of no moment whether it was done immediately or in a month hence; whereas, in the present state of Sicily, when the Court were suspected of negotiating with Buonaparte for its surrender, it was of importance not to diminish our force there until the last moment.

I remained with him till past ten o'clock; it blew fresh, and I had some difficulty in getting back to the *Apollo*. The Admiral was rather inclined to think with me on the subject of Alexandria, and before we parted, as he was to make sail immediately for the Dardanelles, it was agreed that he should send a fast-sailing vessel to General Fox as soon as he had communicated with Mr. Arbuthnot and determined on hostilities; when, if the troops had not already

sailed, they should immediately be sent to Alexandria. Sir John showed me his instructions, which are that if the Porte does not desist from hostilities with Russia he is to demand the surrender of their fleet, and, if they do not, in an hour, agree to do this, he is to take such a position with his squadron as may enable him to destroy the town of Constantinople, and also to take or destroy their fleet. The next morning I wrote an account of what had passed with Sir John Duckworth to General Brownrigg, and we stood in for La Vallete in order to leave that and other letters to await the arrival of the packet. We got in with difficulty in the afternoon. I saw General Villetes and some other friends in the evening at a ball given at the palace by Villetes. I came on board to sleep, and sailed for Messina early this morning.

A few hours after we had left the harbour of La Vallete we met the *Hirondelle* returning from Messina, where she had been with the letter from Admiral Duckworth to General Fox which I have mentioned. The officer commanding her came on board the *Apollo* and delivered me a letter from the General enclosing a copy of that to him from Sir John Duckworth, with two letters from himself to Sir John Duckworth under flying seal for my perusal. By the first of these he refuses to send the troops to Alexandria until after the Admiral's arrival off the Dardanelles. In the other he says that upon further consideration he will take upon himself to send them immediately, but the General desires me to deliver the second or not as I think proper, trusting the whole decision to my discretion. I enclosed both letters to the Admiral, stating to him the whole of the circumstances, and that the General had left the decision to me; that I determined to abide by the determination contained in the first letter, but that I sent him the second merely to show the strong inclination the General had to comply with every wish of his, as far as he thought he was justified by his instructions; that thus the troops and every other requisite should be got ready as soon as possible, but the expedition should not sail until General Fox heard from

him after his arrival off the Dardanelles. The *Hirondelle*, after she received my letter, continued on her voyage to Malta, from whence she will be ordered to follow Sir John Duckworth to Constantinople.

My opinion is that the expedition to Alexandria is ill-judged. It is not by attacking their distant provinces that the Turks can be much affected. If, in the scramble for the Turkish provinces, supposing the Empire to be demolished, Egypt be thought the best for us, we can possess Alexandria at any time, the French cannot be beforehand with us there; but in this stage of the war we should not shut up our force in detached garrisons, which, by depriving us of a disposable force, prevent our deriving the advantages of our naval superiority to act offensively. We should, I think, establish ourselves firmly in Sicily, which can only be done by first seizing possession of the Government, for which we have the wishes of all the inhabitants, and then keep a disposable floating force always ready to act offensively. It would have been well at present to have sent 7000 or 8000 men with the fleet to Constantinople, which would have secured their passage through the Dardanelles and enabled the Admiral to destroy the Turkish fleet and arsenal; which, from the want of such force, he may not be able to effect. The absence of 8000 men acting offensively would not weaken Sicily in the same degree. Whilst absent it would still keep the enemy in check. They can never be certain where it is to fall, and at all events, though at Constantinople to-day it may be in Sicily in a fortnight; but, when fixed at Alexandria, it not only weakens Sicily by diminishing the number of troops, but still more by relieving the enemy from all anxiety of being attacked. They will know, when that is gone, that there is not left a force sufficient to injure them.

It is interesting to note that there are in the Castle-reagh Correspondence two papers, one by Captain the Hon. Henry Blackwood, commanding the *Royal George*, off the Dardanelles, dated March 6, 1807; the other a memorandum by Sir John Duckworth, showing,

after Duckworth's failure, that it was entirely due to the cause which Moore had thus, before it failed, expected to make it fruitless, viz. the absence of any military force to land and secure the Dardanelles.¹

I had a short passage back, and landed at Messina on the forenoon of the 6th. By this packet I have written both to Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon and to General Brownrigg, expressing uneasiness at my situation here, where I see I am doomed to continue second in command, as I am satisfied that General Fox will not leave this as long as affairs continue as at present, and that he can act by means of me and others. The General has received permission to return to Gibraltar or to England when he pleases, and it is not doubted at home but he will avail himself of it. I am kept here for the purpose of succeeding him, should he either choose to go home, or should his health not allow him to act. Neither his constitution nor his habit of body makes him equal to the exertion of service. He knows this, and is aware that whatever is called for must be executed by me and others, and the moment the command becomes critical and arduous he will resign it. I have represented to Gordon and to Brownrigg, desiring them to mention it to the Duke of York, that I think it hard to be detained here as second merely for General Fox's convenience. If he is considered as fit for this command in all its parts, there can be no occasion for me, and I should wish to be recalled in the hope of obtaining a chief command elsewhere. But if he is not so considered, and that the command must fall to me whenever it becomes difficult, it is neither fair to me nor just to the service that I should not have the previous direction with all the advantages incident to command. I have great respect for General Fox, and considerable attachment to him. He behaves to me in the kindest and most confidential manner, and never decides on any measure without consulting me. I trusted that nothing I expressed on this occasion would be considered as incompatible with

¹ "Castlereagh Correspondence," second series, vol. ii. pp. 161-167.

these sentiments. Great attention was deservedly due to General Fox. I thought, however, that some was also due to me, and that it was time to ask the General if it were his intention to continue in the Mediterranean, informing him, if it were, that it was intended to employ me elsewhere. Much as I should regret leaving this army, which I thought held out the fairest prospect of service, still I should prefer to take my chance of a chief command elsewhere rather than be continued longer as second here. I put much stress on this, that what I had expressed was drawn from me from what I thought due to myself, which I hoped might be done without inferring anything unkind or disrespectful of General Fox, with whom I lived on the most intimate terms, and for whom, personally, I had a sincere regard. In the letter which I wrote to Gordon and Brownrigg on this occasion I gave them my opinion fully on the proposed expedition to Alexandria, as well as upon the kind of operations which I should have thought to be preferred in the present state of the war in the Mediterranean.

MESSINA, 10th February 1807.—Captain Hollowell of the *Tigre* is appointed by Lord Collingwood to command the squadron at Sicily and this part of the Mediterranean. He arrived at Palermo some days ago, and, finding that Mr. Drummond wished to pay a visit to General Fox, he brought him in his ship to Messina. They arrived yesterday. I called upon Mr. Drummond with General Fox this forenoon; we sat with him about two hours. He says the Queen has no longer any influence, that everything now is transacted between himself, Mr. Circello, and the King, and in consequence of it he had agreed to continue the payment of the subsidy, which before he had withheld. This seems to me, and I told him so, an arrangement made to deceive him in order to get the subsidy, as I was convinced that the Queen directed as much as ever. Had it been otherwise, she was not of a character to have submitted so easily to the loss of power, and as long as Circello was Minister he durst not refuse to communicate to her everything that

passed. Mr. Drummond is, however, perfectly satisfied, or, rather, wishes to make us think he is so, feeling that he has not firmness to take the steps which can alone give us security in Sicily; a kind of humbug upon himself in the hope of humbugging others. General Fox left the conversation principally to me, and I did as I always shall do on such occasions, gave my opinion fully, both with respect to what he had done and what he should do, without troubling myself whether it was agreeable to him or not. I consider truth and plain dealing as most fit for public business.

MESSINA, 7th March.—About the 16th February Mr. Drummond sailed for Palermo in the *Tigre*. The next day the packet arrived from England, and on the 18th H.M. brig the *Delight* came in with despatches from Sir John Duckworth off the Dardanelles, stating that on his arrival there he found that Sir Thomas Louis had come through the Dardanelles and was at Tenedos, and that Mr. Arbuthnot had made his escape from Constantinople, and was also at Tenedos. This he considered as a declaration, or as equivalent to a declaration, of war, and therefore gave notice in order that the expedition might sail for Alexandria. He himself was going to join Sir Thomas Louis, and endeavour to force his passage through the Dardanelles to Constantinople. The troops were instantly embarked, consisting of the two battalions 35th, the 31st, De Rolls', Chasseurs Britanniques, 78th, Royal Sicilians, with a detachment of artillery, 20th Dragoons, &c., amounting to 5300 men, under Major-General Fraser, with Major-General Wauchope, Brigadier-Generals Honourable William Stewart and Meade. Everything was ready in the course of three days, but they were detained yesterday by the absence of Captain Hollowell and the *Tigre*, who, having gone round by the south of Sicily, had been forced into Syracuse, and afterwards delayed by contrary winds from reaching Palermo sooner than the 1st instant.

In the absence of Mr. Drummond, the hereditary Prince was appointed Inspector-General of the Army, with Mons. St. Clair for his assistant. This appointment will prove to

Mr. Drummond that his influence is not so great, nor the Queen's so little, as he wished to persuade himself. Accounts have been received within these few days from Mr. Adair, at Vienna, of some successes obtained by the Russians over the French on the Vistula. It is something to have arrested the progress of Buonaparte in any degree; but unless great exertions are made, and the blow is followed up, little good will result from temporary success. The Austrians are still afraid to declare themselves. The letters from Mr. Drummond, since his return to Palermo, show that he is completely deceived by the Court, who, in order to get him to pay the subsidy, persuade him that the Queen has no longer any influence. The hereditary Prince is none the less Inspector-General of the Army, and St. Clair his assistant.

MILAZZO, 13th March.—I left Messina on the 11th. General Paget, who commands here, pays great attention to the troops, and they are in good order. I have the pleasure to observe that my regiment preserves an excellent spirit, and that both officers and men take a pride in doing their duty. Their movement in the field is perfect; it is evident that not only the officers, but that each individual soldier knows perfectly what he has to do; the discipline is carried on without severity; the officers are attached to the men, the men to the officers. The men find that pains are taken to keep them from doing wrong, that allowances are made for trivial faults, and that they are not punished for serious crimes until advice and every other means have been resorted to in vain. General Fox is to be here to-day. The General saw the 52nd out the day after he arrived by itself, and next day the whole troops in brigade. They were moved by General Paget in a very military manner. We were detained by bad weather until the 18th, when we set out in company with General Fox for Francavilla, where we arrived in the evening. The road, after passing through Barcelona, follows the bed of a torrent or "*fiumara*" to Jondachelli, a miserable little village on the side of the mountain, a little beyond which it ascends and crosses the

mountain, and descends on the other side into another *fiumara* about three miles from Francavilla. The distance from Milazzo is about twenty-four miles, but the road is so bad, that we were eight or nine hours on horseback. This is the road by which the Imperialists marched in 1718 to the attack of Francavilla, which was defended by the Spaniards. Francavilla is commanded from the neighbouring heights, and is not a position tenable against an enemy with cannon; but neither the Spaniards nor Imperialists had any. The transport of cannon of weight is impracticable through such a country, and, when not opposed to cannon, the position which the Spaniards occupied is certainly a strong one. The Imperialists, who do not seem to have attacked with judgment, were accordingly beaten.

GIRGENTI, 26th March.—The morning after our arrival at Francavilla (viz. the 19th) General Oakes, my aide-de-camp, Captain Hunt, and myself set out on a tour which we had for some time meditated. The first night after passing through Randazzo we slept at Bronte; the road runs round the foot of Etna, through a country which, on the Etna side, is wooded, on the other quite bare; on neither side very pretty. In Randazzo the population is estimated at 6000. Bronte is a miserable village, containing 4000 souls. It is built upon the lava of an eruption which happened centuries ago, but from the appearance of the country might have happened only a few months. The next day we proceeded over a dreary country to Traina, a town built by the Normans, founded by Count Ruggiero. It occupies the ridge of a very narrow, but a very lofty and inaccessible mountain; nothing can be more strong than the situation. We slept at a Basilican convent under the town, about half-way down the mountain. We were received by the superior and the monks with great cordiality, and treated with much kindness and attention. The view from the convent and from the town is very commanding, and is said to be beautiful, but a thick fog prevented our enjoying it. We proceeded in the morning to Leonforte,

situated very beautifully on the side of a mountain. The country through which we passed for some miles before we arrived at Leonforte was better cultivated than any we have seen. From Leonforte to Castrogiovana the country is undulated, but less mountainous than any we had passed. Castrogiovana is the ancient Enna. The situation is the same as it was in ancient times, and as described by Polybius, Cicero, &c.; as a military position it is quite impregnable. From the top of the hill, on which the town is built, and which is flat, it commands a view of the whole island. It was formerly a place of great riches, containing, I think, 80,000 inhabitants.

It is now, like everything I have seen in Sicily, in decay, and contains about 13,000. Of the celebrated Temple of Ceres there is no vestige. The rock on which it was built alone remains. Near it is the castle, chiefly of Saracen structure. One square tower alone is Roman. There is upon another part of the hill another Saracen tower, an octagon. The country of Enna was the favourite of Ceres; and within three miles of the town is the Lake of Pergusa, which was formerly surrounded with woods and groves, and is celebrated for the rape of Proserpine. The rock, or mountain, on which the town is built is magnificent and commanding. It abounds with food and water, and is surrounded by a fertile country, and, as it is in the very centre of the island, it has been proposed as a place of military dépôt. It is that to which the Spaniards retired in 1719. We halted one day at this place. We met here, as in every place through which we have passed, with great civility and attention from the magistrates and inhabitants. The complaints against their Government are universal. Indeed, it must be bad when, in a country so rich and fertile, so much misery is met with. In no part of Sicily I have yet been in do any of the inhabitants dwell out of the towns. The country round them is generally well cultivated, and becomes less so as you get to a distance from them. The towns are thus an assemblage of peasants' huts with a small mixture of houses of a better description, a good many convents and churches. From Castrogiovana to Caltanissetta,

and from thence to this place (Girgenti), the country is not mountainous, but undulated, and, where there are trees and cultivation, it is very beautiful. At Caltanissetta there is a degree of cleanliness, neatness, and comfort which I have seen in no other place of the island. The country for some miles round it is fertile and well-cultivated, and the roads leading to it are made and good. I had a conversation upon the subject with some of the inhabitants who called upon me. This apparent wealth and comfort is not due to the Government, which is oppressive here as in other places; nor could I learn whence it arose; perhaps from the richness of the soil and the situation of the town as one of mere passage. Here, for the first time, we found an inn at which we could be lodged.

GIRGENTI, 28th March.—We arrived here on the afternoon of the 25th, and were received at the house of Mr. Sterlini, the British Consul, who has attended us and shown us everything that was to be seen. The present town of Girgenti is situated upon a commanding hill over the plain where stood ancient Agrigentum. It is, or rather has been, surrounded, for much is demolished, with a wall and towers of Saracen or Norman structure. The present town is an assemblage of miserable huts, with a great many churches and monasteries. The cathedral is the finest. The bishop's palace, seminary, and library, placed upon the highest part of the town, corresponds. The situation of the ancient Agrigentum is in all respects preferable, in an undulated plain sloping towards the sea, from which it was about a couple of miles distant. Where the ancient town stood are now cornfields, with olive, almond, pistachio, and fig trees, with two rivulets running through them. The remains of a few temples are all that exist of that large town; the stones with which it was built were at first probably taken to build the walls and houses of the present town, and what remained form now the walls which separate and enclose the fields. The Temple of Concord is the most complete. The capitals of the pillars are of Doric. It is well placed,

and is extremely beautiful. The Temple of Juno Lucina is the next. Of the other temples little remains but their foundation and their broken fragments. The Temple of Olympic Jupiter is by far the largest, but its pillars and walls are prostrate. The ancient port was at the mouth of the Agragas, which ran through the middle of the town. The present port is at a couple of miles from it to the south-west. The mole is well built; it is defended by a battery at the head of the mole and by a castle on the shore, which by an inscription on it appears to have been erected by Charles V. This harbour is safe; but it is shallow, and only fit to receive brigs and vessels of small burthen; it is one of caricatories.

Whilst at Girgenti I received a despatch from General Fox, enclosing a letter to him from Mr. Drummond, in which he presses the General to undertake an expedition to Naples. Mr. Drummond seems to be completely in the hands of the Sicilian Court, at the same time that he is flattering himself that he is directing them. His letter is exceedingly pert, and more in the style of a criticism in the *Edinburgh Review* than of a public despatch. The General states in his letter to me his objection to the expedition to Naples, but desires to know my opinion, which I have accordingly given him. I entirely agree with him upon the absurdity of it at present. Since the detachment to Alexandria we have not a force equal to it, and, when Government ordered 5000 men to Egypt, they gave up all thoughts of acting in Italy.

TERRA NOVA, 3^{1st} March.—We left Girgenti yesterday, slept last night in the Franciscan convent at Licata, and proceeded this morning to this place. Licata is a place of more seeming wealth than any we have seen, Caltanissetta excepted. The country is rich, it is a caricatori, and there is some trade and employment beyond most places in Sicily. There is an old castle in bad repair, built upon a rock which commands the anchorage. The height above it commands it; upon this height there is a work, but it is neglected and

is going to ruin. The country from Girgenti to Licata and from thence to Terra Nova is flat, and without trees or enclosure excepting near the towns. The road from Licata is along the shore. Terra Nova is rather a cheerful-looking place; it is disputed whether it or Licata stands where did ancient Gela. Vases and other remains of antiquity are found here. A large Doric pillar lies broken a little beyond one of the gates. We were received here in the Franciscan convent. The superior was a man of decent manners and appearance; the rest of the monks were mere clowns. This was equally the case in the convent at Licata, where the superior and one other, who seemed to have a principal charge in the convent, were conversable men; the rest were very bad. The monks equally with the other inhabitants of Sicily complain of the Government, to whose bad management they impute the greatest part of the misery of the country.

CHIARAMONTE, 1st April.—We left Terra Nova yesterday morning and halted for an hour at Vicaris, a small village, and reached this about 4 P.M. The distance is reckoned at twenty-eight miles. We were eight hours. The whole of the country from Terra Nova is a plain, and from Vicaris to this place it is very pretty, being intersected with wood. The whole of the country from Vicaris is well cultivated, the plain is very extensive, in some places as far as the eye could reach. We could see the town of Caltagirone on a hill in the plain at a great distance. This place is situated on the side of a range of hills which bound the plain. These hills are bare, fit only for grazing. The situation has been chosen for health, the whole of the plain being at certain seasons sickly. The air at Chiaramonte is very fine, and it abounds with good water. The inhabitants are better-looking than we have seen elsewhere. For the first time since we left Messina we have seen some tolerable-looking girls.

We were recommended to the Baron Montepane, who had ordered rooms to be prepared for us at the Capuchin

convent, and sent beds and everything we could want, with his cook and servants to prepare dinner. He waited upon us soon after our arrival, with some other gentlemen of the town. He walked with us through the town; there is nothing but the situation and view from it worth observing. He invited us in the evening to his house, but as it was late and we were tired we declined. We were prepared to set out this morning, but it rains so hard and promises so little to change that I fear we shall be detained. The rain ceased about twelve, and we set out for Modica through Ragusa. All this country is covered with stones, but it is said to be very productive. The town of Ragusa in the mountains is situated very romantically, but all beauty ceases upon entering the town, where the streets are unpaved and narrow and dirty, and the houses wretched. Modica is also surrounded with mountains. It is a large, populous town, with many fine buildings. It contains 30,000 inhabitants, Ragusa only 15,000. From Modica we proceeded next day to Noto, which is delightfully situated on a gentle rising ground about three miles from the sea. This is the handsomest town I have seen in Sicily. The ancient town of Noto was thrown down by an earthquake about a hundred years ago, and this was built about four miles from it. The streets are wide and straight, and there are many good gentlemen's houses. The country round it is improved and cultivated. On the 3rd we proceeded to Syracuse, where we arrived early.

SYRACUSE, 6th April.—Colonel Clinton, who commands the flank battalion of the Guards here, rode out with an old friend and relation of mine, Mr. Leckie, to meet us, and conveyed us to Mr. Leckie's house. He himself was living at a small country house three miles from Syracuse, and he was so good as to lend us his house in the town. The country from Noto and for many miles round Syracuse is much finer than any we had seen. The harbour is an excellent one, and the fortifications, in good repair, render the place very secure. The principal error committed in

fortifying this place is that the narrow neck of the peninsula is occupied by outworks. It should have been left for the enemy to advance over. In this manner much expense would have been saved. There is a want of casements and magazines, but still Syracuse is a most respectable fortress. The present Syracuse occupies that part only of the ancient city called the Ortigia, but the situation of the other town is well described, and its walls can still be traced. A Greek theatre and an amphitheatre are still to be seen in the old town, with other remains of antiquity, which render Syracuse the most interesting place in Sicily. The country about it is very beautiful. We have had the advantage of Mr. Leckie to attend us and to show us everything interesting. I should have wished to remain here much longer, and I shall probably return to it, but we have determined to proceed to-morrow. Colonel Clinton takes much pains to instruct his battalion, which is a very fine one. He is a sensible, good officer, and it is accordingly in good order.

Here I again received letters from General Fox, enclosing two notes from the Marquis Circello, sent to Fox by Mr. Drummond. One of these states that H. S. Majesty is determined to support his subjects in the kingdom of Naples, and wishes to know what assistance he is to expect from the British. The other note states, like the former, the great successes of the Russians and the small number of French troops in the kingdom of Naples, and therefore calls upon General Fox to take advantage of the present favourable moment, not only to make a diversion in favour of the Russians, but to restore H. S. Majesty to the throne of Naples, leaving sufficient garrisons in Sicily and Malta. He is afraid of the censure which may fall upon him if he refuses to act, though he owns it will be against his judgment if he does act. He asks my opinion.

I have written to him that I had no idea of being importuned into a measure which I disapproved; that the Russian successes were not yet sufficiently confirmed, and it was not desirable to re-act the part which Sir James Craig had done last year. If the successes should prove such as

Circello said, and that the French were evacuating Naples, it would be time enough to go there when these points were ascertained; the kingdom would not run away; but that even then I should allow the King of Sicily to take possession with his own troops. I should not allow a British soldier to quit Sicily. As auxiliaries to the King of Naples we should do nothing good in Italy, and I should certainly not go there unless we had command of the King's person, and unless the Queen and all her emissaries were removed, and we had the complete direction of the Government. Nothing short of this would give confidence to the people or induce them to join us, and without the people it was vain to hope for permanent success in Italy. If we went, as Mr. Circello and Mr. Drummond wanted us to do, as appendages to the Court of Palermo, we should do little good to the Court, and should for ever lose that confidence which the people of Italy still inclined to place in the British nation. These notes of Circello are word for word such as were daily sent during the Queen's time. They prove that her influence continues the same as ever, and that Mr. Drummond, poor man, is completely under their guidance.

CATANIA, 9th April.—We left Syracuse on the 11th, and went on to Augusta, which stands, like Syracuse, upon a peninsula. The situation is very strong; the works, though good, are not equal to those at Syracuse. The same fault, though in a less degree, has been committed here, that of occupying the neck. Augusta has this advantage, that the ditch and sea at the neck are deeper than at Syracuse, and the heights which command it are at such a distance as to be of little importance. The harbour of Augusta is a very fine one, though inferior to Syracuse; the fortress is strong, and, if some towers were added to prevent the possibility of a landing upon the promontory in rear of the works, an enemy could have little hope of getting possession of it. Like Syracuse, Augusta is deficient in bomb-proof cover and cisterns. The first part of the road

from Augusta is very strong and barren, until it reaches the plain of Catania, which is rich and extensive. This is bounded by the cultivated hills surrounding and forming the base of Mount Etna. Catania has been built within these 100 years, the ancient town having been destroyed by an eruption of Etna. The streets are straight and wide, the buildings very fine, and altogether it is perhaps as handsome a town as any in Europe. It abounds with convents and churches. The Benedictine convent is the best, and is indeed the finest convent I ever remember to have seen. There are in Catania considerable remains of antiquity. A theatre and amphitheatre and baths have been in part excavated, and are the most remarkable. As the old town was covered by an eruption and the present town is built over it, those buildings cannot be cleared without endangering the streets and houses. Many noblemen and gentlemen live constantly in Catania, and, next to Palermo, it is reckoned the town of most society. The town is certainly handsomer than Palermo: at first its appearance is imposing, but the poverty and misery of the lower inhabitants accords ill with the magnificence of the houses and churches, and make Catania to me an unpleasant residence. General Wynyard and the Guards are stationed here, and are well accommodated. He exercised them for me in the plain.

TAORMINA, 11th April.—We left Catania yesterday, and arrived at Giarre in the afternoon, having stopped a short time at Aci Reale. As far as Aci the road is over lava, and very bad. Aci is rather a large town, about a mile from the sea. Giarre is only a village, but the country to Giarre and from thence to this place is well cultivated, and abounds in small villages and detached houses. It is certainly better inhabited; there is more movement and a greater appearance of wealth than in any part of Sicily I have been in. Taormina stands upon a hill over the sea; it is overlooked by other hills. The view from it is one of the finest I have seen; from it, and from the whole road

leading from Augusta, Etna appears most magnificent. The Greek theatre here is more complete than any we have seen; there are other remains which prove the ancient grandeur of Taormina. To-morrow we shall proceed to Messina, from whence we have been absent nearly five weeks.

MESSINA.—We arrived here on the 12th. The appearance of the inhabitants in the neighbourhood of this place is much improved; the effect of the British money is very visible. During this tour we have received from all classes of people the most marked attention. The complaints against their own Government, and the wish to be taken under that of Great Britain, were expressed universally. The Sicilians seem a mild people; they are debased in disposition, and so timid as to be quite incapable of redressing their own wrongs. They never think of it, but always look to be taken under the management of some other nation who will use them better than their own. They are much under the control of the priests, whose establishments are far too rich and too numerous. Of their attention to honesty with each other I cannot judge, but in all their dealings with us they are the most imposing people I have met with. During my absence the packet arrived from England and brought me letters from all my family; when the packet returned I wrote to Brownrigg a letter, from which what follows is an extract.

Extract of a letter written to General BROWNRIGG, 15th April 1807.—"Mr. Drummond, though a good scholar and possessing respectable talents, proves in point of character to be one of the weakest and silliest of men. What Mr. A'Court and I dreaded when we left him alone at Palermo has come to pass; he is led and humbugged by the Sicilian Court. The Queen, who has apparently retired from public affairs, has left all her minions in office, and secretly directs as much as ever; whilst Drummond, deceived by appearances, flatters himself, or wishes to persuade others, that he alone has the management of their counsels. They have induced

him to press upon General Fox, and have urged in very dictatorial terms, the old favourite object of the Queen, the reconquest of Naples. Fox, although he has resisted it, is seriously alarmed as to the representations which Drummond will send home, and I believe he would have been in danger of yielding, contrary to his own judgment, had I not been present to support him. 8000 or 10,000 British troops, which are as many as could possibly be spared from the garrisons, would, I am persuaded, do all that could be expected from their number; but 8000 or 10,000 British could not reconquer Italy nor hold the kingdom of Naples, betrayed as they would be by the Court and unsupported by the people. Before we venture to set a foot in Italy we must begin by proving that we control the Court of Palermo, and can oblige it to govern with wisdom and justice. We must gain the confidence and goodwill of the inhabitants by pledging British faith; they will trust no other; that we come to aid them, to expel the French and all other oppressors, and that we shall support no Government but what is just and agreeable to them. In this manner perhaps we should rouse the inhabitants of Italy, without whose assistance we cannot hope to do permanent good. Without it, if the French are weak, we may obtain a first success; but when they are reinforced, and they can easily outnumber us, we shall be forced to retire and re-act the part we did last year. No honour can result either to the troops or to the nation from expeditions which are only successful when not opposed.

“The effect of our conduct last year was such that it required the battle of Maida to relieve us from the contempt into which we had fallen. If what is passing on the Vistula obliges the French to withdraw from Italy, the King of Naples may return to his dominions without us. Let him; I certainly would not give the aid of a British soldier to countenance and support his unwise, arbitrary, and oppressive measures. The people of Sicily, however well disposed towards us, begin to think that our presence amongst them serves no other purpose. Upon these grounds, and upon

the diminution of his force since the expedition to Alexandria, and on the uncertainty in which he is with respect to the views of Government, the General has been induced to decline undertaking any operation in Italy until he is further instructed. I much fear the consequences which will result to this part of the world if Ministers give their confidence to such men as Mr. Drummond, who, however respectable in private life, have neither the firmness to act a manly part, nor character to send home a true and faithful representation. The operations in the Dardanelles have had, as you will hear, an unfortunate termination. If the Alexandrian expedition had been deferred, and 7000 or 8000 troops had accompanied Sir John Duckworth's squadron, Constantinople and the Turkish fleet might have been destroyed.

"Fraser seems to have conducted his operation well, and he has succeeded at Alexandria with little or no loss. I wish, instead of sending a detachment of 1400 men under Wauchope to Rosetta and Rhamanie, he had left a few hundred men to guard Alexandria, Aboukir, and the cut, and with the body of his force he had marched himself to Rosetta and Rhamanie; he would there have been in a plentiful country, from whence he could have thrown into Alexandria what supplies he chose. The presence of the whole force would have been more imposing; he himself would have been near their supplies, and the trouble of transport would have been saved, which is an advantage when done without risk. His retreat on Alexandria was always secure. He is pressing for a reinforcement; it is only a great one which can give him the command of Egypt if the Turks can spare a force to send there, and 5000 men are sufficient for the defence of Alexandria. If the Russians cannot occupy the Turks, and Sebastiani, who must now have increased influence, can persuade them to send an army through Syria to Egypt, all supplies from the country will be cut off from Alexandria, and the inhabitants as well as the garrison must depend upon the sea for their subsistence. In this case I do not see what can be done but to destroy the harbour and evocate."

Extract of a letter I wrote to Mr. LECKIE in answer to one which he wrote to me from Palermo, where he was with Mr. DRUMMOND.

MESSINA, 20th April 1807.—“I had the pleasure to receive your letter of the 16th yesterday. I am glad you find less difficulty than you expected, and that you have hopes of bringing matters shortly to a happy issue. There will be no difficulty in this quarter, where no private views interfere, and where all that is wished is to see affairs conducted in a manner suitable to the interest and honour of the nation. I have never entered so much as you seem to imagine into the details of the constitution, nor have I ever considered or given any opinion upon the means by which it might be amended. Our connection with this country makes it necessary that the direction of its Government should be in the hands of persons whom we can trust and whom we influence; it is our interest that the constitution, if it be not ameliorated, should as it stands be wisely and justly administered. The members of the present Government are certainly not men we can trust, nor from whom good administration can be expected. They are all the creatures of the Queen, inimical to Great Britain, and indifferent to the welfare of Sicily, whose inhabitants they continue daily to vex and to oppress in the most stupid and arbitrary manner. We shall not reconcile to us the goodwill of the people by countenancing men whom they have so much reason to hate, and it is impossible not to believe that Mr. Drummond is deceived when he pretends to have influence and to direct the Government, when the persons who are known to have betrayed us are in office, and the same measures are pursued, whether with respect to internal management or external relations, which he and all of us have so often reprobated.

“I shall be glad to find that you are able to convince him of his error, and to persuade him to connect himself with men of more respectability and weight in Sicily, whose

interests are connected with the prosperity of the country and the welfare of the State, who are friendly to the connection with Great Britain, and whose characters and understandings are to be trusted. Until then it will be difficult for me to believe that the Queen has lost her influence, or that Great Britain is held in that consideration at the Court of Palermo to which she is entitled from the subsidy she pays, the fleet and army she maintains for the support and protection of the island. I understand that Mr. A'Court is hourly expected from England, and I am glad of it. From the tenor of the despatches he took home, and from the language he was authorised to hold, there is reason to hope that he will return with ample powers; but it will require the aid of yourself and of Mr. A'Court to urge Mr. Drummond to act up to them."

May.—We have lately heard of the change of Ministry; the Catholic question was the cause of it. We have now the Duke of Portland, Lords Hawkesley, Castlereagh, Mulgrave, &c. &c.—in short, all Pitt's friends, but without Pitt. This may perhaps make some change in men and measures here and at Palermo. A man less fitted for a diplomatic situation than Drummond cannot well be found. Mr. Leckie was with him for some time after I left Syracuse, and is lately come to join us here. He succeeded in proving to him that the Court was, as formerly, guided by the Queen, and that he himself (Drummond) had no influence whatever; but though his understanding is convinced, he continues to act in the same pusillanimous manner as before. His letter to General Fox yesterday stated that the Neapolitan army, under the Prince of Hesse, was going upon an expedition to Naples. He enclosed a letter from Tattistscheff, the Russian Minister, pressing him to use his influence with General Fox to land the British in Naples, giving with respect to Naples the old reasons so often given by the Queen and Circello, viz. the weakness of the French in the kingdom of Naples, and the attachment of the inhabitants to their legitimate sovereign, all of which we

know to be false. With respect to Russia, our landing would operate as a diversion in favour of the Russian armies serving in Dalmatia and European Turkey, and give employment to an army the French were collecting in Upper Italy.

Mr. Drummond, without communicating with General Fox, has answered officially this letter of Tattistscheff's, agreeing with him with respect to the advantages of such an employment of the British forces, but stating that he had no powers over the British army, who were solely under the direction of General Fox, to whom, however, he should transmit his letter. He states in his letter to the General that Mr. Adair, at Vienna, and the Commr. Ruffo, Minister from the Palermo Court, had written that Austria had offered her mediation for peace, which had been accepted by Buonaparte, and the other Powers, it was expected, would do the same. General Fox is naturally much hurt at this conduct of Drummond in answering personally an application of this nature from a foreign Minister. If his instructions do not, good sense should have pointed to him the propriety of consulting him before he gave an answer, and the answer, whatever it was, should have been given in the name of both. It is difficult to act with a man whose conduct is so weak and silly. With respect to the expedition itself, he knows General Fox's reasons for not undertaking it; they have formed the substance of his correspondence with him ever since he arrived, and the only thing now stated in Mr. Drummond's letter is the information from Vienna, which is rather an argument against the expedition, as to the point of effecting a diversion in favour of the Russians in Dalmatia and European Turkey, since at present our landing in Naples would not make any.

MESSINA, 11th May 1807.—I went yesterday morning to Reggio to pay a visit to the Prince of Hesse Phillipstadt, who, the evening before, had arrived with troops. I wished to know what was intended, and I thought the

Prince would be pleased with these attentions. He told me he had brought about 2000 men with him, which, with the regiment already at Reggio, made about 3000, and he expected 500 cavalry from Palermo. With these he meant to advance into Calabria, and he expected to drive back the French, who were in no force. He said another expedition was to land under the hereditary Prince near Salerno, and that he himself would advance as soon as his cavalry arrived. I told him General Fox was at Catania, but that I should order transports to pass the cavalry as soon as they arrived in Messina. On my return I communicated to General Fox the Prince's arrival at Reggio, of which he had as yet no information from either Mr. Drummond or the Court of Palermo. Yesterday the *Wizard* brig of war arrived from Alexandria with despatches from General Fraser, which I opened. The contents were very unpleasing. Soon after the surrender of Alexandria, General Fraser detached Brigadier-General Wauchope and Brigadier-General Meade with the 31st Regiment and Chasseurs Britanniques, 1400 men, to Rosetta; from thence they were to go to Rhamanie, and, after taking possession of both places, to leave detachments to hold them. This was done upon a representation of Major Misset, the British Consul or Resident in Egypt, who represented the necessity of holding those places to secure provisions for Alexandria. It appears that General Wauchope, before he had induced the Governor to agree to receive the British troops, marched into the town; the garrison and inhabitants flew to arms, and from the houses fired upon our people, and drove them out with the loss of about 500 killed and wounded. General Wauchope was amongst the killed, General Meade amongst the wounded; the troops made good their retreat to Aboukir.

It is difficult to conceive what could have induced General Wauchope thus to enter an armed town where every house was a citadel against him. Our men never saw those who fired at them, but were all killed from the windows, which at Rosetta are all latticed. General Wauchope received two shots through the body before he

fell, the third through his head killed him. General Fraser, after consulting with the Admiral, thought it expedient to make another attempt on Rosetta. He therefore detached Brigadier-General Stewart with the flank battalions, first battalion 35th Regiment, 78th, and De Roll's Regiment, with a detachment of artillery and dragoons, in all 2500 men. With these the brigadier invested the town and opened a fire of cannon and howitzers, by which means he hoped to force it into a surrender. The inhabitants were the more obstinate in holding out from the cruelties they had committed on our wounded and prisoners in General Wauchope's attack, which they feared would be retorted upon them. In the meantime a large body of Turks came down the Nile. They forced General Stewart to raise the siege or blockade he had commenced, and he retreated by the caravansery to Aboukir, but with the loss of 1000 men killed and taken. The General had not received the particulars of this last action when the *Wizard* sailed, but the loss was certain.

General Fraser, after such repeated failures, is naturally much alarmed, and presses for an immediate reinforcement of men, money, and provisions. I sent off the despatches to General Fox at Catania, and I expect to hear from him this day, and have no doubt but he will himself return to concert what measures to adopt. General Fraser has been deceived by the information he received from Major Misset, both with respect to the enemy's force in Egypt and to the military position of the country, and all the misfortunes which have followed are owing to the bad measures he pursued. Neither Rosetta nor Rhamanie are posts which can be held by inferior forces, and with 5000 men General Fraser could not pretend to do more than hold Alexandria. If, because Alexandria wanted provisions, General Fraser thought it advisable during the absence of the Turkish force, or while it was otherwise employed, to march to Rosetta and Rhamanie by way of facilitating and covering the transport of supplies to Alexandria, he should certainly have gone himself with his whole force, leaving only a

few hundred men for the protection of Alexandria, taking always care to place himself so that his retreat upon it was secure in case a superior force came against him. In this manner he might ultimately have been shut up in Alexandria and reduced, for want of fresh supplies, to inconvenience, but no misfortune could have befallen the troops. By carrying out with detachments operations which required his whole force, he exposed them to what has happened.

On 31st March 1807, when the Ministry of the Duke of Portland had succeeded to that of Lord Grenville, Canning had become Foreign Secretary, and Castlereagh Minister of War and Colonies.

15th May.—The General returned from Catania the evening before last. It is determined to send off two victuallers to Alexandria immediately. The *Hind* has sailed with money, and the 21st and 62nd Regiments with Major-General Sherbrooke are to follow, as soon as a convoy can be procured for them. This will be a reinforcement of between 1500 and 1600 men, which is believed to be rather more than the loss sustained; thus General Fraser will have, as at first, about 5000 men. The instructions sent to him on this occasion are distinct, that the possession of Alexandria is all that ever was expected from the force under his command. The conquest of Egypt was quite out of the question. If it is found impossible to subsist Alexandria when deprived of the communication with Egypt, or if water cannot be found, it must be evacuated, but otherwise it must be held until Government directs it to be abandoned.

The General, in forwarding General Fraser's despatches, has written to Ministers, representing to them the situation of Alexandria when cut off from the rest of Egypt, and the difficulties of providing the garrison and inhabitants with water and provisions. He points out that to conquer Egypt and afterwards to maintain quiet possession of it would

require at least an army of from 15,000 to 20,000 men. The General leaves it to them to determine whether to adopt the conquest of the whole, or to abandon Alexandria, or to hold the latter as we now do, victualling it from without, but quite unconnected with the rest of Egypt. It would have been found more easy had they not met with such defeats to have formed a friendly communication with the Arabs. They could have received partial supplies from them through the desert, and probably the Mamelukes might have been prevailed on to act at Cairo. That would have diverted a part of the enemy's force from the neighbourhood of Alexandria, in which case the inhabitants would have availed themselves of the opportunity to throw in cattle and refreshments. Perhaps in this manner the garrison might have become more comfortable, and with management an influence might have been acquired by which the Turks might finally have been driven out of Egypt; but the hope of this is much diminished, if not annihilated, by the bad success of our first operations. Major Misset told General Fraser that Rosetta and Rhamanie were necessary to the subsistence of Alexandria, and that when once taken they could be held by a few hundred men. So far General Fraser was misled by Major Misset; but it was the General's own error sending a detachment to attack those places, instead of marching against them with his whole force. If he had done this none of the misfortunes could have happened to him which befell his detachments, and on the spot he would soon have perceived that neither Rosetta nor Rhamanie were posts to be held by inferior numbers; that he could hold no posts out of Alexandria; and that, if Alexandria could not be held independent of Egypt, it must either be abandoned or such a force sent out as was equal to the conquest of the country.

17th May.—General Sherbrooke with the 21st and 62nd Regiments embarked this morning, but the wind blows so strong, that the transports cannot warp out of the harbour.

28th May.—A sloop of war arrived this forenoon with

despatches from General Fraser so late as the 6th inst. They contain little respecting their situation beyond what his former despatches contained, only that by means of the Arabs he is tolerably supplied with provisions; his letters contain the detail of the operations under General Stewart. It appears that the garrison of Rosetta was sufficiently strong to make frequent sallies, the enemy in the country so numerous that to prevent them from annoying him in his rear he had detached a corps to El Hamed, several miles off. This corps he was afterwards obliged to reinforce to the amount of 800 men, under Lieutenant-Colonel M'Leod. The position of El Hamed from the Nile to Lake Ettro is between two or three miles, and in attempting to occupy it this small force was necessarily separated and extended. A large force from Cairo, aided by a considerable body of cavalry, attacked, surrounded, and cut them off before they could collect for their defence; it appears that upwards of 300 men were killed and 447 wounded or taken. On this Brigadier-General Stewart raised his blockade, buried his guns, destroyed his ammunition, and made good his retreat with little loss. All the accounts agree as to the good conduct and bravery of our troops. It is to be lamented that they have been so miserably directed; for, after all, the disasters which have befallen them can only be attributed to the faults committed in the plan and execution of our operations. I am exceedingly sorry for General Fraser, who is a just, worthy, and honourable good man.

30th May.—The Calabrian expedition under the Prince of Hesse has terminated as might have been expected in the total discomfiture of the Neapolitans. About a fortnight ago the Prince moved forward from Reggio towards Bagnara and Palmi. The French, who had there only an advance corps, retreated. On this the Neapolitans, and I fear even the Prince himself, were elated, and began to think that he had only to march on to get to Naples. The Queen was already congratulating herself on recovering

lost dominions *con meno riconoscenza* to the English. The French, wishing to draw them on, collected at Monte Leone, and, when the Prince advanced, attacked him between that and Mileto at daylight on the 28th inst., and totally defeated him. It is impossible to obtain either particulars of the action or of the loss sustained; the probability is that the Neapolitans made but little resistance; they dispersed and fled. All their cannon were taken; the Prince himself escaped with a few of the cavalry, the infantry arriving by three and four; and the French have occupied their former posts in front of Seminara.

1st June.—On the forenoon of the 30th May I was surprised by a visit from the Prince of Hesse, who had that moment landed from Reggio. I had a short time before received a telegraph message from Scilla that the French were advancing on Reggio. The Prince said that he had left Colonel Nunciante with a garrison in the castle. I was a little uneasy about Reggio, and desired Lord Proby, the Deputy-Adjutant-General of the Army, to go over, and I gave him a letter to Nunciante. He found that the Colonel with his officers and all the men in the town had escaped from Reggio and were in the gunboats. Lord Proby said they all seemed to have lost their senses. Nunciante had left a captain and 130 men in the castle. The French were in and about the town, and the gunboats were firing on them. The Prince, in truth, had shown the example; for, without taking any pains to collect his broken army, and without giving any orders respecting the castle, he had also come away. I went immediately on Lord Proby's return and represented to the Prince in strong terms the shameful conduct of Nunciante, and the disgrace they would all suffer if Reggio was allowed to fall into the hands of the enemy. What I said to him, together with what I had written to Nunciante, who is one of their best men, had some effect. Nunciante that night went back into the castle, and wrote to me that he should defend it. The Prince was, I thought, drunk, which is generally his situa-

tion after dinner. He, however, yesterday, upon my pressing him, has sent some men to reinforce Reggio, and is taking some steps to collect his people, who are hourly passing in boats from Calabria. I do not believe there ever was such a rout; both officers and men seem all to be panic-struck. I am certain that if the French made a show of coming here they would all run away. The French remain about Reggio and Scilla. I have ordered some transports, and it is already rumoured that our troops are to embark in them; this, I think, may cause the French to retire.

Copy of a letter to Major-General BROWNRIGG. (Private.)

“MESSINA, 3rd July 1807.

“The General has received within these few days a despatch from Lord Castlereagh, dated the 21st May, explicit as to the intention of his Majesty's Government not to prosecute further the war against the Turks, but to employ, as of the utmost moment to the cause of his Majesty's allies, the British force in Sicily, leaving sufficient garrisons to secure their return, in active operations against Naples or some other point of that coast. His Lordship computes the force, British and Neapolitan, to be thus employed at 20,000 men, and states it to be the King's pleasure that General Fox should use every exertion to prepare the troops of both nations for such an enterprise; adding that, although the quality of the Neapolitans be in all respects inferior to what could be wished, yet, as numbers were in themselves of great importance, they must be encouraged, improved, and made the most of with a view to this important object. The whole of the despatch is founded upon such errors as these, and upon a state of things which does not exist in this island. It is difficult to believe that Lord Castlereagh has read the General's correspondence with Ministers since he took the command in Sicily, for though that is not so explicit as I have always wished it to be, yet it is sufficiently so to have prevented orders such as those contained in the despatch. From my former letters, but

particularly from that of the 15th April, you will be at no loss with respect to my opinion upon any operations in Italy undertaken in support of so odious and so unpopular a cause as that of the re-establishment of their Sicilian Majesties. It is needless to say what might be done under different circumstances; but, as long as the Court of Palermo is governed by the Queen, and while so weak and insignificant a man as Drummond is British Minister, I see no possibility of combining with it any military operation. Whatever can be done by the British force alone may be attempted, but whatever is communicated to the Sicilian Court will be betrayed to the enemy.

“The General has at no period had the smallest command over the Sicilian troops; their number never exceeded 9000 or 10,000 men of all descriptions for the field. These by the losses in Calabria are reduced to 7000 or 8000, without spirit as without discipline, ill-officered, ill-paid, and disaffected. The British force disposable after leaving 2000 men to garrison Messina and Syracuse does not exceed 8000, including the Corsican Regiment at Capri, and supposing a regiment to be drawn from Malta. Thus 15,000 is the extent of the force to be calculated upon for offensive operations, one-half of which the General has at present no command of, or if he had, it is difficult to say how far he would not be rather embarrassed than aided by it. Of the French force in the kingdom of Naples there has never been a satisfactory account, but no statement has ever led me to suppose that less than 20,000 men, including national corps, could be brought into the field. For my part I should think it madness to place the smallest trust in any co-operation of the Sicilian troops, constituted as they are and acting under such a Government as that of Palermo. Eight thousand British without cavalry are not sufficient to beat the French; nor is so small a force calculated to gain the confidence of the inhabitants and to obtain their assistance, even were they from other circumstances inclined to give it. I have always thought the English might have done a great deal in Italy with such a force as

we had at one time here had we pursued different measures with the Sicilian Court, had we controlled them and been wise for them. But our numbers now are too small for almost any undertaking. If things are to continue as they are, and our cause is the re-establishment of the old Government, nothing will have success in Italy but a very superior and commanding force; our present numbers will cause no diversion.

“Buonaparte knows that the fate of Italy will be decided on the Vistula, and even were we, against all probability, to beat the force which might be assembled against us in the kingdom of Naples, our own numbers are not sufficient to secure the confidence of the inhabitants, or to make such an establishment as he could not overthrow the moment he could divert a sufficient force for that purpose. The General writes by this opportunity to Lord Castlereagh, stating his reasons for doubting the practicability of carrying his Majesty's instructions into execution, at the same time assuring him that the troops shall be held in readiness, and he shall seize the opportunity to act should favourable circumstances arise to admit of it. The General has also written to Mr. Drummond to apply to the Court to know if in case of his acting in Italy H. S. Majesty means to give him the command of his troops, stating that, unless he has the command of them, he will undertake no service in which they are concerned. I conclude that you will have access to Lord Castlereagh's despatch and the General's answer, which contains a copy of his letter to Mr. Drummond. I need, therefore, say nothing more to you about them. I cannot conclude without expressing a fear that the King's Ministers on this occasion have been led into error by Mr. Drummond, to whom, if they give their confidence, I augur ill for our success in this part of the world. I have for some time past wished I were in any other.—
I am, &c. J. M.”

4th July.—The May packet brought me letters in answer to those I wrote in March and April respecting my

situation with this army. They have been communicated by General Brownrigg and Colonel Gordon to the Duke of York, and I am told that he enters into my feelings and would willingly place me more advantageously, but he is at a loss to know how to do it. They recommended a little longer patience, when they are convinced I shall succeed to the command here, as they are satisfied General Fox will not stay. This pretence will, however, hold no longer, as the General has since intimated that he has no intention of leaving Sicily. I shall now be kept on the pretence of service, as held out in Lord Castlereagh's despatch. The General was exceedingly puzzled on the receipt of it. He has written to Lord Castlereagh his reasons for not undertaking anything immediately in Italy, but saying that the army shall be held in readiness to act should the opportunity occur. He has written to Mr. Drummond to demand of the Court of Palermo what command they mean to give him of their troops, as he can undertake no operation in which they are concerned unless he has the chief command of them.

5th July.—Despatches were received last night, forwarded from Palermo, from Lord Castlereagh. They chiefly regard Alexandria, and are explicit and sensible with respect to the objections to holding that post, disclaiming every intention of further conquest in Egypt, and forbidding our committing the faith and honour of Great Britain in any negotiation with any of the Powers there in such a way as to prevent the propriety of withdrawing our troops from thence at any moment, either in consequence of a negotiation with the Porte to that effect, or for any other reason. The new Government is certainly more communicative. From the last no single instruction was ever received since the General's arrival, except the peremptory order to detach to Alexandria. I suspect the last administration after Mr. Fox's death were never united.

10th July.—Yesterday despatches were received by

the —, Captain Palmer, from Lord Castlereagh. dated the 14th June, ordering us to evacuate Egypt, and to bring the troops from thence to Sicily. These despatches were written immediately after Ministers had received the letters giving an account of the two defeats at Rosetta and El Hamed, and when it was conceived from the letters written from this and from Egypt that it was doubtful if even with the reinforcement we should be able to retain Alexandria. In the course of the morning, yesterday, Admiral Martin arrived in the *Queen*, having Sir Arthur Paget and his suite on board, bound to Tenedos to endeavour to negotiate a peace with the Porte. The Russians and we find we have done very foolishly to quarrel with the Turks, and we now wish to make it up with them.


A private letter from the Duke of York to General Fox accompanied the public despatch, notifying to the General his recall, and desiring him to give up the command to me. The letter is couched in terms perfectly polite and respectful to General Fox, but stating that, as his health does not admit of his using those exertions which are required in service of such activity as it is intended should be carried on in Italy, his Majesty has thought it proper that the command should be placed in the hands of that officer to whom the operations must ultimately be entrusted. This letter has come on General Fox very unexpectedly; he had no intention to give up the command. It seems to me rather singular that he wished to hold it; he must perceive that it is most likely we shall be involved in operations in Italy, and that his constitution and health do not admit of his serving, and that he would be ultimately obliged to leave to me the conduct of whatever active was done. I have, therefore, always been surprised that for the sake of holding a command he should risk to expose himself to so mortifying an alternative as either to give up the command in the moment of difficulty and danger, or submit to remain behind when service was being carried on under his orders. There can be no doubt that he intended to hold his command, and he probably would have been

allowed to do so had I not written in the pressing manner I have done to be recalled.

The General referred to me to send the orders I thought proper to General Fraser. It is considered of importance to the success of Sir Arthur Paget's mission that Alexandria should not be given up previous to his arrival at Tenedos and his communicating with the Porte, in order that he may be able to hold out to them the evacuation of Egypt as an inducement to make peace. I have, therefore, sent orders to Fraser to make his arrangements quietly for evacuating and returning to Messina with the troops, but to postpone the final execution until he hears from Sir A. Paget from Tenedos. I have told him to take care to keep his intention secret, as otherwise the object for which the evacuation is deferred will be lost. Sir A. Paget saw the Queen during the two days he was at Palermo. She complained much of the manner in which General Fox and I talked of her; that we listened to the conversation of the disaffected persons, of which there were numbers in Messina, &c.; in short, the Queen has a rage for knowing everything that passes, public and private, and pays spies of all descriptions. She therefore hears, like all persons who have this mania, infinitely more lies than truths, and she believes everything. Mr. Drummond, whose business it is to soften and palliate these reports, is, on the contrary, open-mouthed against both the Generals, as he calls us.

Sir Arthur justly observed that this state of things could not possibly continue. I told him that with respect to me, and I was very certain it was the same with General Fox, our passions did not enter into the business, and that, had it depended on us, no disagreement would have taken place. My own opinion of Drummond was that he was weak, mean, and false; it was difficult to deal with a man of this sort in affairs where openness, candour, and firmness were required. I should probably go to Palermo soon; that, notwithstanding all that had passed, I should make an offer to Drummond to be on good terms with him, and should endeavour to act with him if possible; that with

the Queen I should have a full explanation, and endeavour to convince her that she did General Fox and me injustice; that we had no views but for the public good; that in most respects the two nations had but one interest, and, if ever we had differed from her Majesty, it was only from seeing the same object in a different light; but that our intentions were like those of her Majesty, to promote the welfare of both countries. Sir Arthur said he thought I might in this manner do much good. I found little difficulty in refuting the stories the Queen had told him, and he is gone away convinced of their falseness. Sir Arthur sailed yesterday (11th July). He expects to see Lord Collingwood at Malta, and proceeds from thence to Tenedos. I have taken advantage of the interval before I enter upon the command of the army to write a private and confidential letter to Lord Castlereagh, in which I have explained fully all I thought with respect to affairs here and the steps I should take as soon as I get the command. I have not written as to a Minister, but as to a man to whom I thought it necessary for the public good to give a true, fair, and honest statement. An answer was received yesterday from Mr. Drummond to the letter General Fox had addressed to him relative to the command of the Sicilian troops. The answer is from Circello; it is civil but decides nothing, but invites him to go himself or to send a confidential officer of rank to concert plans and agreements. I mean to go accordingly in a few days.



CHAPTER XXIV

MOORE IN COMMAND IN SICILY

PALERMO, 26th July 1807.—I left Messina on the morning of the 18th, and arrived here the forenoon of the 21st. The road is along the coast between the sea and the mountains, which last are cultivated to a considerable height with corn, olives, silk, mulberry trees, vineyards, &c. The roads are like those all over Sicily, unformed and bad. On my arrival I wrote to announce myself to Mr. Drummond. I waited upon him next morning, and afterwards dined with him, and that evening I went with him to the Marquis Circello, and afterwards to the Queen. Marquis Circello told me that he should, by the King's orders, direct the Brigadier Fardelli, Chief of the *État Major*, to wait upon me with the states of the corps destined to act in the field, and to give me every information I should wish with respect to their army. I observed to him that by this means I should know the force of their army, and something of their state of preparation and discipline, but it gave me no command of them, and was no answer to General Fox's letter. He said that if I would undertake to act against Naples the command would certainly be given to me: to whom could it be given but to the British General. He cajoled a great deal and paid me compliments, but nothing further was decided. I have since then seen Brigadier Fardelli, who has brought me the state of their troops for the field, and I have had a good deal of conversation with him; they amount to 4400 of all arms. I have acquired as much insight as I can, both with respect to this disposable corps, and as to the rest of the army. I shall then bring Circello and the King to a point with respect

to the command. The visit to the Queen was one of mere form, and nothing particular passed at it; but I wished to have a private audience with her by myself, in order to explain to her Majesty the motives upon which General Fox and I had acted. I wished to endeavour to remove those unfavourable impressions which Sir Arthur Paget told me she had imbibed from certain conversations and opinions of mine which had been reported to her. As I wished to speak to her, not in Mr. Drummond's presence, and not to be questioned beforehand on what I meant to say to her, I next day asked Sir John Acton in what manner to proceed in order to see the Queen. He undertook to write to her, and she appointed the next day at three o'clock.

She received me very politely, and made me sit down. I said I should require her Majesty's indulgence, as I was not in the habit of making such explanations as I felt it incumbent upon me to make to her, and I hoped she would have patience to listen to me. I had long known that her Majesty disliked General Fox and me, as we had declined to enter into plans which had been proposed to us, but which we thought bad. We had submitted to her displeasure, in the hope that the time would come when we should be able to act and to convince her that she had done us injustice, and that, if we had declined to act sooner, it was not from ill-will to the cause, but from a conviction that by acting prematurely we should do harm and risk the loss of the only corps left for her defence. With respect to the language which Sir A. Paget had told me had been reported to her, I was more anxious to clear myself from it immediately. If I had been capable of expressing opinions so insulting to their Majesties I should think myself very unfit for the station I held, and I hoped that, when I assured her Majesty they were not true, she would believe the assurance of a man who had served above thirty years, and had always maintained his character for truth, integrity, and honour. Had I been other, it must have been discovered in the various services in which I had

been employed during so long a period; but, in fact, they were the aspersions of persons enemies to their Majesties, and whose interest it was to create discord between two nations to whose union they were adverse.

The English Government had but one object in maintaining so large a force in this country, the defence of Sicily and the re-establishment of their Majesties on the throne of Naples. Their Commanders had no other orders; but a discretion was left to them as to the time and manner, and as they were responsible for their actions, they must be allowed the liberty of judging for themselves without being suspected of ill-will when they declined entering into plans which their judgment disapproved. If I had ever expressed disapprobation of any acts of their Majesties' Government, it proceeded from zeal for their cause. I know the importance in the present times of public opinion, and I regretted when their Majesties were so ill-advised as to adopt any measures which rendered them unpopular. I considered the cause of their Majesties and that of Great Britain, as far as I was concerned, as exactly the same. I could not injure the one without being a traitor to the other, and I trusted her Majesty would do me the justice to believe that I desired nothing more than to be the instrument of placing her Majesty upon the throne. My interest and my ambition were concerned in it. It was not to my taste to remain inactive, nor did I leave England and come to Sicily to live at Messina.

The Queen heard me patiently to the end, and then expressed herself satisfied. She said she perfectly believed all I had said. She believed me to be a man of honour and of character, who would not say or do what I did not think right in order to agree with anybody, and she esteemed me the more for it. She said a great many civil things, after which we conversed for a short time on other matters, and I retired. I know not what impression I have made upon her Majesty, for she is very false; but I have done that which became me, and I feel the easier for it. Mr. Drummond was hurt that I should have asked an audience

of the Queen not through him, and as he expressed himself to me in a manner I thought improper, I told him plainly that as Commander of the Forces I considered myself as no ordinary subject here ; that I was in some degree accredited to the Court as much as the Minister, and might have business with the Sovereign in which I did not want his interference, and had a right to ask an audience whenever I thought proper. But, however, as I had no wish to deviate from ordinary rules, and still less to disoblige him, I should in general prefer the channel of the Minister.

This matter being settled, but both a little heated, led to further discussions. He complained of the contemptuous manner in which I had always spoken of him. I told him that I thought his conduct had been weak and pusillanimous ; that with common fairness, when he first came, he might have gained an ascendancy at this Court which at present he does not possess. He harped a good deal upon the asperity of my expressions with regard to him, until I lost patience. I believe he wanted me to retract them ; so I told him that if he had heard of my speaking harshly of him, we had also heard of his not speaking very respectfully of the Generals, that for my part I thought he should for ever hide his head. "Hide my head!" he exclaimed. "For ever hide your head," I repeated, "for having encouraged the reports of us which were made to the Court, for having betrayed conversations which had passed in confidential communications between yourself, General Fox, and me ; for having at all times spoken slightly and disrespectfully of us." I quoted a strong instance of the latter, one night in his own house, in presence of Tattistscheff, the Russian Minister. He denied it in the most solemn manner, and prevaricated, which only confirmed the opinion I had before had of his meanness and falsehood, for the things I told him I knew for certain. As he cannot pretend any longer that he has any influence or that the Queen does not govern, he pretends to say that she has regained her influence since the receipt of General Fox's letter demanding what command H. S. Majesty meant to give him of his troops ; that this demand

threw the Court into confusion. The King had gone to consult her upon that occasion and she had regained her ascendancy, had turned out two Ministers, and had very nearly dismissed Circello; that until then she had been excluded from all public affairs.

I do not believe Drummond to be such a ninny as to credit this; but it suits his purpose to say so, to cloak his weakness, and a lie is at all times preferable to truth with him. The fact is, that the Queen has never ceased for one moment to direct this Government. There has been no Prime Minister since General Acton; each works with the King for his own department, but not one of them dares to make a proposal or give in a paper to the King that has not first been presented to the Queen for her correction and approval, and, as she is not the least an able woman, and is guided solely by her whims and passions, no one system is ever followed, and nothing can be more confused or absurd than the whole conduct of the Government. At present the anti-Anglican or French faction prevails; the Ministers are all of this description, and they have succeeded in exciting in the minds of the King and Queen the greatest distrust of the British. I cannot help always suspecting that the chief reason for pressing so much the expedition to Naples is to get us out of Sicily, and perhaps to get us destroyed. The chief of the staff is frequently with me; he gives me every information with respect to the force of their army. This evening (24th July) I am to see their cavalry; I have already seen their infantry. When I am satisfied, and have obtained every information, I shall then have an audience of the King and get a direct answer about the command.

August.—I saw on three successive days the whole of the troops; the cavalry, about 600, is tolerably good; the reserve, composed of the Grenadiers and of two other picked corps, amounting to about 1500 infantry, is passable, but all the rest is bad indeed. A few hundred artillery is, I understand, good, and they seemed well equipped in horses, drivers, &c.; but the troops are without confidence, ill com-

manded, and are not even organised in a manner to take the field; they bear the marks of long neglect. From the returns I got the army paid is about 10,000 men, but it would be difficult to collect for service 6000; they are dispersed, and no means taken to make them better. When I had obtained all information on the state of the army I asked and obtained an audience of both the King and the Queen. With the Queen I was by myself, with the King the Marquis Circello was present.

I represented to both of them the inefficient condition of their army, and the unprepared state of the country to carry on war of any kind, either offensive against Naples or for the defence of Sicily. I regretted the general want of confidence shown by their Majesties' Government to the English, who, as it happened, were their only defenders. I did not see how it was possible to suspect the views of a country which acted so honourably. England sent to their Majesties no intrigants to get about their persons and to flatter them. She sent fleets and armies with the proper Admirals and Generals to command them. These Admirals and Generals never came near their Majesties except when business called them. At other times they were at their posts. If their views were bad, what could they wish for better than the present order of things? The army was weak and bad, and being wasted, together with the resources of the Government, on fruitless expeditions on the coast of Calabria. If our views were bad, we should rather please and flatter their Majesties by encouraging this conduct. By advising the contrary, and by thus making ourselves unpleasant to their Majesties, we gave them the strongest proof that we consider their prosperity our interest.

The Queen allowed the justness of the reasoning, but she confessed that it was not distrust alone but fear she had of us. The King denied that he had either. Both spoke their sentiments, but the acts of the Government evidently show distrust. The Queen directs the Government, but she is directed by a set of miscreants who, if not in the pay of France, are at any rate enemies of England.

The King declined to give me the command of his army until we went to the kingdom of Naples, but asked me to put in writing what I should advise respecting it. Both their Majesties expressed themselves graciously respecting me. They assured me that I had entirely removed the bad impressions they had conceived of me, and in future they promised to listen to no such reports.

The day after I saw the King the Marquis Circello sent me one of his formal letters (for he is quite an old goose) recapitulating what the King had said respecting the command of the army, and his desire that I should state in writing my opinion with respect to the measures to be taken to render his army more effective. This was prefaced by some reflections on the past and against General Fox, which I thought improper, and in my answer I told him so, entering into a short recapitulation of the motives which had actuated the General's conduct during his command. I told him I saw no use in such discussions; for my part I wished to avoid them, but when his Excellency was inclined otherwise I was ready for him, as I had been consulted and had concurred with General Fox in every important measure. But the King had at his audience recommended oblivion of the past, and I thought it best for his Excellency and me to take this advice. I enclosed with this answer to Circello a paper containing some heads for the better regulating their army, in which I advised their whole troops to be assembled in the neighbourhood of Palermo, divided into brigades, and proper officers appointed to command them under General Bourcard, whom his Majesty had already named his Commander-in-chief. General Bourcard is a very good, honest man; from him and from Brigadier Fardelli I received all my information respecting the Sicilian army. He is perfectly capable of putting the army into good order if the King would give him authority to do so. I communicated the order respecting the army to him before I sent it to Circello for the King.

It was on the 4th of August that I saw the King. On

that day I was seized with a fit of fever, which confined me for a week, and I have not even yet entirely got rid of it. During this time we received the accounts of the successes of the French on the Vistula, the fall of Dantzic and Königsberg, the advance of the French and the armistice, followed by the peace signed between the Emperors of France and Russia and King of Prussia at Tilsit on the 9th July. These accounts have necessarily thrown the Court of Palermo, but particularly the Queen, into the greatest despair. I had signified to Marquis Circello my intention of returning to Messina, requesting that he would excuse me to their Majesties for not waiting upon them before I went, as I had been for a week past confined by a fever, to remove which I believed that change of air was necessary. As the Queen expressed a wish to see me before I went, if I could come to her during an interval of fever, I attended her at eight o'clock on Monday evening the 10th.

I found her in tears; she had before her a Neapolitan paper, in which were inserted the articles of the peace signed at Tilsit. She spoke with much feeling and not without dignity. She said she supposed she would be desired to abandon Sicily to Joseph, and that Dalmatia or some islands would be offered as a compensation. For her part she would have none of them; she called them *cochonneries*. She thought that all the princes of Europe had disgraced themselves so much, and the new set were such a canaille, that she longed to quit the fraternity and become a simple individual. As Caroline, retaining her honour, she would be much happier than by retaining the name of Queen and belonging to the class of sovereigns which had now become contaminated by fools and upstarts. I continued an hour and a half with her. She made me sit down, and I had a great variety of conversation with her. She was too deeply affected to play the hypocrite, and from this and the former conference I have somewhat changed my opinion of her. She is not herself a wicked or a bad woman, rather the reverse; but she is guided very much by those about her, and unfortunately she shows little dis-

cernment in the choice she makes. If she could see as other people do the things her counsellors make her do, she would disapprove of them as much as anybody, for they are in general quite contrary to her principles. Her misfortune is to dabble in public affairs, for which she has not capacity. In private life she would have been a clever, entertaining woman, violent in her passions, but upon the whole kind and good. As Queen, directing a Government, her weaknesses, which in private might have passed unobserved, resolve themselves into crimes, and she becomes violent, absurd, cruel, unjust, just as those about her and who have the management of her choose to make her.

She parted with me on the very best terms; she owned that much pains had been taken "pour la prevenir contre moi; pas sans succès," but I had by my plain manner done it all away, and nothing should make her think ill of me hereafter. "Car je vois bien Monsieur Moore, que vous êtes un homme droit, qui ne flatté personne, un peu réservé et qui ne donne pas facilement votre confiance: et j'en serai le plus flatté." On coming from the Queen I had a visit from Circello. It was agreed that I should correspond upon military matters with Bourcard. We exchanged great expressions of cordiality, and hopes that in future there would be a perfect understanding and frequent communication of sentiments between those in the direction of the Government and myself in order to cherish a perfectly good understanding. I was not well enough to return by land; I therefore sent away my horses and embarked myself with Captain Stanhope, my aide-de-camp, on the evening of the 11th August on board a transport which happened to be in the bay. General Fox embarked from Messina on the 3rd on board H.M.S. *Intrepid*, and sailed on the next day for England.

MESSINA, 22nd August.—I arrived here on the 16th, and have been employed ever since in despatching business accumulated by my absence since General Fox's departure. I have had no fever since I left Palermo, and I am daily regaining my strength.

25th.—Some days ago I received a despatch from Mr. Forrester, British Consul at Corfu, stating that orders had been received by the Russian Minister there to deliver up, agreeably to the articles of the late treaty, Corfu and the other Ionian islands to the French; that French officers had arrived, and were employed in taking an account of stores, &c. The Russians were all prepared to embark, and expected daily to be relieved by French troops. I have since heard from masters of merchantmen that French troops had been passed in small craft from Otranto and had arrived at Corfu. The French have also received from the Russians, Cattaro; the Russian garrison marched home from the latter place through the Turkish dominions. Their garrison from Corfu is to be conveyed to Trieste, and is to march through Austrian territory. This cession of Cattaro and of the Ionian Isles does not appear in any articles of the peace as hitherto published in the foreign papers; it was rather a surprise upon us. This is an advantage the French possess; from the quick and certain means they have of communicating with their most distant possessions they are enabled to act whilst we are without instructions, and know not whether we are at peace or if we are to continue the war single-handed with France, which, in other words, is with all Europe. The possession of the seven islands by France is most threatening to Sicily. I shall endeavour immediately to put the fortresses in some state of defence, and have demanded from the Sicilian Government that they may be put into my hands. Our force at present does not exceed 9000 men, and our fleet is also small.

MESSINA, 3rd October.—On the 15th September I received despatches by a cutter which came express from England directing me to embark with the Guards, 20th, 52nd, 61st, Watteville's, 2nd battalion 35th, and 78th Regiments, and proceed with them to Gibraltar, where I should be further instructed. These despatches are addressed to General Fox, The Generals named to serve under me are Major-Generals Marquis of Huntly, Wynyard, Oakes, Fraser, and Paget. It

is supposed that the troops from Alexandria have arrived, but, if they have not, I am directed not to embark until they do. In the meantime strict secrecy is enjoined. As his Majesty's Government must have been aware at the time they wrote their despatches of the probability that General Fox would be gone from this before the despatches arrived, and as they have made no arrangement in case it should be so, I shall make no change in either troops or Generals, but embark with those directed, leaving the command with Major-General Sherbrooke, the senior general officer of those not named to go with me. In the meantime the troops from Alexandria have not arrived. I meant, when I agreed to postpone the evacuation of Egypt, merely to give by it some advantage to Sir Arthur Paget in the commencement of his negotiation, but intended that this advantage should be abandoned if the negotiation drew to any length, as the orders for the evacuation had left me no option. Sir Arthur has delayed it much beyond what I intended, and it is only since he received, on the 16th, a letter from me, dated the 3rd of September, that the order was sent to General Fraser to come away from Alexandria. It must be the middle of this month, I fear, before we can look for their arrival. Lord Collingwood is come down to Malta with four sail of the line, having left Admiral Martin with two sail to attend on Sir A. Paget until he determines to give up his negotiation, of the success of which it is impossible to entertain the smallest hopes.

ON BOARD H.M.S. "QUEEN," 30th October.—On the 12th the ——— arrived from Alexandria, and gave notice that the evacuation had taken place on the 19th September, and that the convoy had sailed from Aboukir on the 24th. On the 16th of October they were anchored at Messina. The orders for the embarkation of the troops from Sicily were instantly circulated, to the great surprise of every one, no person having the least idea of any intention to diminish the force in Sicily. The embarkation was completed on the 24th, on which evening I embarked on board the *Chiffonne* frigate and sailed for Syracuse, where Lord Colling-

wood had directed the convoy to assemble. We reached Syracuse on the 26th, when I removed to the *Queen*, with Major-General Oakes, Quartermaster-General, Lieutenant-Colonel Lord Proby, Adjutant-General, and our aides-de-camp. The Guards, who had embarked at Catania, Augusta, and Syracuse, had collected at this port, and we sailed together on the 27th, and stood to the northward towards Messina in order to meet the rest of the convoy, which we did in the course of the 28th and 29th. We are now altogether to the number of fifty-six sail, including two men-of-war. We are standing towards Cape Passaro, our first rendezvous being the island of Mantimo, where we expect to meet the *Windsor Castle*, which is to proceed with us to Gibraltar.

The troops embarked amount to 7258 rank and file, including sick, the greatest part of which I ordered to be taken, expecting that the sea voyage would recover the majority of them, and that the rest might be left at Gibraltar. It is supposed that the Russian squadron has left the Mediterranean. Eight or nine of them appeared off Syracuse some time ago and caused some alarm. Their conduct was so ambiguous that I directed that they should not be permitted to enter any of the harbours of Sicily where we had troops. After cruising off Cape Passaro for some days they proceeded to the westward. Some others with some empty transports passed Messina; they wished to have anchored there, but I sent to them to desire they would not. Lord Collingwood, in consequence of the appearance of the Russians, came with his squadron and cruised between Cape Spartavento and Sicily. He has now sailed with the intention of going off Leghorn or Toulon, according to such information as he may receive of the French, who have entered Leghorn, and are taking measures which indicate an intention to undertake some maritime expedition. It is thought that Sardinia is their object. This I consider as a previous step to any undertaking against Sicily. They have as yet marched no troops into the kingdom of Naples. The British force left for the defence of Sicily amounts to 10,335 rank and file.

As my destination was kept a secret, and I know not myself whether I was to be employed out of the Mediterranean, I, upon embarking, put it in orders that Major-General Sherbrooke should command in Sicily during my absence. If I am to be employed out of the Mediterranean a general officer will probably be sent out to command in chief. When I gave the orders for the troops to prepare for embarkation I wrote to Mr. Drummond to make what communication he thought proper to the Court of Palermo, and the day before I embarked I wrote to the Marquis of Circello to notify my departure. From the time I left Palermo the Sicilian Government had been remarkably civil, but latterly they pretended to follow implicitly every measure I had recommended with respect to the assembling of their troops, the organising of the militia, &c. What this indicated I knew not. I did not trust to it, nor ever, as long as that Government directed, should I have put trust in any but the British forces. I recommended to General Sherbrooke a similar conduct; to place a garrison of 1200 men at Syracuse, about 1000 at Augusta, 4000 or 5000 at Messina and its dependencies, and to keep whatever he had disposable at Milazzo. The force at present in the Mediterranean is, in Sicily 10,335; Malta, 5221; embarked, 7258; total, 22,814.

GIBRALTAR, *4th December*.—We had a very rough and tedious passage of five weeks, and arrived here on the 1st inst. I received from Sir Hew Dalrymple two despatches from the Secretary of State, one dated the 8th October, directing me on my arrival at Gibraltar to proceed with the forces under my command to England, leaving two regiments at Gibraltar to reinforce the garrison; the other is dated the 8th November. It states that an order had been sent to me to Sicily to remain there with the whole force, and refers to the letter of the 7th October, directing me to proceed to England should I have already sailed from Sicily before the other reached me; it adds that, upon a calculation as to the probable period of my leaving Sicily, it

appears to his Majesty's Ministers probable that I cannot have left the Straits before this despatch shall arrive, and so the corps I command may now be available for several of the purposes for which it was called to Gibraltar. The despatch then enters into an explanation of our relations with the Court of Portugal, and directs me to enter into a correspondence with Lord Strangford, the British Minister at Lisbon. Should the Royal Family of Portugal determine to remove to the Brazils they are to have the aid of a British squadron, and Sir Sidney Smith with seven sail of the line has accordingly arrived off the Tagus, and they are further to have the aid of a corps of British troops, and I am to land with those I command, but not unless the Forts St. Julien and Bugio are put into my possession.

When the Royal Family are embarked I am to accompany them as far as Madeira, of which I am to take possession. Should the Royal Family of Portugal determine not to remove to the Brazils, but enter into a convention with France merely to shut her ports against Great Britain, I am in that case to send a force to take possession of Madeira, which, upon being summoned, the Governor will have orders to surrender. Should, in consequence of the measures Portugal may pursue, Lord Strangford be obliged to quit Lisbon and return to England, in this last case, if Rear-Admiral Sir Sidney Smith communicate to me his wishes that I should proceed with my force off the Tagus there to act in concert with him, I am to do so and to co-operate in such measures as may appear to us both essential for his Majesty's service.

The transports require to be revictualled and to be supplied with water; many of them also require considerable repairs. They will not be able to proceed on any service for eight or ten days. Whilst the transports are being made ready I have determined to go in a frigate myself off Lisbon to Sir Sidney, where I shall be able with most facility to communicate with him and with Lord Strangford, and to determine the measures to be pursued. I should have sailed accordingly on the day after I came into Gib-

raltar, but have been prevented by the westerly winds which still blow and make it impossible to get through the gut.

THE "CHIFFONNE" FRIGATE, AT SEA, 6th December.—The wind became fair on the afternoon of the 4th. I embarked, and in the course of the night we passed through the Straits. Yesterday we fell in with some ships of Admiral Purvis's squadron that are blockading Cadiz, and spoke to Captain Fleming Elphinstone of the *Bulwark*. He told us that the squadron had been dispersed in a gale of wind two days before; that his ship and two others had been obliged to anchor close to the shore, and luckily rode it out, but he was afraid that some of the ships were lost, and he knew nothing of the Admiral. He said Sir Sidney Smith was off the Tagus; that he understood Lord Strangford had sailed for England. The Portuguese had refused to admit the English squadron, and French and Spanish troops had arrived at Lisbon. The information obtained at Gibraltar was, that the Portuguese Government was determinedly hostile to England; that the Court had at no time any intention to go to the Brazils, but had, in concert with France, completely deceived our Minister. All their troops had been withdrawn from the frontier and collected round Lisbon, and for a considerable time they had been employed in improving the defences of the Tagus. Sir Hew Dalrymple, at Gibraltar, introduced to me several British merchants who belonged to the factory there. They had lately left Lisbon, and from them I received the above information. They said that the intention of the Court of Lisbon had long been evidently hostile to us, and that the manner in which our Minister had been deceived was gross. Lord Strangford is, I understand, a very young man, one of those who upon leaving college without any intermediate intercourse with mankind become statesmen and [diplomatists.

THE "CHIFFONNE," AT SEA, 8th December.—This morning we met H.M.S. *Foudroyant*. The captain came on board,

and by him we were informed that he belonged to the squadron under Sir Sidney Smith; that they had been in doubt to what resolution the Court of Lisbon would come, when, on the morning of the 29th of November, eight sail of the line, with the Royal Family on board, came out of the Tagus and joined the British squadron. They proceeded to the Brazils, and my brother, with four sail of the line, was named to accompany them. Sir Sidney Smith went with them, but it is supposed that he will return to the squadron he left off the Tagus. He ordered the *Foudroyant* on Thursday last, the 3rd, to return to the Tagus, and she is proceeding there. I shall go there in hopes of meeting him. The French troops arrived the day before the Royal Family sailed, but instead of improving the defences of the Tagus, as was reported to me by the merchants I saw at Gibraltar, the Portuguese had destroyed the batteries at Belem. The Russian squadron are still in the Tagus, and witnessed the evacuation without taking any part. Lord Strangford was on board of Sir Sidney's flagship, and the Consul, M. Gambier, had returned to England.

Upon further consideration and conversation with Captain Thomson, with whom I have since conversed on board the *Foudroyant*, I have determined to return to Gibraltar, where I think it certain that either Sir Sidney Smith or Lord Strangford will communicate with me. Captain Thomson said he dined on board of Sir Sidney's flagship on Thursday, the 3rd, when, without any previous notice in the afternoon, just as he was about to leave him, Sir Sidney gave him orders to return off Lisbon. Sir Sidney did not say how long he should continue with the Portuguese fleet, or where he was afterwards going, but told him he should join off the Tagus. I must conclude, as he knows my orders, that he will either go or send to me to Gibraltar. I have written to him by Captain Thomson that, having come so far with a view to communicate with him, but having met with Captain Thomson and hearing of the fortunate issue of events at Lisbon and

of his subsequent movements, I should return to Gibraltar as the place where I should most likely hear from him. Until I did I should be at a loss what to determine with respect to Madeira. We are now steering a course back to the Straits.

GIBRALTAR, 13th.—I was back here on the night of the 10th. In passing Cadiz I spoke to Admiral Purvis, who was blockading the port, and told him what had happened at Lisbon. On arriving here I found no letters from either Sir Sidney Smith or Lord Strangford. This is most unaccountable conduct on their part. I can only conclude that some arrangement has been made which makes my aid in taking possession of Madeira unnecessary. I have, therefore, determined to return to England with the whole force, leaving only two regiments, the 61st and Watteville's, to reinforce Gibraltar, and I expect to sail in two days.

ST. HELENS, 29th *December*.—Everything being ready and the wind fair, we sailed from Gibraltar on the 15th, and anchored here last night after a very pleasant passage of fifteen days. It was too dark when we reached this to proceed last night to Spithead, and this morning it blows so hard the anchor cannot be weighed. We, however, have communicated by telegraph our arrival to Portsmouth, from whence it will be conveyed to London.

LONDON, 7th *January*.—We were kept in quarantine for three days; the troops were then ordered to be disembarked at Portsmouth and marched into Kent. The different general officers, with the staff, &c., were permitted to come to town. I find that, in the uncertainty with respect to my return, Major-General Spencer had sailed with 8000 troops to the Tagus and Gibraltar, and that on arriving there, if he found that I had passed the Straits, he was to proceed with his force to Sicily. The convoy, with General Spencer, have since been dispersed by the gales of wind. He himself, with a part of the convoy, has put into Falmouth.

LONDON, 12th *January*.—I understand that some members of the Cabinet, influenced by the representations of Mr. Drummond, disapproved my conduct in Sicily, and inferred from the strong manner in which I expressed myself in my official correspondence that I was violent in my conduct. I thought it necessary, in my first interview with Lord Castlereagh, to explain myself on this subject. I told him that, in my correspondence with my own Government, my only object had been to lay before them the truth; that from them it was my duty to hide nothing. It was only from truth that they could frame proper instructions; that it was rather unjust that they should conclude that because I did not disguise my sentiments from the King's Ministers, I did not know the respect due to the princes and public authorities with whom I had occasion personally to communicate.

I told Lord Castlereagh what a contemptible fellow Mr. Drummond was, and quoted many instances of his falsehood and meanness; that I hoped I was not to be judged by his representations. I had now been employed so long and had held so many public situations, that my character must be well known, and his Lordship and the world must have ascertained whether I was in conduct wrong-headed or otherwise. In Sicily as elsewhere my endeavour had been to discharge my duty conscientiously, and, upon reflecting on what was past, I felt nothing with which to reproach myself, not even the candour with which I had written to his Lordship. I should always, when I was employed, communicate in the same manner. The truth alone was becoming me; if it displeased, I knew no remedy but not to employ me. Lord Castlereagh had rather supported me in the Cabinet. He expressed himself kindly respecting all I had done, and said he hoped there would soon be an opportunity of employing me advantageously. He has since sent to me, and has consulted me upon different points respecting Sicily and the Mediterranean. The Duke of York has stood my friend in all the attempts to traduce me, and I have been told that the King has not allowed

himself to be influenced. I believe my enemies in the Cabinet are confined to two or three individuals whose voices, though they may have weight there, are not in point of character either for sense or dignity such as to give me the smallest concern whether my conduct be approved by them or not.

It is of some dramatic interest to realise the causes which were likely to have made Canning share the feelings of those of the Cabinet who disapproved Moore's reports from Sicily. Canning had been the eloquent advocate of the national liberties of Europe against French and ultimately Napoleonic attack. As he showed later, he was quite ready to defend these against the "Holy Alliance." He knew nothing of Moore till he became Foreign Minister. When, then, he found Moore from Sicily saying that we could only defend Naples if we coerced the Government into proper treatment of their people, how natural was it that he should look upon this as a proposal that we should imitate the very practices for which we were fighting Napoleon. Moore's blunt veracity in stating the facts as he saw them and leaving Ministers to frame decisions thereon was familiar to Castlereagh, but not to Canning. Drummond's eyes were those through which Canning first saw the facts. When in a second case, to be now recorded, Moore had to deal with an impossible King, it is probable that this feeling would be further developed in Canning. Whether Moore was aware of Canning's hostility I do not know. It was probably of other members of the Cabinet that he was thinking when he penned the sentences above. He certainly shared Canning's views about the war and his devotion to Pitt.

CHAPTER XXV

IN COMMAND OF THE SWEDISH EXPEDITION

ON BOARD H.M.S. "MARS," *4th May* 1808.—I was sent for on the 17th of April to the Duke of York's office, and met there H.R.H. and Lord Castlereagh. They told me that H.M. Ministers had determined to give me the command of 10,000 men destined for Sweden to aid his Swedish Majesty against his enemies; that instructions should be made out for my guidance, but in the meantime he could say that the intention was that we should go in the first instance to Gothenburg, where he was assured by the Swedish Minister that we should be received with every attention. Our arrival would liberate at once the Swedish troops in that quarter. The Swedes could then either reinforce the corps under General Armfeldt on the frontiers of Norway, that opposing the Russians in Finland, or that in Sweden; that with respect to other measures he had not sufficient information, but I should judge on my arrival, and after I had communicated with his Swedish Majesty and his Generals. It was not intended that I should ever put myself under the command of the King of Sweden, or engage in any enterprise which would lead me from the coast or risk my re-embarkation or the power of withdrawing, if either I thought proper to do so or was so ordered from England. Sir James Saumarez would command the fleet employed for the protection of Sweden; I should concert with him and facilitate his operations by every means in my power. The names of the regiments which it was intended should form this corps were given to me, and I was desired to state the quantity of the ordnance I thought necessary. It was plain from the whole of Lord Castlereagh's conversation that Government had no specific

plan, and had come to no determination beyond that of sending a force of 10,000 men to Gothenburg to be ready to act if occasion offered. All the troops, &c. &c., were embarked in the course of the next fortnight, during which time I had frequent interviews with Lord Castlereagh.

On Friday, the 29th, I received my instructions, and on Saturday I came to Deal, and the Monday following (the 2nd of May) I embarked on board this ship, which bears Rear-Admiral Keat's flag. We sailed yesterday with the *Audacious* and about eighty sail of transports. We go to Yarmouth, where the whole army are directed to assemble from the different ports of Portsmouth, the river, and Harwich, at which the troops, ordnance, and stores have been embarked. The force consists of one regiment of light cavalry and six battalions of infantry of the German Legion, five battalions of British infantry, viz. the 4th, 28th, 52nd, 79th, 92nd, and three companies of the 95th (riflemen), two brigades of light and one brigade of heavy artillery of the German Legion; the whole making a force from 11,000 to 12,000 men, with, I think, every necessary equipment. The proportion is nearly one-half British and one-half German. General John Hope is second in command, with the rank of Lieutenant-General. The Major-Generals are Mackenzie, Fraser, Paget, and John Murray.

YARMOUTH, 8th May.—We anchored here on the evening of the 5th, and were joined on our passage by the ships from Portsmouth and from Harwich. Those from the river, which contain our ordnance, stores, provisions, forage, hospital stores, and camp equipage have not yet arrived, and we are detained for them, though the weather is fine and the wind fair. They were reported to the Secretary of State as all ready on the 3rd, but this cannot have been the case or they would have been round, for the wind has been favourable for these five days. Our armament will consist when collected of about 180 sail. The transports are so small, that it takes seven or eight of them to hold

one regiment. For a mere passage this is of less importance, but I have represented to Lord Castlereagh how unwieldy and unmanageable we shall be if required to act upon the enemy's coast; for this latter purpose troopships or transports coppered and of a large construction are alone fit. Twenty or twenty-five might carry this whole expedition, sail well, be amenable to signal, fit to carry each a couple of flat boats, and to man them when required. Unless some plan of this kind is adopted we shall not be able to carry on a littoral warfare or be able to avail ourselves of our naval superiority.

AT SEA ON BOARD THE "MARS," 11th May.—All the convoy, except four ships, for which I thought it not worth while to wait, were collected in the course on the 9th, and, everything being prepared, we sailed with a fair wind from Yarmouth roads yesterday morning at daylight, and we are now proceeding with a fair wind and fine weather.

FLEMISH ROADS, GOTHENBURG, 20th May.—We had a fine passage, but were detained three days by fogs from making the land; on the 17th we anchored early in the morning. I immediately waited on Sir James Saumarez on board the *Victory*. He had been here about nine days. On the 18th I received a letter from Colonel Murray from Stockholm, covering a letter to Lord Castlereagh, which was to be forwarded to him in case I had not arrived, but it was left under a flying seal for my perusal in case I should be here. It represents the regular force of Sweden to be 28,000 men. Beyond this there were the dépôt battalions, which if completed would be 9000, but they were not complete, and composed of recruits and boys. There was also the "levée en masse" of 30,000, but of this the officers and non-commissioned officers alone were collected. Hitherto no system had been followed, but now two plans had been proposed; the one an attack on Zealand, the other on Norway. The first Murray considers as out of the question; for the other, it was proposed that the British should land at Frederickstadt and form a junction with General

Armfeldt, whose army, now 8000, was to be increased to 18,000.

I enclosed Colonel Murray's letter to Lord Castlereagh, and sent it by the packet which sailed yesterday, with one from me, in which I state that I think it very improbable that I shall adopt either of the plans proposed; that Zeeland is defended by 28,000 Danes; and that 44,000 French, Spaniards, and Dutch (25,000 French, 15,000 Spaniards, 4000 Dutch; total 44,000) were on the island of Funen and on the neighbouring coast. The whole army of Sweden was already fully employed; 6000 under General Armfeldt were opposed to 30,000 Danes and Norwegians on the Norwegian frontier. Ten thousand in Finland were similarly opposed by a superior force of Russians; at least I supposed so, as they had been uniformly forced to retire. The remaining 10,000 Swedes were guarding Stockholm and the southern coast. Threatened as they thus were by superior numbers on each flank, no point could be weakened to strengthen another without evident risk. No means therefore existed for augmenting the corps under Armfeldt except from the *dépôt* battalions, which were represented to be unfit for service, or from the "*levée en masse*," not yet embodied; but even 18,000 Swedes joined to 10,000 British were not sufficient to conquer so difficult a country as Norway, defended by 30,000 men. In my opinion, the Swedes had no right to look to conquest; the danger to be apprehended was that they would be overpowered and invaded; and, unless they were able themselves to make far greater efforts than they had done, I did not see how a corps, such as that I command, limited as it was to operations on the coast, could render the Swedes any essential service or for any time protract their fall. It is to be regretted that Government had not better information of the military force of Sweden before they determined to send this force to co-operate. The fortress of Swedenburgh has capitulated to the Russians. It is the only one in Finland, and it was supposed to be impregnable. The Swedish Admiral who commanded in it

is supposed to have betrayed it, and he is with his principal officers dismissed the service. In the meantime the fortress is gone, and with it the power of ever recovering Finland. It is to be feared that this Governor is not the only traitor in Sweden, but that on this occasion he has acted in connivance with others.

Gothenburg, 25th May.—On the 21st, Lieutenant-Colonel Murray, Quartermaster-General to the army, returned from Stockholm. He had been sent from England immediately before the embarkation of the troops in order to announce their arrival; to inquire into the force and means Sweden possessed, the plans the King proposed, &c.; and to communicate this and such other information as he could procure to me upon my arrival. Colonel Murray brought with him two other letters addressed to Lord Castlereagh, containing a continuation of the information given in the former letter he had sent from Stockholm, but all to the same point, confirming the weakness of the Swedish army, their want of military stores, and the wild projects of the King for conquests.

He delivered to me a letter from the King, in which his Majesty states that, before he enters into any discussion with respect to the employment of the troops I command, he thinks it necessary to explain himself upon the conditions which the British Government had attached to their employment; and he thinks it better for the sake of both armies to have this explanation before operations commence. His Majesty then goes over his different objections; first, the power which his British Majesty reserves to himself to withdraw the corps whenever he has occasion for it elsewhere, which under certain circumstances might subject him to serious inconveniences. To this he proposes that he should have a week at least or a fortnight at most notice, and he reserves also to himself the power of withdrawing his own troops and of ordering ours out of his territory when he thinks proper, giving us similar notice. Secondly, that our troops are to act, as much as possible, independently

of his, and always to be connected with our fleet. This he states must be very inconvenient and very difficult to manage, particularly at the commencement of operations, where unforeseen events may make a union of the forces necessary for mutual assistance, besides cramping the operations of both the fleet and the army. Third, and lastly, the General commanding the British troops, though directed to pay all deference to his Majesty's wishes and to the objects he desires to accomplish, is to have his troops under his own immediate orders and disposition; this his Majesty states is contrary to general custom, as the entry of any auxiliary corps into the territory of an independent State necessarily supposes the chief command to be in the sovereign who reigns. From this condition he cannot depart, and until these points are explained his Majesty declines our aid.

The King's letter is well expressed, and is perfectly polite both to me personally and to the British Government, and, as it appears that the conditions attached to the employment of this corps have never been explained to him until the moment of our arrival, when they were communicated by Mr. Thornton, it must be owned that his observations are both natural and just. In my answer I have stated that nothing could be more gratifying to me and to the corps I command than to be employed under his Majesty's orders in any measures he thought best for the service; but the conditions which had been communicated by Mr. Thornton to his Majesty were those of my instructions, from which his Majesty must feel I could not depart. I had therefore taken the only step left me under such circumstances; I had transmitted his Majesty's letter to England to be laid before the King, my master, and I could only hope that the instructions I should receive would prove agreeable to his Majesty, and such as might enable me to testify my zeal for his person and for the welfare of his dominions.

As Colonel Murray had originally been sent by Lord Castlereagh to Stockholm in advance of the army, and from that and other circumstances he was the fittest person to

send and the best informed on every subject relating to their country, I despatched him to England with a copy of the King's letter and my answer, and I referred the King's Ministers to him for every information. In my letter to Lord Castlereagh upon this occasion I confessed that, although I saw the impracticability of the plans proposed by the Swedish Government, I had none to offer from myself to which I did not see serious objections; that I had given him all the information in my power with respect to Sweden, and had now sent Colonel Murray, who was originally his own ambassador, and could give him every other information he could require; that he knew more than anybody the state of things here. I had communicated with him in the most unreserved manner, and he therefore knew also all my opinions. I had furnished his Lordship, as I conceived, with all the materials, and I should be happy if his better judgment could suggest any plan by which by my best exertions I might be of use to the public service. With respect to the objections made by the King of Sweden, had his Majesty's plans been such as I could possibly concur in, I might have endeavoured to have arranged an understanding with him in such a manner as to have enabled me to go on with the immediate service, leaving the final decision to be sent afterwards from England; but, as it was, I thought it best to avail myself of his objections to stand upon my instructions, and to put a stop to all action until I was further instructed.

It is plain that Government in England were ignorant of the state of affairs in Sweden when they determined on sending this corps to act in concert with our fleet upon the enemy's coasts. They must have conceived that the Swedish force was more considerable than it is. It is so much inferior to that which is opposed to it, that they could take no advantage of any diversion we made. The King of Sweden, from the account of Colonel Murray, who had frequent interviews with him, is a man of an honourable, upright mind, but without ability, and every now and then proposes measures which prove either derangement or the

greatest weakness of mind. He has no Minister, but he governs himself; and as he has neither the habits nor the talents requisite, Sweden is in the state of a country without a Government, or of one that is only governed by fits and starts. The King is perfectly despotic; whatever he orders must be done, and, unfortunately, when he gives orders he depends entirely on himself and on his own impressions as facts. He does not see the perilous position he is in, and nobody dares represent it to him. He is speculating on conquests when he has already lost one province, and has not the means to defend the rest. In short, his situation is such that it is next to impossible that he can sustain himself *beyond this summer*.

Our fleet, by guarding the sound and belts and by overawing the Russian squadron, will perhaps save him during the summer. Our troops, upon the plan proposed, can do him no service. If lent to him altogether they would not put his army on a footing equal to that opposed to him, but in this way they might check his enemies so far as to prevent their immediate advance into Sweden, and thus give the King time to rouse his people and form them for defence; but nothing but the greatest exertions on the part of the Swedes themselves can possibly save them. The King, in the first place, has no such plan. He does not see his danger, but, if he did, it is not a prince such as he is that could rouse a people or gain their confidence or that could direct their efforts with ability. The natural consequence of a character like his is that his people become indifferent, and many adverse. They see no hopes of safety from anything they can do themselves, and are willing to hope and trust to accident. The nobility are adverse to the war and to all resistance, and will be glad to see the King reduced to compromise on any terms, or themselves to become subject to any other Power. The probability is that he is surrounded by persons in the interest and in correspondence with his enemies. In such a state of things we can do him no permanent good; he will not follow our counsels, and our force alone is not

sufficient. I am therefore quite satisfied that we should take advantage of the objections he has made to the conditions upon which the force is offered and withdraw it. Zealand should have been kept when we had it last year; it is now fortified and guarded beyond reach of our attack. Cronstadt and the Russian fleet is the only other object worthy of us, but that also has been secured since the Peace of Tilsit. It was within our grasp last autumn. It seems that we left the Baltic when we could have done everything, and we have returned to it when we can do nothing.

A most voluminous correspondence relates to this abortive business. I give only, as now interesting, five letters which Colonel Murray, on his return from the mission on which Moore had sent him, brought back with him from England. Two of them are from Lieutenant-General Brownrigg, the Quartermaster-General, one from Major-General Gordon, Military Secretary to the Duke of York, the other two are Lord Castlereagh's despatches in reply to Moore's report home of the situation which had arisen from the mad conduct of the King of Sweden. All are, I think, material to the understanding of the sequence of events during the last year of Moore's life.

(Secret.)

HORSE GUARDS, 31st May 1808.

MY DEAR MOORE,—I was glad to hear of your safe arrival at Gothenburg from Murray, who arrived the day before yesterday, and returns to you to-morrow. I hope he will be the bearer of explicit instructions. Ministers, I hear, would have been better pleased had you acted on your own responsibility; here they are like all other Ministers that I have ever known, always backward in giving specific directions, and endeavouring to get rid of the responsibility which properly

belongs to them. From what Murray tells me, I fear your prospects are not promising, and that the utmost you can do is to keep the enemy in check. I heartily wish you had never gone to such a remote corner, but now a more encouraging scene presents itself in Spain, where the army and people have shown a disposition to make a struggle for their independence. Sir Hew Dalrymple is in correspondence with the Spanish General commanding before Gibraltar and at Cintra, and a communication is also said to subsist between the Spanish commanders at Cadiz and Admiral Purvis, to whose fleet the force under Spencer that was at Gibraltar has been ordered. Five thousand men are ordered from Cork to the Mediterranean, among the number the 1st battalion of the 9th. Three thousand are to go from hence, which, added to Spencer's corps, will form an effective army of 12,000 men, which report says is to be commanded by Sir Arthur Wellesley. It is needless to say that I wish it were you.

As to myself, nothing is decided. All belonging to me are well.—Your affectionate friend, R. B.

The Duke approves of your having sent Murray home, and Gordon tells me that Ministers are satisfied of the expediency.

(Endorsed)

Lieutenant-General BROWNRIGG, 31st May 1808.

(Secret and separate.)

To Lieutenant-General Sir JOHN MOORE, K.B.

DOWNING STREET, 2nd June 1808.

SIR,—Your letter, enclosing the King of Sweden's, having been submitted to his Majesty, I am to convey to you his Majesty's instructions with regard to the

points on which the King of Sweden has demanded explanations.

They may be stated under the following heads:—

Firstly, his Swedish Majesty requires, previous to any recall of the British troops, that a notice of from eight to fifteen days should be given, in order that his Swedish Majesty may make such arrangements with a view to his own security as such change of circumstances might require.

Secondly, his Swedish Majesty claims a reciprocal right to return the British succours or to withdraw from combined operations on a similar notice when he thinks fit.

Thirdly, that the condition which required the British troops to act as far as possible as a separate corps and in connection with its own fleet should not prevent combined operations between the forces of the two Powers; and

Fourthly, that the British troops when actually within Sweden should be under the King of Sweden's orders.

With respect to the latter condition, which seems to be the most important, his Majesty, in deference to the King of Sweden's wishes, is pleased to acquiesce in your considering yourself under his Swedish Majesty's command whilst actually serving within his dominions.

His Swedish Majesty will be apprised, however, of the limitations which his Majesty has felt it necessary to annex to the employment of his troops as stated in your former and present instructions, in order that his Swedish Majesty, in such orders as he may be pleased to give, may conform thereto.

Should any departure from the principles laid down occur which you may deem of sufficient importance to

justify hesitation on your part in carrying any orders you may receive from the King of Sweden into execution, his Majesty is pleased to authorise you, having first made the necessary representation to his Swedish Majesty in conformity to the spirit of your instructions, to acquaint his Swedish Majesty that you do not feel yourself authorised to comply therewith until you shall receive his Majesty's orders thereupon.

With respect to the other conditions, his Majesty feels no hesitation in acceding to them, in the confidence that they will be acted upon on both sides with every disposition to conciliation and the accommodation of the mutual views and interests of the respective Powers.

The demand of due notice previous to withdrawing his Majesty feels perfectly reasonable in itself, and to be not more than his Majesty's own anxiety for the King of Sweden's interest would have determined him under any circumstances to afford. The reciprocal right claimed, as above stated, on the part of the King of Sweden his Majesty considers not less equitable, and such as his Majesty cannot possibly object to.

The third demand, that the orders given to the British troops to act as much as possible as a separate corps in concert with the navy should not prevent conjoint operations with his Swedish Majesty's forces, can meet with no difficulty on the part of his Majesty. His Majesty can have no hesitation in acceding to it in the terms expressed by his Swedish Majesty himself, which are as follows :—"Que cette communication sera principalement concerté entre les chefs mêmes des deux forces de manière que les expéditions par terre en soyent genées aussi peu que possible."

His Majesty is aware that considerable difficulties may occasionally occur where operations are to be carried on by allied States, and where the supreme command is of a qualified nature. He trusts, however, that you will be disposed to smooth all such difficulties as much as possible, and to act towards his Swedish Majesty in the utmost spirit of accommodation which you consider to be compatible with the essential principles which have been laid down for the direction of your conduct.—I have the honour to be, Sir, your most obedient humble servant, CASTLEREAGH.

(Secret.)

Lieutenant-General Sir JOHN MOORE, K.B., &c. &c.

DOWNING STREET, *June* 1808.

SIR,—In my despatch of this date marked “separate,” in the event of your receiving orders from his Swedish Majesty which you consider to be at variance with your instructions, and to be in their nature sufficiently important to justify such a step on your part, you are authorised, after making every suitable representation, in conformity to the spirit of such instructions, to acquaint his Swedish Majesty that you do not consider yourself authorised to comply herewith until you shall receive his Majesty’s orders thereupon.

After such an intimation has been given on your part, should the King of Sweden, in virtue of the right which his Swedish Majesty considers himself to possess of commanding any auxiliary corps serving within his immediate dominions, object to such a reference, and press upon you an immediate compliance with his orders, you will, in that extreme case, consider yourself authorised to withdraw your corps without waiting for

orders from home, giving, however, as far as circumstances will permit, the required notice.

His Majesty, in entrusting to you this discretionary power, is persuaded you will only use it under circumstances of a pressing nature, and that you will lose no occasion of proving to his Swedish Majesty the warm interest the King takes in affording to his Swedish Majesty the most cordial and disinterested support.

I have thought it right that you should have precise instructions upon this case, however little probable I trust it is that any such event should occur.—I have the honour to be, Sir, your most obedient humble servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

HORSE GUARDS, *3rd June 1808.*

MY DEAR MOORE,—I sincerely hope that Murray, who left town yesterday, will take to you such instructions as will prove satisfactory. He appears to have acted with a great deal of judgment and good sense, and I do not think you could have had a better negotiator. Gordon has shown me your letter of the 23rd ult., transmitting copies of your correspondence with the King of Sweden. Nothing can be more clearly or better put than the manner in which you describe the state of the country in which you are destined to act. God knows, the prospect is black enough; you must now make the best of it, and if you cannot gain laurels there, I shall anxiously wish for your return. Parts of your letter have been communicated to the Cabinet, and they have expressed themselves satisfied with your reasoning, and Taylor tells me that the King entirely approved of the manner in which you have acted. There are letters of the 13th ult. from Sir Hew Dalrymple, which are not so sanguine in regard to efforts

in favour of independence in Spain as his former communications. It appears that the population of Madrid have submitted without a struggle to the assumption of French power, and, as far as the capital is concerned, the revolution is effected; and it is much to be feared that there is not sufficient energy or means in the provinces to make head against the army that Buonaparte has taken care to establish in the more important parts of this devoted country. Spencer's force has certainly joined Admiral Purvis off Cadiz. The force to proceed from Cork to the Mediterranean is to consist of the first battalions of the 5th, 9th, 38th, 40th; fifth battalion 60th; first battalions 71st and 91st; to be commanded by Sir Arthur Wellesley, with Major-General Hill and two brigadiers under him. An expedition against Spanish America on a large scale is again talked of.—
Ever yours, R. B.

Major-General BROWNRIGG, *3rd June 1808.*

Received at Gottenburg, 11th June.

(Confidential and Secret.)

HORSE GUARDS, 3rd June 1808.

MY DEAR GENERAL,—Yesterday I had the pleasure of receiving your private letter of the 23rd May with its several enclosures. Lieutenant-Colonel Murray left London the evening before on his return to you.

As you were so good as to leave it to my discretion to impart such passages of your communication as I might judge expedient, I selected those for the information of Government which could not in any manner commit you, or have the appearance of rebutting what the Cabinet in its deliberations had been pleased to enact, but I thought it advisable to lay the whole before the Duke. His Royal Highness read your account

with the utmost attention, and repeatedly expressed to me his entire approbation at everything that you had done, and with every sentiment that you have conveyed in your letter, and as it was thought advisable that a true statement of things in Sweden and of your proceedings should be made known in a higher quarter, your letter was read in that quarter this morning, and gave the same favourable impression that had been given to the Duke.

You who know so well my caution in affairs of this kind, and how little likely I am to err in overmuch writing, will, I am sure, feel highly gratified in this unequivocal expression of your judgment from quarters where you must most wish to stand well.

In my last letter I believe I said that your instructions appeared to me to leave you just where you were before, and I am still of that opinion, but it is said that you are placed at the disposal of the King of Sweden except as relates to Zeeland, and therefore that you can be at no loss to determine upon your actions, guided as they must be by instructions from the King. You have done your duty in stating your sentiments to Lord Castlereagh according to the best of your information and judgment, and you have now but to act upon such instructions as he may transmit to you.

In speaking my mind openly to you, I have no hesitation in saying that I think you are very unpleasantly circumstanced, that it does not appear to me that any service can be performed by your corps either for your reputation or for the advantage of the common (or what is usually termed the *bonne*) cause ; but you have this consolation, and it is no small one, that in doing your duty you do well, and deserve that

praise which is due to those who act to the best of their judgment, and with their utmost exertions, in the service upon which chance may throw them. Do not, therefore, despond if you are locked up in Norway, but do the thing cheerfully, whatever it may be, and be assured of the utmost possible support from every friend you have left behind you.

We have no accounts from Spain since Spencer sailed from Gibraltar for *off Cadiz*, but those which I have received state that the Spaniards don't much like the new order of things, but that the French have so managed matters, and have so large a force which they use right and left with great animation, that no alternative is left but submission. We are upon the point of sending a corps of 8000 men, under Sir A. Wellesley, to join Spencer, and if things do not look well in Europe, they will try their luck across the seas.

The India Board have not yet come to any decision about Brownrigg, but I think they will be obliged to receive a military Governor of Bombay, and therefore him.—Believe me always, with the greatest regard,
yours faithfully, even while J. M. G(ORDON).

STOCKHOLM, 25th June.—Colonel Murray returned from England to Gothenburg on the 11th June, and brought me letters from Lord Castlereagh of the 2nd, in answer to the demand of the Swedish King. They consent to his having the supreme command of the British troops upon their landing in his territories, and agree equally to the other demands he made, but, as the conditions upon which the troops are lent have been communicated to H. S. Majesty, it is expected he will conform to them; if he does not, by a separate instruction I am directed to remonstrate, and, if I see cause, finally to withdraw the

troops, giving as far as possible the notice required. The instructions state reasons for forbidding the British troops from co-operating in an attack on Zeeland, and give a great many good reasons why an attack on Norway should not be attempted. These I am directed to lay before the Swedish Government, but should, notwithstanding, the King of Sweden determine to prosecute an attack on Norway, I am directed to co-operate with the British troops by making a descent on Christiansand, or in such other manner as H. S. Majesty shall direct. The instructions are upon the whole sufficiently inexplicit and contradictory, and Lord Castlereagh does not otherwise answer the letters I had written to him than by acknowledging their receipt. I determined on coming myself to Stockholm, and have written to England that I should do so.

I set out with Colonel Murray the day after his arrival (the 12th June), and by travelling night and day we reached Stockholm on the afternoon of the 14th. I omitted to mention that Lord Castlereagh said that it was with much surprise and dissatisfaction that the King had heard that there had been any hesitation on the part of the Swedish Government to permit the troops to land, and that Mr. Thornton was instructed to communicate to the Swedish Government that if the most unreserved facilities in this respect were not afforded I had orders to return with the troops to England. On my arrival I waited upon Mr. Thornton, the English Minister; from him I heard that he had received no communication from Government, only a copy of my instructions. It was agreed that he should announce my arrival to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which he did next day, and Thursday, 16th, was fixed for my being introduced to the King. After a short conversation upon common matters his Majesty bowed, and Mr. Thornton and I retired; but I was instantly called in again by myself, when I had a private audience, which lasted upwards of an hour. I said to his Majesty that upon Colonel Murray's return from England I had judged it most respectful to come in person to Stockholm and present myself to

his Majesty and receive his orders. I then read to him the orders which had been sent to me in consequence of his Majesty's letter, which I had transmitted to be laid before his Majesty. He observed that the command was given to him only within his own dominions, and that he did not see how he could be said to have the command of troops that he could not direct against the objects which he thought of most importance; that he considered an attack on Zeeland to be of this description, yet he saw that the British troops were forbidden taking any share in it. I endeavoured to explain to him the reasons which had actuated the English Government, that they were as fully impressed with the importance of Zeeland as his Majesty, but that they considered it as an undertaking beyond the power of the two countries at present. With respect to command, it appeared to me that his Majesty had the same command of the British as it was usual to give over auxiliary troops. They were given on certain conditions, and within these conditions his Majesty had the supreme command.

I soon discovered by his Majesty's answers that reason had no weight with him when opposed to his own opinions. He generally answered either by something which did not apply, or by a simple assertion or repetition of his first observation. The conversations I had this day and on several subsequent days I put in detail in writing and transmitted them with my despatches to Lord Castlereagh: they were curious enough. His Majesty sent to me next day General Tibell, his Quartermaster-General, with a proposal to me to make a descent with the British troops in Russian Finland, in the neighbourhood of Viborg, to favour the operations of his troops in Finland. I told General Tibell that it had never been the intention of England in sending this corps to the assistance of H. S. Majesty that they should act at such a distance and in the Russian territories; that a descent so near the capital and near the strength of the Russians might lose my own corps, but could not possibly be of any use to the Swedes, the head-

quarters of whose troops were still at Brahestad. The General did not seem to expect a different answer from me, but he said I had better explain myself to the King. The King, I find, solely directs the affairs of this country; every measure, civil or military, originates with himself. His Ministers and Generals are mere instruments, who are expected implicitly to obey his mandates; advice, if ventured, is badly received.

My second interview was to communicate to his Majesty my reasons for declining to act as he proposed, and I had another long conversation, in which he complained that I would do nothing he desired. I gave him my reasons, but this was of no avail. He asked me of what use were we if we would not act. I had repeatedly endeavoured to explain the motives of England in sending the troops, that, when his Majesty had pressed for them, his Minister in London was told by the English Government that they were ready, and should sail as soon as the operations upon which they were to be employed had been concerted, but that Mr. Adlerbørgh had pressed their immediate departure, assuring our Government in his Majesty's name that on their arrival at Gothenburg they should meet with the most hospitable reception, &c. &c. The troops sailed accordingly, on the supposition that their presence would give security to Sweden, and would liberate a portion of the Swedish troops, and enable his Majesty to strengthen his armies on his frontiers, and that after their arrival future operations might be concerted. That the power which England had of concerting in what manner her troops should be employed was delegated to me. On my arrival at Gothenburg I found, however, no arrangements made for their reception. I was informed by Colonel Murray that his Majesty would not suffer it, and this his Majesty has since confirmed to me, saying that they were of no use unless to act offensively. Had the King of England known that his Majesty wanted troops only for conquest, he perhaps would not have sent them. I was, however, ready to act in any operation that I thought my King would approve. I had declined that proposed by

his Majesty, because I thought it would have been equally declined by the English Government, as tending to no good, whether to the interests of Sweden or of England. I might as well not have spoken; his Majesty answered by saying that he had no use for troops in Sweden, had never asked for them, and never would admit them. Mr. Adlerbørgh could not promise or ask what he was not authorised to do, &c. &c.

He at length said: "I suppose if I were to ask you to go to Norway you would refuse it also?" Upon his putting this question, I said he surprised me, as he had already given me repeatedly such sound reasons for not undertaking anything against Norway, that I could conceive no other reason he had for proposing it to me now but to push me to a refusal. His Majesty denied having ever said more against the attack on Norway than that he preferred that on Zealand, and he asked me positively if my instructions forbade me also from acting in Norway. I said that they did not, and his Majesty had better order his plan for that purpose to be communicated to me. I met his Quarter-master-General at dinner that day at Mr. Thornton's. He told me that he had orders to wait upon me with a plan against Norway, and that he should do so, but, his attention having been turned of late altogether towards Viborg, he could not immediately *s'orienter vers Le Norvège*, but he would endeavour to be with me in the course of the following evening. He came accordingly; he is a sensible man, who went, during the war, into the French service, as he says, to learn experience, and rose to be a general of brigade. He continued six years in it, and left it upon being offered service in his own country: he is suspected by many to be in the interest of Buonaparte. At present he is in great favour here, and has a principal direction in military affairs. He was ashamed of his plan; he, however, explained it on the map, went through the farce, and answered all questions gravely enough. He was not sent to discuss, but merely to explain the plan which the King had given him, and he discharged his duty. This plan,

together with all other papers which have passed, I keep, and therefore do not insert them here. Nothing can be more crude than the plan, and, as the General could hardly, I saw, contain himself, I relieved him by saying: "I think we have all acted our parts exceedingly well (Colonel Murray was present) and quite long enough; for God's sake, let us lay aside our gravity and let us speak of something else!" "*Ah! de tout mon cœur,*" said the General, "*en effet* we have done all due honour to the plan." He then continued to converse with us about the King, his own campaigns, &c., and was exceedingly agreeable until bed-time.

I had long been convinced, and had written home to this purpose, that it was quite impossible to act in concert with this country, whose Government was directed by a person without the least ability, and whom nobody ventured to advise; that he would not admit the troops into his country, and had neither troops nor means for any military operation whatever. If we undertook anything, or once placed ourselves under his orders, it was impossible to say the absurdity to which we might be exposed. For my part, I was so much impressed with this that, unless I was positively ordered, no other consideration should induce me to land the troops in Sweden or undertake any operation which took from me the disposal of the troops. An instruction I had received by Colonel Murray stated the surprise and dissatisfaction of the King of England upon hearing that there had been a hesitation to receive the troops at Gothenburg, directing that if the most unreserved facilities were not given to them to land I was immediately to return with them to England. I consulted Mr. Thornton, and we agreed that it was best to break off upon this, as it was evident that no good could result from our continuing here. I wrote accordingly a letter to him to communicate to his Majesty stating my orders. I said that, as it would be the beginning of August before the preparations were made to collect the Swedish army and enable it to act on the frontier of Norway, until which time the British troops

must continue in their transports, since his Majesty persisted in refusing to admit them to land, I must obey my orders and return with them to England.

Mr. Thornton desired to know when he transmitted this letter if it would be agreeable to his Majesty to see me before I returned to Gothenburg. His Majesty appointed the day before yesterday, the 23rd, at noon, to receive me. At the former audiences I had always seen the King alone. On this occasion I found with him General Tibell, Admiral Riolia, and Baron Wettenstedt, his secretary. Colonel Murray was called in with me. The conversation was very long. I have endeavoured to detail it to send home, and cannot recapitulate it here. The purport was to show that no blame attached to the Swedish Government should the British troops return, but much to me, applying to me, as my act, the restrictions put by the English Government on the employment of the troops as well as the objections I had made to the plans he had proposed. He accused me of having misrepresented what had passed in the interviews I had had with him, and that this was his reason for speaking to me now before these gentlemen fully to explain himself, as no doubt I should represent matters to my Government differently from what they really were. I spoke a great deal in justification, of course repelled his accusations that I had misrepresented anything, and supported all the opinions I had ever given him. At last, as I felt myself much hurt and irritated by what had passed, upon his asking me what I intended to do, fearful lest my passion might have carried me too far, I said I would return to Gothenburg; but, if he desired it, I should not sail with the troops until I heard from England in answer to the despatches I should now write. He said he did desire it, and I thus gave hastily a promise of which on reflection I repented, as I was sensible I had exceeded my instructions, which left me no option but to return with the troops to England if the liberty of landing was refused to them.

Upon consulting with Mr. Thornton I wrote to him to

beg he would represent to his Majesty that the promise I had given was from a wish to comply as far as possible with his pleasure, but I had exceeded my powers, that I must retract it so far that I should not hurry the departure of the troops, but should be guided by the letters I might receive from my Government to hasten my departure or delay it according as I should by their tenor feel myself authorised or otherwise. This letter was accordingly communicated to his Majesty last night, and I had ordered horses and settled everything for setting out for Gothenburg early this morning. At eleven o'clock last night, after I was in bed, the King's Adjutant-General came to me with an officer as interpreter, and delivered to me a message from his Majesty desiring I should not leave Stockholm *sans la volonté du Roi*. I communicated this this morning to Mr. Thornton, and though there is but too much reason to suspect that his Majesty's intention, by his message, is to arrest me, yet we have agreed, as the reflection of the night may have sobered him, to consider until we hear further that he has merely stopped me from a wish still to communicate something to me before my return to Gothenburg. I have, however, taken the precaution to write by messenger to General Hope to apprise him of what has happened, that he may be upon his guard, and be able to return with the troops or take whatever other step in his prudence he thinks fit, should he find that I am arrested and prevented from communicating with him. An aide-de-camp has just called (twelve o'clock) with a message from the King desiring to see Colonel Murray. He is gone to him accordingly.

STOCKHOLM, 27th June.—Colonel Murray was absent about an hour and a half; when he returned he related to me what passed with the King; it consisted of complaints against me. He said I had broken my promise to him; that after having said I would remain with the troops at Gothenburg until I heard from England, I had written to Mr. Thornton that I would not, "Qu'on ne manque pas

ainsi à un Roi." I had placed myself under his command, and could not retreat. It was in vain that Colonel Murray endeavoured to explain my letter or the meaning of my conduct, or to represent the insult he had offered in my person to the King of England, to whom if he was dissatisfied with me he might complain, but he could not with propriety himself punish me. I went to Mr. Thornton as there could be no longer a doubt that I was arrested, and told him my situation, and that it became him to act. He accordingly addressed a very spirited remonstrance to Baron d'Ebenheim, Minister for Foreign Affairs, representing the outrage committed on my person, so insulting to the King and the British nation, that if the arrest was not instantly retracted the consequence must inevitably be war between the two nations.

To this no answer was returned, but yesterday morning an invitation was received by Colonel Murray from Count Piper, Colonel of the Guards in waiting upon the King, inviting him to dine at Haye at two o'clock. The Colonel wrote for answer that he had no longer any mission to his Majesty, but was here only as an officer under me, that in the present situation of affairs it was impossible for him to have any communication with his Majesty but by my order. With respect to the invitation to dinner, he would transmit it to Mr. Thornton. Mr. Thornton wrote to Baron d'Ebenheim, enclosing a copy of the invitation to Colonel Murray, to inform him that during my arrest it was impossible that any British subject could have any intercourse with his Majesty, and beseeching him if he had any weight to recall matters before it was too late. About twelve o'clock a second note came to Colonel Murray from Count Piper, countersigned by the King, ordering him to attend at Haye at five in the afternoon, with a threat if he failed. Colonel Murray answered that he would obey his Majesty's orders. There appeared to be a continuance of so much wrong-headed violence in the King's actions, that it was proposed I should make my escape to Gothenburg.

I deferred the final determination until the result was

known of Murray's visit to Haye, and on his return from it he said he found the King more reasonable. His Majesty said that he had not seen my letter, nor had he understood it as Colonel Murray then explained it; he spoke as if he doubted the existence of such a letter, saying that it had been only told him that a communication had been received from Mr. Thornton, and that I had retracted the promise I had given, and should send off the troops *peu à peu*. Murray, who is anxious that all should be accommodated, took much pains to explain things to him, and he, finding probably that he has gone too far, and frightened perhaps by Thornton's letters and fearing for the loss of the English subsidy, some such high-minded motives as these have at last inclined him to listen to reason, and he is driven to the miserable subterfuge of a lie by denying that he had seen my letter. Murray wishes that all should be hushed and, each party retracting, that things should return to the situation in which they were on the day when I took my leave of his Swedish Majesty. This would perhaps be agreeable to Ministers in England, who may not wish to quarrel with Sweden, but in my opinion matters have been carried too far. My arrest is now public, and should be atoned for, and as to quarrelling with Sweden, it is more her interest than that of England to keep on amicable terms. The King should be made to acknowledge his error, and I think it is pretty plain that the insolence which insulted will have the meanness if properly addressed to submit. The King is at last sensible of the necessity of appearing not to be on bad terms with England; he was mild, and begged Murray would take a dish of tea in the adjoining room, the door of which he threw open. The aides-de-camp and officers in waiting were present, and tea was brought. He begged for the same reason that Murray would attend him at the parade this morning. In consequence of all this I put off my intended attempt to escape, as Murray thinks that this morning some proposal will be made which will enable me to return to Gothenburg openly.

H.M.S. "AUDACIOUS," AT SEA OFF GOTHENBURG, 3rd July.
—On Colonel Murray's return from the King he said he had found him as unreasonable as ever. He had then in his hand a translation of my letter to Mr. Thornton, which he read to Murray. He went over all his former nonsense of my breaking my promise, &c., and, though he had avowed to Colonel Murray the day before that he had never understood me to have promised more than that I should not take away the troops until I received a communication from Government—my letter stated no more, but he had considered the promise in a more extensive view—"that I should not withdraw the troops until I received an answer to the communication I then made." So that what I had retracted only brought the promise to H. S. Majesty's understanding of it. He found fault with my having addressed my letter to Mr. Thornton and not to himself, and desired Murray to tell me that if I would now address it to him and apologise to him, and say I meant no disrespect to him, that he would not detain me from my command. Murray begged his Majesty would dispense with his being the bearer of any message to me; if his Majesty had any proposal to make, he requested he would do it through Mr. Thornton. The King said, "Well, will you tell General Moore what I have said?" Murray said he would, but that he was certain I should not consider any such communication as requiring an answer.

Seeing thus no hopes of any return of his Majesty to reason, and fearing that proposals for apologies would be made to me, which I was fully determined not to comply with, and that these might lead to correspondence and end in further irritation, perhaps expose me to personal insult, I resolved to make my escape to Gothenburg. My remaining at Stockholm answered no purpose; on the contrary, by my escape I left the Government in England more at liberty to act as they thought proper without being restrained by considerations for my safety. It was my duty to make every effort to return to the post my sovereign had assigned to me at the head of his troops. Hitherto I had been kept

from it in submission to the power of the King of Sweden. I had never acknowledged the authority he had pretended to assume over me. I had given no promise, and could break none by withdrawing from my arrest.

A courier had been kept in readiness all the morning to carry Mr. Thornton's despatches and mine to England. He was ordered to leave Stockholm that day at 2 P.M. Mr. Oakely, the Secretary of Legation, called upon me in his curriole about one o'clock, and proposed to me to take a drive with him. He drove me a couple of miles beyond the first stage on the Gothenburg road, where the courier overtook us, when I got into the *calèche* with the courier and proceeded to Gothenburg. Mr. Oakely returned to Stockholm. I made the journey in a very short space, and immediately took a boat and got on board Sir James Saumarez' ship the *Victory*, where I found the Admiral and General Hope, whom I had apprised of my arrest, under considerable anxiety. General Hope had already embarked the horses of the general officers, and had directed everybody to repair on board. Colonel Murray, who had left Stockholm some hours after me, arrived the day following, and I immediately sent him on with my despatches to England. Major Colborne, my military secretary, left two days after me, when my departure was still unknown at Stockholm. He arrived yesterday. He had taken the precaution to send all my papers by an English brig-of-war then at Stockholm, lest the King in his passion should seize them. The English Minister had done the same with his. Colborne tells me that it was Mr. Thornton's intention the day after he came away to announce officially to the King my departure. I am very anxious to know how he received it and the sensation which it occasioned at Stockholm, but every arrangement being made for my departure, and the wind fair, I took my leave of Sir James Saumarez this morning and sailed with the troops on our return to England.

It is impossible for me to guess in what manner all that has passed in Sweden will be received in England.

Soon after my first arrival at Gothenburg I gave my opinion fully that no good could be done by us in this quarter, and recommended withdrawing the force. The foundation for this advice was the character of the King of Sweden and the want of adequate means and force in the Swedes to cope with their enemies. Since that time, and particularly from my arrival at Stockholm, I have taken every opportunity to transmit accurate details of all my conferences with his Majesty and of everything else that occurred, accompanied by letters containing my own reasoning and sentiments. I have, however, received no letters from the King's Ministers since those brought to me by Colonel Murray, dated the 2nd June. I have thus been left to act according to my own discretion, and Ministers by the contradictions in their instructions and by their silence are at liberty, according as events turn out favourably or otherwise, to blame or to approve of them.

CHAPTER XXVI

MOORE'S QUARREL WITH MINISTERS

WHEN a man's name has by the achievements of after years been encircled with all the glories and honours that in our minds gather round the "Duke of Wellington," it is difficult to put ourselves back into the time when he stood before his contemporaries without them. It is even harder to realise that, capable as they knew him to be, it was not because of any prophetic insight into his after-career that the Ministry of 1808 were anxious to appoint him to the command of the army which they were sending to Portugal, but that the reasons which influenced them were altogether other than this. His genius for war, as it developed during the Peninsular campaign, has tended to throw around the choice of Castlereagh and of Canning a glory which it does certainly not deserve. It is always true, as Lord Palmerston once said, that "selection by merit" will be, and must be always, as long as human nature is human nature, "selection of the men whom I like." The difference lies in the motives of liking.

There can be no doubt whatever that the two strongest motives which at this time determined the choice of the Government were, first, that Sir Arthur Wellesley was one of themselves, a colleague whom they thoroughly knew and could trust to act in hearty co-operation with them, and, secondly, a very strong wish not to employ Moore in high command if they

could find some one whose reputation could in any way be compared with his. The shot which brought Moore to his end at Corunna left the true monument of his career a broken pillar; so that, except from what we know that the man had been, we can only judge of what he would have become had he had the experience of long and independent command in many campaigns. All comparison between the two careers is utterly ridiculous. Wellington became the final conqueror of the world's conqueror, the most powerful statesman as well as the first soldier in Europe from the time when the great Corsican was confined upon his solitary rock. Moore ended his life under circumstances which tended utterly to obscure from the greater number of his contemporaries, and from all those historians who form their judgment from the passing impressions of those contemporaries, the grandeur of his actual achievement.

Moreover, as Spain became the scene of a progress of English arms, so continuous that on the Continent itself they, in their five years of unbroken triumph, seemed to stand alone serenely superior to the disasters that were overwhelming all others, it was the war in Spain that came to be exclusively remembered. All the previous period compared with that coruscation of glory looked poor and paltry, so that what Moore had done in Spain fixed his reputation with succeeding generations, and it seemed at best an ineffectual glimmer before the great sun arose.

I am not now concerned, as I shall shortly be, with Moore's actual work in Spain. In order to understand the history of the year 1808 it is necessary to put ourselves back in thought to the time when no part of the Peninsular War had been fought, and when Moore and Wellesley stood before their countrymen with the

reputations which they had then acquired, and having behind them the careers which they had then run. Now, startling as it may seem to us at the beginning of the twentieth century, it is true that the strongest motive which actuated the Cabinet of 1808 in their wish to have Wellesley and not Moore in command of their army was, that they were afraid of Moore because of the reputation and influence which he had acquired, and that they were not at all afraid of Wellesley. Wellesley was a Minister's General; Moore was not.

Castlereagh and Canning were, in their different ways, the two most conspicuous figures in the Portland Cabinet. Each of them had done notable service. Castlereagh's prompt arrest of the leaders of the Irish Rebellion had saved the feeble Cabinet of his grandfather, then Lord Camden, from the consequences of its own folly and panic, and had prepared the way for Cornwallis. In Ireland, he and Moore had virtually served together on Lord Cornwallis' staff, and from that time onward Castlereagh had known and appreciated Moore; but, even in his case, it was the appreciation of one whose ways were not his ways by a man not himself particularly scrupulous as to the means he used to attain his ends. Arthur Wellesley, spending his time in "bartering boroughs and appointing Government nominees to represent Irish constituencies," all the time engaging in unblushing bribery and corruption, was a much more comfortable man for Castlereagh to deal with than one who, as Castlereagh well knew, had looked upon the whole system so carried on as the ruin of Ireland. It was not in Moore's favour that he had, whether in Corsica, the West Indies, Ireland, or Sicily, been insisting that the governing classes had

duties as well as rights, or rather, as has been more nobly said, and as Moore believed, that their duties were their rights, that their own welfare lay in fulfilling their duties. Moore, wherever he had been, had insisted that our policy was to support and maintain justice and good government. For Canning, or for Castlereagh, still more perhaps for many of the other members of the Cabinet, such as Camden, Dundas, and Bathurst, there was very much of what Moore wrote from Sicily as to the corruption of the miserable Court of Naples that could not fail to be profoundly distasteful. At least as regards Ireland it must have seemed to them that, under a changed name, of them the tale was told. In all these matters Wellesley had the great advantage for gaining their regard that he was a man of his time, Moore the disadvantage that he was a man in advance of his time.

Nevertheless, Moore might have been allowed to indulge as philosophic opinions these and many other heresies without begetting more than the somewhat passive dislike which easy-going men, who accept the current corruptions of their time as matters of course, feel for any protestant against them, had it not been for another circumstance. I have given without comment Moore's letters from Sicily to General Brownrigg, and the letters to Moore when in Sweden from both Brownrigg and Gordon. Now the history of the earlier period of the war, as we have watched it throughout Moore's Diary, is that of expedition after expedition, planned at home, with no adequate conception of the nature of the task to be undertaken, with no adequate information, and with the conspicuous omission of necessary preparation. On all of these Moore might have commented in his private Journal without having

any reason to fear "the swords of Antony." But he had come to be known to all the men who were round the Duke of York as the first English soldier of his time. To them he wrote with absolute frankness of the mistakes made by Ministers. He pointed out with unanswerable logic, and more often than not with the force given by prediction beforehand, how certain consequences must follow from certain premises.

Most fatal result of all; this logic, these predictions not only reached the Duke of York, but they reached the King. They therefore tended to affect the careers of particular Ministers. After Moore's death Castlereagh's letters to the King are almost pathetic in their anxiety to show that he personally had neglected nothing for the supply of Moore's army. Was it not natural then that these Ministers should have desired to substitute for this strong, clear-sighted, blunt-spoken man, whose words carried such weight with their master, and were sure to reach him, anybody else they could get who might have a chance of success.

The fact that Castlereagh and Canning were always sparring and tending always towards the quarrel that ended with a duel, made the case as regards Moore all the stronger. Both of them agreed in dreading him. His exposure of the recklessness with which the Swedish expedition had been despatched had touched both of them alike in their tenderest point.

Moore, though there had been no sacrifice that he had not been ready to make throughout life for the sake of perfecting himself for the right command of an army, was not ready to make the smallest sacrifice of his own self-respect for the sake of having a command conferred on him, any more than, as he had showed at Ferrol, in Sicily, and in Sweden, he was ready to expose

a British army to fatal danger for the sake of obtaining personal opportunity. Moore was at no time a man of whom "all men" were likely "to speak well." Surely it was a proof of the greatness of Abercromby that he should on the next opportunity that came in his way select as the first soldier for whom he asked the man who had told him to his face that the proper place for a Commander-in-chief was with the advanced guard. Moore's own subsequent recognition of the fact that Sir Ralph's fault as a commander was that he exposed himself too much was a proof that Moore had not, when in St. Lucia, understood Abercromby any more than he then knew the essential condition of conjoint expeditions. Yet the frankness with which in this matter, as in all his West Indian correspondence, he dealt with Abercromby is a good illustration of the kind of men with whom he was likely to be acceptable, and of those to whom he would be hateful.

It certainly speaks well for the stamp of men who were then at the head of our armies that the blunt, unflattering frankness with which he laid before them the truth as he saw it did not in any one instance prevent the elder Charles Stuart, Ralph Abercromby, Cornwallis, the Duke of York, or, for that matter, Pitt or Fox, whom he addressed with equal frankness, from turning to him on every occasion, as indeed did, in a different sense, James Stuart, Trigge, Hutchinson, General Fox, and the other weaker commanders with whom he was associated. He had already at this time become the idol of a body of men—Colborne, afterwards Lord Seaton; Graham, afterwards Lord Lynedoch; Charles, William, and George Napier, of whom the world was to hear more in later years.

On the other side, it was not a disadvantage, but

an enormous advantage, to Wellesley that his experience had been gained in India. His career there was a proof for the Ministry that they were not rash in employing him. It was known to the world and the army that his opportunities there had been given by the favour of a brother, the Governor-General. That brother was a friend who had been almost more closely bound up in Canning's career and in Castlereagh's than any other. His other brother, Henry, was also a member of the Ministry. He had no approach to the King but through them, seeing that the Duke of York had not viewed with much favour his absenting himself from army work for political employment. From every personal point of view, therefore, Wellesley was as much their man as Moore was the man they wished not to have.

At the same time, it is only fair to the Ministry to say that they had a very plausible reason for not wishing at that moment to employ Moore in high command. They, as Castlereagh told Moore, were aware that the King of Sweden was virtually mad, but, as yet, that condition of his mind had not become so conspicuous as to make his deposition the inevitable thing it soon afterwards became. Therefore, as yet, the King meant Sweden, and the Swedish alliance was on national grounds of much importance. It was impossible to tell what effect the news of the immediate appointment of Moore to the most important command that could be given to him would have upon the mad monarch who had quarrelled with him. It will be seen presently that it was to this cause that Sir Arthur Wellesley himself at the time attributed the disinclination of the Ministry to employ Moore. It was obviously the natural motive for

Arthur Wellesley to suggest, but it is impossible to believe that it was more than a pretext. The real grounds of dislike lay far deeper. At all events, as we shall now see, Moore returns to England to find a Ministry resolved at all cost to keep him out of high command, but quite unwilling to tell him why they have so decided.

PORTSMOUTH, 23rd *July* 1808.—We received an order at sea to go to the Downs instead of Yarmouth, and we anchored there accordingly on the afternoon of the 15th. I sent on shore for letters, but got none that were official. Captain Owen, who was senior naval officer there, had orders to complete the transports in provisions and water as fast as possible. I reported by express that night our arrival to the Commander-in-chief and to Lord Castlereagh. In the course of the night an order came addressed to the senior naval officer for the transports to go to Portsmouth, and for General Moore to go to town. I left the transports getting under way and set out myself for London, where I arrived in the evening. Next day being Sunday none of the Ministers were in town, but I saw Colonel Gordon, the Duke's military secretary. From him I learned that I was to proceed to Spain or Portugal with the troops I had. We were to be joined to others that were embarking, those under Sir Arthur Wellesley which had sailed from Cork, and those under Spencer now at St. Mary's near Cadiz, and were to form an army of 30,000 men, to be commanded by Sir Hew Dalrymple as chief, and Sir Harry Burrard as second.

I understood from Gordon and from others that there had been much intriguing about the command. Ministers had done everything in their power to give it to Sir Arthur Wellesley; but he was so young a lieutenant-general that the Duke had objected to it, and, afraid of disgusting the army and the nation by such an appointment, they had given it up. Disappointed in their favourite object, they were determined it should not be given to me, and, to pre-

vent the possibility of its falling to me, Sir Harry Burrard was named as second. I was appointed to see Lord Castlereagh next day (Monday) at his office at two o'clock.

He received me as usual. He confined his conversation to Sweden, respecting which and the transaction he asked many questions. He at length said that the Cabinet were sensible of the difficulty of the situation in which I had been placed, having to do with a King, mad and impracticable; that my instructions from many circumstances had necessarily been vague, leaving much to my discretion, but that I had conducted myself perfectly to the satisfaction of Government.

The only point upon which any difference had arisen was the propriety of my withdrawing myself from the arrest after I had thrown the business into the hands of Mr. Thornton. Some individuals thought it would have been better if, after that, I had remained and left the discussion to Government, or, if determined to come away, that I had said to the Swedish officer who brought me the message from the King that I was not under the command of the King of Sweden and could receive no orders from him, and had then not countermanded my horses but left Stockholm, as I had before determined. Lord Castlereagh added that he did not mention this to me officially or as implying the smallest blame, but merely as an opinion which some individuals of the Cabinet had formed upon a reconsideration of what had passed.

I told Lord Castlereagh that I could not feel the least uneasiness from such an opinion, even should it be found to be just. It was at best speculative, and it was enough for me that I acted for the best at the moment, and with the concurrence of the British Minister. One of the motives which had induced Mr. Thornton and me to come to the determination we did was, that we thought my departure would leave Government more at liberty to act as they thought proper, not embarrassed by any consideration for my person. If I had rejected the arrest the King would certainly have secured me, and upon the whole, I said,

although it was one of those points on which I had no objection to be thought wrong, yet I doubted if what I had done was not preferable to that which those individuals had proposed. His Lordship then asked some questions about the troops, and when I thought they would be ready to proceed, and as I was leaving him he said he would probably wish to see me to-morrow, when he would speak with me on another subject.

On leaving Lord Castlereagh I waited on the Duke of York, who received me with his usual kindness. He assured me that the King and he perfectly approved all I had done, and they thought it was very fortunate that the command of the army had been given to me, who had firmness to withstand importunity, and not to allow it to be wasted in unnecessary service. He asked me if I had seen Lord Castlereagh. I told him that I had just come from him. He had spoken to me of Sweden, and expressed the approbation of the Cabinet of all I had done. The Duke asked if he had spoken on no other subject to me. I said he had not. H.R.H. seemed much embarrassed. I knew very well that what was going on was not his doing. He said, as he was going away, that he knew very little. That night, after I was in bed, I received a note from Brigadier-General Charles Stewart that Lord Castlereagh wished to see me at three o'clock, and that I should make my arrangements for leaving town as soon after that time as possible.

At this time not a word had yet been said to me of the manner in which I was to be employed, and yet I was desired to prepare for leaving town that evening. Luckily all my baggage was at Portsmouth in the ship in which I had come from Sweden. I had little preparation to make, and I ordered a chaise to be at the door at 4 P.M. When I waited upon Lord Castlereagh at three he began by saying that Sir Arthur Wellesley had sailed from Cork on the 12th, and might be expected off the Tagus on the 20th; that it was intended that if he found himself, by the intelligence he should receive of the enemy's force,

strong enough to attack them he should land; if not, he should await the arrival of the troops under me and of others which were ordered, when, as it was not supposed that Sir Hew Dalrymple would have arrived, the operation would be undertaken by Sir Harry Burrard. It was thus by inference only that I was to understand that I was to proceed on this service as a lieutenant-general under Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir H. Burrard. This I thought a most extraordinary manner of behaving to me. I naturally expected when, returning from a command-in-chief, that if it was thought necessary to send me on with the troops I had thus commanded, in a far inferior station, that something by way of explanation or excuse would have been said to me, but it was evident from Lord Castlereagh's manner that he was ashamed of himself, and he never could bring himself to say plainly the station I was to hold.

I was fully determined to go upon the service, but before I went I thought it became me to express to Lord Castlereagh the sense I had of the manner in which I had been treated. When, therefore, he seemed to have finished all he had to say, which was nearly what I have stated, I said to him: "My Lord, the chaise is at my door, and upon leaving your Lordship's I shall set out for Portsmouth to join the troops with whom I perceive it is intended I should proceed as lieutenant-general. It may perhaps be my lot never to see you again. I, therefore, think it right to express to you my feeling of the unhandsome treatment I have received from you." He said he was not sensible of the treatment to which I alluded. I therefore recapitulated all that had passed since my arrival in the Downs. "Had I been an ensign it would hardly have been possible to treat me with less ceremony. It is only by inference at this moment that I know I am to be employed, for your Lordship has never told me in plain terms that I was appointed to serve with the army under Sir Hew Dalrymple as a lieutenant-general, and, coming from a chief command, if it was intended to employ me in an inferior station I was to expect that something would be said to me. You have

told me that my conduct in Sweden was approved, but from your actions I should have concluded it was the reverse. I am at a loss to conceive the cause; for if there is an officer in the service who has steered a straight course, who without intrigue or detracting from the merit of others has endeavoured by his own exertions to establish his reputation, I think it is myself.

"Why I should be the object of such obloquy I cannot guess; but, my Lord, I have been treated unworthily and in a manner which no part of my conduct could justify. His Majesty's Ministers have a right to employ what officers they please, and had they on this occasion given the command to the youngest General in the army, I should neither have felt or expressed the feeling that the least injury was done to me; but I have a right, in common with all officers who have served zealously and well, to expect to be treated with attention, and when employment is offered to me, that some regard should be had to my former services." In this I alluded to Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir H. Burrard, who, though both respectable and good men, are neither of them officers of such service as myself. Lord Castlereagh said little to me during the conversation but that he was not sensible of having given me any cause of complaint. When I had finished what I had to say I rose abruptly and retired.

The exact circumstances and motives of this conversation with Lord Castlereagh prior to Moore's departure from England require to be carefully noted. It will be seen that it throughout turned on the point that an officer, Sir Hew Dalrymple, of no war experience, and Sir Harry Burrard, an officer of little, had been put over his head without the smallest reason being assigned for it. It will be seen in the course of this chapter that the danger of this situation was a subject on which Sir Arthur Wellesley very strongly agreed with Moore. There appears, however, to have been a final sentence of Moore's which he has

not reported in his Diary. After he had left Lord Castlereagh's room he opened the door again and said, "Remember, my Lord, I protest against the expedition and foretell its failure." Now obviously the point of this remark depends on the subject of the previous conversation. That turned entirely on the fact that Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard had been appointed to the command. It expressed no opinion on the success which was likely to attend a campaign carried out either by Sir Arthur Wellesley or by Moore himself, each of whom had had large experience of war.

The success of a well-conducted campaign must obviously depend amongst other things upon the condition of the armed forces between whom the British army was about to intervene. Moore had had recent experience of the inaccuracy of the information on which the Cabinet were prone to rely, but not being in command in this instance, he had had no means of sifting, as he had done in previous cases, the data on which assumptions were made. There is, therefore, not the smallest reason to suppose that had the command been offered to himself he would have predicted its failure. The actual situation both in Spain and Portugal appeared to favour an attempt by Britain. The reports and rumours were even more favourable than the truth. As early as the 2nd May 1808 war had broken out, and was soon afterwards raging in all parts of the Peninsula. As Napier puts it, "The spirit of insurrection breaking forth simultaneously in every province was nourished in each, until it acquired the consistence of regular warfare." It had become "an awful struggle between great nations."

All this had become known in England whilst

Moore was engaged in the Swedish expedition. It was on the 17th April that Moore had been sent for to take command of the force destined for that enterprise. His correspondents at home kept him fully informed whilst he was at Stockholm of the reports that were reaching England, chiefly through Sir Hew Dalrymple, then at Gibraltar, of what was taking place in Spain. His friends had also told him of the despatch to Spain of the armies under General Spencer and Sir Arthur Wellesley. They had mentioned that Sir Hew Dalrymple, who was at first very sanguine of Spanish success, had become very much less confident as time went on. Sir Hew had raised a loan at an early period from the merchants in Gibraltar for the aid of the Spanish patriots, and had been throughout the insurrection in close correspondence with them. By the time that Moore had returned from Sweden and was having his conference with Castlereagh, news was beginning to come in of the effect of Napoleon's first combination against the rising insurrection.

The month of June was one of mixed fortunes for the patriots. Bessières, with Burgos for his centre, dispersed them in all directions throughout the neighbouring district. Lefebvre-Desnouettes was scattering the defenders of Arragon. The siege of Saragossa was just beginning. It was closely invested, and gave little promise of its future heroism. In Catalonia the French gained successes, but had also failures. It was not till later that the co-operation of Collingwood and Cochrane turned the balance against the French in that quarter. In Valencia, Moncey had hitherto gained successes. Thus as to the opportunities open, the situation was uncertain. Everything depended on the extent to which the General who was to go in command of the army

realised what was necessary for an English expeditionary force, how far the Government had supplied it, how far the General who was to be in command understood his opportunities and took them when they occurred, never anticipating the right moment and never letting it slip.

Moore had had many experiences of the kind of information on which Cabinets with which he had had to deal had been ready to act. The incidents connected with Sicily may be now left to speak for themselves. Apart from those disastrous failures, of which he had only indirectly known, such as Quiberon Bay and Ferrol, he had personally stopped with wise counsels the attempt on the Boulogne flotilla, proposed by Sir Sidney Smith, the proposal for the second attempt on Ferrol, and, lastly, had just experienced the Swedish fiasco. He knew that the Government was at present being driven into action, not by any careful judgment of the opportunities presented to them, but by the passionate excitement of English public opinion, and that they had entrusted the expedition to a man wholly incompetent to carry it to success. His prediction of failure under such a commander was amply fulfilled. How nearly it led to more serious consequences this chapter will disclose. The sentence of Moore's has no bearing whatever, and cannot, in any wise, affect a sound judgment as to the humour in which he, under quite different circumstances, entered on his own campaign in Spain. Yet so easy is it by a change of dates completely to falsify facts, that the following extract will show how this true prediction of Moore's is made to prejudice judgment against him in a matter with which it had no concern. Sir Herbert Maxwell appends the following note to his short and misleading reference to Moore's campaign in Spain :—

"Sir John Moore, though second to none in bravery, was oppressed with misgiving from the first. After he had received his final instructions from Lord Castlereagh and taken his leave, he reopened the door and said to the Minister, 'Remember, my Lord, I protest against the expedition, and foretell its failure.' Canning told Mr. Stapleton that when Castlereagh related this incident at a meeting of the Cabinet he (Canning) could not help exclaiming, 'Good God! and do you really mean to say that you allowed a man entertaining such feelings to the expedition to go and take command of it?' In consequence of this a letter was sent to Sir John virtually demanding his resignation; but he only sent a dignified reply, and sailed for Portugal. ('George Canning and his Times,' by A. G. Stapleton, p. 159.)"¹

Is it then really the case that Sir Herbert Maxwell has been misled by Mr. Stapleton into supposing that Moore used this language at the time when he was actually appointed to command the army in Spain? Did he not know that not in an interview with Castlereagh in London, but by a despatch received after the incidents connected with the "Convention of Cintra," when he was with the army in Portugal, Moore was appointed to its command? Sir Herbert has necessarily mentioned the fact that Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard were appointed. He has omitted to notice the significance of the date of the appointments. On the 15th July Moore reported his arrival from Sweden, having been previously communicated with at sea and ordered to go to the Downs. On that day the order informing Sir Arthur Wellesley of the appointments of Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry

¹ "Life of Wellington," vol. i. p. 131, *note*.

Burrard was despatched, together with a private letter from Lord Castlereagh apologising to Sir Arthur as well as he could for the change. In other words, it is obvious that the change was made because of the arrival of Moore with his army from Sweden, and that the whole of the well-known fiasco of the supersession of Sir Arthur Wellesley after Vimeiro was due to the causes I have already indicated, brought to a head by Moore's arrival, and a sudden decision by Ministers, who had been annoyed by the frank manner in which Moore had exposed the want of necessary information and the want of a proper understanding with the King of Sweden which had caused the despatch of the army on a bootless errand. Certainly never did an abuse of power to gratify personal spleen meet with more deserved failure; but with that subject I shall be concerned later. At present, as a specimen of the kind of mis-statements which have sullied the fair fame of Moore, I must follow Sir Herbert to his authority, Mr. Stapleton, who discloses the hopeless confusion of facts on which he and Sir Herbert have founded this charge more clearly than does Sir Herbert in his note.

"Neither was he (Canning)," writes Mr. Stapleton (p. 159), "satisfied with the temper of mind in which Sir John Moore *had set out to take the command of the expedition*; for Lord Castlereagh had disclosed to the Cabinet the parting words addressed to him by Sir John. After the latter had had his final interview, had taken his leave, and actually closed the door, he reopened it, and said to Lord Castlereagh, 'Remember, my Lord, I protest against the expedition, and foretell its failure.' Having thus disburdened his mind, he instantly withdrew, left the office, *and proceeded to Portsmouth to take the command of the expedition.*

When Lord Castlereagh mentioned this circumstance to the Cabinet, Mr. Canning could not help exclaiming, 'Good God! and do you really mean to say that you allowed a man entertaining such feelings with regard to the expedition *to go and assume the command of it?*' It was in consequence of what passed in the Cabinet respecting this interview that an official letter, which is described as equivalent to one demanding his resignation, was sent after him; but Sir John did not take the hint, sent a dignified reply, and sailed with the expedition."

I am aghast at this use of historical materials by Sir Herbert. Of the three phrases used by Mr. Stapleton, which I have put in italics, he has given the third, which is sufficiently puzzling. It must be obvious that Mr. Stapleton, not knowing the facts, had confused what Canning had said to him. It reads as if Lord Castlereagh had in previous Cabinet discussions been defending Moore, as he had certainly often done before that time, from the attacks of Canning, and as if Canning must have said, "Good God! . . . and this is the man whom you had intended to assume the command of the expedition." What completely baffles me is to understand how Sir Herbert could have read the other italicised sentences and not have seen that Mr. Stapleton was no authority to quote in this matter. Mr. Stapleton expressly asserts that Moore "proceeded to Portsmouth to take the command of the expedition." The dates of the despatches informing Sir Arthur Wellesley of the appointments of Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard are all given, both in the Wellington Despatches and in the Castlereagh Correspondence. Surely it could not have been difficult to ascertain that, so far from Sir John

Moore's "proceeding to Portsmouth to take over the command of the expedition," he proceeded to Portsmouth to hand over to Sir Harry Burrard the command of the corps which he had just brought back from Sweden. This perpetual copying of the most obvious blunders of previous historians is surely a poor way of writing history, and to render correct and intelligible this part of Sir Arthur Wellesley's own life it was essential that these facts should have been cleared up. The Diary continues:—

I understand that several of the Cabinet have taken a personal dislike to me, though I seldom have seen them, and they can know nothing of me. They wish to hold up Sir Arthur Wellesley, and had intended to give him the command of the whole force in Spain and Portugal. He is the youngest of the lieutenant-generals made the other day, and the King and Duke of York objected to him. This provoked them, and, added to their general dislike, had led them to endeavour to mortify me by placing me in a station similar to Sir Arthur. Though they were forced to approve what I had done in Sweden, yet it was against the grain, for I took no trouble to conceal the ignorance which had sent us there, when they should have known from the character of the King and the weakness of his force that it was impossible for anything to be done. Upon leaving Lord Castlereagh I set out for Portsmouth, and arrived on Wednesday evening, the 20th, having stopped at my brother Frank's, and afterwards with my mother. I found the fleet just come in from the Downs. I was occupied in getting everything ready to proceed, when, on the 23rd, a King's messenger brought me a letter from Lord Castlereagh, evidently with a view to irritate me, in the hope that I would answer it intemperately, and give them an excuse to recall me from this service, for, as senior to Sir Arthur, though there are many others his seniors, they think I shall be particularly in his way. I, however, have

disappointed them; for I sent them a very calm answer, in which I give them a wipe which they will feel but cannot resent. I sent at the same time copies of both letters to Colonel Gordon for the Duke of York, together with a narrative of everything that has passed since my return to England. I am in hopes now to be allowed quietly to go on the service, on which I am ordered, without further molestation. Sir Harry Burrard arrived yesterday, and I gave up the command to him.

The letters which thus passed between Lord Castlereagh and Sir John Moore have been mentioned casually by nearly every biographer and historian who has touched the subject. They have never been given together.¹ They will explain what Moore means above by "I gave them a wipe which they will feel but cannot resent." The letters were as follows:—

ST. JAMES'S SQUARE, 22nd July 1808.

SIR,—I think it right that you should not leave England without hearing from me that I have communicated to the King's Ministers (as I felt it my duty, and conceived it to be your purpose that I should do) the complaint which you made to me in our last interview, of "unhandsome and unworthy treatment" received by you on the part of the King's Government, and on mine, in the mode of carrying their measures into effect.

At the same time, that this complaint is felt by them, as it is by me, to be unfounded, I have to assure you that had not the arrangements of the army been so far advanced as that they could not be undone without considerable detriment to his Majesty's service, there would have been every disposition on their part humbly to have advised his Majesty to relieve you from a situation in which you appeared to consider yourself to have been placed without a due attention to your feeling as an officer.

I am further to add, that it is thought proper that his Majesty should be apprised of the complaint which you

¹ Napier in a note, vol. i. p. 312, prints Moore's, not Castlereagh's.

have made, together with the sentiments of his Majesty's confidential servants thereupon.—I have the honour to be, your most obedient humble servant,

(Signed) CASTLEREAGH.

Lieutenant-General Sir J. MOORE, &c. &c. &c.

PORTSMOUTH, 23rd July 1808.

MY LORD,—I am this instant honoured with your Lordship's letter, by messenger, of yesterday's date. As I have already had the honour to express my sentiments to your Lordship fully at my last interview, it is, I think, unnecessary to trouble you with a repetition of them now.

I am about to proceed on the service on which I have been ordered, and it shall be my endeavour to acquit myself with the same zeal by which I have ever been actuated when employed in the service of my country; the communication which it has been thought proper to make to his Majesty cannot fail to give me pleasure. I have the most perfect reliance on his Majesty's justice, and shall never feel greater security than when my conduct, my character, and my honour are under his Majesty's protection.—I have the honour to be,

(Signed) JOHN MOORE.

To the Right Hon. LORD VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH.

H.M.S. "AUDACIOUS," 30th July 1808.—The wind was from the eastward on the 27th, and we all embarked, but before we reached St. Helens it changed to the south-west, and we were obliged to anchor, and have remained ever since. Yesterday Sir Harry Burrard received a despatch from Lord Castlereagh that Sir A. Wellesley had arrived at Corunna, and had communicated with the Spanish patriots, who had offered every facility for the transports in Vigo, had encouraged the attack on Portugal, and offered to send a corps of Spaniards in aid of the Portuguese insurgents. Junot had 15,000 men, 12,000 of which were at Lisbon. Sir Arthur sailed from Oporto on the 21st.

"AUDACIOUS," 19th August.—We sailed from St. Helens on the morning of the 31st July. The wind was very adverse to us, and it was the 16th before we made the land of Cape Finisterre. We met a frigate, by which we were informed that Sir Arthur Wellesley had landed with his troops in the Mondego River. Sir Harry Burrard removed into a frigate, and went on to Oporto, from whence he would be guided by the information he should receive. He directed me to lie off Vigo until I heard from him. It was then blowing fresh from the north-east, and we reached Vigo early on the 17th. We spoke another frigate, by which the landing of Sir Arthur Wellesley in the Mondego was confirmed. With the wind as it then was, blowing fresh from the north-east, it was impossible for Sir Harry Burrard to send me orders. I, therefore, as things stood, thought it best to go on off Oporto. On our arrival yesterday we learned that Sir Harry had proceeded the evening before to Mondego. Here we heard of the surrender of General Dupont's corps; we also heard that Sir Arthur was on his march towards Lisbon, that he had been joined by General Spencer's corps from Cadiz. We proceeded, and are now in sight of Mondego, but we are nearly becalmed.

"ON BOARD THE "BRAZEN," AT SEA, 23rd August.—We anchored in the *Audacious* in Mondego Bay on the evening of the 20th, but very few of the convoy got in that night or the following day, owing to calms and light winds. I communicated with Captain Malcolm of the *Donegal*, who was stationed there in charge of the transports. He had not heard of Sir Arthur for six days, but understood he had advanced near to Obidos. I received a letter from Sir Harry Burrard, enclosing a correspondence he had had with Sir Arthur Wellesley. He had not then seen Sir Arthur. His letter is dated from St. Martinho, the 19th. Sir Harry's letter expressed apprehension for Sir Arthur, who has, he thinks, advanced too far, and as his (Sir Arthur's) intention, expressed in his letter, is to march on Lisbon by

Maffra, the General's orders to me were to land at Mondego and proceed to Leyria, in order that in case of a check Sir Arthur may have something to fall back on.

I went on shore on the 21st, fixed the ground for the troops when landed to hut upon, as I meant to use no tents, and having made some other arrangements I returned on board. The difficulty of landing at Mondego is very great. It can only be done at certain times of tide, and never unless the weather is calm. The bar at the entrance of the river is very bad. Few of the ships have yet come in, and none with either the Commissary-General or staff of the army. A considerable portion of the ships came in in the course of the night, and arrangements were made for landing next day the cavalry, artillery, and first division of the infantry. When on shore I saw a captain of the 45th, who had left Sir Arthur's army on the 18th. They were then some miles in front of Obidos. They, the day before, had a brush with a corps of the enemy of about 8000 men, who had posted themselves on the opposite bank of a ravine, across which the road lay. We drove them from it, but not without the loss of 400 to 600 men killed and wounded. Amongst the former were Lieutenant-Colonels Lake of the 29th and Stuart of the 9th Infantry.

The disembarkation of the troops, as settled the day before, began at eight o'clock on the 22nd, and, having given my orders to the general officers with respect to the mode in which it was to be carried out on the following days, I got into the boat to land myself, when a letter was brought to me by the *Brazen* from Sir Harry Burrard, dated a few miles to the southward of Peniche, 20th, in the evening. He had had an interview that afternoon with Sir Arthur Wellesley, whose army was posted a few miles from thence. Junot, with all his force, had advanced from Lisbon, and was at Torres Vedras. Sir Harry thought it, he says, of importance that I should immediately join him there with the troops under my command; that he should remain on the ground then occupied by Sir Arthur until I joined him.

He desires me to sail immediately with the troops that were not disembarked, and to leave some general officers to re-embark the rest and follow. Orders were immediately given to stop the disembarkation, and, though a great portion of the infantry, much artillery, and above 150 horses were then, about one o'clock, on shore, yet all the artillery and all the infantry were re-embarked, and a portion of the horses and the fleet put to sea before dark. Captain Malcolm, whose exertions were very great, assured me that the horses should be off by the first tide in the morning. As Sir Harry Burrard expressed a wish in his letter that I should myself join him without delay, I removed to this ship, which had brought me his letter, and left General Hope in the *Audacious* to bring on the convoy. The wind, however, has been against us all night, and our progress has been trifling. We see the convoy at a distance.

VIMEIRO, 28th August.—I arrived at Eiriceira on the morning of the 24th, where I found the *Alfred*, Captain Bligh, with some transports at anchor. From Captain Bligh I heard that the army had marched to Batalha, about eleven miles on the road to Torres Vedras, that on the 21st the French had attacked them at Vimeiro, and had been completely defeated. Sir Harry Burrard had landed during the action, and Sir Hew Dalrymple arrived the day after it.

Moore does not mention that the moment he heard of the action at Vimeiro he very characteristically, considering the relations with Sir Arthur Wellesley which the Ministry had created for him, wrote at once warmly to congratulate him upon his success. Naturally, as it was a merely personal and private letter, he did not keep a copy, despite the admirable regularity with which almost all his correspondence throughout life was preserved. The nature of the letter can, therefore, only be judged by the reply which Sir Arthur

sent him. As, according to the Diary, Moore did not hear of Vimeiro till 24th August, and Sir Arthur replies on that day, the eagerness with which both men entered into communication with one another is noteworthy. It is, as I shall show, typical of all the relations between them. The attempt which has been made, by the grossest mis-statements of undoubted facts, to put the judgment of these two great soldiers against one another, has been so general and so scandalous, and all that passed between them is so honourable to both of them, that this first letter is of exceptional interest:—

CAMP AT RAMALLAH, 24th August 1808.

MY DEAR GENERAL,—I am highly flattered and much obliged to you for your kind letter, which I have just received, and I assure you that nothing could have given me greater pleasure than to have assisted you in the performance of the service which my good fortune has allotted me. At all events I wish that you had arrived a few days sooner, that you might by your influence have prevailed with those who prevented me from making all the use in my power of the victory which the troops had gained. But you are not now too late, and I hope that you will soon come to headquarters and ascertain the state and means of this army, and state your opinion to the Commander-in-chief respecting the means to be adopted.

I believe that you are aware that Portugal is a country with but few resources, that great drafts have been made upon those resources lately, and that we depend in a great measure upon our shipping for our supplies. Every increase of our numbers must add to the difficulty of supplying us at any distance from the sea; and the question arises how far an increase of numbers is necessary for our immediate objects, what are our ultimate objects which render it desirable, and whether all our objects will not be rather impeded than forwarded by any increase of numbers beyond

that which the means which we have and can procure can supply and enable to move with facility.

Time in all these questions is a most important consideration. In less than a fortnight it will not be possible for a fleet to remain on the coast of Portugal, excepting in Lisbon or Oporto. About the same period the rains will begin to fall, the troops must have tents, and the roads will become more difficult than they are at present. All these circumstances appear to be forgotten, and we have done nothing since the 21st. I am therefore very desirous indeed that you should come over here, and I assure you that you will find our situation to be well deserving your *serious consideration, and the exercise of your influence* for the purpose of setting us right.—I am, dear General, yours most faithfully,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

I went on shore and saw Brigadier-General Crauford, who had been left with his brigade when the army marched two days after the action. From him I received an order from Sir Hew to land the troops under my command and to proceed myself to him, as he was anxious to see me. The day after the action of the 21st General Kellerman came with a flag of truce from General Junot with an offer to treat, and a suspension of arms had been agreed to.

The surf on this coast is generally great, as there is no part of it much protected from the westerly winds, and it is only occasionally that it is possible to land on it. I left orders with General Fraser with respect to the landing of the troops, &c., the moment the weather permitted it, and I went on shore on the 25th with General Hope, and proceeded with him to headquarters, where I arrived in the evening. I was sorry to find everything in the greatest confusion, and a very general discontent. Sir Hew, though announced to the army, had not as yet taken the direction of it; much was still done by Sir Arthur Wellesley, and what was not done by him was not done at all. The action of the 21st had been very complete; the French attacked our centre and left and were completely beaten. Their

force is supposed to have been from 12,000 to 13,000 men; ours was about 17,000 or 18,000. Our loss amounted to about 800 killed and wounded; the French is supposed to have been about 2000.

Sir Arthur's wish was to have followed them, in which case I believe he would have been in Lisbon next day; but Sir Harry Burrard would not allow him. He had in the same manner been prevented by Sir Harry Burrard from attacking the French the day before at Torres Vedras. Sir Arthur's views on both occasions were extremely right; the option of fighting or not was not with us. Junot had marched from Lisbon with the determination to fight us; the question was whether to attack or to be attacked. After the success there is no doubt that the French should have been followed. Several of our brigades had not been in action; our troops were in high spirits, and the French so crestfallen, that probably they would have dispersed. Of twenty-three pieces of cannon we had taken from them fifteen.

The terms asked by Junot were, not to be prisoners of war, but to be embarked with arms and baggage for France. Something was stipulated for the Russian fleet in the Tagus, and this was refused, as it was not admitted that the French had any right to negotiate for the Russians. Our Admiral, Sir Charles Cotton, would do that with the Russian Admiral. Junot had agreed to this, and I hope the negotiation will terminate favourably. It is evident that if any operation is to be carried on it will be miserably conducted, and that seniority in the Army List is a bad guide in the choice of a military commander. Sir Arthur Wellesley seems to have conducted his operations with ability, and they have been crowned with success. It is a pity, when so much has been thrown into his hands, that he has not been allowed to complete it, and the conduct of Government on this occasion has been absurd to a degree. I have told both Sir Hew and Sir Arthur that I wished not to interfere; that if the hostilities commenced, Sir Arthur had already done so much, that I thought it but fair he should have the command of

whatever was brilliant in the finishing. I waived all pretensions as senior. I considered this as his expedition. He ought to have the command of whatever was detached. For my part I wished I could withdraw myself altogether; but I should aid as far as I could for the good of the service, and, without interference with Sir Arthur, I should take any part that was allotted to me.

TORRES VEDRAS, *31st August*.—The convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French, as agreed between Colonel Murray and General Kellerman, was sent the day before yesterday. The Lieutenant-Generals were collected, some articles were objected to, and they were sent back for explanation and amendment. The one of most importance was, that they should give up the forts of St. Julian, Bugio, and Cascas to us upon the ratification of the treaty. The French had proposed to give us Cascas only, and St. Julian and Bugio after the embarkation of the second division of their troops. Colonel Murray arrived this morning with this and the other objectionable articles amended. We shall move towards Lisbon to-morrow. We were prepared to have advanced at any rate. It is most fortunate that this operation has thus terminated. Had Sir Arthur Wellesley not been interfered with, had he been allowed to follow up his success on the 21st, the French army must have dispersed, and never could have reached Lisbon. After they did collect, had they been reinforced, or had any circumstance enabled them again to take the field, they would in all probability have been successful; for, unfortunately, the command of the British had been given to Sir H. Dalrymple, a man certainly not without sense, but who had never before served in the field as a general officer, who had allowed a war of sixteen years to pass without pushing for any service except in England and Guernsey, and who seemed to be completely at a loss in the situation in which he was placed.

NEAR CINTRA, *3rd September*.—We marched from Torres Vedras on the 1st at midday. It was intended to reach Maffra that evening; but we found the French posts still in

front of that place, and we took up our ground in the valleys and mountains opposite to them; part of our left was in the park belonging to the convent of Maffra. The French posts were withdrawn in the night, and we marched at six in the morning of the 2nd. The army halted by stages on the road for the convenience of water. General Murray's division, who had marched from Coctada, halted at Maffra; General Fraser's division at Chillieros; Major-General Paget's at Cintra, the headquarters; the cavalry and artillery at this place, which is three miles short of Cintra; General Hope's division about a mile and a half on our left. Yesterday the forts St. Julian, Bugio, and Cascaes were taken possession of by the 42nd and Buffs, which regiments, the first from Gibraltar, the other from Madeira, happened to be off Lisbon on their passage to join the army. The country we marched through these two days is exceedingly strong and difficult; and if the French have 12,000 or 15,000 men, it is odd they did not attempt to stop us instead of fighting a battle on the 21st. Had they determined to make a defensive campaign they must have kept us out of Lisbon for a considerable time, and obliged us to gain every mile at considerable loss.

PAPÓ DOS ARCOS, 8th September.—The whole army marched in different columns on the 5th and took up this position with our right on the sea at this place, the front extending along a rugged steep ravine to where the ravine terminates, and where Major-General Paget's corps is posted. The troops are generally in one line; it is extended, and with great intervals between the divisions. The army assembled in this position, divided, according to the new organisation, into four divisions, each commanded by a Lieutenant-General, a Light Corps commanded by Major-General Paget, and a corps called the Reserve under Major-General Spencer. The cavalry is under Brigadier-General Charles Stewart; Sir Arthur Wellesley's division is on the other side of Lisbon. The tents have been landed, and now, for the first time since they landed,

the troops have been put under cover. We are about six miles from Lisbon, and the men-of-war and transports are in the harbour. The confusion which exists in the different departments exceeds anything I have ever witnessed.

Sir Hew, having never had the experience of command, seems quite at a loss how to work with the different heads of departments; the troops suffer. In the meantime he is occupied with his correspondence with Government, with the Portuguese, and with the French, who give the Commissioners sent into Lisbon to oversee the fulfilment of the treaty a great deal of trouble from bad faith and the tricky disposition which, if it was not natural to them before the Revolution, has been characteristic of them ever since. Sir Hew, when I called upon him yesterday, spoke to me upon what might be our future operations. He showed me a despatch from Lord Castlereagh, which, as usual, was plausible verbose nonsense, proposing operations for the British upon the flank and rear, as he called it, of the French from St. Andero or Gihon, whilst the Spaniards pressed them in front. This is a sort of gibberish which men in office use and fancy themselves military men, but without knowing how far it is susceptible of being carried into practice. It does not appear that our Ministers are in communication with the leading men in Spain, or are acquainted with their means or designs. Without a knowledge of these, and a perfect concert with the Spaniards, I cannot see how it is possible to determine where or how we are to act.

NEAR LISBON, 12th September.—The information received from Madrid is that the French have collected near Burgos troops to the amount of 40,000; the Marshals Soult and Ney are come to command them. An insurrection had taken place in Biscay, which the French were successfully employed in crushing. Different corps of Spaniards under various chiefs were at Madrid, with General *Castanos* at Astorga and *Blake* at Leon, *Questa* at Salamanca, *Palafox* at Saragossa, *Llamas* at Valentia. The Cortes were about

to be assembled, when it was supposed that General Castanos would be declared Generalissimo. A division of the French are embarked, and the Russian squadron, seven in number, sail this day for Portsmouth under the escort of Admiral Tyler and seven British line-of-battle.

Headquarters move to Belem this morning.

CAMP AT QUELUS, 18th September.—Lieutenant-General Fraser's division and mine marched to this camp yesterday. It is the intention to assemble the whole army here, with the exception of General Hope's division, which remain in Lisbon. Sir H. Burrard is to command the camp; it was chosen for no other reason but convenience and discipline. Lord William Bentinck left this in a frigate three days ago for Cadiz, from whence he is to proceed to Madrid.

QUELUS, 18th September.—Last night I received a letter from Sir A. Wellesley expressing a desire to converse with me on the subject of some discussions he said he had understood I had with H.M.'s Ministers previous to my coming to this country, which he regretted the more as he feared they might prevent me from being employed in the manner I merited. That a change in the command of this army was quite necessary, and the army and the country, he said, naturally looked to me. This letter surprised me the more as I have little previous acquaintance with Sir Arthur, and have had very little communication with him since I joined this army.

The letter to which Moore refers in the previous passage is that given in Volume III. of the "Wellington Despatches," p. 123, but I repeat it here because the dates are important for my purpose, and the letter should be read in connection with Moore's report of the conversation which followed on it.

"LUMIAR, 17th September 1808.

"I write to you on the subject to which this letter relates with the same freedom with which I hope you

would write to me on any point in which you might think the public interests concerned.

“It appears to me to be quite impossible that we can go on as we are now constituted ; the Commander-in-chief must be changed, and the country and the army naturally turn their eyes to you as their commander. I understand, however, that you have lately had some unpleasant discussions with the King’s Ministers, the effect of which might be to prevent the adoption of an arrangement for the command of this army which in my opinion would be the best, and would enable you to render those services at this moment for which you are peculiarly qualified. I wish you would allow me to talk to you respecting the discussions to which I have adverted, in order that I may endeavour to remove any trace which they may have left on the minds of the King’s Ministers, having the effect which I have supposed.

“Although I hold a high office under Government, I am no party man, but have long been connected in friendship with many of those persons who are now at the head of affairs in England ; and I think I have sufficient influence over them, that they may listen to me upon a point of this description, more particularly as I am convinced that they must be as desirous as I can be to adopt the arrangement for the command of this army which all are agreed is the best. In these times, my dear General, a man like you should not preclude himself from rendering the services of which he is capable by an idle point of form. Circumstances may have occurred, and might have justified the discussions to which I have referred ; but none can justify the continuance of the temper in which they are carried on : and yet, till there is evidence that it is changed,

it appears to be impossible for the King's Ministers to employ you in the high situation for which you are the most fit, because during the continuance of this temper of mind there can be no cordial or confidential intercourse.

"In writing thus much I have perhaps gone too far, and have taken the permission for which it was the intention of this letter to ask; but I shall send it, as it may be convenient for you to be apprised of the view which I have already taken of these discussions, as far as I have any knowledge of them, in deciding whether you will allow me to talk to you any further about them. If you should do so, it would probably be most convenient to us both to meet at Lisbon, or I can go over to you, if that should suit you better.

"ARTHUR WELLESLEY."

It may be as well to notice here that whatever Sir Arthur may have either written home or said when he reached home, as a consequence of the conversation to be now detailed, it had no possible influence on Moore's appointment to the command of the army. The conversation took place on 18th September, and Sir Arthur reached London on 6th October. Moore's appointment to command the army was dated 25th September. The passionate demand in England for Moore gave the King just that support for which he always patiently waited. He dictated to his Ministers a course of action which he well knew to be unwelcome to them, solely on grounds personal to them as individuals, not as Ministers of State.

I wrote to him that I should be very happy to see him if he would make it convenient to him to call here. He has just left me. I told him that with respect to

our present commander I might think of him as he did; it was impossible not to see how unfit he was for the station in which he was placed, and not to regret that he was ever named to it. But it was the business of Government to remove him if they thought proper. I could enter into no intrigue upon the subject. With respect to myself, since he was kind enough to interest himself about me, I could have no difficulty in telling him my feelings on the treatment I had received from the King's Ministers. What their reason was for being displeased with me I could not say, but they had acted towards me with a want of attention for which I could not account.

I thought it incumbent upon me to express my sense of it to Lord Castlereagh, and, when I had done so, I had acquitted myself of what I thought became me, in the same manner as I should have felt myself called upon to resent a personal insult had one been offered to me by a man in power. I was perfectly aware of the consequence of speaking as I did to a Minister, but it became me to do it, and, when I had done so, I had done all that I was called upon to do, and I felt no more upon the subject. I did not serve one Minister more than another, and I could act with the same zeal under the present Ministers, though they had been wanting to me, as I should under any others; when I served, it was not Ministers I considered. And at any rate, what had passed had left no unpleasant feeling upon my mind.

Sir Arthur said he did not see how I could be employed in an important command unless some explanation took place; that he was certain that it was not the intention of Ministers to behave unkindly to me; he had so often heard them express their respect and goodwill for me; that Lord Castlereagh was cold and cautious, and there might have been awkwardness in employing me in command after what had passed in Sweden until some explanation had passed with that Court, and this I might have mistaken for offence. He wished I would empower him to say to Ministers that, if nothing had been intended by them to

displease me, I was sorry that I had been deceived and that I had expressed myself as I did, that at any rate I had forgotten it, and thought no more of it.

I said I had heard nothing from any individual connected with Government since I left England; that no opening had ever been made to me by them. I did not see with what propriety I could enter to them upon the subject; that when I had addressed Lord Castlereagh I was aware of the consequences of speaking thus to a Minister, and I was ready to submit to them; that I would not, for the sake of obtaining any situation, make a submission, or anything that tended to it, which I thought unbecoming; that if he interested himself about me sufficiently to state to Lord Castlereagh the conversation he had had with me, that I had explained to him candidly my feelings, and that I had no ill-will to Lord Castlereagh or to any of the Administration; they had been wanting to me, and I had told them so, and there with me it ended. My wish must naturally be to remove any impression which should prevent me from being employed, and I should be obliged to him or any other friend who would be kind enough to do it.

Sir Arthur seemed fully impressed with the opinion that I had been mistaken, and had taken as intended neglect what was merely omission and forgetfulness, and he seemed anxious that I should empower him to make a greater advance than I thought I could in honour do. He sails for England to-morrow, and has promised to say no more than I have authorised. If he is sincere, and I have no reason to doubt him, his conduct is very kind. If he should be otherwise, I am no worse than I was, for I said nothing to him that I would not have said to anybody with whom I had conversed upon this subject.

CAMP AT QUELUS, 24th September.—I was invited by Sir Hew yesterday to be present with the other Lieutenant-Generals of the army at his first visit from the Regency of Portugal, since they had been reinstated, and to attend him

when he returned it. The visit to him was by deputation, and by the Marquis de las Minas only. It had the appearance of a private visit, and to all appearance passed as such; but when we attended Sir Hew we went with him in a body, attended by our aides-de-camp, and were received by all the members of the Regency. The necessity for a speech on this occasion had not, I believe, occurred to Sir Hew. He had prepared none. After he had made his bow and they theirs, there was a pause. They evidently expected to be addressed, and Sir Hew was a little confused to find he had nothing to say. He, however, recovered himself, and muttered something which I could not hear. The interview was awkward enough, and we retired, returning as we came in state carriages to General Beresford's, who is appointed Commandant of the town.

QUELUS CAMP, *2nd October*.—A few days ago we received letters and newspapers from England as late as the 21st September. The disapprobation of the public at the terms of the Convention seems to be at least equal to that expressed at the defeat at Buenos Ayres. I thought it would not be much approved of, but I did not expect it would have been so generally reprobated. The expectation of the public had been much raised by Sir Arthur's despatches, which led to a belief that the French forces had been beaten in two successive actions, whereas the first affair, that of the 17th August, was the repulse of a small corps, from two to three thousand men, sent to occupy a strong pass with a view to impede our march. The attack on this post was certainly mismanaged; for though by dint of great superiority of numbers we gained the pass, yet we lost a great number of men, above 500, with some valuable officers. The French said truly on this occasion that our soldiers were brave, but that our Generals showed little conduct or experience.

The action of the 21st was stated by Sir Arthur's despatch to have been fought against the collected force of the French in Portugal, commanded by Junot in person.

It is true that they were commanded by Junot, but the number was from 12,000 to 14,000, whereas it was then known that they had 20,000 men in Portugal. It has since been known that they had from 23,000 to 24,000. Whether we should have been more successful had the victory on the 21st been immediately followed up, it is impossible for a person not present to decide. Every one understands that a victorious army knows no difficulties, and that against a beaten army much may be risked; but by following at that moment we removed from our ships and our supplies; the enemy had a superior cavalry unbroken, and we had a difficult country ahead, known to the enemy, unknown to us. The least check would have proved fatal to us, though the pursuit might, if unchecked, have led at once to Lisbon.

It was for those present to weigh and determine. Sir Harry Burrard arrived after the action had commenced. Nothing could be more unpleasant than his situation; whatever happened afterwards, the merit, if successful, would be given to Sir Arthur; the blame, if otherwise, be imputed to him. He decided to halt. To Sir Arthur, therefore, are attributed all the advantages which might have ensued from a successful pursuit. It is said that if Sir Harry had not arrived, Sir Arthur would have pursued, and we should have been in Lisbon in three days, and the French would have been prisoners. Nobody considers that it is possible that if Sir Arthur had continued in command he might not have pursued, for people often propose when second what they would not undertake if first; but if he had he might have been checked in passing through a difficult country, and the enemy's cavalry, acting in his rear, might have cut in between him and his resources, destroyed his baggage, &c.

There is no doubt that Sir Arthur was superseded at a most fortunate moment for him, after a successful action, but just as his difficulties were about to commence. Hitherto his march had been unimpeded. The north of Portugal had been open for the arrival of supplies, and the country

supplied his corps as he passed with every refreshment. All this was at an end at the moment when Sir Harry Burrard arrived. The neighbourhood of the enemy cut off the supplies, and henceforth the army would have to depend almost solely upon the shipping. The proof that what remained to be done did not appear to him so easy is that he approved, recommended, and signed the preliminary articles, which I never thought justifiable, for they were far more unfavourable to us than the final convention.

He was perhaps in some degree induced to recommend the preliminaries from an eagerness to have everything settled before the landing of my corps. This, however foolish, certainly had weight with him. When I joined the army on the 25th the negotiation was in some forwardness. The question was no longer whether to treat, or upon what basis; what remained was to get the articles to be as little objectionable as possible. I thought this was in a great degree accomplished when the French were not allowed to treat for the Russian ships; for it followed, when they gave up the harbour, that the Russian and all other ships fell to us as a thing of course, and we might give them terms or no terms as we thought proper. I was surprised to see the terms which they obtained; but I understood the Admiral, Sir Charles Cotton, acted upon instructions sent to him on a former occasion, which he thought analogous to this.

After the negotiation had commenced, the French, instead of being followed, were allowed to recover from their panic and to collect in force at Torres Vedras and the strong country behind it. We depended for daily subsistence on our fleet at anchor on an open coast, where the difficulty was great even in good weather to land anything. The possibility of the ships keeping their anchorage was becoming, as the season advanced, daily more doubtful. Thus situated, it required an officer of decision and talents to surmount the difficulties with which we were surrounded. An officer of this description at the head of a spirited army

would certainly have advanced and never would have listened to such terms; but we had no such commander.

Sir Hew Dalrymple was confused and incapable beyond any man I ever saw head an army. The whole of his conduct then and since has proved him to be a very foolish man. I had always before given him credit for some degree of sense and understanding, but I see I was mistaken, so little can men be judged in ordinary intercourse or until they are placed in situations of difficulty. Sir Hew Dalrymple being our commander, I am quite satisfied that the best thing to do was to treat on almost any terms. Government may thank themselves for what has happened, since they chose an officer to command of no military experience. They are fortunate that he did not arrive sooner, or we should not, as we did, have beaten the French in the field, nor be at this moment in possession of Portugal. Sir Hew has received orders to return to England to explain, and to give up the command to the officer next in rank, viz. Sir Harry Burrard. Sir Hew resigned the command to Sir Harry Burrard on the 3rd, and this afternoon he is to embark on board the *Phæbe* for England.

Letters have been received from Lord William Bentinck from Madrid, in which he states that he has seen Mr. Florida Bianca, the President of the Junta. He promises to write again when he has communicated with General Castanos. In the meantime he gives it as the joint wish of the whole civil and military leaders that the British army should enter Spain. No determination can, however, be taken until orders are received from England, for the command left with Sir Harry is merely an expedient for the moment.

There is perhaps one point that I ought to notice before I leave this phase of the very interesting relations between Sir Arthur and Sir John. Sir Arthur had one very strong personal reason for sympathising with Sir John Moore in the manner in which he had been superseded, viz. that early in life he had had a very similar experience, which he had resented quite as

fiercely as Sir John Moore resented his own treatment. Though it is to any one acquainted with the life of Wellington a familiar story, probably I shall best serve most readers of the present generation by referring them to the latter half of Appendix C. of the first volume of Sir Herbert Maxwell's Life. It will be seen that long after he had become the most distinguished living soldier in Europe the Duke of Wellington remembered with bitterness the fact that his brother, to whom he owed so much, had superseded him in command of the expedition against the Mauritius. He uses words almost identical with Moore's: "It was of the *unexplained* supersession that I complained." The analogy is in some respects the more remarkable, because the Duke himself says, "The truth is, that I never entirely approved of the expedition to Mauritius." He had written an exceedingly able paper showing cause against it as then arranged. Moore had done nothing of the kind in regard to Spain, but of the expedition commanded by Sir Hew Dalrymple he had no doubt used the words attributed to him by Canning, and misinterpreted by Mr. Stapleton and Sir Herbert. Only Moore's words were used after he had been already superseded; Arthur Wellesley's, with which the Duke of Wellington sympathised, were, he thought, at least one cause of the supersession for which he in 1833 reproached Lord Wellesley.

CHAPTER XXVII

MOORE'S DIARY THROUGHOUT HIS SPANISH CAMPAIGN UP TO SAHAGUN

FOR reasons which will appear later on, I propose to give in this chapter, without note or comment till it is complete, Moore's own Diary of his campaign in Spain, from the moment of his taking over the command to the time when the retreat from Sahagun to Corunna began. It is worthy of careful consideration before it is compared with the comments that have been made by others upon his handling of the army under his orders.

LISBON, 14th October.—On the afternoon of the 6th instant a vessel arrived from England with despatches, dated the 25th and 26th September, which contained my appointment to the chief command of the army to be employed in Spain. Sir Harry Burrard remains in command in Portugal with 10,000 men. He is directed to turn over to me 20,000 infantry, the two regiments of cavalry, and a proportion of artillery. The despatches state that 10,000 infantry, five regiments of cavalry, and the proportionate artillery sail from Falmouth to Corunna to be under my orders, making in all an army of about 40,000 men. There has been no such command since Marlborough for a British officer. How they came to pitch upon me I cannot say, for they have given sufficient proof of not being partial to me. A private letter from Lord Castlereagh accompanied the despatch, assuring me of his personal assistance in everything respecting the public service, and begging me to write to him confidentially and privately on all subjects

connected with my command. I have answered in the same strain of civility, and mean to write to him as cordially as if nothing had before passed to prevent it. This the good of the service requires, and I think of nothing else. As for his support I shall have it if I am successful, and if I am not, that alone will vex me so much that the displeasure of a Minister more or less will be of little importance to me. It is left to me to embark the army and go to Corunna by sea or to march the army by land. I have determined on the latter as preferable. The passage by sea is precarious, an embarkation unhinges, and when I got to Corunna I should still have to equip the army before I could stir, and in Galicia it might have been impossible to have found sufficient means of carriage. I am equipping the troops here and moving them towards the frontier, but I found the army without the least preparation, without any precise information with respect to roads and arrangement for feeding the troops upon their march. The Commissariat had at its head Mr. Erskine, a gentleman of great integrity and honour, and of considerable ability; but neither he nor any of his officers have any experience of what an army of this magnitude requires to put it in motion. Everything is, however, going on with zeal; there is no want of that in an English army; and though the difficulties are considerable, and we have to go through a very impracticable country, I expect to be past the frontier early in November. I have spoken to the general officers, and told those commanding what I expect from them, and, if they are diligent, as I believe they will be, the army will at the end of its march be far better than it is at present.

VILLAFRANCA, 27th October.—All the troops are out of Lisbon except two regiments, which will march to-morrow and the next day, and, having finished every arrangement, I left Lisbon this morning, meaning to follow this road to Abrantes, and then to be guided by the information I received. All accounts agreed that artillery could only pass by the great road leading from Badajos to Madrid. I

have been, therefore, obliged to order Lieutenant-General Hope, with the cavalry, artillery, and four regiments of infantry, to the amount of 6000 men, to take that road, which will separate it from the rest of the army. This road turns to the left at some short distance from Madrid and leads on Espinar. I have ordered Sir David Baird, as soon as his troops are equipped, to march from Corunna on Astorga. I go to meet the troops as they arrive by their different routes at Almeida, and shall collect them at Ciudad-Rodrigo and Salamanca, and wait until Hope's and Sir David Baird's corps get to Astorga and Espinar, when, according to circumstances, I can direct the junction of the whole at Valladolid, Burgos, or wherever else is thought best. My anxiety is to get out of the rugged roads of Portugal before the rains. The road to this place is chiefly paved, and is very good; the distance from Lisbon about eighteen miles along the Tagus.

ABRANTES, 30th October.—From Villafranca to Santarem, seven leagues or twenty-eight miles. I went on the 28th or the 29th to Galegas, four leagues, and this day to Abrantes,¹ five leagues. I have been civilly entertained at the gentlemen's houses at the different places at which I have stopped. The road thus far has been good, but the country in general neither beautiful nor fertile. From Santarem to Galegas is a plain of considerable extent; beyond Galegas the hills confine the Tagus within narrower bounds, and from Santarem to this place the road is close to the river. At Pinhete it passes the Casere over a bridge of boats. Olives and vines are the only culture; the country is quite open, and can nowhere but at Pinhete be disputed by inferior numbers. The right bank of the Casere, that next Lisbon, is the strongest; it offers flanks which the other does not.

NIZA, 2nd November.—I left Abrantes on the 1st, crossed the Tagus, and stopped at Gavido, a small wretched village four leagues from Abrantes. The road, except in a few

¹ Marginal note in MS.: "From Lisbon eighty-four miles to Abrante."

places within a short distance of Gavido, was good and fit for artillery. These few could be easily rendered passable for artillery if necessary; but there is a good road by going a little round to the right, which does not go through Gavido, and on which troops marching must bivouac for one night, as there are no villages on it. The country is wild and dreary. From Gavido to this place is five leagues, over a flat but very wild uncultivated country. There is one village only within a league of this at Arey, round which are some oaks, olives, and cork trees. The soil is sandy gravel, and the road perfectly good for any carriage. Niza has an old wall round it, and seems a miserable place.

CASTELLO BRANCO, *4th November*.—I left Niza early and reached this between three and four o'clock; the distance is called seven leagues, and is about thirty miles. The road is hard, the first two leagues to the Tagus at Villa Velha are a good deal up and down hill and for a league after it crosses the Tagus, but though fatiguing for horses it is by no means impassable or very bad for artillery. One brigade of ours has gone this way; the whole country is dreary and uncultivated. This is a miserable place, such as might be expected in such a neighbourhood. I am lodged in the bishop's palace, an old ruinous building. The bishop is a little old man, who received me very kindly. He is dirty in his person, without any of the external dignity of his station, and speaks such bad French that it was impossible to carry on any conversation with him. There is an old castle in ruins upon the height above the town, and an old Moorish wall connected with it surrounds the town. I received here a letter from General Hope from Elvas, dated the 30th. He was to begin his march on the 2nd, and, according to his calculation of his marches, will reach Valladolid on the 30th inst.

ALPEDRINHAO, *5th November*.—This is a very small village four leagues from Castello Branco, which I left yesterday morning. The country is open, undulated, but not broken, and presents rather more cultivation than that

which we had passed the two days before. I received on the road despatches from Madrid; the French are supposed to have received a reinforcement of 10,000 men; General Castanos and the army of Arragon were making movements to their right, which can hardly fail to bring on an action. This has made me rather uneasy at my separation from General Hope, the more so, as I now find I could have brought the artillery by this road; but the difficulty of obtaining correct information was such, that this road was only discovered from stage to stage by our own officers. When the artillery arrived at Castello Branco it was not known whether it would be able to proceed. I have sent a messenger to meet General Hope at Truxillo to beg that he will send out officers to discover and, if he can find a practicable road for artillery without going round to Madrid, that he will take it. In answer to an application I had desired Lord William Bentinck to make to the Central Junta to know with whom I was to concert my movements, they have referred me to General Castanos, which, though not in direct terms, is tantamount to declaring him Commander-in-chief, a very wise step, which was not expected from the Junta, who have shown the greatest jealousy of a military chief.

CARIA, 6th November.—After crossing a low chain of mountains we came into a valley in which stands this village upon a gentle eminence. This valley, called the Covo de Beira, is cultivated and wooded, is bounded to the north by the Sierra Estrella, which are high mountains. On the rising grounds at the foot of them are several villages; upon the whole this is one of the best and prettiest countries I have seen in Portugal. This is five leagues from Alpedrinhao. Here we have overtaken the brigade of artillery. It was my intention to have reached Guarda for dinner, but the weather is so bad, it has rained so incessantly since daylight, that after waiting until mid-day I have been induced to remain here till to-morrow. Lieutenant-General Fraser is at Guarda. Brigadier-General Anstruther, who took possession of Almeida from the

French, and has been there ever since, and to whom I had written to make preparations for the passage of the troops on this road and Coimbra, has stopped them within the Portuguese frontier, instead of making them proceed, as I had directed, to Ciudad-Rodrigo and Salamanca. I expected to have arrived at Almeida before the heads of the columns, but I was detained in Lisbon longer than I intended, and, having no conveyance but my own horse, my progress has been slow, though I left my baggage at Villafranca and have come on with Colonel Murray, an aide-de-camp and secretary, and a small escort of dragoons. General Fraser's division is at Guarda, Belmonte, and other villages in that neighbourhood; that under Beresford at Pinhel, Celorico, &c. I have written to Generals Fraser and Anstruther to make arrangements for moving forward, and these I shall quicken when I reach Almeida, which I cannot now do before the 8th. When I directed General Hope with the cavalry and artillery to march by Madrid I desired him to order General Paget with his division, which was also in Alemtejo, to march by Elvas on Alcantara and Zarza, at which two last places I have since ordered it to be collected and wait until arrangements are made for it to move on Ciudad-Rodrigo.

GUARDA, 7th November.—I left Caria this morning early; it rained incessantly the whole way, and I think upon the whole I never saw a worse day. We fell in with the 5th and 28th Regiments on their march. In consequence of what I had written General Fraser had put his division on the march for Ciudad-Rodrigo. The 4th and 42nd left this morning, and he himself went to Almeida. From Caria the distance is five leagues; the road follows the course of a rivulet, I believe the Zezere, and except in a few places is very good, though, it is feared, too narrow for our artillery, which in that case must take a worse road by the mountain. From following the course of the river the road I came is level until within a league and a half of this place, when it ascends first the left and then the right bank

of the river and is led with great judgment so as to be nowhere very steep. The banks are lofty, and wooded with fine chestnut; in any other weather the ride would have been very beautiful. We were received here at the house of the bishop, who is absent, but his brother and nephew have treated us very magnificently. I received letters from Madrid both from Lord William Bentinck and Mr. Stuart, which do not describe the affairs in Spain as prosperous. The Junta are very inefficient, the armies weak, and the French getting reinforcements daily.

SALAMANCA, 14th November.—I arrived here yesterday afternoon. I have been much occupied for some days past. On the 8th I reached Almeida, where I found Brigadier-General Anstruther, who had been sent with the 6th Regiment to take possession of it, and had continued in command from that time. It is a poor enough little town, but regularly fortified and at great expense. It is, however, defective in many parts of its construction, and could not resist a serious attack for any time. I remained there the 9th and 10th to settle business and to write letters to Madrid, &c. The French have already received a reinforcement of 27,000 men, and more are joining them. The Supreme Junta begin to be alarmed, and to do that from fear which they should have done three months ago from prudence and good sense. They have not, however, yet appointed a Commander-in-chief, though, from General Castanos being appointed the person with whom I am to correspond, it looks as if he was considered as the officer in whom they placed most confidence. The Junta is still composed of thirty-four persons, all equal in power, but many of whom are weak and many interested. Some change must take place, or affairs cannot prosper. I saw the 6th Regiment, as it is one of those to move on with me. Their conduct has been bad, and their officers have been shamefully negligent. I spoke to them with great severity, and told them I should not take them into Spain; they were unworthy of it. One man had been sentenced to death by

a general court-martial, and I ordered him to be executed. On the 11th I proceeded to Ciudad-Rodrigo, six leagues over an open country. A small rivulet divides the two countries. About two leagues from Almeida a hill on the Spanish side of the river is well fortified. It is known as "Fort Concepcion," but is of no use, as the country is open and the river passable everywhere. Ciudad-Rodrigo is an ancient walled town. The governor met us two miles off, and I was saluted from the ramparts by a discharge of artillery, taken to the house of the richest gentleman of the town, and well entertained. No change, whether in the face of the country, in men and manners, can be greater than that immediately perceptible upon entering Spain from Portugal. The advantage is entirely on the side of Spain and of the Spaniards. We were received on approaching Ciudad-Rodrigo with cheers of "Viva l'Inghilterra et l'Inglese." On the 12th we proceeded seven leagues to Seaueros, a small village; we lodged at the curate's, a respectable, sensible man. That day twelvemonth General Loison had slept at his house, and Junot and all the other French Generals in succession. On the 13th, nine leagues to this place. I came a short road, and by that means escaped the governor and corporation, who went several miles on the great road to welcome me to the town. The country from Ciudad-Rodrigo is a fine open country, abounding in wood, chiefly the cork tree. At this place I mean to assemble the army. The French have driven the troops of Estramadura and have entered Burgos; this news was confirmed to me on my arrival here.

SALAMANCA, 15th November.—In the night I received an express that the French had advanced and had entered Valladolid. This is only twenty leagues from Salamanca. The distance may of course be marched in three or at most in four days. The troops marching on this place by corps in succession cannot be all collected sooner than the 25th. I have thus no option, if the French advance, but to fall back on Ciudad-Rodrigo, which is a poor country, not able

to subsist such a corps for any time, and if I am afterwards obliged to go into Portugal, I do not mend the matter. I always foresaw this event as a possible one, that the French would move upon us before our junction. I, however, always hoped that we should not be so unfortunate. The positions of the Spanish armies I have never been able to understand; they are separated, the one in Biscay, the other in Arragon, on the two flanks of the French, leaving the whole country of Spain open to their incursion, and leaving the British army exposed to be attacked before it was united. It is singular that the French have penetrated so far, and that yet no sensation has been made upon the people. They seem to remain quiet, and the information was not known through any other channel than that of a letter from the Captain-General of the province to me. I assembled the Junta and spoke to them to explain the reasons which must oblige me to retire to Ciudad-Rodrigo if the enemy advanced; that they should not allow the people to be discouraged, but endeavour, on the contrary, to excite their enthusiasm, which seemed to me to be somewhat lessened. No people ever obtained independence without great sacrifices; English aid, though I hoped it would prove an excellent accessory, would not do without Spanish union and determination. I then said I must have the aid of all the cars and mules of the country to transport my magazines, otherwise I could not stay long at Ciudad-Rodrigo. I have ordered the troops already here to be ready to march with three days' provisions; but I have not stopped those who are coming up from advancing. I wish, if possible, to collect here, and shall only retire in case the French advance in force before I am ready to oppose them; but I have been obliged to write to Generals Baird and Hope to concentrate their divisions and not to advance unless they hear the French have left Valladolid, and that I am still here; but to use their discretion and act according to circumstances. I did not think it possible that the French could have advanced into any part of Spain and the people remain passive. Undoubtedly the

Government wants energy as well as ability. The Spaniards at present should not only have armies, but every man in Spain should be armed and belong to some corps, and be ready to turn out whenever occasion offered. It is said that the peasantry and lower orders are enthusiastic and determined never to submit to France, but the enthusiasm is less as the class ascends.

SALAMANCA, 18th November.—From the officers I sent out I found that 1000 cavalry, with two pieces of cannon, had advanced to Valladolid after the action at Burgos. They entered the town on the 13th in the afternoon and left it next morning, returning to Palencia. No infantry have advanced from Burgos. I have given both Generals Hope and Baird discretionary orders to join me with all speed, but to be guided by the information they receive of the enemy. Accounts have been received of the defeat of General Blake's army in Biscay. His army has been dispersed, and he himself with such part as kept together are at Reinosa. How far this may enable the French to act against me or Baird and prevent our junction I cannot say. I consider our junction as very precarious. I received despatches by a King's messenger yesterday from Lord Castlereagh. They have been buoyed up in England by the false information transmitted by the officers sent to the different Spanish armies, who had neither sense to see nor honesty to tell the truth, so that Lord Castlereagh has very little idea of the situation in which we are here. The Spaniards are certainly upon the eve of receiving serious defeats, and their ultimate success will depend on whether they sink under them or are roused to greater exertions.

SALAMANCA, 28th November.—I wrote to Lord Castlereagh upon the 25th and 26th stating the critical situation in which we were, that Spain was without armies, Generals, or a Government; that I saw nothing that could give a hope of her being able to resist the attack being made upon her. I could not calculate the powers of a people enthusiastic and

determined. I saw no symptoms of this, and yet I knew nothing else that could save them. I was not in communication with any of their Generals, and neither knew their plans nor those of the Government. No channel of information had been opened to me, and I had no knowledge of the force or situation of the enemy but what as a stranger I picked up. I was occupied in uniting the army, and could determine on nothing beyond that. When that was accomplished I could see what was to be done. I have written to Mr. Frere at Madrid pointing out the singular conduct of the Spanish Government. I understand they are in great confusion, are frightened, and know not what to do. The French cavalry cover the country, and raise contributions to which the people submit. They say they have no arms, nor have they any one to command them. Lord Proby was at Fordillas when a patrol of French cavalry came into the town; they stayed some time. Every man in the town knew that Proby was there. He had been there two days, yet not a man betrayed him, and when the cavalry left and he came into the streets they all testified their satisfaction and declared that, though they had no arms, they would have died rather than have allowed him to be taken. They are a fine people, and it will be only for want of men of ability starting up to direct them if they do not succeed. Intelligence has been carried to Sir D. Baird that the French have assembled at Medina de Rio Seco to prevent our junction, and he has stopped the march of his troops and convoys, and is preparing to retreat. This information is false, and I have written to him to come on. The French are moving against Castanos, and are threatening Madrid. They have already intercepted his communication with Madrid, and have turned his left flank marching by Soria. Castanos will either be beaten or retreat. The Junta are on the point of quitting Madrid. I see my situation as clearly as any one. Nothing can be worse, for I have no Spanish army to give me the least assistance. The Marquis of Romana is endeavouring to assemble the fugitives from Blake's army at Leon. I am determined to

form the junction of this army and to try our fortune. We had no business here as things are, but, being here, it would never do to abandon the Spaniards without a struggle.

SALAMANCA, 30th November.—On the night of the 28th I received an express from Mr. Stuart at Madrid containing a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel D'Oyley, announcing the defeat of Castanos' army near Tudela; they seem to have made but little resistance, and are, like Blake's, flying. This renders my junction with Baird's so hazardous that I dare not attempt it, but even were it made, what chance has this army, now that all those of Spain are beaten, to stand against the force which must be brought against it? The French have 80,000 in Spain, and 30,000 were to arrive in twenty days from the 15th of this month. As long as Castanos' army remained there was hope, but I now see none. I therefore determined to withdraw the army. I have written to Sir David Baird to fall back on Corunna, embark, and go round to the Tagus. I have ordered General Hope, the head of whose column was arrived at Villa Castin, to push by forced marches for Penaranda and Alba de Tormes. When he gets there he will march on Ciudad-Rodrigo, to which place I shall also retire as soon as he is safe at Alba. There is a considerable risk that he may be intercepted or be forced to fall back by the Guadarama on Madrid. I am making every preparation to retreat and to enter the frontier of Portugal, where at first I shall find great difficulty in subsisting, and which I cannot long defend; but perhaps for a sufficient time to cover the embarkation of the stores, &c., from Lisbon. Portugal must be evacuated if the French get Spain. If the Spaniards still hold out, by taking this army to Cadiz and landing it there it may still be of use. I have written so to Lord Castlereagh.

SALAMANCA, 9th December.—After Castanos' defeat the French marched for Madrid; the inhabitants flew to arms, barricaded their streets, and swore to die rather than submit; this has arrested the progress of the French, and

Madrid still holds out. This is the first instance of enthusiasm shown; there is a chance that the example may be followed and the people be roused, in which case there is still a chance that this country may be saved. Upon this chance I have stopped Baird's retreat, and have taken measures to form our junction whilst the French are wholly occupied with Madrid. We are bound not to abandon the cause as long as there is hope; but the courage of the populace of Madrid may fail; at any rate they may not be able to resist. In short, in a moment things may be as bad as ever, unless the whole country is animated and flock to the aid of the capital, and in this part the people are passive. General Hope arrived at Alba on the 4th; on the 5th and 6th I stopped the retreat and wrote to Lord Castlereagh. I have sent Colonel Graham to Madrid to let me know exactly what is passing. We find the greatest difficulty to get people to bring us information. All my preparations for the retreat on Portugal, should it be necessary, go on. I have now been joined by Lord Paget and the cavalry from Baird; they will be at Zamora tomorrow, and next day I will move a division of infantry to that place and town to be near Baird, whom I have ordered to send his troops by brigades as they come up to Benevente.

SALAMANCA, 11th December, 1808.—Colonel Graham returned on the 9th without getting into Madrid, which capitulated on the 3rd. The people will not give up their arms, but they say they have been betrayed by the Duke of Castelfranco and by Monsieur de Morla. It was those two who wrote to me on the 2nd to ask my assistance, and next day it appears that they capitulated! I cannot think that the inhabitants could have been very determined, or those gentlemen could not have capitulated. What the actual state of Madrid is I cannot learn; the French have the gates, the Retiro and the Prado. I am moving the troops to the Duero, and shall assemble the army at Valladolid without waiting for Sir D. Baird's corps, which cannot be brought forward so soon. By this movement I shall

threaten the French communications, which will make some diversion in favour of the Spaniards if they can take advantage of it; but I much fear that they will not move, but will leave me to fight; in which case I must keep my communications open with Astorga and Galicia. The reserve marches this morning, Fraser's division to-morrow and next day, when all the troops will have left Salamanca.

SAHAGUN, 22nd December.—I moved my headquarters on the 13th from Salamanca to Alaejos. There I saw an intercepted letter from Berthier, Prince of Neufchatel, to Marshal Soult, Duke of Dalmatia, at Saldanha, which determined me to unite the army without loss of time. I therefore moved on the 15th to Toro instead of Valladolid. The letter states that Madrid was quiet, that the troops were on their march to Badajos, and encourages Marshal Soult to clear the country between the Gallicias and the Duero, saying that nothing Spanish could oppose his two divisions, and the English had retreated into Portugal. I halted at Toro on the 16th. There Mr. Stuart came to me from Mr. Frere, accompanied by a member of the Junta, to request that I would connect myself with the Marquis Romana. I told them that I was about to do this, and that I had written to the Marquis from Salamanca. I explained to Mr. Stuart Mr. Frere's extraordinary conduct to me, and I showed him his letter, which surprised him. He was not much pleased at having been sent upon a mission with only a half confidence. On the 17th headquarters were at Castronuevo; the advanced guard at Villapondo, where I met Sir David Baird, who rode over from Benevente, where he was with three brigades. At Toro I received a letter from Marquis la Romana, brought me by his aide-de-camp, stating that he had 22,000 men, and would be happy to co-operate with me. At Castronuevo Sir David Baird sent me a letter Romana had addressed to him of rather a later date, stating that he was retiring into the Gallicias. I sent his aide-de-camp back to him with a letter, requesting to know

if such was his intention, but without expressing either approbation or disapprobation. In truth, I placed no dependence on him or his army, and was determined to persevere in moving up to Soult at all events. On the 19th headquarters at Valderas, advanced guard at Majorga. At Valderas I was joined by Sir David Baird with two brigades. On the 20th headquarters were at Majorga, where Brigadier-General Manningham's brigade joined. On the 21st we moved to this place, where Lord Paget with the 10th and 15th Hussars by a night march surprised and defeated 600 or 700 of the French cavalry, took 2 lieutenant-colonels and 11 officers and 140 men. It was a handsome thing, and well done.

SAHAGUN, 23rd *December*.—It was necessary to halt yesterday after the hard marches the troops had in very cold and bad weather, the ground covered with snow. I was also obliged to stop for provisions. This night we march in two columns to Carrion, where I believe some of the French are. Next night I mean to march to Saldanha so as to arrive and attack at daylight; we start at eight this evening.

SAHAGUN, 24th *December*.—Last night, about an hour before the troops were to have begun their march, I received a letter from the Marquis de la Romana saying that a confidential person he had upon the Duero had reported to him that the French were marching from Madrid in this direction. The truth of this was confirmed to me by information I had received that a quantity of provisions and forage was prepared for the enemy in the villages in front of Palencia. I also knew that the march of the French on Badajos was stopped. Having therefore no doubt that all their disposable troops were turned against me, I had no option but to give up all idea of an attack on Soult and to get back to secure my communications with the Gallicias. In the course of the evening I received a report that Carrion had been considerably reinforced by troops which had arrived from Palencia. This has been confirmed this morning. I gave up the march on Carrion, which had never been

undertaken with any other view but that of attracting the enemy's attention from the armies assembling in the south, and in the hope of being able to strike a blow at a weak corps whilst it was still thought the British army was retreating into Portugal. For this, I was aware that I risked infinitely too much; but something, I thought, was to be risked for the honour of the service and to make it apparent that we stuck to the Spaniards long after they themselves had given up their cause as lost. Generals Hope and Fraser retire this day to Majorga, Sir David with his division will march to-morrow on Valentia, and I shall follow Hope and Fraser with the reserve and two light corps by Majorga and Valderas to Benevente. Lord Paget with the cavalry will follow me. If we can steal two marches upon the French we shall be quiet; if we are followed close, I must close and stop and offer battle. At this season of the year, in a country without fuel, it is impossible to bivouac; the villages are small, which obliges us to march thus by corps in succession. Our retreat, therefore, becomes much more difficult.

It will be better before passing on to the next chapter to observe the date and place where Moore notes that the road he travelled was possible for artillery. It is at Alpedrinhao, before the rains and before the worst part of the road was reached. Subsequently he wrote on 24th November to Castlereagh that this light battery had got through with "infinite difficulty"; that the roads were the worst he ever saw. He wrote on 13th November to Hope that no other practicable road for such a body of artillery as Hope had with him was available other than that by which he moved. An admirable description of the difficulties of the roads even for infantry is given in the *Oxfordshire Light Infantry Chronicle* for 1902, pp. 226 *et seq.*, by the late Sir J. Ferguson, who moved by Coimbra. He describes them as goat-tracks descending into ravines almost inaccessible.

CHAPTER XXVIII

MOORE'S LAST CAMPAIGN: ITS WORLD-WIDE EFFECT

THE literature that has gathered round the short campaign of Moore's army in Spain is of vast volume. Unfortunately, vast as it is, some of the most important data for judging of the circumstances of the campaign itself have not been given to the world, while some have been strangely ignored or as strangely misinterpreted by every historian. It is certainly a remarkable fact that Lord Londonderry, amidst the many tomes and the successive series in which he published the letters and despatches of his brother, Lord Castlereagh, whether previously printed or not, should have never included the full series addressed to Sir John Moore, which here, in their original form, signed by Castlereagh himself, lie before me. Any one who looks at Vols. II. and III. of the second series of "Castlereagh's Correspondence" must be struck by the strange absence of these despatches.

The more formal and official ones were published in the "Instructions to the Commanders of His Majesty's forces in Spain and Portugal in 1808," ordered to be printed 2nd March 1809, and much of other important matter in the "Correspondence relating to the Expeditions to Spain and Portugal," ordered to be printed 8th March 1809; from these, however, were necessarily omitted the most telling passages as to the condition of the Spanish Government and the armies. A great body of the correspondence is printed

at the end of the volume of Hansard which gives the debates on the campaign. Apparently even these have been unread. Certainly they have been completely ignored by all others, and, as I shall have occasion to show, by our very latest historian of the Peninsular War, the Professor of History at Oxford, who mentions them, but ignores their significance. In addition to these, however, there was a large body of correspondence, whether "private," "most secret," or the like, which has never been published at all, nor does the collection in the Record Office approach completeness. Some of Lord Castlereagh's letters to Moore are given in the Appendix to Mr. James Moore's account of his brother's campaigns, but even these have been quite ignored, I may say, by every one. I do not propose to publish them textually, because they only indirectly concern my subject, but I think that the whole body of them ought to be published together in a readable form as very valuable historical documents. On the whole they are an important series of State papers, with perhaps the one defect, of that tendency to verbosity which almost every one finds in Lord Castlereagh's writings.

Even more unfortunate for the accuracy of history has it been that the very valuable series of reports addressed by Lord William Bentinck to Moore should never have seen the light, as they, no doubt, would have done had Lady Bentinck carried out her purpose of publishing a biography of her husband. All these, as well as the letters from Stuart and others giving the reports from the various armies, carefully endorsed by Moore, with the day of their receipt, an important point both with them and with Lord Castlereagh's despatches, were preserved by him, as well as the original letters from Baird and Hope, with

copies of his own letters, and these ought to be before any historian who pretends to judge of the campaign.

Before I touch on the important bearings which they have upon the judgment to be formed on Moore's decisions as taken in the campaign, it is necessary to say very emphatically that my present purpose is not at all the one which Mr. Oman, the latest historian of the Peninsular War, attributes to Sir William Napier, that of "defending Moore." My purpose is altogether other, as I think, for the matter of that, it was Sir William Napier's also. One does not talk of "defending" Leonidas, though he lost all of his little band, or of defending Seton, though most of his men, because of his orders, went down into a watery grave from the deck of the *Birkenhead*. What I intend to do is to claim for Britain, and to sustain and make good my claim, that the boldest, the most successful, the most brilliant stroke of war of all time was delivered by the Captain to whom she on the 7th October 1808 entrusted the command of her armies in Portugal for action in Spain.

Consider the facts. The Master of Europe, the greatest of all organisers of armies, the supreme genius of War, at a time when he is in close alliance with the only unconquered and, as in the end it proved, unconquerable power on the Continent, Russia, concentrates his whole mind and all his vast resources on one purpose—the conquest of Spain. He pours 300,000 of his choicest troops over the Pyrenees. He organises with his wonted skill an elaborate scheme for crushing Spain under his heel. He is in the fullest perfection of his control over France and over Europe, in the very period of his supreme mastery of the military art, and when he has developed the instru-

ment of his power, his army, to the highest point of its efficiency. It is the period immediately following upon Ulm, Austerlitz, and Jena. Not only does he scatter like chaff before the wind all the Spanish armies, but, securely seated at Madrid, he receives reports from every quarter that his triumphant army corps dispersed throughout the provinces are meeting with no resistance; that the people are everywhere, except in Saragossa, submitting. Believing that the British army has retreated to the coast, he sees nothing to resist him anywhere. He fully expects to capture Saragossa by a well-defined date, and to overtake the British army before it can embark at Lisbon. After that it will only be an affair of police and of guerilla warfare. He knows well how to deal with that, and so do his commanders.

Suddenly he is awakened from these happy dreams by the startling news that the little British corps—it is no more—has struck a blow at his very vitals. The vast army under his orders depends on the line of his supplies from France, and cannot bear the risk of even menace to that tender point. The menace is serious, for already the enemy has gained some unpleasant advantages, and is pressing actually in superior numbers on Soult, on whom safety depends. Soult, detailed for quite other duties than to deal with an organised British army under a General whom Napoleon rates so high as from former experiences he does Moore, may be taken unawares. It is as if a vampire had settled on the heart and liver of a giant. The mighty Emperor loses not a moment in forming his resolution. The *whole* plan for the subjugation of Spain must be given up. The vampire must be crushed, not brushed away. Therefore *every* corps, except those in the eastern

province of Catalonia, to whom all along a separate part has been assigned, is diverted from its purpose. Sacrificing everything to gain his object, he pushes his troops in the depth of winter over snow-clad mountains with that same indifference to their lives, health, or comfort which had in his marches over the deserts of Egypt reduced "the Army of Italy" to such a condition of passionate despair as I have recorded,¹ and had, during the marches which led to the surrender of Ulm, made Fezensac declare that the sufferings of the soldiers were as great as those in the retreat from Moscow.

Napoleon's concentration of purpose and sacrifice of means to gain his object were never more recklessly displayed than during the time when he devoted his whole available army to the capture of Moore. It was not merely that by prodigious exertions he brought the army under his immediate command by forced marches to intercept Moore, that he strengthened Soult by calling off Ney and the division of Lapisse from Arragon, but, partly in consequence of his orders, and partly from the general dislocation which ensued, and the mistakes consequent thereon, other grave consequences followed. Moncey, deprived of Ney's support, withdrew for a whole month from the attempt on Saragossa, with the result that during all that time Palafox was able to employ 60,000 zealous workers in making it into a most formidable fortified place. Lefebvre's whole corps, the 4th, wandered north to Avila in Castile, and had to be promptly sent back. Everywhere the provinces thus released took up arms. The Spanish armies were re-established.

Such were the sacrifices which Napoleon made in

¹ Vol. ii. pp. 37, 38, 39.

order to intercept, to surround, and to crush Moore. Yet he failed utterly even in the object at which he aimed. When he at length, after all his sacrifices, arrived at Benevente, he found Moore's army safely behind the Esla, and from that time forward every attempt on the rear of the British was repulsed with loss, both of prestige and men, to the assailants, whether when under Napoleon's own command, or, after he had abandoned it, when under the orders of Soult. Very admirably has Sir Bartle Frere applied to the circumstances a phrase of Napoleon's, used of Bessières' corps when in a position not quite so important to the safety of the French army in Spain as was Soult's at the moment when Moore selected it for his blow. As Sir Bartle Frere puts it,¹ "Moore's march upon Sahagun was a movement which, as the event proved, saved the south of Spain, had the most important bearing on the final issue of the great Continental struggle, and won from Napoleon himself the tribute of unqualified approval, as the only move which could have arrested the southward progress of the French armies, and for the time, to use his own phrase, 'given the lockjaw to their other movements in Spain.'" When and where has the like success been achieved by an army of less than 30,000 men acting against one of ten times its number under such a captain as Napoleon?

In one respect Sir Bartle is not adequate in his

¹ Sir Bartle Frere's "Memoir of John Hookham Frere," p. 'c'. The quotation from Napoleon is taken from one of the five notes dictated by Napoleon and addressed to General Savary. This one is dated 13th July 1808: "Le coup qui serait porté au Maréchal Bessières serait un coup porté au cœur de l'armée qui donnerait le *telamos* et qui se ferait sentir a toutes les points extrêmes de l'armée." It is given in Napier, vol. i., Appendix, p. ii.

expression. It was not merely "for the time" that lockjaw seized with its fatal grip that cunningly conceived plot for the exercise of supreme and irresistible power to crush the liberty of a nation. It was a mortal blow, not only to that one effort. The weakness engendered by the stroke in the whole substance of the French power in Spain made virulent "the Spanish ulcer," which but for it might have been healed.

Napoleon has himself said of it:¹ "No one can deny, that if the Austrian Court had, by not declaring war, permitted Napoleon to remain four months longer in Spain, all would have been completed. The presence of the General is indispensable. He is the head, the all of an army. It was not the Roman army which conquered Gaul, but Cæsar. It was not the Carthaginian army which shook the Republic to the very gates of Rome, but Hannibal. It was not the Macedonian army which reached the Indus, but Alexander. It was not the French army which carried war to the Weser and the Inn, but Turenne. It was not the Prussian army which for seven years defended Prussia against the three greatest Powers of Europe, but Frederick the Great."

The argument is in all respects but one unanswerable, and it means that grand as was the work of

¹ "Personne ne peut nier que, si la cour d'Autriche en ne déclarant pas la Guerre, eût permis à Napoleon de rester encore quatre mois en Espagne, tout n'eût été terminé. La présence du Général est indispensable ; c'est la tête, c'est le tout d'une armée : ce n'est pas l'armée romaine qui a soumis la Gaule, mais Cesar ; ce n'est pas l'armée carthaginoise qui faisait trembler la république aux portes de Rome, mais Annibal ; ce n'est pas l'armée macédonienne qui a été sur l'Indus, mais Alexandre ; ce n'est pas l'armée française qui a portée la guerre sur le Weser et sur l'Inn, mais Turenne ; ce n'est pas l'armée prussienne qui a défendu sept ans la Prusse contre les trois plus grandes puissances de l'Europe, mais Frédéric le Grand."

Wellington during the long years that followed up to 1814, it would have been all impossible but for the previous achievement of Moore. But if we may take account of the elaborate investigation of the careful, though not friendly, Lanfrey, Napoleon could not help in this instance, as he often did in others, maintaining at St. Helena a fiction that he had framed for an immediate emergency. If Lanfrey be right, it was not the Austrian Emperor but Moore who compelled Napoleon to return to Paris. When Napoleon turned back from Astorga, asserts Lanfrey (pp. 462, 463), nothing new either in Vienna or Paris had taken place. He went back solely because Moore had evaded him. Lanfrey devotes a long argument¹ to show that Napoleon worked up the war with Austria to conceal his failure in Spain. Having done so he goes on to show that it was Moore's action that brought this about.² "The effective though desperate diversion of Sir John Moore in the north of the Peninsula," he says, "had caused Napoleon to miss the theatrical success on which he had most counted in order to impress the imagination of mankind and to strike terror into his enemies. The failure of that grand stroke lay in the falsification given by facts to his proud pledge 'that he would plant his victorious eagles on the ramparts of Lisbon.' To make his appearance in France without having fulfilled that pledge, without having made good an undertaking to

¹ Whole end of chapter xi., vol. iv.

² "La diversion efficace, quoique désespérée de Sir John Moore dans le Nord de la Péninsule, lui avait fait manquer le coup de théâtre sur lequel il comptait le plus pour impressionner les imaginations et intimider ses ennemies. Ce grand effet manqué c'était le démenti que l'événement avait donné à son orgueilleuse promesse de 'planter ses aigles victorieuses sur les remparts de Lisbonne.' Être revenu en France sans avoir accompli cette promesse, sans avoir tenue un engagement pris à la face de l'Europe, c'était pour lui un échec relatif." Vol. v. p. 69.

which he had bound himself in the face of Europe, was for him virtually a defeat."

I must a little anticipate the sequence of the narrative in order to bring out this relation of Moore's campaign to the general politics of Europe. Napoleon in person follows Moore as far as Astorga. On the way thither a memorable scene occurs. It is 1st January 1809. Napoleon visibly before his surrounding army tears open despatches which are brought to him by a courier dismounting from panting steed. The Emperor becomes absorbed in their reading; then he gets up, and, after his manner, paces backwards and forwards, evidently in great excitement. Orders are immediately afterwards issued for the return of the Guards, the division of Lapisse, and other detachments. Rumours are allowed to spread that intrigues in Paris, the threat of Austrian war, make it necessary for the Emperor to return. Lanfrey's cruel criticism shows that though Fouché, Talleyrand, and in some degree the silly Murat, were undoubtedly intriguing, though Austria was steadily and quietly arming, Napoleon had the intrigues completely in hand, and could crush them at any moment; that he himself by his instructions to the confederate German princes designedly forced on the war with Austria. As Mr. Oman himself says:¹ "There was absolutely nothing in the state of European affairs to make an instant departure from Spain necessary."

Therefore, Lanfrey's contention, that both the scene of 1st January on the road to Astorga, and the St. Helena fiction about Austria, were designed to conceal the extent to which Napoleon had been outwitted by Moore, holds the field as the one valid explanation

¹ Oman, vol. i. p. 561.

that fits in with all the facts. In proportion as men exhaustively study the evidence on Napoleon's side of the question, that is the conclusion to which they come. Not only does Lanfrey say expressly that when Napoleon turned back from Astorga nothing new either in Vienna or Paris had taken place, but that he went back solely because Moore had evaded him. "Napoleon could not help recognising that his calculations had been upset."¹ Of Napoleon's reproaches against the British army for having broken down bridges in their retreat, reproaches specially designed for Spanish consumption, Lanfrey says: "At bottom the barbarism which he least pardoned them was that of having escaped from his net."²

"Echappé au piège" ("escaped from the net"): in that lies the whole point. Dangerous for Napoleon as was Moore's stroke at Soult, it at first rather rejoiced his heart than disturbed his composure. To make once and for all an example that should resound throughout Europe, not of a representative portion of the British army, but, as Canning vigorously put it,³ of "the British army," so that "another army" Britain "had not to send," would be well worth much risk and all his efforts. He recognised, indeed, that Moore was the only General left "fit to contend with him," but he never doubted that he would be able by his own prodigious energy, by bending to the object all his vast resources, to surround, to cut off, to cause the capitulation of that entire army. When, not only had he failed in this, but when, on arriving before Bencvente he had, on 29th December, personally ordered forward

¹ "Napoléon dut reconnaître que ses calculs avaient été déjoués."

² "Au fond la barbarie qu'il leur pardonnait le moins c'était d'avoir échappé au piège." Lanfrey, vol. v. pp. 462, 463.

³ In a despatch to be presently given, p. 360.

all the force which the position taken up by Moore permitted him to employ; when that force had been utterly routed, and the General commanding it captured under his eyes,¹ the personal failure was manifest to the whole army, and the news would soon be spread by a hundred channels over Europe.

It was the effect of this triumphant escape of Moore's, after treading on the giant's tail, that Napoleon dared not face in Paris or Vienna. This was what had to be washed out in Austrian blood. Because of this he brought on the war of 1809, in which he met another General very fit to contend with him—the Archduke Charles—who defeated, and only just missed annihilating his army at Essling and Aspern. He was never able to return to Spain.

Captain Mahan has shown that he became absorbed in the endeavour to cut the coils of the anaconda pressure which the English sea supremacy was bringing to bear on his whole dominion: to fight the sea on land. But another change had taken place also. Germany, inspired by the example of the efforts of Spain, was everywhere stirring with new life. So much was this the case, that in the new campaign the Archduke Charles, using the sentiment as an instrument of war, thus appealed to it. "The liberties of Europe," he told his troops, "have taken refuge under your banner. Your victories will break their bonds, and your German brethren still in the enemy's ranks await their redemption"—a new sound surely, but in so far as it was affected by the example of Spain it depended on Moore. If Napoleon had carried out his original scheme, including the planting of his victorious eagles on the ramparts of Lisbon, then, despite Baylen and

¹ "Lefebvre . . . s'est fait prendre. Je l'avais envoyé."

despite Saragossa, which would probably, as Napoleon had calculated, have fallen within a month, Spain would have been an example not of Napoleon's failure, but of the hopelessness of revolt.

As it was, within three years the struggle to force the "Continental system" on the resistant nations brought on the war with Russia, which largely owed its failure to the shallow dependence to be placed upon allies everywhere hoping for freedom. That war led by a progressive though slow and gradual decline to the end. If there was a moment when the rising stream of Napoleon's fortunes, driven upward by the volcanic forces from which it rose, went over the ledge and began its long descent, that moment was when, baffled and disappointed, he turned back, on 1st January 1809, from Astorga, conscious of such personal failure as he had felt three days earlier. That failure he owed entirely, as he recognised himself, to the genius of Moore.

So far I have dealt with the question solely from the side of Napoleon, of the effect of Moore's action on the fate of Spain and the fate of Europe. It was necessary so to do in order to make it worth while to study the steps which led up to a result so great. If Moore was only, as Southey, Sir Herbert Maxwell, and Mr. Oman would have us believe, responsible for a disastrous retreat, redeemed to some extent by a successful rearguard action and an heroic death at Corunna, it is hardly worth while to follow the "vacillating," timid creature, infirm of purpose, full of strong "prejudices," easily vexed, hastily complaining, irritable, whose "resolution broke down," who was "weighed down by the burden of responsibility" and "worried," determining the movements of his army by "phantoms

hatched in his imagination," actuated by "a curious mixture of motives," "lingering," "harassed," "ill-informed"—a man whose opinions were formed by what his army were saying about him, "guessing what his Government would say," full of needless doubts and hesitations.

If all of these libels together are "phantoms hatched in the imaginations" of those who cannot recognise a great man when he stands out impressively before them; if they are founded everywhere upon the rejection of the best and the acceptance of the worst evidence that the case admits of; if they are due, in fact, though I am sure quite unconsciously, to the blinding effects of mistaken prejudice, the source of which is easily traced; then it may be worth while to consider in some detail how it has been possible that those, who of all men ought most to have claimed for their country the glory which I have here shown to be her due, have been unable to realise what has long been understood, in at least its broader outline, by all mankind, except by a few of Moore's own countrymen. "The tale of Moore's splendid retreat, of his courage and calmness in loss and disaster, of his superb control of his men in their disappointment when Corunna was reached and no fleet was found there, of his brave fight with Soult, of the mortal wound which struck him down in the hour of victory . . . all this is a brilliant page of English history, perhaps the finest record, in its entire course of glory, won in retreat, of patience, moderation, and success in the very hour of bitterest disappointment. It was the spirit and example of Moore which made possible the victories of Wellington."¹ As to the last phrase, I may have more

¹ "Life of Napoleon Bonaparte," W. M. Sloane.

to say hereafter, but it was certainly the actual achievement of Moore, as I have shown already, which did so ; for if Napoleon had planted his victorious eagles on the ramparts of Lisbon, the formation of that corps of Portuguese on whom Wellesley relied in his original scheme for the defence of Portugal would have been impossible, and the coast of Spain and Portugal would have become as unapproachable by English expeditions as were Quiberon, Ferrol, or the innumerable points of the French Empire which had been marked by our repeated and disastrous failures.

Surely to rob a country of its examples of heroic achievement, the true portraits of its really great, is the deadliest crime that can be committed against it. To substitute for them the flimsy imaginings, not even of party, but of personal spite, is the lowest degradation to which history can sink. For my part, though I cannot pretend that I could laugh at such an attempt made by any one more than I could laugh at murder, I can honestly say that in the bitterness of my disappointment I could, though I am not given to weeping, weep that such an act should be attempted by one for whom I have so much respect as for Mr. Oman.

Before I leave this subject I must once more emphasise the point that it was not merely on the success of Moore in drawing off Napoleon from the south of Spain, from Portugal and from Saragossa, on his completely upsetting the whole scheme of Napoleon, that the greatness of his achievement depended. It was that he should have done all this in presence of Napoleon at the head of 300,000 of his best soldiers, and yet have not only saved his army, but, after inflicting on Napoleon himself a severe check, should,

in presence of that master of pursuit, have drawn off his army intact. In other words, the essence of Moore's campaign lay in the advance on Sahagun as preparatory to a retreat that should compel the over-wieldy numbers of the French army to undertake a pursuit where numbers were unavailing, where the small army might evade the strength of the great one, and make its very numbers involve it in losses far greater than it could inflict upon the army that it was all the time vainly endeavouring to bring to action under circumstances that would permit of the adequate employment of its strength.

That being so, the one question that arises is how far Moore was contemplating this result from the beginning when he decided to attempt his advance upon Napoleon's communications, how far there is historical basis for the one criticism to which those who really wish to understand war will attach more importance than to the judgment of a whole theatre of these others. "In Sir John Moore's campaign," said the Duke of Wellington, "I can see but one error; when he advanced to Sahagun he should have considered it as a movement of retreat."¹ Southey, Sir Herbert Maxwell, and Mr. Oman have taken the utmost pains to advertise to the whole world that from the very beginning Moore did consider it as a movement of retreat. All of them have quoted from a letter of Moore's to Sir David Baird written at the moment when he made up his mind, in consequence of the hope given by the holding out of Madrid, that as soon as he could unite the army, he would advance against the communications of the French. "I mean

¹ The end of the sentence refers to a different matter, and I shall deal with it hereafter. See pp. 376-377, *post*.

to proceed bridle in hand ; for if the bubble bursts, and Madrid falls, we shall have a run for it."

Delicious is the contrast ! These words, even if they had stood alone, would have shown the Duke that Moore's whole movement was of the kind which he saw that it ought to have been. There is nothing exceptional in the Duke's wisdom in the matter. It is safe to say that neither in Europe or America is there to be found the soldier who understands his business who would not look at the matter from the same point of view. Certainly the man who has successfully commanded armies in the field and would take another view is not to be found. They provoke from Southey the comment, "These were ominous words." Competent critic!! One would have thought that either Mr. Oman or Sir Herbert might have at least attached sufficient importance to the Duke's criticism to have acknowledged its existence. They both prefer to accept as decisive Mr. Southey's, and to follow in his steps.

Nevertheless, the emphasis which they have attached to these words of Moore's ought to make impossible the common, I may almost say the habitually repeated, mistake of treating Moore's retreat from Sahagun as though it were a thing that was unexpectedly forced on him by the report of Napoleon's march from Madrid. The essence of Moore's whole campaign lies in the threatened attack on Soult as bringing on the march of Napoleon and the other consequences involved. For the gallery no doubt it would have been more effective if Moore had just had time to defeat Soult before Napoleon came up. It would not by the dot of an iota have affected the greatness of Moore's movement in its nation-saving and world-wide effect.

In one respect only would success at Carrion against Soult have been seriously valuable. It would have given some satisfaction to the soldier's craving for actual victory in the field. But that touches a different subject, to be dealt with hereafter.

The whole thing as to the intended fight at Carrion has about the same importance as the battle of Corunna, which is so unimportant in itself as a part of Moore's campaign, that I should be quite glad to leave all description of it alone were it not that one very important fact about it is habitually forgotten. Of that hereafter. Having now, as fully as I can, brought out the nature and importance of the great campaign with which we are dealing, I turn back to take up from the beginning of it the points that require to be cleared up, not because Moore does not state them clearly enough, but because others have confused them.

CHAPTER XXIX

THE MARCH INTO SPAIN

THE aspect of Moore's campaign presented in the last chapter is one that could not possibly have been understood by his contemporaries, nor would it be realised by any one whose attention was directed to Spain alone. The examination of the whole career of Napoleon, almost entirely reserved for our own generation, has made evident the greatness of Moore's achievement. Like most men who have done the best work in the world, Moore only saw his way step by step, and it is these footsteps which led up to the great result that I have now to trace.

It will be seen from the beginning of the Diary given in chapter xxvii., that the first subject which occupied Moore when he took over the command was the necessity of getting the army out of Portugal before the rains came on. Of this subject all his earliest letters are full. He writes to Baird about it in his first letter to him, from Lisbon, of 12th October. He mentions it to Castanos in the earliest local letter I have, that of 10th October; again to Anstruther, on 12th October; and so accurate is the knowledge he has obtained as to what was to be expected, that on the 26th October he writes to Hope:—

“The first rains will be as usual very heavy, and will continue, probably, incessantly for several days. During their continuance it will be better for you to give some orders that the troops may stop. . . . My idea of the rains is, that the

first are incessant and for several days; but after these the weather clears, continues fair for some time, and during the rest of the winter the climate is like that of other countries, at all seasons diversified by occasional rains."

Which is just what proved to be the case.

It is necessary to press this point, because one of the commonest accusations made against Moore's management of this part of the campaign is founded on an *obiter dictum* of Sir A. Wellesley's, thrown out when he was, like Moore, intensely annoyed at the dilatoriness of Dalrymple. He wrote to Stuart on 1st September, that he did not know what Dalrymple would do, "but if I were in his situation, I would have 20,000 men at Madrid in less than a month from this time."¹ Whereupon it is concluded that Wellesley, in Moore's place, would have had 20,000 men in Madrid in less than a month from 7th October, when Moore obtained command of the troops. Now, in the first place, it is quite certain that unless, which I do not admit, the Government, and especially Castlereagh and Canning, deliberately lied to both Houses, Wellesley would not, in Dalrymple's place, have begun to move 20,000 men towards Madrid then, or at a much later date. Not being in command of the troops, Wellesley had naturally not seen the instructions of Government, and it was a very loose statement.

The case of the Government as laid before Parliament in the debates on the war was that "the Supreme Junta had not been installed till the last week in September, and as soon as intelligence had been received

¹ "I do not know what Sir H. Dalrymple proposes to do, or is instructed to do; but if I were in his situation, I would have 20,000 men at Madrid in less than a month."—Wellington Despatches, iii. 109, "To Mr. Stuart, 1st September 1808," quoted by Oman, vol. i. p. 274, as Wellington Despatches, iv. 121, and referred to again, p. 436.

of that event in this country, the expedition under Sir David Baird had been ordered to sail, and a communication made thereof to the Junta of Galicia and the Supreme Junta requesting an order for permitting the troops to land in Galicia. This communication had been made in the week in which the change of Government took place, and to that circumstance was owing the delay of ten days in the transmission of the order." The entrance into Spain was, according to the speeches of Lord Liverpool, of Castlereagh, and of Canning, dependent upon authority being given by the Supreme Junta, or some body that could give national permission to that effect. Dalrymple could not have crossed the frontier without it, though he might have made preparations which he did not make.

Secondly, Wellesley had left Spain, not to attend the court of inquiry on the Cintra Convention, but on leave, which he had asked for, "as in the present state of the season some time must elapse before the troops can enter into any other active operation" (17th September 1808);¹ and, as he told the Duke of Richmond, "as the equinoctial gales were expected at every moment, it is impossible to commence any further operation 'by land';"² so that Moore's hope that he might be able to get out of Portugal before the wet season began, which was the only chance of his being able to move without injury, very far exceeded Sir Arthur's anticipations of what was possible. The writers who, like Mr. Oman, quote Sir Arthur's saying of 1st September and ignore these facts, do not realise how very much they compromise the fair fame of Sir Arthur. For an officer to go home on leave

¹ Gurwood, vol. iii. p. 124.

² Ibid., p. 126.

from an active campaign in which he would have held a high command, and to do so in order to take up a lucrative and influential civil appointment, would, during any of Wellington's own campaigns in the Peninsula, have been looked upon as the lowest step of professional dishonour. Wellington's scorn for such a man would have been boundless. The only defence of Sir Arthur's action is that, when he left Portugal on 20th September, he believed that all possibility of active operations was over for the year. Necessarily, therefore, all Moore's actions and orders, when three weeks later he received the command, were bent towards the one object of getting the troops out of Portugal before the rains, and of providing as far as possible for the contingency of the rains coming on during the course of their march. Obviously an historian whose only notice of the determining factor of Moore's earliest moves is the statement that "the autumn rains *surprised* the troops in their passage through the mountains,"¹ is not likely to have formed to himself a very accurate conception of the nature of Moore's campaign.

Mr. Oman so quotes authorities as to leave the impression on a casual reader that he has complete data on which to work. Trusting his honour as an historian, I am sure that he has never seen, as I hardly think he could possibly have done, the letters I have referred to, showing how completely Moore's knowledge of the coming wet season determined his earlier movements as they gave excuse to Sir Arthur Wellesley's absence from the campaign. What is certain is, that when in a note to the same paragraph he says "Moore names one regiment only as an exception" to the good

¹ Oman, vol. i. p. 501.

discipline of the army, he has not read either Moore's letters to Gordon, the military secretary, or all of Hope's letters to Moore, or of Moore's letters to Hope. For, among the troubles of a race against the weather, was the indispensable necessity of getting rid of thoroughly inefficient officers, and especially of commanding officers who ought never to have reached such a position. Lieutenant-Colonel Z. is reported, both by Crauford and Fraser, to have reduced his regiment to such a condition, that he "is quite incompetent to do his duty." Captain Y. is a man "who is constantly drunk, and unfit either for the society of gentlemen or the duties of an officer." These and others have to be summarily got rid of before the campaign begins, altogether apart from the battalion named in the Diary. It is an experience not unknown in more recent campaigns.

It is necessary now to consider the instructions and the impressions of the Government which regulated Moore's entry into Spain. When, on 7th October 1808, Moore received the command of the army for the movement into Spain, he took over several documents from his predecessor, Sir Harry Burrard, who remained for a time in command of the army in Portugal. Burrard handed over to Moore instructions relating to the expeditionary force passed on to him by Sir Hew Dalrymple. Of these the earliest was one from Lord Castlereagh to Dalrymple of 27th August 1808, informing Sir Hew of the Spanish revolt against the French in Biscay, and directing that a force should be prepared so as to be *ready to co-operate with the Spaniards* as soon as he should receive orders from home, but leaving him discretion to *detach* from his army for this purpose, if he

should deem it to be of advantage to His Majesty's service. The next was one of 2nd September, saying that as soon as the French had been "either reduced or expelled from Portugal," it may be expedient for His Majesty's Government to direct "as large a British corps as can be conveniently assembled to the north of Spain, *there to co-operate with the armies of Spain* in expelling the enemy from the Peninsula; 10,000 infantry and a proportion of cavalry are held in readiness here to be united" with the force from Portugal, which is estimated at 20,000 available men. Dalrymple is, therefore, to have his force in such a state of preparation that it shall be ready to start on receipt of orders. He may in case of necessity move in advance of orders, but, though this is not stated in the despatch, it is clear from Castlereagh's own words in the House of Commons that it was expressly dependent on a demand from an authority having the right to speak in the name of the Spanish nation. Without that no General with a foreign army could cross the frontier of an independent kingdom, a kingdom, moreover, with which at this very date we were still formally at war, though we were aiding the people in every way we could.

Moore received also his own letter of service and instructions from the Commander-in-chief, directing him to correspond in all matters with himself, and leaving it to his discretion whether he marched the infantry by land to join the force under Sir David Baird, of whose despatch to Corunna he is now informed, or whether he sends them by water. He also receives from Castlereagh instructions which inform him that the reason for selecting Corunna as the point for Baird's disembarkation is that it will necessarily

require considerable arrangements before a force of this magnitude can be enabled to take the field. Moore is therefore to select such points in Galicia or on the borders of Leon as will enable the troops to be most advantageously assembled and equipped for service. From thence they may move forward as early as circumstances permit. In order to make his army mobile he is to draw mules and horses from all parts of Spain, and not to depend on Galicia, which has been considerably drained of resources by the equipment of Blake's army. Arrangements are made on a large scale for the supply from home of provisions, &c., but he is neither sent nor promised any money, and all his transport is to be obtained locally. He is told that with respect to the plan of operations *on which it may be most expedient to employ your troops when assembled and ready, there will be full time before your equipment can be completed for concerting this with the Commanders of the Spanish armies.* He is to open a communication with the Spanish authorities for the purpose of framing the plan of the campaign on which it may be advisable that *the respective armies should act in concert.* Thus the authority given to him over the army depends, according to all these instructions, upon the fact that the British army is entrusted to him for the purpose of co-operating as an auxiliary force with formed and organised Spanish armies in the field. Authority to employ it or right to employ it in any other way he has none.

The picture drawn for themselves by the Government at home, and by the whole nation for the matter of that, of the state of things in the Peninsula is more accurately conveyed by despatches from Lord Castlereagh to Sir John Stuart, then in command in Sicily,

than in any to Moore himself. Naturally, Castlereagh assumed that Moore knew the facts to be what people at home assumed them to be, and he therefore does not detail them to him. But it is necessary to inform Sir John Stuart of the state of things in the Peninsula, because Stuart is to employ all the force he can against Catalonia. In order that Sir John Moore may know of this co-operating movement copies of the despatches to Stuart are sent to him, and therefore through them Moore has much better information of the ideas of Ministers as to the conditions under which the British army is to be employed than he has from those addressed to himself. Now as late as 1st November Lord Castlereagh's statement to Sir John Stuart is that "since I last wrote Sir John Moore's army has been put in motion towards Spain; they move by Almeida and Ciudad-Rodrigo. Sir David Baird, with his corps, has landed at Corunna, after a favourable passage of four days from Falmouth, and is advancing towards Valladolid, where the whole will assemble, consisting of 35,000 infantry and nine regiments of cavalry. The enemy, 40,000 and 50,000 strong, are concentrated in Biscay and Navarre, expecting reinforcements; they are encircled from Saragossa by Milapo, Lagrono, Frias, and Bilbao by the various provincial armies, which exceed in number 100,000 men, and I have reason to believe they meditate an attack before the French reinforcements are actually on the line of operations." That despatch was not received by Moore till he was at Salamanca, but the ideas conveyed in it, as he well knew, underlay all his instructions. He received from all English communications accounts of the excitement in England with which the Spanish attack to drive the French altogether out of Spain was awaited. As (Sir

Charles Stewart) Lord Londonderry shows, the army under Moore moved out of Portugal affected by similar impressions, fearing only lest they should be too late to join in the triumphal march of the Spanish armies.

Among the papers handed over to or received by Moore on his taking over the command was a long memorandum that had on the 26th September been sent in to the Spanish Government by Lord William Bentinck. Bentinck had been sent expressly by Sir Hew Dalrymple in order to enter into communication with the Spanish Government, to gather all the information he could at Madrid, to concert with them some plan of co-operation for the British army, and to ascertain their intentions and wishes. Lord William's memorandum throughout assumes that the only question is whether the Spanish armies will of their own strength be able to drive the French armies out of Spain into France, or whether they will for that purpose require the assistance of the British army, and whether, supposing either by the support of the British army or without it, the French have been driven out of Spain, the Spanish Government will be ready *in the event of an Austrian war* to join the British in an invasion of France. He points out to them that for that purpose Britain would certainly be ready to strain her strength in supporting them in every way.

Thus from all the sources of information at his disposal, and in accordance with all the instructions of his Government, Moore's preliminary advance into Spain was one covered by Spanish regular armies so vastly superior to the French opposed to them, that the only question was how soon the Spaniards would drive the French before them in utter rout. His movement, according to the plan of campaign arranged for him by

his Government, was to begin by a concentration of his army with Baird's somewhere about Valladolid, there to complete their equipment in all security behind the line of Spanish troops far in advance on the Ebro. Moore's own movement out of Portugal so far anticipated the expectations of his Government, that he was moving his various detachments before they were at all adequately equipped, even as regiments, in order to avoid a contingency which his Government had not anticipated, that of the wet season. It was not the movement of an army marching to war at all. He was in any case to obtain mules, horses, and conveyances of all sorts from all parts of the country on his arrival in Spain, and till these were obtained and organised, and much other equipment provided, his army was not fit to take the field. All calculations, therefore, based on the assumption that Moore could in any case have reached Salamanca by a certain date and then marched on within a given number of days upon Madrid, belong to the order of criticism of those who suppose that the movement of an army previously unequipped and unprovided with transport, with no established magazines, is the same thing, as Moore puts it (p. 325, *infra*), as the march of an army into Hyde Park.

Now for the march through a country friendly, but not rich, of an army to a point far behind the rayon of warlike operations it is the rule of war, based on obvious necessity and unlimited practical experience, that the more roads such an army uses, the easier and more rapid will be its movement, especially if the district to be covered be one of very bad mountain roads. The first arrangement, therefore, of Moore's march, which was for the movement of his army in three divisions, by Coimbra, Abrantes, and Alcantara,

was not one to be regretted at all. The division for the march by roads meeting at Salamanca was the necessary and legitimate means for the most rapid concentration. The reason is a simple one, viz. that if all these troops were strung out along a single road, the rear of the column on that road would be much longer in reaching the point of concentration than the shorter columns moving on several roads would be. But on 21st October he received from General Hope a letter assuring him that from all the information he had been able to collect the Madrid road was the only possible one for artillery, and on the 22nd October Colonel Lopez, who had been sent from Madrid to give him information about the roads, brought another letter from Hope, urging the same point. He replies to Hope on the same day :—

LISBON, 22nd October 1808.

MY DEAR HOPE,—Early yesterday morning I received your letter of the 17th, and in the course of the forenoon Colonel Lopez arrived and brought me that of the 19th. I was already, in consequence of your first letter, nearly persuaded that the Madrid road was that which we must follow; but after conversing with the Colonel I am convinced of it.

I should only propose that Paget's division should march on Alcantara, because it will shorten your line, and from Lopez's account such measures are already taken in the neighbourhood of Ciudad-Rodrigo, that whatever number of troops arrive there will be supplied.

That he at first thought this a mistake the Journal records. Moore says it was possible to have moved artillery by the Almeida road. But his statement that this road was practicable for artillery was written before he had seen the really bad part of the road and before the rains began. The effect of these was sub-

sequently such that even the light guns Moore took with him were injured and required serious repair,¹ and that Moore subsequently wrote to Hope, "I am now convinced that no other practicable road exists on any other line."² But it is thoroughly characteristic of Moore that he does not allude to the fact that he had yielded to the pressure of Hope on the subject. Hope was the man who was to be responsible for the march of the artillery. He had been known to Moore as a capable soldier ever since they served together in the capture of St. Lucia. He was in later years declared by Wellington to be the ablest soldier then in the Peninsular army. If the information on which the whole of the Government's scheme of campaign was based was correct, it was a movement fraught with no danger. If the concentration with Baird was to be made near Valladolid, and Valladolid was far in the rear of the rayon of warfare, if that concentration was to be made in order that the army might be there provided with transport sufficient to enable it to take the field, then the natural, the right, and the quickest thing to do was to send the artillery by the best road.³ Moore, who never spares himself in any of his criticisms, when he thinks that the artillery could have been moved by the road by which he travelled, writes to Hope on the 4th November from Malaga, that they have been deceived as to the impossibility of the road by which he has travelled. "The road I am now

¹ To Hope, 13th November.

² *Idem*. It is possible that this means only that there is no road by which Hope could turn off from his then present line, but I think not.

³ A glance at the map will show any one that as long as the point of concentration was fixed at Valladolid it was not a serious détour for a corps already in the neighbourhood of Estremos. Mr. Oman's measuring the distances to Salamanca is quite irrelevant. Salamanca did not become the point of junction till Hope had finished more than half his march.

travelling, from Abrantes across the Tagus to Liza, from thence again across at Villa Velha to Castel Branco by this place, and Belmonte to Guarda and Almeida, is found practicable for artillery . . . this knowledge was only acquired by our own officers. When the brigade was at Castel Branco it was not certain that it could proceed, and then it was found there was a choice of two roads. This leads me to suspect that you also may find a practicable road by Placentia, in some other direction, without going the round proposed, which, were the Spaniards on the Ebro to give way and the French to advance, would oblige you to measure back your steps again, or to join a Spanish instead of a British army." He suggests various lines that Hope should try.

Hope, however, reports exactly the same difficulty, viz. that no one knows anything about the roads, and that the commissariat arrangements are so limited, that he cannot halt whilst his own officers, on whom alone he can rely for report, investigate. Just as at the time Moore agreed to send him by the Madrid road it was necessary to move at once to get out of Portugal before the rains, so now Hope considered the eventual risk of having to fall back less serious than that of committing the artillery to uncertain roads in an uncertain season of the year. It is in this letter of 4th November that Moore, writing for this practical purpose to Hope, who knew all the circumstances which had determined the move, uses the expression, "if anything adverse was to happen, I shall not have necessity to plead," evidently designing to let Hope understand that he himself, as in duty bound, took all the responsibility on himself, and had no wish to recall the fact that Hope had urged it, or to reproach him

therewith. It is solely based on his own correct anticipation that the whole scheme of campaign on which he has been sent, involving his junction with Baird near Valladolid, may break down because of the failure of the Spanish armies to hold the Ebro. It is on these words, thus used, that Mr. Oman fastens in order to show that Moore has confessed his own utter incompetence, and to prove by a series of suggestions how admirably he, Mr. Oman, would have managed the army had he but been in Moore's place. This illustration of the kind of criticism that is quite useless and mischievous for all military history is too valuable to be lost.

"There is, in short," writes Mr. Oman,¹ "no way of justifying Hope's circular march, when once it is granted that the roads of Northern Portugal were not impracticable for artillery. Moore knew this perfectly well, as his letter to Hope," as above, "shows. No arguments are worth anything in his justification when he himself writes 'if anything adverse happens I have not' *(sic)* necessity to plead.'" There is no way of justifying this kind of criticism which proceeds on the assumption that it is a General's business by some faculty unknown to man to be infallible. Mr. Oman has evidently never read Napoleon's sentence, written in the zenith of his fame and power, "I have so often in my life been mistaken, that I no longer blush for it"; or Nelson's at the moment of his greatest exercise of skill in penetrating Napoleon's designs,³ "So far from being infallible, like the Pope, I believe my opinions to be very fallible,

¹ Vol. i. p. 497, note.

² The words are correctly quoted from Moore's letter in my version, not in Mr. Oman's. Moore is not responsible for the obvious grammatical error of the latter.

³ Mahan's "Sea Power," vol. ii. p. 156, quoted from "Corresp. de Nap." vol. xi. p. 162.

and therefore I may be mistaken that . . .¹” If Mr. Oman’s book is to be of the smallest value to the historical student he must come to realise that a General may often be absolutely right in doing at a given moment what afterwards, when full information is obtained, turns out to have been based on a mistake due to false reports. If he has, on the best information to be obtained, sifted as thoroughly as he can sift it, taken the right course, his decision was that of a sound and wise man, though it should turn out afterwards that the information was wrong. Mr. Oman must, in fact, come to realise the meaning of “the fog of war.”

Further, he must understand that knowledge, which is in our possession a hundred years after certain events, cannot justly affect our judgment of the conduct of those who lived a hundred years ago and had no means of making use of it. As this is a point very necessary to force home, it is worth while to examine the following sentence, which will show the mistakes into which critics are apt to fall even when full knowledge is before them.

“He ought on first principles to have refused to believe the strange news that was brought to him. It might have occurred to him to ask how heavy guns of position had found their way to the ramparts of Alneida, the second fortress of Portugal, if there was no practicable road leading to it. A few minutes spent in consulting any book dealing with Portuguese history would have shown that in the great wars of the Spanish Succession, and again in that of 1762,² forces of all arms had moved freely up and down the Spanish frontier, in the direction of Celorico, Guarda, Sabugal, and Castello

¹ *Idem*, p. 162.

² *e.g.*, in 1706 Lord Galway took over forty guns, twelve of which were heavy siege-pieces, from Elvas by Alcantara and Cosia to Ciudad-Rodrigo. In 1762 the Spaniards took no less than ninety guns from Ciudad-Rodrigo by Celorico and Sabugal to Castel Branco and thence back into Spain.
—*Note by Mr. Oman.*

Branco. Even a glance at Dumouriez' 'Account of the Kingdom of Portugal,' the one modern military book then available, would have enabled Moore to correct the ignorant reports of the natives. Strangest of all, there seems to have been no one to tell him that, only four months before, Loison, in his campaign against the insurgents of Beira, had taken guns first from Lisbon to Almeida, then from Almeida to Pezo de Ragoa and Vizeu, and finally from Almeida to Abrantes. It is simply astounding that no one seems to have remembered this simple fact. In short, it was not easily pardonable in any competent General that he should accept as possible the statement that there was no road for artillery connecting the capital of Portugal and the main stronghold of its north-eastern frontier. Moore did so, and in a fortnight was bitterly regretting his credulity."¹

This is an exceedingly interesting illustration of the difference between antiquarian research and the knowledge required for the command of armies. The practical question before Moore was whether he could safely trust his artillery to mountain roads when a wet season might come on at any moment, and whether at the end of such a march they would be in a condition to begin a campaign. Every point made by Mr. Oman is not merely a bad one, but one that shows he does not understand the nature of the question. The important point, as far as Moore's field artillery was concerned, was whether the carriages on which the guns travelled would be knocked to pieces or not by the actual condition into which the roads had been allowed to fall under one of the feeblest and most rotten Governments that then disgraced the world. For that purpose actual report of the condition of the roads at the time was necessary. No evidence of what had been done in 1706, or even in 1762, no

¹ Oman, vol. i. p. 495.

evidence at all about the fact that during the best season of the year heavy guns had been carried to and mounted in Almeida many years before, would have been of the smallest value. Whether the heavy travelling carriages which carried the fortress guns had been broken to pieces or not by the movement, the guns themselves would have been safely lifted into their positions by cranes and tackle, and would have been none the worse; but on the very same roads field artillery might have been rendered utterly inefficient for campaigning by the knocking about which their carriages would receive.

No General who relied on any one of the indications on which Mr. Oman would have had Moore depend could have been safely trusted with the command of an army. Of the campaign of Loison, seeing that it had taken place before the British army had entered Portugal, only the vaguest gossip could have reached Moore. He had himself seen the condition to which much of the French artillery was reduced by their campaigning in Portugal. He could have no means of knowing that such artillery as Loison took with him had not been among that which had been so destroyed. He had to deal with the army in the positions in which he found it. Hope with the artillery and cavalry were already in the Alemtejo, that is, on the east side of the Tagus, so that in the original scheme when he supposed that the road by Alcantara would be possible for them, the natural move for them was that by Elvas; and they were already well committed to it when Hope first reported to him that the Alcantara road was not possible, and recommended the Madrid road. To bring them back, and to make them travel by the road which Moore

himself took, would have made it quite certain that they must encounter the equinoctial storms and the wet season in the mountains, the very thing which it was Moore's object if possible to avoid, especially for the artillery.

Strangely enough, Mr. Oman has condemned Napoleon, as I believe on mistaken grounds, for doing the very thing which Moore refused to do. He has very powerfully¹ described the utter destruction which befell Junot's whole army, because Napoleon ordered him to march from Ciudad-Rodrigo upon Alcantara.

"When it reached Alcantara half the horses had perished of cold, all the guns but six had been left behind stranded at various points on the road ; and of the infantry, more than a quarter was missing, the famished men having scattered in all directions to find food." "He found to his surprise that there was no road suitable for wheeled traffic along the Tagus valley." "The march from Alcantara to Abrantes proved even more trying than that from Ciudad-Rodrigo to Alcantara," so that in the end "he had neither a gun nor a horseman left ; but he struggled forward, and on the 30th November entered the Portuguese capital at the head of 1500 wearied soldiers, all that had been able to endure to the end. They limped in utterly exhausted, their clothes in rags, and their cartridges so soaked through that they could not have fired a shot had they been attacked."

It is of a kingdom which succumbed to this helpless mob that Mr. Oman tells us that Moore ought to have assumed "on first principles" that it had maintained its mountain roads in such a condition that they would be passable in the worst season of the year by artillery, and that the artillery would have certainly been then fit to begin at once, marching straight away, as he assumes that they ought to have done, to begin a

¹ Oman, vol. i. pp. 27, 28, 29.

most arduous campaign. After having given this accurate description of what happened to Junot's army, Mr. Oman at least leaves on the mind of his reader the impression that when Moore wrote to Lord William Bentinck on 22nd October from Lisbon as one of the experiences determining the march of the artillery, "the French brought theirs from Ciudad-Rodrigo to Alcantara, but by this it was destroyed,"¹ that was false information for which he had "credulously" trusted to Colonel Lopez, the man who had been sent from Madrid to assist Moore and guide the march of Hope's corps.

As an illustration of the true principle on which to judge Moore, and of the reckless misrepresentation which comes from judging Generals in the field on the principle that they ought then to have known what we know a century after the event, the most perfect is Mr. Oman's statement that Napoleon ordered that ruinous march of Junot's army, "because looking at his maps" he "saw that there was a much shorter way to Lisbon by another route, down the Tagus."

No one who has ever made any real study of the Napoleon correspondence, or of Napoleon's management of affairs, military or civil, will fail to bear me out in saying that the sentence which recurs most frequently throughout his correspondence, and is typical of his whole administration, is "*Faites moi savoir.*" That translated, as it came to be in the minds of all his subordinates, meant, "At your peril send me information which is false, because you think I shall be flattered by it and like to hear it. Throw your utmost energy and all your capacity into the work of laying before me the very truth as you know

¹ Oman, p. 494, note 3.

it. Leave me to judge how far anybody else shall know the truth or something quite other that I choose to tell them. In writing to me *make* me know the truth, however unpleasant it may be." It was with that potent instrument rather than with any other that he struck down and swept away the wretched and unfortunate Princes who, because they loved to be surrounded by flatterers who lied to them, had obtained their wishes.

In Moore's life we have had specimens enough in the miserable Queen of Naples and the mad King of Sweden. But the Courts of Spain and Portugal were, if possible, even more utterly rotten than these, and had corrupted the whole Society of the two kingdoms to such an extent that truth was not to be found in either, except among those who did not belong to 'Society,' whom Napoleon could not reach. Therefore, though it is certain that Napoleon, having complete possession of all information to be obtained by any of the authorities of Spain, applied to the search after facts his potent "*Faites moi savoir*," the result of his best attempt to get at facts was represented by Junot's disastrous march. Napoleon, in the same sense, though with far more disastrous results than Moore, made a mistake.¹ The criticism which assumes him of all men not to have known the use and abuse of maps is utterly valueless for the study of war and for the judgment of a great man like Moore.

To sum up this first part of the history : Moore's movement of the whole army in the first instance was one designed to carry out the scheme of campaign as determined for him at home and enforced by the despatch of Baird to Corunna. Valladolid or Burgos

¹ That is, assuming that the Abrantes road was possible. The Coimbra road was out of the question because of the position of Hope's column.

was to be the point of concentration of the army, and there it was to be provided with the necessary transport, picking up much of its equipment as it went forward. In the meantime Moore's first anxiety was to get the army out of Portugal before the rains. For that purpose, as it would have been impossible to supply the army with food at all if it had moved "in masses of not less than a brigade,¹ and if they had been kept" well closed up, as there was no advantage in that mode of movement, and every disadvantage when the whole length of Spain divided them from an enemy, Moore wisely and rightly moved them by detachments such as could be fed, as far as Ciudad-Rodrigo, and Almeida, where the central part of the army was to be concentrated, till such time as the point of junction with the two flanks under Baird and Hope could be more exactly determined. Moore's views at this time are so fully set forth in a letter of 22nd October to Lord William Bentinck, that it is better to give them in his own words. After explaining the fact of the despatch of Hope's wing by the Madrid road and of Paget's infantry by Alcantara, he continues:

The rest of this army is already on its march towards Almeida by the two routes of Coimbra and Abrantes, but the difficulty of obtaining correct information of roads, and the difficulties attending the subsistence of the troops through Portugal, are greater than you would believe—the information respecting roads should have been got, and the arrangement for supplies should have been made before the march began—but when I got the command nothing of this sort had been done. They talked of going into Spain as of going into Hyde Park; nobody seemed aware of what an arduous task it was; *and the season of the year admitting of no delay, there was a necessity for beginning the march, and trusting to information and supplies as we get on.* Unfortunately

¹ Oman, p. 494.

our commissariat is inexperienced—and a scoundrel of a contractor, Mr. Sattaro, has deceived us—upon the whole, if we get over this march, nothing after will appear difficult; you may believe that it is not without regret that I separate the army by the corps which Hope marches on Madrid and Valladolid, but there is no help for it. It was the opinion of General Castaños and the Spanish officers that we should enter Spain by Almeida and Ciudad-Rodrigo; the troops were distributed accordingly, and it was only when too late we found that direction would not do for artillery and cavalry; and as it is, we must hope that the French will be kept on the other side of the Ebro until our junction. Colonel Lopez speaks confidently that Hope will find no wants upon his route, and that the orders already given, and the arrangements made in the neighbourhood of Ciudad-Rodrigo, Salamanca, and on the line to Valladolid and Burgos, will secure plenty to us when arrived in that quarter—in this confidence I shall move on. I shall myself go towards Almeida and Ciudad-Rodrigo. When Hope gets near to Madrid I shall hear from him, and, according to circumstances at the time, I can determine the place of junction. After such a march it is impossible to expect that we shall not be a little crippled—but if we collect in tolerable cantonments we shall soon get right and be able to act.

Sir David Baird arrived with his corps, about 12,000 infantry and artillery, at Corunna on the 13th—but no notice of his arrival having been received the Provincial Junta refused to permit him to land—this permission has, of course, been since sent to him, in consequence of his report to you—and I hope orders have been given to facilitate the equipment of his corps; to afford it cantonments and corn, and to aid its supplies. Sir David has unfortunately been sent out here without money. He has applied to me, and I have none to give him, as very little is to be got here, and from England none is yet come. I undertake my march in the hope that some will arrive; if it does not, it will add to the number of a great many distresses. As it will take some time for Sir David to equip his troops, I shall have time to direct his march on the point most proper for his junction.

When I heard from him, which was on the 15th, no cavalry had arrived, but as it may be hourly expected, not a moment should be lost in collecting forage for its subsistence. Upon this subject it will be necessary for the Spanish Government to give directions, for I should be sorry to advance it far into the country until we were forward to join it and the infantry from Corunna.

The conduct and arrangement of my march is of such importance and so difficult, that it necessarily occupies my whole time. I detail its movement to you that you may apprise the Spanish Government of it; and state to them that I shall do everything that depends upon me to bring up the army to their assistance—but that I do it in the confidence that they are taking measures to provide for its wants and subsistence on the march and on its arrival at its destination. *My present intention certainly is to assemble it at a distant point only as I see union and plan in those who direct the Spanish Councils; the most fortunate event would be the appointment of a Chief Commander; but if not, the Generals must meet to agree and decide on operations; and unless this is done, I do not see how it can be possible for me to be so forward as I could wish.*

The point of most importance in this letter is the fact that before he left Lisbon Moore's intention, strictly in accordance with the orders he had received, was to move forward the British army only when, after that army had been properly equipped and made mobile for a campaign, he had been able to concert with the Spanish General or Generals a method of co-operation with them. For that purpose it was essential that he should be given by them complete information of their strength, disposition, and plans, that any disaster which affected any part of their force, and must necessarily modify his plans and endanger his army, should be communicated to him. No such campaign as he had been ordered to carry out was possible without this.

CHAPTER XXX

MOORE AT SALAMANCA

ON arrival at Salamanca Moore finds that the whole conditions have changed from those contemplated by the Government. The French are in actual occupation of Burgos. The successive reports of the defeats of the army of Estremadura at Burgos and of Blake's with Romana's army reach him in succession. Gradually but steadily it becomes clear that the conditions under which he has been entrusted with the command of the British army no longer obtain. He has to decide for himself, not what he would like to do, but what, under the quite altered circumstances, his Government would wish him to do. For the specific circumstances in which he finds himself he has no instructions.

He had been very clearly made to understand that he was sent to command an auxiliary army, which it was considered quite safe to divide by the distance between Corunna and Lisbon, because the point of concentration at which the two fractions would meet was securely protected by the victorious Spanish armies on the Ebro, to whom the British army was to serve as a reserve. He had been specifically ordered not to involve his army in fighting against the French until the two parts of it had been united, and until they had been provided with the necessary transport and with lacking equipment. Now he finds that whatever zeal against the French may exist in the Spanish nation, organised armies and Generals with whom he can concert a campaign there

are none. Even Castanos, to whom he was at first referred, has been displaced from command.

As a broad general principle of war, a concentration of an army from very distant points may be safely carried out, provided there is in front of the concentrating army a friendly force so much stronger than that of the enemy that there is no fear whatever that the point of concentration can be reached by the enemy before the divided army has effected its union. The Government scheme of the campaign left Moore no choice, other than the impossible one of transferring his infantry, during a period of the year when the fleet itself could hardly remain on the coast, by sea to Corunna. They assumed that even in that case his artillery and cavalry must meet him in the neighbourhood of Valladolid.

It was therefore evident that the Government assumed as the secure datum on which his orders were based the fact of Spanish superiority on the Ebro. In obedience to these instructions Moore's movement had been arranged. During his personal advance from Lisbon to Salamanca he began to receive from Charles Stuart and Lord William Bentinck most valuable reports as to the utter disorganisation of the Spanish Government, the helpless condition of the Spanish armies, to which no one bore stronger testimony than Castanos himself. It was only then that he became uneasy as to Hope's movement. Under his instructions it had been an entirely correct move, whether the roads in the north of Portugal were good for artillery or not. When there came to be a risk of reverse on the Ebro, Hope's march involved just those possibilities which Moore had detailed in the letter to Hope from which I have given an extract on page 317.

When he found that the French had entered Valladolid, and that Napoleon himself was in Burgos, he did what every soldier will recognise as the one thing inevitable. It was impossible to know in what direction Napoleon might strike, nor did he know the strength of the French, but he did know that they were "receiving reinforcements every day," and that Napoleon had at least 80,000 men under his hand, while there was nothing between the French and him. Therefore he warned the commanders of each of his separate wings that they must act on their own judgment and look to their own safety, continuing their march to join him if possible, but ready to fall back if the French should advance in strength. He allowed the battalions which constituted the column with him to continue their advance to join him at Salamanca, because he could always make good his retreat as soon as he should know that the French were advancing, and because even if he were only able to effect his junction with Baird by letting him embark at Corunna and come round to Lisbon, it was all-important even with a view to that contingency that his junction with Hope should be effected before he began to fall back.

Only a full publication of all his despatches and of the reports he received, and when he received them, can do justice to the calmness, the sound military judgment, and the quiet foresight with which, during this trying and difficult period, he acted. That alone can adequately expose the way in which sentences taken out of their context, or interpreted in quite a different sense from that in which he used them, have been made to give a false impression of these most masterly papers, which in every respect justify what Lord Seaton has said of his despatches in general

(pp. 86-89, *ante*). Either for a soldier who desires to see what may be done by the capacity of a General to bring the most disadvantageous circumstances to an ultimately triumphant issue, or for any one who can appreciate the interest of a drama in which one strong man, who sees clearly his duty, and who understands his business, may by patient watching of opportunity make the smallest resources available for the greatest ends, I know nothing anywhere in history so instructive as these papers are. Unfortunately, to do justice in detail to the campaign would require a volume to itself, and all that I can attempt here is to bring out its main features as they display the character of Moore. For that purpose some knowledge of the *dramatis personæ*, and of Moore's relation to them, is essential.

The strange position in which Moore stood to the Cabinet must now be clear to any one who has read my chapter on that subject. Castlereagh, though it was impossible for him not to feel sore at the appointment of Moore, which had been forced on him in such strange fashion, honestly did his best to accept the situation and to do his duty to the country. Feeling the necessity of having confidential communication with the General in the field, he at the time of Moore's appointment wrote him this private letter :—

ST. JAMES'S SQUARE, 26th September 1808.

SIR,—His Majesty having been graciously pleased to nominate you to the chief command of his forces about to be employed in Spain, I cannot allow the official notification of His Majesty's determination to reach you unaccompanied with an assurance of my personal desire to render you every aid in my power in the execution of His Majesty's commands, and I beg you will correspond with me unofficially and with-

out reserve on all points in which my interference can contribute to promote the public service.—I have the honour to be, sir, your faithful and obedient servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

Moore, as will be seen in the Diary, accepted it frankly, and wrote fully to Castlereagh in his private letters, not merely on business matters, but, now that he had discharged himself of what he felt to be a debt of honour in not merely cringing to men who had the loaves and fishes at their disposal, he did his utmost to enter into the views of Ministers, and to carry out their wishes. His one object, as in duty bound, was to do his best to conform to the instructions of the Cabinet. This is the aspect of the question which seems to be most persistently ignored in all the discussions as to his decisions in the campaign.

The excessive stiffness of Castlereagh's private letters, of which the above is a fair specimen, the contrast between these and the letters to "My dear Wellesley," was, under the circumstances, perfectly natural. It is only doing Castlereagh justice to say, that he seems to have worked very hard to try to do his best to supply the needs of Moore's army. The Ministry were, in this respect, emphatically like Moore himself, on their good behaviour. All the facts were fully known to the King, who had expressly conveyed to Moore his entire approval of the course of conduct he had adopted at the time of his quarrel with the Ministers.

I do not think that there is the least justification for Napier's assumption that the failure of the Ministry to supply Moore with money, which was on the whole the most serious of all the difficulties from which he suffered, was due to any want of effort on Castlereagh's

part. His immensely long private letters teem with the subject. The real obstacle was purely a Treasury one. It was impossible to get in time adequate amounts of *silver coin*. Strangely enough, it was at the very crisis of Moore's great decision, 4th December, that he received Castlereagh's longest explanation. Two millions of Spanish dollars were ultimately sent, but more could not be obtained, and at the very time when the local purchase of equipment and transport was essential to the carrying out of the programme assigned to Moore, his correspondence is full of letters and appeals for money in all directions. There can be no doubt whatever, that the deficiency of transport which brought on most of the troubles of his great retreat was mainly due to this cause. As the money was sent to Corunna, Baird, whose business it had been, both at great cost to equip his army and to arrange for the general depôts and magazines for the whole army along the line from Corunna towards Benevente, claimed the money as sent for him personally, and in reply to Moore's demand for the first 500,000 dollars, said that he had already spent it.

The point is an important one, not only for this campaign. Identically the same difficulty, not quite with such serious consequences, occurred during Lord Wolseley's campaign for the relief of Gordon. Then immense quantities of Maria Theresa dollars were required. Sovereigns were of no use. The Treasury is the most important war power of England, and it is an urgent necessity for all our many wars in lands where the sovereign is not known at its true value that the Treasury, before the war begins, should have command of many millions of the coinage current in the country. As it was, Moore was emphatically ordered to make

bricks without straw, to obtain equipment and transport locally, having no resources with which to obtain it.

To return to Moore's relations with Castlereagh. Nothing could be more elaborate and emphatic than the approval given by Castlereagh for the Ministry to each separate step taken by Moore during the campaign, up to the time of his decision to remain at Salamanca and watch for an opportunity for advance. If these were merely formal approvals, they might be taken to be only the necessary support given by a Ministry to a General whom they could not replace, but the point is that they are not. They enter fully and argumentatively into Moore's reasoning for each step, and approve it as accepting that reasoning. When Baird, taking advantage of Moore's necessary permission to him to judge for himself of what was essential for the safety of his army, retires towards Corunna on a false report received from the Marquis Romana that the French are advancing from Valladolid to intercept his junction with Moore, orders are at once sent to Baird, saying that only in the event of Moore's being unable to communicate with him is he to act for himself, and in that case to move by sea, to unite again with Moore in Portugal. When Moore, having ascertained the error of Romana's report, recalls Baird, his action is warmly approved. When, on Castanos's defeat, Moore decides that in order to unite his army his three columns may have to fall back separately to Portugal, but that if possible he shall draw Hope to him before falling back, his action is entirely approved. As, however, on this subject there is a brilliant despatch of Canning's, and as I suppose no one would quote Castlereagh's verbose, roundabout, inconclusive

language when Canning's masterful English is available, I shall give that presently.

It is important to note that these approvals of his decision, that his first duty was to save the British army from useless destruction, did not reach Moore till some time after he had arrived at Benevente, when the movement of retreat had begun. He never read Canning's brilliant eulogy on his advance to Sahagun. Unquestionably, the fact that his intended retreat into Portugal had been emphatically approved, and that he had never heard of the appreciation of that stroke which involved the retreat on Corunna, gave a tone to his last hasty letter which has caused those who do not adequately examine the circumstances to misunderstand him.

As to Moore's private relations with Castlereagh during the campaign, it is characteristic of him that he met Castlereagh's cold private letters with an attempt in all respects to restore friendly terms. He at once communicated with Sir Charles Stewart, Castlereagh's brother, in order more easily to convey this wish. He, whenever he could do so, wrote to Castlereagh about his brother, warmly praised to him Stewart's brilliant and dashing performances as a cavalry *beau sabreur*, and selected Stewart to send home as his reporter on the campaign.

Stewart, the third Lord Londonderry, another important person in the drama, emphatically did not deserve the generosity with which Moore treated him. He was a very brilliant cavalry regimental officer. He could very well describe what passed under his immediate vision. He was about as competent to judge of great men and of the larger operations of war as one of those gentlemen in Corsica whom Moore hits off

with the phrase, "—talks like a child." A perfect specimen of this is his idea when he meets Moore at Salamanca on 4th December, that the one thing for Moore to do is to carry out "offensive operations," and his subsequent reflection when speaking of the advance against Napoleon's vast army, "Our only chance lay in beating him in detail. But was it probable that we should succeed in this"!!! helpless imbecility of just the kind that represents the popular half-idea of war.

But he had graver defects than his ignorance of war and incapacity for judging of great operations. It was probably true of him, as Moore said when he sent him as his messenger home, "he is incapable of stating anything but the truth," in so far as he saw it; but he was also the man of whom Wellington wrote, "Charles Stewart intrigued in the army against me, and with the assistance of Robert Crauford had turned every one of the general officers against me, except Beresford, who, like a good fellow and honest soldier as he is, discountenanced all these petty intrigues."¹ If Stewart, when acting as Adjutant-General to Wellington throughout such campaigns as his was capable, doubtless from a quite honest and stupid misunderstanding of Wellington's designs and purposes, of carrying on such an intrigue, it may be judged what was likely to be his understanding of Moore. Wellington was the intimate friend and colleague of Castlereagh, and, at this period, of Canning. Moore stood in such relations to the whole Cabinet as I have shown. Stewart's one loyalty was to his brother, Castlereagh. He had been Under-Secretary of State for War under him. It was from Stewart that Moore had received,

¹ See note to p. 253 of vol. i. of Sir Herbert Maxwell's "Life of Wellington," quoting from Croker, i. 346.

prior to his interview with Castlereagh, the order to be ready immediately after it to proceed to Portsmouth to hand over his command to Sir Harry Burrard. One curious document, a certified copy of which was handed over to Moore from Sir Hew Dalrymple, shows the extent to which Stewart looked upon himself as his brother's *alter ego*. It is the despatch from which Mr. Oman has quoted (p. 481, note 1), the authority to Dalrymple in case of urgency to act without orders from home. In its original form as received by Dalrymple it was undated and unsigned. It bears this rather remarkable note on the back of it:—

As this instruction is anonymous, it is fit that Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Burrard should be apprised that a few days ago Brigadier-General Stewart asked if, upon that account, I should hesitate to act upon it, and even offered (if I understood him rightly) to affix some mark, probably his own signature, to give it validity.

I thought for my share that the remedy was more objectionable than the omission, and I declared in consequence that I should not hesitate to act upon the instructions as if they had been signed.

Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Burrard may think differently, not having the same motives as I had when this conversation happened.

H. DALRYMPLE,

Lieutenant-General.

BONAFICA, 2nd October 1808.

Stewart was therefore intimately acquainted with all his brother's views, and with all that had passed. If he could not understand Wellington, and intrigued against him, he, being a person naturally from his relations with Castlereagh of no small influence in the army, was likely enough to be the focus round which such intrigue as that complained of by Welling-

ton, such dissatisfaction with orders the motives of which could not be explained and were not understood, would spread, as it undoubtedly subsequently did, among many of the generals and other officers of Moore's army.

Another important personage was Mr. Frere, the Envoy-Plenipotentiary. He had been our Minister in Spain before the outbreak of our war with it at the time of the seizure of the treasure-ships. He was the intimate friend of Canning, and one of the most brilliant of that band of men who, with Canning, so powerfully influenced England through the pages of the *Anti-Jacobin*. Naturally he saw Moore through Canning's spectacles, and came from England just at the moment when the Ministry, sorely against the grain and smarting under the snub to themselves involved in the necessity, had appointed Moore to the command. As Frere's brother was on the staff of Lord Minto, then in Vienna, he was not likely to have a very favourable impression of Moore's earlier career. It is quite impossible to read his letters without seeing how largely these influences affected his mode of communication with Moore. As I am very firmly convinced that the Ministry were fully justified in their plea that when Moore first remained at Salamanca, then moved cautiously forward, and finally struck for Sahagun, he did so solely on his own responsibility, and that far too much importance has been attached to Mr. Frere's influence upon him, I shall content myself with giving one only of Moore's letters to him, in which the whole conditions of their relationship are quite adequately summed up. Moore had been ordered in all political matters to defer to him, and with his instructions to that effect he had received a private letter from

Gordon, the Duke's military secretary, telling him that they had only with the greatest difficulty prevented the Cabinet from placing Moore under Frere's absolute orders.

Frere had come from England full of the popular enthusiasm about the grand rising of the Spaniards. He was quite unable to estimate the military situation, and was completely deceived as to the real strength of the Spanish armies. Sir Bartle Frere, who evidently had not the means of knowing anything about the instructions which Moore received, or about the earlier circumstances of the campaign, quaintly enough supposes that Frere suggested to Moore the stroke on Sahagun and the retreat to Corunna. It must be obvious to any one who has followed me that the line of communication from Corunna, whether for advance or retreat, was that which was from the first designed for the whole army as soon as it had effected its junction, and that Moore's intention at one time to retreat to Portugal was merely a necessity forced on him because the assigned point of junction for the army was in the hands of the enemy, and that therefore with a view to his future operation in Spain he must unite where he could, to the rear instead of to the front. In his first letter to Baird, Moore directs him to form the general depôt for the whole army at Corunna, another principal one at Astorga, and periodically he presses on him the necessity of other intermediate and advanced depôts along that line. The one difficulty was that, partly from want of money, and partly from the denuded state of the Gallician district, adequate transport could not be procured, and that without transport, as Moore had at an early stage warned Castlereagh, the ample stores of all kinds sent

from England to Corunna were quite unavailable for the supply of the army.

Lord William Bentinck (afterwards the Governor-General of India) was, till the complete disappearance of the Spanish armies made his presence at headquarters useless, invaluable in supplying Moore with information on which, as Bentinck became better and better acquainted with the facts, Moore could more and more surely rely. Charles Stuart, who had been our acting Minister at Madrid till the arrival of Frere, was the son of that Sir Charles Stuart who had been Moore's chief in Corsica, and had proposed that brilliant scheme for the employment of the British army in Italy before the Marengo campaign, to which I have often alluded. Naturally, therefore, he and Moore were on familiar terms, and from him Moore received most valuable information. He afterwards became Lord Stuart de Rothesay.

Among Moore's general officers I have perhaps already said enough of Hope, who in every respect verified Wellington's subsequent warm praise of him. No one could have carried out a difficult march more skilfully and wisely than he did. Having long known Moore, no one could have been more loyal to him than he was. They saw eye to eye on every point throughout the campaign. The strangest copying of an initial mistake that I know of, among the innumerable cases in the various accounts of the campaign, concerns Sir David Baird. Mr. James Moore, who evidently knew nothing of him, made, in the first instance, the erroneous statement that Baird was an officer of purely Indian experience, and as a result we have the remarkable fact that whilst Sir Bartle Frere attributes to Wellington's Indian experi-

ence the advantage which he assumes that he had over Moore, James Moore, copied by Southey and by Mr. Oman, speaks of the fact that Baird had only Indian experience, as though it were a source of weakness in Spain. They evidently do not know that Baird had had much larger experience out of India than Sir Arthur Wellesley. He had commanded in chief two independent expeditions, the one the very difficult Indian expedition to Egypt, by way of Kossier and Keneh across the desert. He had also captured the Cape of Good Hope, and had been in higher command than Sir A. Wellesley during the Copenhagen expedition. Moore, who had hardly ever met him, had, on account of his general reputation, asked for him as his second in command at the time of the proposed expedition to Ferrol.

I am much inclined to think that the campaign in Spain confirmed Wellington's judgment of him as given to Croker: "Baird was a gallant, hard-headed, lion-hearted officer, but he had no talent, no tact," . . . and, as Wellington suggests, a sulky temper.¹ General Fraser also had been in independent command. It was he who commanded in the unfortunate expedition to Alexandria in 1807 (chap. xxiii.). Spencer had skilfully managed a roving corps just before Sir A. Wellesley landed for the Vimeiro campaign, and had earned his warm praise by his conduct in that campaign. Lord Paget was one of the most brilliant of cavalry officers. General Paget, Moore's old friend of the Egyptian campaign, throughout managed his own division with the greatest skill, and conducted the rearguard in the retreat under Moore's personal guid-

¹ See Sir Herbert Maxwell's "Life of Wellington," vol. i. p. 36, note, with the quotation from Croker.

ance magnificently. Crauford's character is too well known to need long description. He was very much under Moore what he was afterwards under Wellington, and alike disposed to intrigue against the one as against the other. These were the principal officers.

Baird's part of the army consisted entirely of 2nd and 3rd battalions—raw troops. It had been from the beginning determined that the army should, if possible, be reorganised when it met at its general concentration. Baird's division was not only composed of raw troops, but was weak, because some of the worst battalions had, in accordance with instructions from home, been sent round to form part of the garrison of Portugal. Hope's column was of course made up for the march only. The army was full of zeal for fighting. The reforms of Dundas, very necessary as many of them were, had provoked much indignation as being "made in Germany." The old pride in British valour, and confidence in superiority in fighting, was felt throughout the ranks and among the regimental officers. None knew much of the actual situation in Spain, and the general impression with which they had left Portugal, that the only danger was lest they should be too late, had not been fully removed. In discipline available for any but fighting purposes very much the same conditions prevailed as have so often appeared in the course of Moore's biography. Some regiments were splendid; others, under inefficient commanding officers, were only held together by the general desire for a fair chance to measure themselves against the French.

Moreover, there was a special cause of weakness, very common with a British army. Sir Arthur Wellesley expressly alluded to it when he told Castle-

reagh that he had been too successful with the part of the army which he had commanded for his presence to be useful to it when he was not in command. Moore notices it more definitely when he says, in one of his letters¹ pleading for the necessity of a single commander for the Spanish armies:—

“You recollect the bad effect amongst ourselves whilst the names were retained of Sir Arthur Wellesley’s and General Moore’s armies. The effect upon the cause of Spain of Generals Blake, Palafox, and Castanos is much worse, because their situation is more critical, and there cannot too soon be but one army—the Spanish.”

Alas! there is too seldom “but one army—the British.” Certainly, in this campaign this strange incapacity, to do justice to the services of two leaders at the same time, very seriously affected the efficiency under severe trials of the army, and has affected the memoir writers despite the marvellously honourable relations to one another of Wellesley and Moore. The general inefficiency, from various causes, of practically all the departments, and the inexperience and want of training of the staff, were much the same as they had been for years.

As I have now given these slight sketches of the minor characters of the campaign, it is time to consider the position and circumstances of the central figure, Moore. It appears to be quite impossible to convey to the mind of one who has never seen or felt it the complete isolation of the responsibility of a General Officer in command in the field. In our days most men and women seem to make up their own minds chiefly by endeavouring to find out as well as they

¹ Lisbon, 26th October, to Lord William Bentinck.

can what everybody thinks that everybody thinks. Our writers take their bias from that habit, and as it is the special function of the newspapers to assist their readers in ascertaining this important point, it appears to have almost ceased to be possible to imagine a man whose duty it is to decide what he shall do with an army under his command solely on his own responsibility. That man is, and knows at every moment that he is, a fiduciary: he knows that right to do, or authority to do what he would like to do, or what his army would like him to do, he has none. For the nation, through the Cabinet, he has had a vast trust reposed in him. Instructions have been given to him for the employment of that army which are known to him alone. Information of all sorts reaches him which it is essential that he should keep to himself, or convey only to the very few who ought to be made acquainted with it. He may, nay, he must, hear what others can tell him on every point. Often his most successful and skilful mode of concealing his intentions will be to converse freely with those around him. On points of fact it is very necessary that he should not be too obstinate in his own opinions, but that he should accept the best evidence the case admits of, even if it does not wholly convince him. Divest himself of his own undivided responsibility he cannot by any means whatever.

When Baird gathered his general officers together and sent their joint opinion to Moore that it was necessary for him to fall back on Corunna because of the news which Romanaña had sent him that the French were advancing from Valladolid, he did an exceedingly weak thing. Assuming that the news was correct, and that he could not, as Moore did, verify or ascertain its

falseness, he was quite right to fall back. Moore had given him full authority to do so, but Moore had not given that authority to a committee of general officers. Of all men, the last to be influenced by the chatter of the army under him was Moore. Of the fact that in this campaign he was not so, the evidence of Sir Charles Stewart (Lord Londonderry) is quite unanswerable, because he is a witness necessarily as unfriendly to Moore as any could be. He says,¹ and apparently complains, that Moore was not in the slightest degree affected by the murmurs of his army when he had made up his mind to retreat to Portugal. He saw Moore on 4th December, the day before that on which Moore decided to remain at Salamanca and not to retreat. There is not one particle of evidence that Moore's mind was affected by the murmurs or by anything but the best evidence he could get.

The one and only question which Moore had to decide requires a little careful statement in order to make his position clear and the soundness of his judgment in each step that he took unimpeachable. He had been sent into Spain with specific instructions to use his army as an auxiliary force to the armies of Spain, and on a plan concerted with their Generals before he advanced for action. On 4th December he received a long despatch from Lord Castlereagh, informing him that in the event of the Spaniards appointing a General-in-chief, he was to consider himself as under his orders, while a secret and most confidential despatch gave him authority in extreme emergency to refuse to obey any order that might, in his judgment, compromise the safety of his army. Obviously, up to that time, the instructions of the

¹ Londonderry's "Peninsula," vol. i. p. 109.

Ministry, who had not heard, at the date when these orders were sent off, of any of the Spanish defeats, were based on assumptions which had no relation to the facts existing on 4th December, as obviously in this, as in all former despatches, they held him, and him alone, responsible for the reasonable safety of his army. Moreover, the instruction that he was not to commit his army to action until it was united held good. I refer to this later despatch of Lord Castle-reagh's because it shows that up to the last moment before Moore, on 5th December, formed his great decision to advance, it remained clear that the instructions which he had received from home were no longer applicable. The one thing he had to decide was, what would be the intentions of the Cabinet assuming that they could know the present facts?

An almost exactly analogous situation has occurred in our own times. When Lord Wolseley heard at Corte of the fall of Khartoum and of the practically certain death of Gordon, he at once telegraphed home, as in duty bound, to this effect: "The instructions under which I was sent out are no longer applicable. What do you wish me to do?" To which it will be remembered that he received the famous reply: "The Mahdi's power is to be broken at Khartoum." A change in the political state of affairs in far-off Afghanistan caused that order to be rescinded. The case illustrates the conditions of the command of an army in the field. It is impossible for the General in command to know, when once the circumstances under which he was sent out have ceased to exist, what, taking the whole world into consideration, the intentions of his masters may be. The one thing which any General in such a situation does positively know

is, that it never can, and never will be, the purpose of a British Government that he shall run the risk of the destruction of his army merely for the sake of a theatrical or heroical display. Any one who has in the least realised Moore's character must see that for him the attraction and the temptation lay all on that side.

In forming his judgment he had certain aids. In the first place, the positive order not to commit the army before it was concentrated remained manifestly applicable. It was reinforced by the obvious military necessity of concentrating backwards when the enemy was in possession of, or in close proximity to, the assigned point of junction. In the second place, one at least of the Generals who were under him had been twice in the position in which he now was, that of acting directly under the instructions of distant authority. That man was Sir David Baird. He, at least, had no hesitation in expressing his opinion to Moore of the intentions of the Cabinet in no doubtful terms. He repeatedly wrote in the same strain, but perhaps most definitely on 23rd November from Astorga:—

“As it never could be the intention of the British Government that we should engage in the defence of this country unaided and unsupported by any Spanish force, I confess, my dear Sir John, I begin to be at a loss to discover an object at this moment in Spain.”

In reply to this and other appeals of the same kind Moore wrote on 28th November to Sir David:—

“I see my situation, and that of the army I command, in as unfavourable a light as you or any one can do. I have given it my best consideration. I know that you should have landed at Cadiz, and I should have met you at Seville, where the army should have been united and equipped. But it was

ordered otherwise, and it is our business to make every effort to unite here, and to obey our orders and the wishes of our country to aid the Spaniards as far as lies in our power. It would never do to retreat without making the attempt. If the enemy prevent us, there is no help for it; but if he does not, I am determined to unite the army. When that is done we shall act according to circumstances. We shall be from 32,000 to 35,000 men. There is still a chance that the presence of so large a British force may give spirits to the Spaniards, and I shall hope, if the cause is at last to be given up, to be able to make our retreat. I can give no orders more positive than I have already given you. I hold my resolve to remain and form the junction in the manner already explained in my former letters. In the execution of this you will use your discretion, as I do mine. If the enemy move against you, you cannot do it. You will, in that case, retreat, giving me notice. If he moves in force against me I must do the same, and I shall give you notice."

Thus, on the military point, Moore was entirely agreed with Sir David. In fact, no man who knew his business could think otherwise. He would not allow the separate parts of his army to be attacked by an enemy having the opportunity to concentrate against each in turn. On the other hand, as to the question whether, under the circumstances, it would be right for him, though unable to fulfil the original intentions of his Government, to remain and run much risk for the sake of aiding the Spaniards, he does not allow Baird's opinion to affect him in the least. He sends him orders in accordance with his own decision, and overruling Baird's. He was determined not to abandon the Spaniards as long as there was any prospect of his being able to act in their favour without hopelessly compromising his army. That he would not do if he could help it. As, however, he had no electric wire through which to obtain fresh instructions from his Government, he

was bound to use every means that was available for ascertaining their probable wishes. One obvious means for doing so was open to him. Mr. Frere, Canning's intimate friend, had quite recently come from London. To him Moore had been specially referred as the political authority in Spain. On the one single point, and no other, of the probable wishes of the Cabinet, Moore asked, as he was bound to ask, Frere's opinion. He also asked for all the information which Frere could give him as to the prospects of Spanish resistance. Frere had been specially directed to supply Moore with this information. Moore was bound to ask for it.

Frere completely misunderstood him, and dictated to him a military policy, as to which Moore had never asked his opinion in any way. I find it difficult to characterise Lord Londonderry's statement that Moore had repeatedly solicited Frere's opinion "touching the schemes in agitation,"¹ for he, if any one, had the opportunity of fully knowing the correspondence, and there is not a fact to justify it. But a later letter of Moore's so fully sums up the matter, that it is better to let him make his own statement:—

TO HIS EXCELLENCY J. H. FRERE.

SALAMANCA, 6th December 1808.

SIR,—I had the honour to receive on the 2nd inst. your letter of the 30th in answer to that which I addressed to you on the 27th inst. Had this army been united and ready to act at the time of General Castanos' defeat, much as I think it would have been risking it, yet it was my intention to have marched on Madrid and to have shared the fortunes of the Spanish nation. If I could not have sustained myself there, I thought, by placing myself behind the Tagus, I might give the broken armies, and the people

¹ Lord Londonderry's "Campaign in the Peninsula," p. 110.

of Spain, if they had patriotism left, an opportunity to assemble round me, and to march to the relief of the capital. That this was my intention is known to the officers with me who are in my confidence. It is known also to Lord Castlereagh, to whom I had imparted it in one of my late letters. I wished to have my opinion confirmed by yours, which was the reason of my addressing you on the 27th. Had you seen the affairs of Spain in a different light, and had you been adverse to the army being committed in the heart of Spain, your opinion upon such a subject would, I may say certainly, have decided me to have altered my intention. With respect to the determination I made on the evening of the 28th, upon receiving from Mr. Stuart the account of Castanos' defeat, I should, had you been with me, have communicated it to you, but should never have thought of asking your advice or opinion, as that determination was founded on circumstances with which you could not be acquainted,¹ and was, besides, a question merely military, of which I should have thought myself the best judge. At that time the army was divided into three different corps, and could not possibly be united before the 13th or 14th of this month, before which period there was every reason to believe that it would be attacked by all the force of the enemy, as after General Castanos' defeat I knew of no Spanish army from which it could receive the smallest assistance.

The army I commanded was weak from separation, and when united amounted to only 26,000 men fit for duty. I had been left without any communication with any of the Spanish armies. I expected no assistance from any, and it behoved me to consider the safety of the British troops. I, therefore, directed Sir David, whose corps would not have been collected at Astorga until the 4th of this month, to fall back on Corunna. I directed General Hope, by forced

¹ Obviously this refers to the fact that the army was not yet "mobilised," as we should now call it; that is to say, not yet fit to take the field from lack of adequate equipment and transport, while the military effect of the division was not a question to refer to Frere.

marches, to join me here, where I intended, if I were permitted, to wait his arrival; and I took measures for retiring with him upon Portugal, with a view either to defend that frontier and ultimately to return to Lisbon, or to return to Spain should any change of affairs there render it eligible. The resistance made by the people of Madrid has occupied the French and has prevented any corps from being detached against me. This example of enthusiastic patriotism in the capital, if it holds, may be followed by the most happy effects, if the flame communicates and the example is followed by the provinces. There has been no example of any such resistance in any other part of Spain; and though I hope this will produce it, I have neither seen nor heard of much enthusiasm or patriotism elsewhere. Their armies are devoid of both; and though I trust it will prove otherwise, I cannot but consider it as doubtful whether the people of Madrid will continue firm when they come to be pressed. If they yield, the whole is gone. I received yesterday a letter from the Junta of Madrid. I have ordered Sir David Baird to march back to Astorga, and have stopped my preparations for a retreat on Portugal. I have put myself in communication with the Marquis of la Romana at Léon, and, without being able exactly to say in what manner, everything shall be done for the assistance of Madrid and the Spanish cause that can be expected from an army such as I command. I cannot make a direct movement on Madrid, because the passage of the Guadarrama and Somosierra are in the hands of the French. Besides, until joined by Sir David Baird, I am much too weak. I have thought it my duty thus calmly to explain to you the reasons which have and do actuate my conduct; and I wish anxiously, as the King's Minister, to continue upon the most confidential footing with you; and I hope, as we have but one interest, the public welfare—though we may occasionally see it in different aspects—that this will not disturb the harmony that should subsist between us. Fully impressed as I am with these sentiments, I shall abstain from any remark upon the two letters from you

delivered to me last night and this morning by Colonel Charmilli, or on the message which accompanied them. I certainly, at first, did feel and express much indignation at a person like him being made the channel of a communication of that sort from you to me. Those feelings are at an end, and, I dare say, they never will be excited towards you again. If Mr. Charmilli is your friend, it was perhaps natural for you to employ him; but I have prejudices against all that class, and it is impossible for me to put any trust in him. I shall, therefore, thank you not to employ him any more in any communication with me. It is impossible not to remark, that whatever enthusiasm exists in the country a small portion of it belongs to the Junta, who would otherwise, I think, have found some place more central and less remote than Badajoz for their residence.

As this is the first mention that has appeared in these pages of a personage who has become very prominent in most narratives of Sir John Moore's campaign, it is necessary to mention very briefly the incident to which Moore alludes. It will be seen that Moore does not even condescend to record it in his Diary. On one only of his papers is there a significant endorsement referring to it. Colonel Charmilli, a foreign adventurer, whose scandalous conduct in transactions in England was subsequently exposed, had met Mr. Frere by chance. Charmilli had been present on 1st December in Madrid when the inhabitants were showing the greatest enthusiasm in their preparations to resist the French. Frere sent him on with an enthusiastic despatch of his own, that Charmilli might give Moore personal evidence of what he had seen. The Madrid "Junta of defence," as Moore has recorded, had already appealed to him. As he has also noticed, Morla, who immediately afterwards betrayed his country, and the Prince of Castel-

franco, who may or may not have been honest, were the military chiefs of the Junta, and had signed the appeal urging him to make some diversion in favour of Madrid. Colonel Charmilli produced no effect on Moore's mind, for a reason which will presently appear; but before his arrival Moore had begun to think it possible that Madrid might hold out long enough to occupy Napoleon's attention for some time, and to give him a chance of striking, in the meantime, upon the French line of communications with effect. Above all, an appeal from Stuart, whom he thoroughly trusted, had strongly influenced him.

It was no longer vague, ignorant chatter about "making a diversion" with which he had to deal. Making a diversion!! as if that were quite the easiest and most simple thing in the world, and did not certainly imply the having to deal with Napoleon's whole army when a "diversion" was directed against such a master of the art as Napoleon. On the contrary, now there began to rise before Moore's mind just the hope of a brilliant opportunity. If Napoleon were really obliged to occupy the front of his attack for some time before Madrid, and if, as Moore began to suspect, he was intending to push his columns by a more southerly line towards Portugal, there might be a real opportunity for upsetting all his plans by carrying out that very stroke to the north for which Moore had originally been sent. Napoleon might have calculated on his being tied to Portugal. He had not yet felt the influence of sea power in giving a freedom of base, and he could hardly know that the original scheme¹ of campaign had been calculated on

¹ e.g., *Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck*, 30th September 1808.—"It was the decided opinion of all military men . . . to make Corunna our principal dépôt, and to operate from thence."

the assumption that Corunna was to be the base of the whole army, and that depôts for the whole army had been arranged along the Corunna-Benevente line. These had been much upset by the successive movements in advance and retreat of Baird's army, and Moore's letters to Baird as soon as he has made up his mind to move forward, are urgent on him to restore them and look to them.

If Moore was to make his forward move at all, the one thing that was essential was that till the last possible moment not a hint should get abroad that he had decided to advance. His only hope of making an effective and relatively safe diversion was that Napoleon should up to the latest possible moment believe that he was intending to retire on Portugal. The more Moore's own army chattered and grumbled about it, the better. The one fixed law of all military experience is, that whatever is believed in one's own camp is believed also to be true in that of the enemy. This was the aspect of the question that most disturbed Moore when he found that Frere had not only entrusted his letter to Colonel Charmilli, but had considered it to be Moore's duty to confide to Colonel Charmilli¹ his decision. The personal insult and the complete ignorance of military matters which made Frere, in case of Moore's not confiding to Colonel Charmilli all his scheme, propose that Charmilli should be summoned before a council of war, was a comparatively trivial matter. Moore knew well how to deal with that. The council of war would certainly

¹ As does Mr. Oman in our day!! The same principle exactly guided Moore in his interview with the two, Escalante and Bueno, sent to him by the Junta; what they considered, and Mr. Oman condemns, as Moore's "frigid" bearing, was the necessary reticence of a General determined not to have his plans disclosed.

not be assembled by him, and if the whole army had been pleased to decide that they ought to go forward, and Moore had given orders for retreat, he knew how to make himself obeyed. It was not the first time that he had had to deal with a cabal. But that the Minister in whom he was directed to confide should understand war so little as to suppose that the way to carry out such an operation as now lay before Moore was to blazon it to the whole world, was an alarming feature that justly excited Moore's serious anxiety. Accordingly, what he has written on the back of Frere's extraordinary letter, requesting that he should allow Colonel Charmilli to be examined before a council of war, runs as follows:—

“Received from Colonel Charmilli the morning of the 6th December. He arrived at Salamanca on the evening of the 5th, and delivered to me a letter of the 3rd, but said unless he saw it necessary he was not to deliver this. He had attempted the evening before to speak confidentially to me, but, having no opinion of him, I avoided entering on any subject with him, Madrid or other, and wished to avoid letting him guess my design. I was surprised at the confidence put in him by Mr. Frere, and to find he knew the contents of the letters.”

From which it will be seen that, though the letter that Colonel Charmilli brought from Mr. Frere no doubt strongly co-operated with other reports to induce Moore to give to the prospect of Madrid's holding out the benefit of the doubt whether it might not possibly do so, Colonel Charmilli produced no effect whatever. It is to the general consensus of all the best reports he could get on this subject, including various people from Madrid whom Moore was able to cross-examine, that he refers in the following letter to Lord Castlereagh:—

To LORD CASTLEREAGH.

SALAMANCA, 5th December 1808.

Since I had the honour to address my despatch to you this morning I find considerable hopes are entertained from the enthusiastic manner in which the people of Madrid resist the French. I own I cannot derive much hope from the resistance of one town against forces so formidable unless the spark catches and the flame becomes general; and here the people remain as tranquil as if they were in a period of profound peace. I have, however, in consequence of the general opinion, which is also Mr. Frere's, ordered Sir David Baird to suspend his march, and shall continue at this place until I see further, and shall be guided by circumstances. Unless the spirit becomes general Madrid must soon fall. At all events, if I marched into Portugal it would be with a view to return the moment a favourable opportunity offered.

This letter contains one of Moore's phrases the most frequently misinterpreted, because, like all the others that are similarly treated, it is quoted out of its connection. It will be seen that when Moore speaks of the "general opinion," what he refers to is the general opinion of those best able to judge of the actual state of affairs in Madrid, and of the probability of their holding out, and of the flame catching on throughout Spain. Obviously, as he himself was not on the spot, he was bound to accept this as the best evidence of which the case admitted. His own doubt whether the enthusiasm could be trusted to last proved correct, but he was clearly right not to allow his own impressions at a distance to make him decide against the specific evidence of those who ought to have been able to judge better than he could.

It is a complete delusion that Moore's movement to the front was later than it need have been. The closing

up of the troops from Portugal, and the difficult operation of equipping and mobilising an army in a country where everything had to be purchased, by a General who had no money, was steadily going on all the time. From the beginning Moore had calculated that he would not be able to move forward before the beginning of December. He actually began his arrangements for moving on the 5th. Any one who has made any sort of effort to realise what kind of work it is to convert a mere congeries of regiments, without equipment for the field, without either regimental or army transport, and with wholly untrained departments, without established depôts, into an army that at once takes the field in the highest efficiency, will realise that, in moving his army across the villainous mountain roads of Portugal, in the worst season of the year, within two months of taking over the command (7th October–5th December), and completing its provision for taking the field within that time, Moore had accomplished a very remarkable feat. In the event, neither the movement of the guns nor the retrocession of Sir David Baird's corps made the movement later than it must, in any case, have been, for the preparations necessary for advance were barely completed by 5th December, and the army actually moved at the date originally fixed by the necessary conditions of mobilisation. On 4th December Moore visited Hope at Alba, and found that that skilful General had done what Moore had urged both on him and Baird. He had completed his equipment *en route*. Since it was possible to let Baird join in later, as he in fact did, and as the general trend of the movement was towards his part of the theatre of war, the several parts of the army were able to combine their movements and advance with the cavalry, in their right place in front, towards Valladolid as soon as

the army was ready. Baird's portion of the army, chiefly in consequence of the denuded state of the province through which he moved, was much more backward in point of equipment than the rest. A report which reached Moore incidentally obliged him to urge Baird to do what Hope and he himself had been doing, that is, he pressed him to pick up equipment wherever he could get it as he went along, and no longer to trust to that which had been the original scheme of the Government, that they should first effect their concentration and then complete their equipment. For that there would now not be time. Baird had only retreated as far as Villafraanca, so that the difficulties in equipment were more formidable than the distance to be recovered.

Before passing on to Moore's arrangement for a forward movement, I must draw attention to the last sentence of his letter to Castlereagh, in which he says that in any case if he falls back into Portugal it will only be with the intention of returning into Spain should opportunity present itself. A sentence of a letter to Hope, written at the time when he had made up his mind to fall back on Portugal and there unite his army, speaks of "giving the whole thing up" and falling back. This sentence has been so quoted as to leave the impression that what Moore then intended was to abandon the cause of Spain altogether. It meant nothing of the kind. "The whole thing" that he was intending to give up was the attempt to unite at Valladolid. All his despatches show that it was solely for the purpose of concentrating and completing the "mobilisation" of his army that he was then thinking of falling back. How far Mr. Frere understood this I am not sure, but in any case he did his utmost to persuade Moore to remain, even

if it should be certain that it would involve the destruction of his army. Mr. Oman, amongst others, accepts this as a quite probable result, and yet says that it was what the Ministry would have wished Moore to do. The answer is, that little as the Ministry loved Moore, and much as they loved Frere, Frere's own particular friend, Canning, was obliged to write a despatch which decisively approved Moore's resolution under the circumstances, and as courteously as possible let Frere know that he had been quite wrong in his view.

The following are the decisive passages of the despatch in question which was addressed by Canning to Frere on 10th December 1808, so that the copy of it was not received by Moore till some time after he had arrived at Benevente. It must be noted that Moore, though he had stated the reasons of his own actions, had sent home none of his correspondence with Frere, and that on that ground the Government for a long time declined to publish Frere's letters, as being private communications between him and Moore. Mr. James Moore, who, much as he desired to do justice to his brother, certainly did not understand his campaign, urged their publication so strongly, that the Ministry gave way; but I do not think that they had the influence on Moore's resolutions that Mr. J. Moore fancied they had. In any case, the following decisive letter from Canning was entirely based on the respective reports home of Moore and of Frere.

From CANNING to J. HOOKHAM FRERE.

FOREIGN OFFICE, 10th December 1808.

Thus at the same moment at which I receive from you the caution entertained in your No. 20, that a retreat

into Portugal would be considered by the Central Junta as indicating an intention to abandon the cause of Spain, His Majesty's Government receive the information that this measure has actually been adopted, but under circumstances which, it is supposed, could not have been in the contemplation of the Central Junta.

To obviate, however, the possibility of such an impression, as you apprehend, being produced on the Spanish Government by the retreat of the British armies, I lose no time in conveying to you His Majesty's commands that you should forthwith give the most positive assurances that the object of this retreat is no other than that of effecting in Portugal the junction which the events of the war have rendered impracticable in Spain, with the purpose of preparing the whole army to move forward again into Spain, whenever, and in what direction, their services may best be employed in support of the common cause.

You will recollect that the army, which has been appropriated by His Majesty to the defence of Spain and Portugal, is not merely a considerable part of the dispensable force of this country. It is, in fact, the British army. It may by a great effort reinforce this army for an adequate purpose. But another army it has not to send.

The proposals, therefore, which are made somewhat too lightly, for appending parts of this force sometimes to one of the Spanish armies, sometimes to another, and the facility with which its services are called for, wherever the urgency of the moment happens to press, are by no means suited to the nature of the force itself, or consonant to the views with which His Majesty has consented to employ it in Spain. You are already apprised by my former despatch (enclosing a copy of General Moore's instructions) that the British army must be kept together under its own commanders, must act as one body for some distinct object, and on some settled plan.

It will decline no difficulty, it will shrink from no

danger, when through that difficulty and danger the commander is enabled to see his way to some definite purpose.

But in order to this, it will be necessary that such purpose should have been previously arranged, and that the British army should not again be left, as that of Sir J. Moore and Sir D. Baird have recently been, in the heart of Spain without one word of information, except such as they could pick up from common rumour, of the events passing around them.

Previously, therefore, to General Sir J. Moore's again entering Spain, it will be expected that some clear exposition should be made to him of the system upon which the Spaniards intend to conduct the war; the points which they mean to contest with the advancing enemy, and those which, if pressed by a series of reverses, they ultimately propose to defend.

The part assigned to the British army in the combined operation must be settled with Sir J. Moore, and he will be found not unambitious of that in which he may be opposed most directly to the enemy.

This decisive document shows that Moore had strictly and correctly interpreted what must necessarily be the wishes of the Ministry when he decided, on Castanos' defeat, to remain as long as he safely could at Salamanca, and to bring up the parts of his army that had not yet joined him from Portugal, but to make all preparations for retreating and to unite with Baird in Portugal. It seems to me a strange way of writing history, when I find that Mr. Oman's only reference to it consists in saying that "the forces committed" to Moore "were, as was once remarked, not a British field army, but the only British field army," which leaves the impression that some casual remark of the man in the street has the same importance as the decision of a Cabinet between the general in the field and the diplomatist.

CHAPTER XXXI

THE GREAT STROKE

THE man who was about to throw himself upon the communications of Napoleon needed, if any ever did, to have "nerves of iron and shoes of felt." He must feel his way and watch his opportunity. That sooner or later the stroke must involve a retreat no one understood more clearly than Moore. Now he had, when engaged in watching for the invasion of England, pointed out that a retreat was a movement to which British troops were peculiarly ill adapted (page 73, *ante*). The very anxiety of the men to get at the enemy made them disposed to be disorderly in retreat. Even as late as 1812, after Wellington had been hanging and flogging the army into order for three years, and had gradually been able to improve every part of the organisation and to perfect all the departments, the retreat from Burgos quite broke down the discipline of the army except in a few regiments. Therefore, to undertake a movement, the nature of which was sure not to be understood by more than a very few of those who were under him, was for Moore a very risky thing with such raw troops as largely composed his army.

For fighting purposes they were splendid, but for a long retreat they were quite unprepared and quite untrained. Yet it was on the inevitable retreat that the whole value of Moore's move depended. The one method by which his small army of splendid fighting

quality could gain an advantage over a larger was to draw that larger army away into the mountainous and difficult district that lay between Benevente and Corunna. Whatever hardships the smaller army, falling back upon its established magazines, might suffer, it was certain that the larger army must suffer more, provided that the smaller army was able to hold out in good positions, with its rearguard, sufficiently long to allow whatever was not consumed and could not be carried away to be destroyed.

Moore at the time he personally left Salamanca on the 13th October had received very nearly exact information of the real strength of Napoleon's army, for on the 12th December Sir Charles Stewart, in a very brilliant cavalry skirmish, captured amongst other prisoners Colonel Avignac, from whom he heard particulars of ten corps d'armées, and ascertained the general direction in which they were moving. He heard also the strength of the Imperial Guards and of thirty-six regiments of cavalry.¹ Thus it was with full knowledge of the power of the army against which he was moving that Moore started on the raid against the French communications, a raid which at first was directed on Valladolid. As the prisoners also showed that the French army had no notion of the position of the British, but believed them to have retreated on Portugal, while the directions of the different columns favoured Moore's purpose, the strength of the French army naturally did not change his purpose at all. The larger the forces sent after him the better, the more completely would he have upset Napoleon's plans. Nor did the fact of the fall of Madrid, of which he heard, much alter the question. The French corps

¹ Lord Londonderry's "Campaign in the Peninsula," vol. i. p. 164.

being stationed, or moving, as they were, gave him his opportunity.

On the whole subject of the information Moore obtained, it is necessary to correct a misunderstanding into which Sir Bartle Frere more especially has fallen in regard to Moore's complaint at not receiving information from the Spanish Generals. The point of Moore's complaint lies solely in the fact that it was impossible for him to fulfil the instructions under which the whole campaign had been arranged without being loyally treated by the Generals with whom he was ordered to co-operate. Seeing that he was ordered not to advance without a plan concerted with them, the subject scarcely needs enlargement. From the officers he sent out to get reports and from the cavalry Moore received excellent information. The officers attached to the different Spanish armies had been chosen by Castlereagh without much knowledge of their character. Some of them were most unfortunate selections, the worst by far being Colonel Doyle, whose reports occupy in the Record Office volumes connected with the campaign, a larger space than Moore's own. As Moore promptly found out, and in fact knew beforehand, that he was the "mountebank" he was, Doyle did no other harm than that he misled the Government at home, and seems likely to mislead modern historians who are not able to detect the vanity and feebleness of his reports. Others, such as Colonels Graham and Symes, like Lord William Bentinck and Charles Stuart, sent most valuable reports.

Moore had to take what he could get. He had not the time or opportunity that Wellington afterwards had to organise an elaborate intelligence department of his

own. Neither had the Spanish peasantry as yet developed those guerilla bands which, both as sources of information and in other ways, became invaluable aids to Wellington. Rarely, nevertheless, has any General, at the moment of his entering on a campaign, if we reckon the campaign from the time he left Salamanca, been furnished with more complete information of the movements of his enemy than, thanks to the activity and excellence of his cavalry, reached Moore within the first few days. Almost every day witnessed fresh, small, but brilliant successes of our own over the French cavalry. Napoleon's communications with the north were completely cut. The capture of Berthier's despatch, and Moore's change of plan thereon, are fully recorded in the Diary in chap. xxvii. The steps which Moore took with regard to the future are detailed in the following letter to Lord Castlereagh. It should be noticed that, supposing that Soult had received a duplicate order, and had acted on it by moving on Benevente and Zamora, there were two distinct reasons why it became necessary promptly to unite with Baird, and not to continue the march on Valladolid. First, if Soult moved before the junction was effected, Baird's isolated corps would be endangered. Secondly, if the whole army were ready to receive Soult, the Marshal would be taken by surprise by the British army, of whose existence in the neighbourhood he knew nothing, and must have been overwhelmed. Soult had, in fact, not received a duplicate order, and did not move.

To LORD CASTLEREAGH. (Private.)

TORO, 16th December.

I was to have proceeded on the 15th to Valladolid, which place I should have reached the next day, when I

received the letter of which I send your Lordship a copy. It is from Berthier, Prince of Neuchatel, to Marshal Soult, Duke of Dalmatia. The officer who was charged with it was murdered by some peasants near Valdestillas, between Segovia and Valladolid, who brought the letter to our advanced posts under Brigadier-General Stewart.

I was determined, by the information it contained, to prefer the speedy union of the army to every other object, and therefore, instead of Valladolid, marched to this place.

I had already directed Sir David Baird to push on his corps by brigades to Benevente. The first arrived there yesterday, and the Brigade of Guards will reach it this day. I shall march from this to-morrow to some villages within two or three leagues of Benevente. I shall there be so close as to be able to protect Sir David's junction and make it perfectly secure. It will be the 20th before all his corps are up. If then Marshal Soult is so good as to approach us we shall be much obliged to him, but if not, we shall march towards him. It will be very agreeable to give a wipe to such a corps, although with respect to the cause generally it will probably have no effect, Spain being in the state described by Berthier's letter.

She has made no efforts for herself. Ours come too late, and cannot, at any rate, be sufficient. The French seem to have been ill-informed of our movements. They, however, will soon be acquainted with them, as our advanced posts have met, and General Charles Stewart, with a detachment of the 18th Dragoons, on the night of the 12th, surprised a detachment of their cavalry and infantry in the village of Rueda, and killed and took prisoners the greatest part of them. The affair was trifling, but was managed by the Brigadier-General with much address, and was executed with spirit by the officers and men. It was a detachment from Valladolid, where General Franceski commanded with 300 or 400 cavalry. He had no knowledge of our being so near, and would not believe one of the men who escaped from the village in the dark and carried to him the report of the surprise and defeat of the detachment.

Whether, when Bonaparte hears we have not retired to Lisbon, he will give to the corps on their march to Badajos a different direction, I cannot say, but whilst I march towards Soult I must take care not, too much, to uncover Astorga and the passes into Galicia, from whence in future I must draw all my stores, and through which alone, if pressed, I can ultimately retreat. Should, therefore, on my approach Soult retire towards Burgos to join Junot, who is on his march to that place with the 8th Corps, I shall, of course, be forced to desist and to return to this neighbourhood. In short, unless some great effort, of which there is now but little probability, is made by the Spaniards, it is evident how the business must terminate, for even if I beat Soult, unless the victory has the effect to rouse the Spaniards and to give their leaders ability, it will be attended with no other advantage than the character it will attach to the British arms.

I have apprised Sir John Craddock of Bonaparte's march to Badajos, which has since been confirmed to me by a man who left Talavera after his advanced guard had entered it. I have told him that in case of retreat mine will be through Galicia, and I have begged him, after selecting the quantity of tonnage necessary for the embarkation of the troops in Portugal, to send the rest to Vigo to wait my orders. The Lieutenant-General will communicate to your Lordship the quantity of tonnage he sends to Vigo, when you will be able to judge the quantity necessary to be sent there from England, should the re-embarkation of this army become necessary. Your Lordship must see the probability of such an event, and will, I fancy, think it right to have the means upon the spot. Should this army retire into Galicia, and remain in it any time, I understand from Sir David Baird that we shall want flour, which I should hope you will send from England. With respect to the propriety of sending reinforcements, I must leave your Lordship to determine. If at this moment I had 7000 or 8000 cavalry I should certainly do much. If we retire into the Gallicias they would be an encumbrance, and, to

enable us to keep our ground in Spain, the reinforcements of both cavalry, infantry, and artillery must be considerable indeed. I shall endeavour to give your Lordship from time to time every information, and must then leave you to form your determination; it is a subject upon which you can form as good a judgment as the best military man. I shall ever be of opinion that unless Spain herself makes greater efforts, and displays more ardour and energy in her own cause, the efforts of England can be of no avail.

P.S.—I received a letter on the 13th from the Marquis of Romaña in which he says he will send an officer to me, as he does not dare to commit to paper by a messenger the subject he has to communicate. This officer is not yet come. The Marquis is still at Léon, he says, with 20,000 men, 3000 of whom have no arms; but from Sir David Baird's account they are in no state to be much depended on, and he seems also to doubt their number. The fugitives from that and other armies are spread over the whole country; they have, in general, their arms, and will be troublesome subjects to the French, and we may expect to hear of continual insurrections in different parts of Spain, of massacres, &c.; but there must be a great change in the conduct and character of this country before the people are brought to assemble in armies and to act upon system.

It must be remembered that as yet Moore could not base calculations for the safety of Portugal upon the results of his own diversion, which, in fact, protected Portugal far more effectually by drawing off the French corps intended for its invasion, than any direct defence could do. The Portuguese forces, though they were being organised, were as yet quite unfit to contribute seriously to the defence of the country. The British army was formed of raw troops that had been sent back to be trained because they were not as yet fit to take the field. Moore had urged that steps should be taken to create defensive works; but

these were only in embryo. Portugal, as Wellington always found and definitely declared, was not a country that could be defended on the frontiers. There was only one effective defence of Portugal that could be carried out within its own borders, namely, that which Wellington adopted when he fortified the lines of Torres Vedras covering the port of Lisbon, and to the best of his ability, by drawing within them all the resources of the country, left to an enemy only a desert outside it. For this there was no time, nor had Moore authority. The army in Portugal was not under his orders. Moore might hope that his diversion would draw off the French invasion, as he soon afterwards found that it had done; but, having learned from Berthier's despatch as well as from Napoleon's proclamations that Napoleon's whole strength was to be thrown into the invasion of Portugal in order to fulfil his boast of planting his standards on the walls of Lisbon, it was an obvious duty for him to warn Craddock to have ships ready for embarkation in case of the worst. With such an army, under such a leader against him as he now knew that he had to contend with, it was clearly also his only policy, after having drawn it after him into the north-west corner of Spain, to reserve the power of being able to elude its grasp, and, leaving it only an empty shadow to embrace, to take advantage of sea facilities to reappear unharmed in some distant part of the Peninsula.

I have so fully dealt with the question of the relative responsibilities of a Cabinet and of a general in the field, that it would not be necessary to touch on what Moore says about reinforcements, but that, by one of those strange perversions of his words, of

which I have had to note so many, he has been made to say that he did not care for reinforcement. To Lord William Beresford, from Salamanca on the 13th November, he wrote: "I have no objection to you or Mr. Frere representing the necessity of as many more British troops as you think proper. It is certain that the agents whom our Government have hitherto employed have deceived them, for affairs here are by no means in the flourishing state they were represented and believed to be in England, and the sooner that the truth is known in England the better; *but you must observe, my Lord, that whatever is critical must now be decided by the troops which are here. The French, I suspect, are ready, and will not wait.*" It is clear that the whole point of this sentence lies in that which I have put in italics. Moore could not judge what reinforcements the Government could send, but it was palpable that the critical decision must be reached before they had arrived. Yet by quoting out of its context the first phrase as to reinforcements, Moore has been made to appear unwilling to deal with a larger army than he had.¹

One other point in the despatch requires to be noticed. It is all-important in regard to the conditions of retreat. Moore now learns for the first time from Sir David Baird that flour, that is, bread, will be deficient on the march. Moore's earlier despatches, both to Lord Castlereagh and to Sir David Baird, teem with details of all that will be wanted for the dépôts from Corunna to the front. Castlereagh had undertaken to send, and did send, immense quantities of biscuit to Corunna, but the district was so denuded of transport, and the silver difficulty at the time it was

¹ "Memoir of John Hookham Frere," p. cx note.

most wanted was so great, that Baird had not been able to get it forward. That apart, there can be no doubt whatever that the system of retreat which Moore laid out for himself was the right one. He from the first determined to avoid a general battle, and to fight only rearguard actions, in which on every occasion the British troops asserted their superiority. He did so not in the least from any want of confidence in the fighting qualities of his troops. No one had more confidence than he. Every skilled soldier in Europe or America will know that it was the right game for him to play. He was inflicting far more injury on Napoleon, and actually, as the event proved, far more losses on the pursuing force, by drawing them on to the north-west angle of Spain, than by fighting a battle which was, as he says (p. 380 *post*), Napoleon's game. Only it was essential that, in order to make the pursuit as difficult and costly as possible, the pursuers should be obliged to keep large numbers at the front, whom it would be difficult to feed: that by ruse and artifice they should be continually made to think that small numbers were in front of them and be surprised by many, and that if a strong position offered itself the enemy should be so far challenged as to be obliged to close up his ranks and then be left wondering what had become of his enemy.

If this method of action was wise in any case, it became imperative, since the stores that had been accumulated lacked the one essential element of food. That detail is one which is comically unconsidered either by Southey or Mr. Oman. Both of them went over the ground, and came to the conclusion that magnificent defensive positions existed in the district through which Moore passed. Moore

does not deny it. The only difficulty was that in them his army would have starved. Literally, he asks for bread and they give him a stone. But though this was unquestionably the view which any competent general would have taken of the situation, it was very naturally not the view that was taken by the soldiers. Moreover, undoubtedly for the reasons I have alleged already, many of the general officers were much disposed to cabal against Moore. Hope and the two Pagets were devotedly loyal to him, and the army at large had the utmost confidence of victory under his orders, but they wanted to fight. They did not like to leave all the fighting to the rearguard. They could not understand Moore's entirely correct action.

Exactly applicable to Moore's method is Napoleon's saying,¹ "that a battle should never be risked unless the chances are seventy per cent. in favour of success; that, in fact, a battle ought always to be the last resource, as, from the nature of things, its result is always doubtful." Moore had a far more effective resource, and therefore was right in only twice during his retreat offering battle—once at Lugo, and once when he was obliged and delighted to fight at Corunna. I go thus into the principles of the retreat here, because my concern being with Moore, and not with the details of the movement, I propose to deal with it very shortly, chiefly in Moore's own words. It has been admirably described by Napier, and only at one point shall I have a word of suggestion to offer on his narrative. Otherwise I have no intention of putting myself in competi-

¹ Orders of Napoleon, Shönbrunn, 21st August 1809. "New Letters of Napoleon," from the French, by Lady Mary Lloyd. W. Heinemann,

tion with his brilliant description. I have carefully compared his history with Mr. Oman's recent criticisms, both with the original authorities. Any one who will be at the trouble of doing so will see that Mr. Oman's inveterate hatred of the politician has blinded him to the profound professional knowledge of the soldier, and has led him in this part of his narrative into the most unfair references to Napier. Napier's view of Moore was not that of some partial friend, but is the true portrait of the man as described and seen by those who can best be trusted, by the very soldiers whom Wellington was obliged afterwards to choose for nearly every important position for which he had to select men. Nothing is so misleading as the camp gossip which is reproduced in many memoirs. I know no better test of the value of this than a comparison between Moore's Diary and a little memoir which appears in vol. x. of the *Oxfordshire Light Infantry Chronicle*. The writer was a subaltern under Baird, full of energy and zeal. It is not difficult to picture the confusion which would oppress his mind at the successive orders for advance and retreat, the motives for which he did not know, though each was determined by sound reasons. Nor is it safe to assume, as has been done, that Moore ought to have regulated his conduct by the opportunities he would afford Napoleon for bulletins and for the equally trustworthy letters from Spaniards which appeared in the *Madrid Gazette* under Napoleon's direction. It is necessary to remember Napoleon's view of these: "The man in the ranks has no judgment; but intelligent officers, whose opinion is to be esteemed, who form their judgment with knowledge, pay little attention to orders of the day and proclamations, and understand how to

appreciate facts.”¹ The “man in the ranks” of this sentence applies to a large proportion of all those who are enacting the part of pawn without knowing why they are moved, whether they be officers or soldiers. By what means could Moore any more than Wellington have prevented Napoleon from giving such a report as this—which Napoleon sent as soon as he knew of the result of Talavera? “Give Metternich the news,” he wrote to his Foreign Minister, “that in Spain General Wellesley, with 30,000 English, has been thoroughly beaten about three days’ journey from Madrid, and that, as a consequence, the English will be driven into the sea.”²

Moore’s Diary carries the history down to the time when he had ordered the retreat on Benevente. The following letter to Frere will show how vigilantly before this he was watching for the movement he was expecting from Napoleon, and will explain how it was that he obtained such early news of it:—

To J. H. FRERE.

SAHAGUN, 23rd December 1808.

The movement I am making is of the most dangerous kind. I not only risk to be surrounded at every moment by superior forces, but to have my communication intercepted with the Gallicias. I wish it to be apparent to the whole world, as it is to every individual of this army, that we have done everything in our power in support of the Spanish cause, and that we do not abandon it until long after the Spaniards had abandoned us.

¹ “Le soldat ne juge point ; mais les militaires de sense, dont l’opinion est estimable et qui juge avec connaissance des choses, font peu d’attention aux ordres du jour et aux proclamations et savent apprécier les événements.” —*Corresp. de Napoléon*, vol. xix. p. 571.

² “New Letters of Napoleon,” from the French, by Lady Mary Lloyd. W. Heinemann, 1898.

It was unquestionably this feeling that they had been abandoned by the Spaniards, and just at the moment that this abandonment had deprived them of the opportunity of gaining the victory over Soult to which they were looking forward, that produced in the army the rage and disappointment which the following graphic description from a MS. in my possession records. It begins first at the moment when the troops were parading at Sahagun :—

“ Everything showed that Sir John Moore had adopted the glorious determination to attack the enemy, and no decision could have been more eagerly embraced by his whole army. Every one seemed animated with the same spirit, and the enthusiasm that glowed in this handful of Britons is perfectly indescribable. We were to move in two columns at eight o'clock at night, and by break of day we should be close to our foes, who, no doubt, from their strong position, would give us a warm reception.

“ At the appointed hour our men were under arms and in the most cheering spirits. The artillery were on the road, the baggage collected, the necessary arrangements made for the wounded in the convents. All with impatience awaited the moment of attack. The spirit that ran throughout our ranks was the most impetuous ever witnessed. Every heart beat high, every breast was buoyant for victory, and every countenance demonstrated the eagerness with which they awaited the order to advance. Our Grenadiers had reached the foot of the convent stairs when, astonished and struck with dismay, we heard Sir David Baird give these heartrending orders, ‘ Go back to your quarters and be ready to march in the morning.’ For several moments the men stood transfixed, and at length their disappointment broke out into a murmur, and every countenance lost its high-wrought anxiety. Indeed, the effect of this counter-order on our soldiers was the most extraordinary, and from the greatest pitch of exultation and courage at once a solemn gloom pre-

vailed throughout our ranks. Nothing was heard on every side but the clang of firelocks thrown down in despair, which before they guarded as their dearest treasure, and from the high order they were in had placed in them implicit confidence. The reasons for abandoning so grand a design, when glory seemed calling on our commander to obey and receive a victory so decidedly within his reach, did not transpire until next morning" (p. 74).¹

This is the more valuable because, as soon as the facts were known, it is evident that he and his men realised the necessity. After stating what had happened—

"These circumstances caused our General to relinquish an attack which, although successful, could not have been of any ultimate advantage to the cause we were engaged in" (p. 77).

Nevertheless, the recognition of the necessity did not alter the effect on the spirits of the men, who did not realise how completely they were defeating Napoleon's plans, and could only feel how unhappy they were "to retreat with all our gay hopes and desires withered and fled" (p. 78).

"What a difference," he says, "exists between the humour of an advancing and retreating army, especially when composed of English. All their spirit and emulation to keep up was now changed to dejection and disappointment" (p. 85).

The Duke of Wellington, in his one criticism of Moore's campaign, says that Moore ought, in anticipation of his retreat, "to have sent officers to the rear to mark and prepare the halting-places for every brigade."

¹ "Memoir of Campaign of 1808 in Spain under Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore, K.B." By Captain James Sterling, 42nd Royal Highlanders, who died in 1818, aged 25 years.

Any moderately respectable divisional general, or even brigadier, in our day would be exceedingly astonished if, when he had received orders and a route for the march of his unit, officers from headquarters were sent to prepare the several halting-places. We should certainly regard that as the work of the divisional and brigade staffs. If it really was the practice in Wellington's own army towards the end of the Peninsular War for headquarters to interfere in such a matter, then all that can be said is that it is an extraordinary illustration of the extent to which Wellington, in his utter contempt for his subordinate generals, had reduced the whole army to the condition of a mechanical instrument in his own hand. Moore had under him such generals as I have described, and there can be no doubt that for men with the experience of Baird, Hope, and Spencer, each of them fully accustomed to independent commands, and two of them having exercised them throughout this very campaign, it would, in all probability, have appeared to Moore an insult to them to take their proper duty out of their hands. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that many of the subordinate staffs were quite inexperienced in war, and that their neglect did contribute very much to the discomfort and disorder of the soldiers. Moore had collected round him as brilliant a body of men as ever accompanied a general in the field—Colborne, afterwards Lord Seaton, was his military secretary; Murray, who had been with him in Sweden, was his Quartermaster-General; Graham, afterwards Lord Lynedoch, his ever-faithful Anderson, and George Napier were on his staff, as was also Captain, afterwards Lord Hardinge. But all the generals had not with equal judgment made their friends and chosen their staffs solely for the sake of their professional zeal, knowledge,

and efficiency, and the following passage will show how soon this began to tell upon the troops :—

“About five o'clock (December 31st) we reached a few miserable dwellings inhabited by horror-struck and famished peasantry. Close to them we halted, and piled our arms in the snow. There appeared neither wood nor water near us to cook our scanty morsel. Impatient to satisfy the urgent demands of nature, the men pulled down doors, carried away chairs, carts, &c., from the isolated houses of the helpless natives. No attempt had been made by the staff to supply the troops with wood, and it was impossible to restrain the urgent and absolute wants of a fatigued and half-starved army. Indeed, destruction and terror are the concomitants of a retreating and disappointed army, and the miseries and dire distress at this period of ours is beyond the power of description.”¹

And again later :—

“The terror and alarm of a retreat had caused the peasantry to desert their villages on our approach, and left nothing but empty dwellings.”

This unjustly, but under the circumstances inevitably, infuriated the soldiers, who considered that the Spaniards had deserted those who had come to defend their country, and it led the disgusted soldiery into frightful excesses, which in many regiments were not adequately restrained. It is better to complete this ugly feature of the retreat, which, among the men who were not engaged under Paget and Moore in the brilliant rearguard actions, gradually grew worse and worse. It was seriously aggravated by three special causes—first, at Astorga, Romaña, who had promised Moore to leave that town clear for him, was driven into it by Soult's pursuit, and the starving, fever-

¹ Captain Stirling as above, pp. 90, 94, MS.

stricken rabble that he commanded, breaking in upon soldiery already furious against the Spaniards, so interfered with the distribution of food and supplies that it could not be properly carried out, and the men seized the stores of liquor and became helpless and insubordinate from drink. Secondly, on the 4th January 1809 an intolerable piece of negligence on the part of Sir David Baird entailed most unnecessary fatigue and exposure on the divisions of Hope and Fraser. Moore had sent despatches to Baird to be forwarded to them. For this purpose Moore had sent his own aide-de-camp, George Napier, with a personal message to Baird, pointing out their importance. Baird handed them over to a drunken orderly, who lost them. Baird's division, moreover, at Bembibre had broken into the wine-vaults, and worse scenes than those at Astorga had taken place. The losses of the retreat were almost entirely due to this disorder and drunkenness. Those who have followed the evidence I have given of the extent to which the quality of regiments varied, depending as it did upon the character of their commanding officer, and will consider the conditions of recruitment, will not be surprised that men unable to understand why they were not led against the enemy, and with officers who understood it as little, under generals many of them not too loyal to their chief, having none of the excitement of the rearguard actions and passionately angry with the Spaniards, should under the inevitable hardships of a retreat have become thoroughly disorderly and have suffered accordingly. Nevertheless the fact remains that the rearguard, which did all the fighting, lost fewer men than the regiments whose retreat it was protecting. There is no answer to that as a proof that the retreat was none too rapid.

The more rapid it was the greater difficulties it entailed on the pursuing force, which had as best it could to bring up supplies where it had no magazines to work upon, through a denuded and mountainous country.

To return to Moore. He arrived at Benevente on the 26th and remained there till the 30th, superintending the general movement. A series of brilliant cavalry actions throughout this time covered the retreat of the army, gained advantages over the wearied horsemen whom Napoleon had forced through the snow-clad mountains in his vain pursuit, and imposed upon Soult, delaying him for two days. On the 29th, in Napoleon's presence, they captured Lefebvre, as recorded already (page 298).

The following letters from Benevente exactly describe Moore's views at this time, and flatly contradict much that has been said about them:—

To the MARQUIS DE LA ROMANA.

BENEVENTE, 27th December 1808.

The enemy are advancing, but I believe their main body only reached Valladolid yesterday. The movement I made to Sahagun has answered every purpose I had a right to expect. A little more good fortune would have enabled me to cut up Soult's corps, but the attention of the enemy has at last been attracted from other objects. His march on Badajoz has been stopped, and the forces in the south will have time to be formed and to come forward. I shall continue my movement upon Astorga. It is there or behind it we should fight a battle, if at all. If the enemy follows so far, he will leave himself the more open to the efforts of the south. My opinion is that a battle is the game of Bonaparte, not ours. We should, if followed, take defensive positions in the mountains, where his cavalry can be of no use to him, and there either engage him in

an unequal contest with us, oblige him to employ a considerable corps to watch us, or to retire upon Madrid, in which last case we should again come forth into the plain. In this manner we give time for the arrival of reinforcements from England. It gives time to your army to be formed and equipped, and that of the south to come forth. In short, the game of Spain and of England, which must always be the same, is to procrastinate and to gain time, and not, if it can be helped, place the whole stake upon the hazard of a battle.

To GENERAL BRODRICK, at Corunna.

BENEVENTE, 28th December 1808.

I had advanced to Sahagun in the hope of attacking Marshal Soult, who with 16,000 men was at Saldanha. The real object of my march, however, was to create a diversion in favour of the south of Spain, by attracting the attention of the enemy in his direction.

I knew the danger of having my communication with the Gallicias interrupted, but from a wish to do something I took my chance. On the 23rd the army was prepared to march from Sahagun to Carrion, when I received information that reinforcements had arrived from Valencia, and that the French were marching from Madrid on Valladolid or Salamanca. I had no time to lose. I began my retreat on the 24th and arrived here on the 26th. We are continuing our march. I shall leave this with the last of the infantry to-morrow. As yet the enemy's infantry are not up, but are near. Their cavalry is becoming very numerous. It is not my wish to fight a battle. That at present is not our game, which is rather to save this army: to protect and give time to the Spaniards to rally, if they can. I may, however, be compelled to fight one if much pressed.

If once I enter the mountains I fear the want of subsistence will compel me to go to the coast. At all events, a re-embarkation is a most probable event; and I wish you to give this information to the Admiral.

I long ago represented to Lord Castlereagh the neces-

sity of sending transports for the embarkation of the troops from Portugal, to send the rest to Vigo for us. The Admiral may perhaps enforce this. I shall write to you in a day or two at more leisure. In the meantime I give you this notice. The force coming against me is so superior, that if it presses me I must retire, but otherwise hold as long as I can.

To LORD CASTLEREAGH.

BENEVENTE, 28th December 1808.

The march of the French on Badajos was stopped when its advanced guard had reached Talavera de la Reina, and everything disposable is now turned in this direction. The stores I had collected here are moving back to Astorga, and those at Astorga to Villafranca; the roads are very bad, and the means of carriage scanty. If I am pressed I must lose some of them, and I may be forced to fight a battle. This, however, I shall endeavour to avoid, for certainly in the present state of things it is more Bonaparte's game than mine. It is said he comes himself, with 10,000 of his Guards. The force moving against us cannot be less than 50,000. We shall, when at Astorga, be about 27,000. The Marquis de Romaña came forward to Mansilla with 6000, to co-operate with me in the attack on Soult. I therefore conclude that he cannot have above 8000 fit for action. The country about Astorga offers no advantage to an inferior army. I shall therefore not stop there longer than to secure the stores, and shall retreat to Villafranca, where I understand there is a position, but if the French pursue I must hasten to the coast, for there is a road to Orense which leads more direct to Vigo, and which, of course, renders the position at Villafranca of no avail.

Some time ago the Marquis de la Romaña intimated his intention of returning into the Gallicias, by Astorga and Villafranca. I endeavoured to dissuade him from it, pointing out to him that it was the only communication

we had for our retreat or supplies, and begged that it might be left open to us; he stopped his start for the moment, but I much fear he will now prosecute it. In which case, I know not how it will be possible for us to pass. I had the honour to receive your Lordship's despatches of the 10th by Captain Hardinge yesterday morning. I shall be guided by circumstances, and shall not, you may rest assured, retreat an inch beyond what I am compelled to do. I fear that if once I am forced into the mountains, the want of the means of subsistence will make it necessary to proceed down to the coast to be provisioned from the ships. I need hardly add the necessity of sending immediately the means of transport to re-embark the army at Vigo or Corunna.

As regards the uncertainty between Vigo and Corunna, it is to be noticed that a long correspondence had taken place between Sir David Baird and Moore on the subject, that Moore had always intended Corunna as the point of embarkation, but had so far yielded to Sir David, whose local evidence ought to have been valuable, that he had before he left Salamanca ordered officers to report fully on the subject. These reports did not reach him till 4th January at Las Harrerías. He then at once ordered the change of route to Corunna.

The next stage is recorded in the following letter:—

ASTORGA, 31st December 1808.

MY LORD,—I arrived here yesterday, where, contrary to his promise and my expectation, I found the Marquis de Romana with a great part of his troops. Nobody can describe his troops to be worse than he does, and he complains as much as we do of the indifference of the inhabitants, his disappointment at their want of enthusiasm, and said to me in direct terms that had he known how

things were, he neither would have accepted the command nor have returned to Spain. With all this, however, he talks of attacks and movements which are quite absurd, and then returns to the helpless state of his army and of the country.

It will thus be seen that Napier is entirely right in saying that Romaña's proposals were "to commence *offensive operations* and plans, in comparison of which the visions of Don Quixote were wisdom." Mr. Oman, by discussing them as if the proposals were defensive, and thereon assailing Napier, shows only that he has not ascertained the facts.

The following may serve as a general statement of Moore's work throughout:—

"During all this retreat Moore accompanied the reserve, and rode beside his friend General Paget, their chief. His cheerful demeanour sustained the spirits of the wayworn, suffering soldiers. He praised their superior discipline on the march, and warmly applauded their gallant conduct in action."—"History of the Rifle Brigade," p. 36.

Whilst he was thus almost daily engaged in personally superintending the actual fighting, it would have been hardly too much to expect that the Generals whose march he was guarding would themselves have dealt with the disorder that had arisen among those who were marching peaceably under the protection of the reserve. Lord Londonderry shows the cloven foot of one at least of the abettors of disorder, by complaining that Moore's general orders and vigorous action to repress it, as far as he could, without support from all who ought to have helped him, were too severe. That was not the view of loyal soldiers. During the retreat from Vigo it is recorded that—

"In the former part of the retreat there was a mingled feeling of indignation and pity for the loiterers, but now all commiseration was at an end; the rearguard had only one object in view, to keep the army as effective as possible, and the soldiers of the reserve were so disgusted with the conduct of those worthless fellows, that they beat and kicked them forward on the road."—"History of the Rifle Brigade," p. 104.

While the same Captain Sterling, whom I have already quoted, who being in Baird's division must have seen plenty of disorder, writes that—

"Moore possessed eminent ability to conciliate even in the severity necessary to the support of discipline; with manners refined by a most excellent education, knowledge of the world, tempered by experience and thought, he drew the attachment and confidence of all under his command. When appointed to head the army in Spain the regard he was held in by the troops was proclaimed as universal, and in every period of hard struggle he had to sustain, that army placed in his known abilities, decision, and interest for their welfare and his country's good, the most implicit confidence. Never had he given them orders to face their foe, even when bending under famine and fatigue, than with alacrity, nay, with soul-inspired enthusiasm, they obeyed with joy the summons; and at last, in their greatest extremity, when they beheld their beloved commander fall, in the midst of their undaunted ranks, they were going on to Glory and to Victory. In the breast of every British soldier that fought under the gallant Moore the same tribute of regard and sincere regret must be felt, and every heart beat high in relating his virtues and telling of his short-lived glory."—Sterling, as above, p. 129.

The successive rearguard actions of the march are well worthy of a soldier's study, but I have not space among the ample matter of Moore's biography to do

them justice; to show how, by his appeals to his old regiment, the 51st, in the case of others to the memories of Egypt, and at all times and places to the patriotism and the noble side of the men, he day after day wrought them up to a passionate devotion, and roused them to splendid actions such as reward those who can so appeal to the British soldier. Nor can I do justice in detail to the ruse, the judgment, the tactical skill, and the military knowledge to which Colborne (p. 88, *ante*), who saw it all, has borne such ample testimony. There is, I think, only one point during the march that needs a little comment. When Moore decided to move on Corunna, Crauford's brigade was committed to the march to Vigo. William Napier being, naturally enough, very much disappointed at not taking part in the battle of Corunna, at which both his brothers were present, says that Moore missed Crauford's brigade there. Now certainly if Moore's object had been to defeat Soult in a great action, he could not have had too many troops present. But, unfortunately, Moore had no means whatever of forcing Soult to a general action. Soult had at Lugo, where Moore was without Crauford's light brigade, refused to attack, and, therefore, Moore's one purpose was to embark unmolested and as rapidly as possible. For that purpose, so long as he was able to have with him at Corunna sufficient troops to maintain his position—and he amply proved that he had judged rightly in that respect—it is clear that the movement by two roads and to two ports greatly facilitated his attempt. He had, by a skilfully managed ruse, gained four days on Soult. He would have lost much time had his column been lengthened on the one road. It was certainly advisable to have a flanking column on the

Baneza Orense and Vigo road. The light brigade had separated off on 31st December at Bonillas. It was not till five days afterwards that Moore at Las Herrerias received the report of the engineers, and decided at once to move on Corunna.

Therefore, though then Moore had no choice in the matter, not being able to recall Crauford, I am not convinced that Moore regretted the additional facilities of embarkation given by the two ports, and certainly the charge which has been made elsewhere, that he did not decide the question before he had received the reports, is a comic one. The point which appears to be constantly forgotten in all these comments is the extreme brevity of the whole campaign. From the time that Moore received the command to the day of his death was barely over three months. During that time he had mobilised an army that had no field organisation at all, had, despite all his money difficulties, purchased all his field equipment, and had marched from Lisbon to Salamanca, from Salamanca to Sahagun, and from Sahagun to Corunna; incidentally, on the way, utterly upsetting all the schemes of the mightiest potentate of the day, and saving Spain from utter destruction. During that time there was little enough to spare to get the elaborate reports of engineers on a difficult district and three harbours, and there was none to wait for them. I know no other point of the actual campaign in which Napier, political passion apart, is not strictly correct.

Napier's description of the battle of Corunna is too good to be superseded, but in one respect it requires to be supplemented. Apparently he did not know at the time the facts which he has mentioned in his brother's life. It is Sir Charles Napier who thus records how

Moore's death-wound just saved the French army from utter destruction. But as a picture of Moore himself in battle it is finer than anything else I know, and the whole record of Moore's influence on such a man as Sir Charles Napier is the best memorial to him that has ever been erected.¹

Our line was under arms, silent, motionless, yet all were anxious for the appearance of Sir John Moore. There was a feeling that under him we could not be beaten, and this was so strong at all times as to be a great cause of discontent during the retreat wherever he was not. "Where is the General?" was now heard along that part of the line where I was, for only of what my eyes saw and my ears heard do I speak. This agitation augmented as the cries of men stricken with cannon-shot arose. I stood in front of my left wing, on a knoll, from whence the greatest part of the field could be seen, and my picquets were fifty yards below, disputing the ground with the French skirmishers; but a heavy French column, which had descended the mountain at a run, was coming on behind with great rapidity, and shouting "En avant, tue, tue, en avant, tue!" their cannon at the same time, plunging from above, ploughed the ground and tore our ranks. Suddenly I heard the gallop of horses, and turning saw Moore. He came at speed, and pulled up so sharp and close he seemed to have alighted from the air, man and horse looking at the approaching foe with an intenseness that seemed to concentrate all feeling in their eyes. The sudden stop of the animal, a cream-coloured one, with black tail and mane, had cast the latter streaming forward, its ears were pushed out like horns, while its eyes flashed fire, and it snorted loudly with expanded nostrils, expressing terror, astonishment, and muscular exertion. My first thought was, it will be away like the wind, but then I looked at the rider and the horse was forgotten. Thrown on its haunches the animal came, sliding and dashing the dirt up with its fore-

¹ "Life of Sir Charles Napier," by Sir W. Napier, 1857, vol. i. pp. 94-96.

feet, thus bending the General forward almost to its neck ; but his head was thrown back and his look more keenly piercing than I ever before saw it. He glanced to the right and left, and then fixed his eye intently on the enemy's advancing column, at the same time grasping the reins with both his hands, and pressing the horse firmly with his knees. His body thus seemed to deal with the animal, while his mind was intent on the enemy, and his aspect was one of searching intenseness beyond the power of words to describe. For a while he looked, and then galloped to the left without uttering a word. I walked to the right of my regiment, where the French fire from the village of Elvina was now very sharp, and our picquets were being driven in by the attacking column ; but I soon returned to the left, for the enemy's guns were striking heavily there, and his musketry also swept down many men. Meeting Stanhope, I ordered him to the rear of the right wing, because the ground was lower. It was his place. He was tall, the shot flew high, and I thought he would be safer. Moore now returned, and I asked him to let me throw our Grenadiers, who were losing men fast, into the enclosures in front. "No," he said, "they will fire on our picquets in the village." "Sir, our picquets, and those of the 4th Regiment also, were driven from thence when you went to the left." "Were they ? then you are right ; send out your Grenadiers," and again he galloped away. Turning round I saw Captain Clunes of the 50th, just arrived from Corunna, and said to him, "Clunes, take your Grenadiers and open the ball." He stalked forward alone, like Goliath before the Philistines, for six feet five he was in height, and of proportionate bulk and strength ; his Grenadiers followed, and thus the battle began on our side.

Again Sir John Moore returned, and was talking to me when a round shot struck the ground between his horse's feet and mine. The horse leaped round, and I also turned mechanically, but Moore forced the animal back, and asked me if I was hurt. "No, sir." Meanwhile a second shot had torn off the leg of a 42nd man, who screamed horribly, and rolled about so as to excite agitation and alarm with others.

The General said, "This is nothing, my lads; keep your ranks; take that man away; my good fellow, don't make such a noise; we must bear these things better." He spoke sharply, but it had a good effect, for this man's cries had made an opening in the ranks, and the men shrunk from the spot, although they had not done so when others had been hit who did not cry out. But again Moore went off, and I saw him no more.

Charles Napier then, in most graphic fashion, tells how he, with Stanhope at his side, broke with his regiment into Elvina, how, for some reason which he could not imagine, his men would not come on, and how the one horror that possessed his soul was the thought that Moore would think that the regiment and he had disgraced themselves. He was certain then of being able to capture the great French battery, if only he had been supported, and of turning the whole French left. He little knew at the time that the blight which had fallen on the battle was the death-wound of Moore.

"Lord William Bentinck afterwards told me," he says, "that he had ordered my regiment back, in direct contradiction of Moore's design, who had, he admitted, told him not to recall me, but send men to my assistance!"

On the opposite hill, whilst Napier and Stanhope were making their triumphant progress through Elvina, driving the French before them and threatening to capture the great battery, Moore was watching the movement.

He "with exultant applause gave instant orders to support the impetuous counter-stroke. Had those orders been obeyed Soult's army would have been lost; but just then the heroic Moore fell, and error followed when the presiding spirit was gone."¹

¹ Life of Sir C. Napier.

In the "History of the Peninsular War" William Napier has shown how hopeless Soult's position was in case of defeat. Had the great turning movement, which Moore had so skilfully devised for Paget with the reserve, been carried to its conclusion, and had Napier's attack on Elvina been supported and carried through, the French army must have been destroyed, and the retreating army would have been able to embark with the guns of their pursuers as a trophy of victory.' But it was not to be.

It was in that moment of triumph that Moore was struck down. It is a picture for a great artist. Horse and rider as Charles Napier has described them. The rider watching eagerly the advance of his zealous battalions, whose arms, renewed throughout from the stores of Corunna, were driving the French before them much as men armed with modern weapons drive before them troops with old-fashioned muskets, he himself urging on the 42nd to join in Napier and Stanhope's success; Paget's reserve completely taking in flank the French committed to a premature attempt against a false flank; Spencer coming on in support. Triumph everywhere! visible to the keen eyes that knew war so well as to take in at a glance how not only was the French army tactically in his hand, but that their weapons, rusty with the long march through the mountain snows, their ammunition failing, his troops amply supplied, the enemy would soon be an unarmed crowd!

Escape for Soult was impossible with a raging torrent and only one bridge in his rear. Half-an-hour more and the long, weary marches would have been amply avenged. The guns that feebly insulted the embarkation next day would have been carried away as spoils of battle for future use.

Moore—his whole mind centred on the coming vindication of his long patience, on the triumphal accomplishment of an almost impossible task, hampered by those who could not understand him—sees before him the prize for which he has waited so long. A cannon-ball carries away his left shoulder and part of the collar-bone, leaving the arm hanging by the flesh. The violence of the stroke threw him off his horse on his back. Not a muscle of his face altered, nor did a sigh betray the least sensation of pain. So entirely were his thoughts absorbed in the coming triumph that in that supreme moment, though he knew and recognised at once that it was death that was before him, his eyes turned anxiously towards the 42nd Regiment. He was carried in a blanket to the rear, refusing to allow Hardinge to remove his sword, which was obviously inconveniencing him. Such was “the resolution and composure of his features” that Hardinge said to Moore that he could not believe that he would not recover. “Looking steadfastly at the wound for a few seconds, he said, ‘No, Hardinge, I feel that to be impossible.’” He made the soldiers turn him round frequently to view the battle. He said to his old friend Anderson—“Anderson, you know that I have always wished to die this way.”

As long as he had strength to do so, he made such arrangements as he could for those about him, and sent messages home, breaking down when he spoke of his mother. He took no steps to interfere with the command, which had fallen to Hope. Hope, though a most competent soldier, was not a Moore; and no man taking up a battle command at such a moment could fully realise the thought of the man he succeeded. So Moore’s orders were countermanded. Charles Napier

was wounded and made prisoner, and Stanhope killed instead of heading a triumphal march through Elvina. Paget and Spencer were stopped. What ought to have been one of the most crushing victories ever won, involving utter ruin for Soult's army, became a successful rearguard action, enabling the troops to be embarked.

The real triumph had been won long since—at Sahagun and Benevente. Undoubtedly, in order to make the inevitable sequel of that great stroke, the retreat on Corunna, one of the most successful operations known to us—to blot out the memory of the disorder which accompanied it, and to make clear to all men the wisdom of Moore's policy—a few more hours of his life were needed.

When the report first reached England a burst of enthusiasm greeted the news of the victory and of the hero's death. Canning, speaking in the House, declared of the advance on Sahagun—

“In this movement he acted as a statesman no less than as a soldier; because even though he might fail he must have gained an advantage for the south of Spain, whose exertions had never been relaxed, by drawing off the French army from Madrid and the prosecution of operations against the capital and the southern provinces.

“Every operation of that campaign had proved glorious for the character of the British army.

“If we had been obliged to quit Spain, we had left that country with fresh laurels blooming upon our brows.”

Public opinion is everywhere liable to sudden revulsion. The prodigious effect that had been produced by the little army upon the fate of Spain and of the world could not then be recognised. To understand the skill required for choosing the right point and the right moment for a diversion, and to realise

that a retreat might be more ruinous to an enemy than a dashing attack, required more knowledge of the movements of armies than can ever be general in England. The utter ruin that had fallen on all Napoleon's scheme for the crushing of Spain depended on the fact that armies cannot be swished about from one side of a theatre of war to another without dislocating all the arrangements that have been made for their feeding and supply, and for the combination of their several parts. All that the average man realises is the day of battle and the excitement of fight. To that Moore had only appealed at Corunna, and his death had made the appeal inadequate. The sufferings of the army involved in the retreat were soon realised, and more than realised.

The storm which scattered the ships which bore the returning army strewed the coast of England with the war-tried men. None excited more sympathy than the miserable wretches whom the Reserve, the real heroes, had kicked before them in contempt. Naturally none told their tale more piteously, or more carefully concealed the fact that their own drunken insubordination had been the cause of woe. A cry soon arose that the whole expedition had been a failure. Bending before the popular storm, with that sensitiveness to the public opinion of the hour, one of the defects of his qualities which is the common attribute of a great orator, Canning proposed to Castlereagh,¹ if Lady Castlereagh's evidence is to be accepted, to throw over Moore's reputation. It was this proposal which was answered by a shot in the famous duel. Lord Castlereagh's letter to the King explaining the causes of the duel has never been

¹ See the case stated in the "Life of Sir C. Napier," vol. i. p. 40.

published, but the King's answer, which has been frequently published, turns entirely on Moore, and so far corroborates Lady Castlereagh's assertion.

It was hardly possible for a Government which had approved every step that Moore had taken up to the advance on Sahagun to adopt with honour the position which Canning proposed, but Canning so far revenged himself as to leave among his followers, and especially with his secretary, Mr. Stapleton, an impression which has been the origin of most of the misconceptions of Moore. Those who admired the excellent qualities of John Hookham Frere were indignant that he and not Moore should have been the victim sacrificed to the popular misconception of the campaign. Frere's relation to Moore was, one hardly knows whether to say comically or pathetically, illustrated by the fact that it was at Corunna that Moore received a letter from Frere to say that he, who had known of Moore's movement before Napoleon did, and had asked for it only under the pledge of securing effective Spanish co-operation, had written to urge the Junta to urge somebody else, and that quite an interesting correspondence had taken place in consequence as to the propriety of operating so as to relieve the pressure on Moore.

Of the effect which his achievements had actually produced Moore could, in the nature of things, have no conception. How commonly since the world began has it been the fate of the man who, by great sacrifices, has done great services either to his country or the world, to see nothing of the fruits of his labours? No single step had been taken by any Spaniard which relieved the strain of his solitary struggle against the might of Napoleon. Yet everything had, as I have

shown (chap. xxviii.), not by the testimony of any "friends" of Moore, but by the evidence of those who felt the might of his arm, been completely changed. Then there followed the usual fate which attends great men. His words about the condition of Spain and the circumstances of Portugal, wholly true at the time he wrote them and according to the facts as he knew them, were thrown as a stumbling-block in the way of his great successor, Wellington.

Moore had prepared the way for Wellington. Soult's corps, though it had escaped destruction at Corunna by Moore's death, had been well-nigh ruined by the pursuit, as had also Ney's corps. Everywhere the Spaniards were forming into their guerilla bands, though they had not yet abandoned their miserable attempts at armies. Napoleon had gone. The marshals were squabbling. Beresford had begun to organise the Portuguese forces into some efficiency. Moore's movement had entirely staved off the invasion of Portugal and given time for the preparations of defence.

Everything was changed, and nothing more than this, that whereas Moore was sent on a campaign devised for him on evidence derived from popular impressions and the reports of credulous and vain men like Colonel Doyle, by a Cabinet at a distance and unfriendly to him, Wellington drew up his own instructions, carried out his own scheme, and had behind him a Cabinet at first of personal friends and afterwards of devoted adherents, who depended on his success for place and power.

I had intended to prove point by point how mistaken have been the attempts to show that in military matters, except in their practice of methods of organisation and

discipline, these two great soldiers were ever at issue. The subject is too large for me here, and the evidence I have given of their relations when they met in Portugal must suffice. Wellington went forwards to his glorious career; Moore's path of glory too quickly led to the grave. But across the whole vista of Wellington's triumphant campaigns all those whom he would have chosen, and did choose, as leaders of men, other than as mere tools, looked back to Moore as their great master — Colborne, Hope, Charles, William, and George Napier, Graham, Hardinge, Murray, and a host of others.¹

Nor do I believe that, as long as the British army contains the stuff that makes for the nation's honour, or the nation contains men who can recognise and admire what is great, noble, and true, there will ever be wanting those who will be fired by the spark of Moore's great example. It is not a career rouged and decked out for the applause of the gallery. Moore's was a part that may easily meet with the scorn of the moral groundlings. But as long as Britain is worthy of her great part there will always be left in her some among the best blood of her young men to whose charge, as to a body-guard, I may now commit the future reputation of Moore. Whether I have succeeded or failed in adequately setting the background for his self-portraiture I cannot tell. If they will trust me at all I can assure them of this, that if I have failed to make them recognise one who was great as a soldier, great as a patriot, and even greater as a man, one whom they, if they be worthy of him, will love in proportion as they come to know him,

¹ Some of whose names may be read in the long list of Moore's men in the *Oxfordshire Light Infantry Chronicle*, 1898, pp. 152-161.

the fault is mine. Let them take the work into their own hands, and when any of the many detractors, that will surely hereafter, as in the past, arise to belittle him, say of him the thing that is not, let them examine the facts, judge the truth, and avenge him of his adversaries.

APPENDIX

THE CAPTURED LETTER

A Monsieur le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie, commandant le 2 Corps d'Armée, a Salidana. Le V. Connétable, Major-Général.

“CHARMARTIN, le 10 Decembre, 1808.

“A MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL DUC DE DALMATIE,—

“J’ai lu a l’Empereur, Monsieur le Maréchal votre lettre du 4 Decembre, apportée par l’un de vos officiers; sa Majesté, Monsieur le Duc, approuve tout ce que vous avez fait. Le 8me Régiment de Dragons, le 22me de Chasseurs, le Régiment du Colonel Tascher, le Régiment Hanovrien, font quatre Régiments, formant deux Brigades commandées par les Généraux de Brigade de Belle et Franceschi: ces deux Brigades de Cavalerie sont sous vos ordres; et vous pouvez les faire manœuvrer comme il vous conviendra. L’Empereur pense qu’avec la Division Merle, avec la Division Mouton les 4 Régiments de troupes à cheval, vous n’avez rien qui puisse vous résister.

“Qu’avez vous a faire? Vous rendre maître de Léon, rejeter l’ennemi en Galice, vous emparer de Benavente et de Zamora; vous ne devez pas avoir d’Anglais devant vous, car quelques régiments sont venus a l’Escorial, à Salamanque, et tout porte a penser qu’il sont en pleine marche rétrograde: notre avant-garde est aujourd’hui à Talavera de la Reyna, sur la route de Badajos: elle sera bientôt sur cette ville. Vous sentez assez que ce mouvement (s’il ne l’a pas déjà fait) va forcer les Anglais à accourir sur Lisbonne. Au moment, Monsieur le Maréchal, que vous serez

certain, comme tout porte à le presumer qu'il n'y a pas d'Anglais devant vous, vous pouvez marcher droit et tête baissée; il n'y a rien en Espagnols qui puisse tenir contre vos deux divisions. Faites faire des souliers et des capottes à Léon, à St. Ander, à Palencia. Sa Majesté approuve toutes les demandes que vous ferez ayant pour but d'améliorer votre matériel; vous pouvez également requérir des mulets pour remonter votre artillerie, et des chevaux pour remonter votre cavalerie, en mettant dans tout cela les formes et tout ce qui tient à la bonne administration. Il est possible qu'aussitôt que la division de Dragons du Gén. Miller arrivera en Espagne, l'Empereur vous l'envoie; mais cette division ne sera pas en Espagne au moins de 15 jours. A la distance où vous vous trouvez de nous, Monsieur le Duc, vous ne pouvez vous conduire que par vous-même, et regarder tout ce que je vous écris à un si grand éloignement comme une direction générale.

"Sa Majesté pense que vous prenez toutes les mesures pour soumettre le pays entre le Duero, la Galice et les Asturies, en gardant toutesfois, et précieusement St. Ander. Le 5^{me} Corps, que commande le Maréchal Duc de Trevisé, a reçu l'ordre de se diriger sur Saragosse. Le 8^{me} corps aux ordres du Duc d'Abrantes, dont la 1^{re} Division arrive à Vitoria vers le 12, va vraisemblablement recevoir des ordres pour se réunir à Burgos. Des gabarres et des batiments de tout espèce, armés en guerre, ont l'ordre de se rendre à St. Ander; faites les charger de marchandise Anglaise saisie, de coton, de laine, d'artillerie, et qu'on les expédie sur France. Enfin, tenez Valladolid et Zamora dans la soumission: Valladolid est une bonne ville, et qui s'est bien conduite; on dit qu'il seroit très intéressant d'occuper Zamora. Enfin, Monsieur le Duc, l'Empereur pense que vous pouvez tout faire du moment que les Anglais seront retirés sur Lisbonne.

"Cinq divisions de Castanos, composées des meilleures troupes, ont été culbutées plus facilement encore que vous n'avez culbuté vous-même l'armée d'Andalousie à Burgos. Les débris de l'Armée de Castanos sont poursuivis par le Maréchal Bessières, qui leur a coupé la route d'Estramadure,

et qui les poursuit sur celle de Valence a plusieurs journées au delà du Tage. L'Empereur a son quartier général a Charmartin, petite campagne a une lieue et demie de Madrid; sa Majesté jouit de la meilleure santé. La ville de Madrid est très tranquille les boutiques sont ouvertes, les spectacles ont repris, et il ne parait pas que les premiers pourparlers ayant été appuyés de quatre mille coups de canon.

Le PRINCE DE NEUFCHATEL,
Major-Gencral.

“Je vous enverrai demain la proclamation et les arrêtés pris par l'Empereur; vous y reconnoîtrez celui fait pour commander a tout.”

